Conflict escalation

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Conflict escalation is the process by which conflicts grow in severity or scale over time. That may refer to conflicts between individuals or groups in interpersonal relationships, or it may refer to the escalation of hostilities in a political or military context. In systems theory, the process of conflict escalation is modeled by positive feedback. Conflict escalation can be modeled with game theory. [1] In contrast, de-escalation are approaches which lead to a decrease or end of a conflict. [2]

Contents

While the word escalation was used as early as in 1938, it was popularized during the Cold War by two important books: On Escalation (Herman Kahn, 1965) and Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Bernard Brodie, 1966). [3] In those contexts, it especially referred to war between two major states with weapons of mass destruction during the Cold War.

Conflict escalation has a tactical role in military conflict and is often formalized with explicit rules of engagement. Highly-successful military tactics exploit a particular form of conflict escalation such as by controlling an opponent's reaction time, which allows the tactician to pursue or trap his opponent. Both Napoleon Bonaparte and Heinz Guderian advocated that approach. Sun Tzu elaborated it in a more abstract form and maintained that military strategy was about minimizing escalation and diplomacy was about eliminating it.

Continuum of force

The United States Marine Corps' "Continuum of Force" (found in MCRP 3-02B)[ clarification needed ] documents the stages of conflict escalation in combat for a typical subject:

Level 1: Compliant (cooperative)

The subject responds to and obeys verbal commands. He refrains from close combat.

Level 2: Resistant (passive)

The subject resists verbal commands but complies to commands immediately upon contact controls. He refrains from close combat.

Level 3: Resistant (active)

Initially, the subject physically resists commands, but he can be made to comply by compliance techniques, including come-along holds, soft-handed stunning blows, and techniques inducing pain by joint manipulation and pressure points.

Level 4: Assaultive (bodily harm)

The unarmed subject physically attacks his opponent. He can be controlled by certain defensive tactics, including blocks, strikes, kicks, enhanced pain compliance procedures, impact weapon blocks, and blows.

Level 5: Assaultive (lethal force)

The subject has a weapon and will likely kill or injure someone unless he is controlled. That is possible only by lethal force, which possibly requires firearms or weapons. This could also include the subject physically overpowering someone and choking them out, which will cause injury or death if sustained for a long period of time.

International relations

Conflict escalation forecasts have been increasing in reliability. [4] Asymmetric warfare can in some situations lead to persistent conflict escalation. [5] A Fait accompli can result in rewards for short periods of conflict escalation. [6] Appeasement can in some situations lead to conflict escalation. [7] Overconfidence in escalation control can potentially lead to further conflict escalation including nuclear escalation. [8]

See also

Related Research Articles

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Conventional warfare is a form of warfare conducted by using conventional weapons and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation. The forces on each side are well-defined and fight by using weapons that target primarily the opponent's military. It is normally fought by using conventional weapons, not chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear warfare</span> Military conflict that deploys nuclear weaponry

Nuclear warfare, also known as atomic warfare, is a military conflict or prepared political strategy that deploys nuclear weaponry. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction; in contrast to conventional warfare, nuclear warfare can produce destruction in a much shorter time and can have a long-lasting radiological result. A major nuclear exchange would likely have long-term effects, primarily from the fallout released, and could also lead to secondary effects, such as "nuclear winter", nuclear famine, and societal collapse. A global thermonuclear war with Cold War-era stockpiles, or even with the current smaller stockpiles, may lead to various scenarios including the human extinction.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mutual assured destruction</span> Doctrine of military strategy

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy which posits that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by an attacker on a nuclear-armed defender with second-strike capabilities would result in the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of rational deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Asymmetric warfare</span> A war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly

Asymmetric warfare is a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy or tactics differ significantly. This type of warfare often, but not necessarily, involves insurgents, terrorist groups or resistance militias who may have the status of unlawful combatants against a standing army.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear utilization target selection</span>

Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS) is a hypothesis regarding the use of nuclear weapons often contrasted with mutually assured destruction (MAD). NUTS theory at its most basic level asserts that it is possible for a limited nuclear exchange to occur and that nuclear weapons are simply one more rung on the ladder of escalation pioneered by Herman Kahn. This leads to a number of other conclusions regarding the potential uses of and responses to nuclear weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Brinkmanship</span> Political and military tactic

Brinkmanship or brinksmanship is the practice of trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the brink of active conflict. The maneuver of pushing a situation with the opponent to the brink succeeds by forcing the opponent to back down and make concessions rather than risk engaging in a conflict that would no longer be beneficial to either side. That might be achieved through diplomatic maneuvers, by creating the impression that one is willing to use extreme methods rather than concede. The tactic occurs in international politics, foreign policy, labor relations, contemporary military strategy, terrorism, and high-stakes litigation.

