Jean Tirole | |
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![]() Tirole in 2019 | |
Born | Troyes, France | 9 August 1953
Academic career | |
Field | |
Institution | Toulouse 1 University Capitole Toulouse School of Economics Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales |
Alma mater | Massachusetts Institute of Technology Paris Dauphine University École nationale des ponts et chaussées École Polytechnique |
Doctoral advisor | Eric Maskin |
Doctoral students | Roland Bénabou |
Awards | John von Neumann Award (1998) BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award (2008) Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics (2014) Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (2014) |
Information at IDEAS / RePEc | |
Academic background | |
Thesis | Essays in economic theory (1981) |
Jean Tirole (born 9 August 1953) is a French economist who is currently a professor of economics at Toulouse 1 Capitole University. He focuses on industrial organization, game theory, banking and finance, and psychology. In particular, he focuses on the regulation of economic activity in a way that does not hinder innovation while maintaining fair rules. [1] Tirole's work is largely theoretical and explored in mathematical models, not empirical research.
In 2014, he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his analysis of market power and regulation. [2] [3]
Tirole received engineering degrees from the École Polytechnique in 1976, and from the École nationale des ponts et chaussées in 1978.
He was appointed a member of the elite Corps of Bridges, Waters and Forests, later completing graduate studies at Université Paris Dauphine; he received a DEA degree in 1976, and a Doctorat de troisième cycle in decision mathematics in 1978. He received a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1981, writing a thesis titled Essays in economic theory under the supervision of Eric Maskin. [4] [5]
He started thinking about studying economics when he was 21 years old, which he found both “very rigorous”, but at the same time “still a social science”. He said he found “a lot of that human aspect” in economics, which he found important. [6]
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Tirole is chairman of the board of the Jean-Jacques Laffont Foundation at the Toulouse School of Economics, and scientific director of the Industrial Economics Institute (IDEI) at Toulouse 1 University Capitole. After receiving his doctorate from MIT in 1981, he worked as a researcher at the École nationale des ponts et chaussées until 1984. From 1984–1991, he was a professor of economics at MIT. His work by 1988 helped to define modern industrial organization theory by organising and synthesising the main results of the game-theory revolution vis-à-vis understanding of non-competitive markets. [7]
From 1994 to 1996 he was a professor of economics at the École Polytechnique. Tirole was involved with Jean-Jacques Laffont in the project of creating a new School of Economics in Toulouse. He is Engineer General of the Corps of Bridges, Waters and Forests, Chair of the Board of the Toulouse School of Economics, and a visiting professor at MIT, and has been a professor "cumulant" at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales since 1995.
He was president of the Econometric Society in 1998 and of the European Economic Association in 2001. Around this time, he was able to determine a way to calculate the optimal prices for the regulation of natural monopolies and wrote a number of articles about the regulation of capital markets—with a focus on the differential of control between decentralised lenders and the centralised control of bank management. [7] Tirole has been a member of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques since 2011, the Conseil d'Analyse Économique since 2008 and the Conseil stratégique de la recherché since 2013. In the early 2010s, he showed that banks generally tend to take short-term risks and recommended a change in quantitative easing towards a more quality-based market stimulation policy. [7]
Tirole's textbook, The Theory of Industrial Organization, synthesised modern models of oligopolistic competition, analysing various cases where industries consist of a small number of firms with significant market power. He and Oliver Hart published a paper showing the conditions in which a vertical merger can result in foreclosure. [8] Rochet and Tirole analysed the implications of 2-sided markets for competition policy. [9] Fudenberg and Tirole also created a taxonomy of strategic effects in oligopolistic competition models. [10]
Tirole's 2014 Nobel Prize lecture was titled "The science of taming powerful firms" and explained his theories: [11]
Tirole was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2014 for his analysis of market power and the regulation of natural monopolies.
Tirole has also received:
He has also been a Sloan Research Fellow (1985) and a Guggenheim Fellow (1988). He was a fellow of the Econometric Society in 1986. He is a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1993) and of the American Economic Association (1993), and an Economic Theory Fellow (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory) since 2011. In 2013 Tirole was elected an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. [13]
He is among the most influential economists in the world according to IDEAS/RePEc. [14] Besides his numerous academic distinctions, he is a Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur since 2007 and an Officer in the Ordre national du Mérite since 2010.
Tirole has published about 200 professional articles in economics and finance, as well as 10 books, including The Theory of Industrial Organization, Game Theory (with Drew Fudenberg), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont), The Prudential Regulation of Banks (with Mathias Dewatripont), Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont), Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System, and The Theory of Corporate Finance. His research covers industrial organization, regulation, game theory, public economics, banking and finance, psychology and economics, international finance and macroeconomics.
An oligopoly is a market in which pricing control lies in the hands of a few sellers.
