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Nuclear escalation is the concept of a large conflict escalating from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an intergovernmental military alliance. Because three of its members (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) are nuclear powers, the alliance also serves as a nuclear power. NATO was formed during the Cold War to provide security for its member states and assure mutual destruction with the Soviet Union. While three of NATO's member states are armed with nuclear weapons, the United States has the largest nuclear arsenal. [1]
Though NATO had policies regarding the escalation surrounding nuclear war, they did not take effect until the late 1950s. This was because, while the Soviet Union lacked intercontinental ballistic missiles and other long-range missiles to threaten the United States directly, the US had stationed missile launchers within European NATO member states. This gave the US an advantage should nuclear war commence. [2] After this period, however, the Soviet Union could amass a large enough atomic stockpile to target the US effectively. As the US would be met with a similar or more significant atomic threat than they posed to the Soviet Union, they introduced the NATO response policy of "massive retaliation," which focused on the commitment to retaliate with a greater force than they had been attacked with. [3]
Because of the geographical position of European nations, they would quickly become involved in any war between superpowers, even if it did not originate in Europe. The possible conflict between members of the Soviet Union-led-Warsaw Pact and members of the United States led-NATO would likely escalate from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare. As most of Europe was involved in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, they would be engulfed in any war that arose from a conflict between the two. This made European NATO member states a target if the Cold War escalated into a nuclear war. [4]
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NATO has several policies that are used to prevent nuclear escalation and nuclear war in NATO territory. The first policy, horizontal escalation, involves attempting to relocate the war to an area outside the European continent. [5] [6] The second policy, temporal escalation, consists of prolonging conventional warfare until neither side can continue the war effort, causing a stalemate. However, as seen in wars similar to World War II, wars can last several years and still involve nuclear weaponry.[ citation needed ] Surprise escalation, the third policy, involves attempting to prevent the opposing nation from initiating a nuclear war. [ citation needed ]
NATO began to evolve from its previous policies and devise a plan suggested to it by the United States called "flexible response." [7] By NATO reasoning in the face of an all-out USSR invasion of Europe, the U.S. still guaranteed strategic help, and a USSR invasion, would upset the balance of world powers and force the U.S. to enter due to its many international interests that would be jeopardized.
The ‘Flexible response’ policy laid out a plan for NATO to develop a capacity to respond to any form of USSR aggression without help from the U.S. until all forms of action were taken: battlefield, conventional, theater, or Nuclear weapons. [8] European NATO members quickly let known the great cost required for the ‘flexible position,’ which is what they were avoiding in the 1950s when the proposal for a large ground force for NATO had been suggested. [8]
The ‘Flexible Response’ policy was met with doubt from some Europeans. The U.S. guaranteed the defense of NATO nations if NATO battlefield strategy and theater strategy failed in the face of an attack from the USSR. Still, some Europeans contended that the intermediate steps of 'Flexible Response' were superfluous. [9]
The Europeans who raised this argument believed that the previous 'massive retaliation' stance, in which the U.S. was more than willing to respond to any attack with nuclear weapons if the USSR even thought about attacking any NATO member, was the better course of action due to it unfolding from a small conflict to a war of two superpowers. [9] These doubts within the smaller NATO countries would come to fruition when France quit believing in the past NATO ideology that heralded the U.S. as a martyr in which they would engulf their entire country in the war for its allies in Europe. This led to the creation of France's nuclear defense program, and France would withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure. [10]
In 1967 NATO officially accepted the doctrine of ‘Flexible Response,’ but the European members' anxieties towards it were exacerbated by changing how the policy was implemented. The first proposed change was to create a larger conventional standing force; if destroyed, the U.S. would respond in kind to the USSR with nuclear weapons. This change was not fully implemented. NATO did not increase its conventional force size, and by not doing so, it retained a meager standing military that could be annihilated by the USSR in moments. After the Europeans amalgamated this policy, it allowed them to retain the previous defense employed. NATO forces were insignificant, but the U.S. nuclear might was superior, creating the deterrence they sought at the time. [11] To further increase deterrence, NATO adopted dual capable missile systems, such as 155mm artillery. It allowed for either a conventional payload or a nuclear one. This was not done only for the simplicity of ordnance but as a sign of any USSR aggression that they were prepared to use nuclear weapons given to them. [12]
NATO had a good foundation of nuclear weapons provided by the U.S. and a small amount by Britain.[ citation needed ] They possessed 1,081 155mm artillery, 319 203 mm artillery, 90 Lance missiles, 91 Honest John missiles, and 180 Pershing 1A missiles that were all nuclear-capable with allocated nuclear payloads. In 1974 France created the Pluton, an all-French tactical missile, and made it available to NATO. It was a fully mobile, accurate missile capable of delivering a 25-kiloton bomb for attacking rear areas or a smaller 15-kiloton bomb designed to destroy advancing troops. [13] By 1981, over 30 Pluton units were deployed, with available reloads accompanying them throughout Europe. [13] NATO's battlefield deterrence was not the bulk of its later capabilities in the 1980s. NATO also possessed many nuclear-capable aircraft that could be used in multiple roles, nuclear and non-nuclear, within a conflict. [14]
The solution to a nuclear escalation in international diplomacy lies in a concerted approach rooted in transparency, dialogue, and the establishment of universally acceptable norms. In this respect, bilateral and multilateral discussions present a promising avenue. These should aim not only at disarmament but also at regulating nuclear capabilities, fostering transparency in states' nuclear programs, and facilitating confidence-building measures. Regular dialogue can help reduce suspicion and foster a sense of security among nations, potentially diminishing the perceived need for nuclear arsenals as a deterrent strategy. Similarly, such dialogues should tackle issues such as the modernization of nuclear weapons and the regulation of emerging technologies with nuclear implications, as these factors can contribute significantly to nuclear escalation. [15]
At the same time, international instruments, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), can be further strengthened and more effectively enforced to address the issue of nuclear escalation. The involvement of international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can be instrumental in verifying compliance with these treaties and in providing a platform for dialogue among nations. Notably, nuclear and non-nuclear states must work together toward the common goal of nuclear disarmament. This includes acknowledging and addressing the concerns of non-nuclear states, thus creating an environment conducive to cooperation and shared security. Lastly, education and public awareness of nuclear weapons' catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences could also play a pivotal role in creating a global consensus against atomic escalation.