The game of chicken, also known as the hawk-dove game or snowdrift game, is a model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while the ideal outcome is for one player to yield, individuals try to avoid it out of pride, not wanting to look like "chickens." Each player taunts the other to increase the risk of shame in yielding. However, when one player yields, the conflict is avoided, and the game essentially ends.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deterrence theory</span> Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons

Deterrence theory refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats of using force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some other course of action. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to but distinct from the concept of mutual assured destruction, according to which a full-scale nuclear attack on a power with second-strike capability would devastate both parties. The central problem of deterrence revolves around how to credibly threaten military action or nuclear punishment on the adversary despite its costs to the deterrer. Deterrence in an international relations context is the application of deterrence theory to avoid conflict.

Decapitation is a military strategy aimed at removing the leadership or command and control of a hostile government or group.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Military exercise</span> Employment of military resources for training

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De-escalation refers to the methods and actions taken to decrease the severity of a conflict, whether of physical, verbal or another nature. It is the opposite of escalation. De-escalation may also refer to approaches in conflict resolution, by which specific measures are taken to avoid behaviours that escalate conflict. De-escalation can be modelled with game theory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Peace and conflict studies</span> A subject in social science

Peace and conflict studies is a social science field that identifies and analyzes violent and nonviolent behaviors as well as the structural mechanisms attending conflicts, to understand those processes which lead to a more desirable human condition. A variation on this, peace studies, is an interdisciplinary effort aiming at the prevention, de-escalation, and solution of conflicts by peaceful means, based on achieving conflict resolution and dispute resolution at the international and domestic levels based on positive sum, rather than negative sum, solutions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Second strike</span> Response to a powerful first nuclear strike

In nuclear strategy, a retaliatory strike or second-strike capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. To have such an ability is considered vital in nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the other side might attempt to try to win a nuclear war in one massive first strike against its opponent's own nuclear forces.

Pain compliance is the use of painful stimulus to control or direct an organism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tactical nuclear weapon</span> Nuclear weapon designed for use on a battlefield

A tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) or non-strategic nuclear weapon (NSNW) is a nuclear weapon that is designed to be used on a battlefield in military situations, mostly with friendly forces in proximity and perhaps even on contested friendly territory. Generally smaller in explosive power, they are defined in contrast to strategic nuclear weapons, which are designed mostly to be targeted at the enemy interior far away from the war front against military bases, cities, towns, arms industries, and other hardened or larger-area targets to damage the enemy's ability to wage war. As of 2024, no tactical nuclear weapons have ever been used in combat.

In nuclear strategy, countervalue is the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations. Counterforce is the targeting of an opponent's military forces and facilities. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., records the first use of the word in 1660 and the first use in the modern sense in 1965 in which it is described as a "euphemism for attacking cities".

In nuclear strategy, a counterforce target is one that has a military value, such as a launch silo for intercontinental ballistic missiles, an airbase at which nuclear-armed bombers are stationed, a homeport for ballistic missile submarines, or a command and control installation.

Broken-backed war theory is a form of conflict that could happen after a massive nuclear exchange. Assuming that all participants have not been annihilated, there may arise a scenario unique to military strategy and theory, one in which all or some of the parties involved strive to continue fighting until the other side is completely defeated.

Compellence is a form of coercion that attempts to get an actor to change its behavior through threats to use force or the actual use of limited force. Compellence can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."

References

  1. Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc (1987). "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis". The American Political Science Review. 81 (3): 833–850. doi:10.2307/1962679. JSTOR   1962679.
  2. Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. "Rational Deescalation." (1985).
  3. Freedman, Lawrence (1993). The evolution of nuclear strategy (2nd ed.). New York: St Martin's press. pp. 198–199. ISBN   0-312-02843-1.
  4. Hegre, Håvard; Metternich, Nils W.; Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv; Wucherpfennig, Julian (2017). "Introduction". Journal of Peace Research. 54 (2): 113–124. doi: 10.1177/0022343317691330 .
  5. Langlois, Jean-Pierre P.; Langlois, Catherine C. (2005). "Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence". International Studies Quarterly. 49 (3): 503–528. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00375.x.
  6. Tarar, Ahmer (2016). "A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli". International Studies Quarterly. 60 (4): 742–752. doi:10.1093/isq/sqw018.
  7. McKeil, Aaron (2021-07-09). "The Limits of Realism after Liberal Hegemony". Journal of Global Security Studies. 7: ogab020. doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogab020 . ISSN   2057-3170.
  8. Larsen, Even Hellan (21 Feb 2024). "Escaping Paralysis: Strategies for Countering Asymmetric Nuclear Escalation". Security Studies: 1–37. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2024.2311106 . ISSN   0963-6412.