In economics, specifically general equilibrium theory, a perfect market, also known as an atomistic market, is defined by several idealizing conditions, collectively called perfect competition, or atomistic competition. In theoretical models where conditions of perfect competition hold, it has been demonstrated that a market will reach an equilibrium in which the quantity supplied for every product or service, including labor, equals the quantity demanded at the current price. This equilibrium would be a Pareto optimum.
In economics, industrial organization is a field that builds on the theory of the firm by examining the structure of firms and markets. Industrial organization adds real-world complications to the perfectly competitive model, complications such as transaction costs, limited information, and barriers to entry of new firms that may be associated with imperfect competition. It analyzes determinants of firm and market organization and behavior on a continuum between competition and monopoly, including from government actions.
X-inefficiency is a concept used in economics to describe instances where firms go through internal inefficiency resulting in higher production costs than required for a given output. This inefficiency can result from various factors, such as outdated technology, inefficient production processes, poor management, and lack of competition, and it results in lower profits for the inefficient firm(s) and higher prices for consumers. The concept of X-inefficiency was introduced by Harvey Leibenstein.
From a legal point of view, a contract is an institutional arrangement for the way in which resources flow, which defines the various relationships between the parties to a transaction or limits the rights and obligations of the parties.
A complete contract is an important concept from contract theory.
In economics, market power refers to the ability of a firm to influence the price at which it sells a product or service by manipulating either the supply or demand of the product or service to increase economic profit. In other words, market power occurs if a firm does not face a perfectly elastic demand curve and can set its price (P) above marginal cost (MC) without losing revenue. This indicates that the magnitude of market power is associated with the gap between P and MC at a firm's profit maximising level of output. The size of the gap, which encapsulates the firm's level of market dominance, is determined by the residual demand curve's form. A steeper reverse demand indicates higher earnings and more dominance in the market. Such propensities contradict perfectly competitive markets, where market participants have no market power, P = MC and firms earn zero economic profit. Market participants in perfectly competitive markets are consequently referred to as 'price takers', whereas market participants that exhibit market power are referred to as 'price makers' or 'price setters'.
Leapfrogging is a concept used in many domains of the economics and business fields, and was originally developed in the area of industrial organization and economic growth. The main idea behind the concept of leapfrogging is that small and incremental innovations lead a dominant firm to stay ahead. However, sometimes, radical innovations will permit new firms to leapfrog the ancient and dominant firm. The phenomenon can occur to firms but also to leadership of countries or cities, where a developing country can skip stages of the path taken by industrial nations, enabling them to catch up sooner, particularly in terms of economic growth.
Jean-Jacques Marcel Laffont was a French economist specializing in public economics and information economics. Educated at the University of Toulouse and the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique (ENSAE) in Paris, he was awarded PhD in economics by Harvard University in 1975.
Regulatory economics is the application of law by government or regulatory agencies for various economics-related purposes, including remedying market failure, protecting the environment and economic management.
Screening in economics refers to a strategy of combating adverse selection – one of the potential decision-making complications in cases of asymmetric information – by the agent(s) with less information.
Bengt Robert Holmström is a Finnish economist who is currently Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Together with Oliver Hart, he received the Central Bank of Sweden Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2016.
Mathias François Dewatripont is a Belgian economist and professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and visiting professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Catalyst Code: The Strategies Behind the World's Most Dynamic Companies is a book by Market Platform Dynamics founder David S. Evans and MIT economist Richard L. Schmalensee published in 2007.
In economics, profit is the difference between revenue that an economic entity has received from its outputs and total costs of its inputs, also known as surplus value. It is equal to total revenue minus total cost, including both explicit and implicit costs.
Frederic Michael Scherer is an American economist and expert on industrial organization. Since 2006, he continues as a professor of economics at the JFK School of Government at Harvard University.
Drew Fudenberg is a Professor of Economics at MIT. His research spans many aspects of game theory, including equilibrium theory, learning in games, evolutionary game theory, and many applications to other fields. Fudenberg was also one of the first to apply game theoretic analysis in industrial organization, bargaining theory, and contract theory. He has also authored papers on repeated games, reputation effects, and behavioral economics.
Toulouse School of Economics is a school of economics, affiliated with Toulouse 1 Capitole University, a constituent college of the Federal University of Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées. It is located in the city of Toulouse, France.
A Markov perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium concept in game theory. It has been used in analyses of industrial organization, macroeconomics, and political economy. It is a refinement of the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium to extensive form games for which a pay-off relevant state space can be identified. The term appeared in publications starting about 1988 in the work of economists Jean Tirole and Eric Maskin.
David Martimort is a French economist and Professor at the Toulouse School of Economics. Martimort is one of the most highly cited researchers in the field of contract theory. His research has been awarded the Best Young French Economist Award in 2004.