Nuclear warfare, also known as atomic warfare, is a military conflict or prepared political strategy that deploys nuclear weaponry. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction; in contrast to conventional warfare, nuclear warfare can produce destruction in a much shorter time and can have a long-lasting radiological result. A major nuclear exchange would likely have long-term effects, primarily from the fallout released, and could also lead to secondary effects, such as "nuclear winter", nuclear famine, and societal collapse. A global thermonuclear war with Cold War-era stockpiles, or even with the current smaller stockpiles, may lead to various scenarios including the extinction of the human species.
In nuclear strategy, a first strike or preemptive strike is a preemptive surprise attack employing overwhelming force. First strike capability is a country's ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation while the opposing side is left unable to continue war. The preferred methodology is to attack the opponent's strategic nuclear weapon facilities, command and control sites, and storage depots first. The strategy is called counterforce.
Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy which posits that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by an attacker on a nuclear-armed defender with second-strike capabilities would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of rational deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.
Nuclear strategy involves the development of doctrines and strategies for the production and use of nuclear weapons.
In nuclear ethics and deterrence theory, no first use (NFU) refers to a type of pledge or policy wherein a nuclear power formally refrains from the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in warfare, except for as a second strike in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using WMD. Such a pledge would allow for a unique state of affairs in which a given nuclear power can be engaged in a conflict of conventional weaponry while it formally forswears any of the strategic advantages of nuclear weapons, provided the enemy power does not possess or utilize any such weapons of their own. The concept is primarily invoked in reference to nuclear mutually assured destruction but has also been applied to chemical and biological warfare, as is the case of the official WMD policy of India.
Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS) is a hypothesis regarding the use of nuclear weapons often contrasted with mutually assured destruction (MAD). NUTS theory at its most basic level asserts that it is possible for a limited nuclear exchange to occur and that nuclear weapons are simply one more rung on the ladder of escalation pioneered by Herman Kahn. This leads to a number of other conclusions regarding the potential uses of and responses to nuclear weapons.
World War III and the Third World War are names given to a hypothetical worldwide large-scale military conflict subsequent to World War I and World War II. The term has been in use since at least as early as 1941. Some apply it loosely to limited or more minor conflicts such as the Cold War or the war on terror. In contrast, others assume that such a conflict would surpass prior world wars in both scope and destructive impact.
Brinkmanship or brinksmanship is the practice of trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the brink of active conflict. The maneuver of pushing a situation with the opponent to the brink succeeds by forcing the opponent to back down and make concessions rather than risk engaging in a conflict that would no longer be beneficial to either side. That might be achieved through diplomatic maneuvers, by creating the impression that one is willing to use extreme methods rather than concede. The tactic occurs in international politics, foreign policy, labor relations, contemporary military strategy, terrorism, and high-stakes litigation.
Canada has not officially maintained and possessed weapons of mass destruction since 1984 and, as of 1998, has signed treaties repudiating possession of them. Canada ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1930 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970.
Deterrence theory refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats or limited force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some other course of action. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to but distinct from the concept of mutual assured destruction, according to which a full-scale nuclear attack on a power with second-strike capability would devastate both parties. The central problem of deterrence revolves around how to credibly threaten military action or nuclear punishment on the adversary despite its costs to the deterrer.
The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was the United States' general plan for nuclear war from 1961 to 2003. The SIOP gave the President of the United States a range of targeting options, and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched. The plan integrated the capabilities of the nuclear triad of strategic bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The SIOP was a highly classified document, and was one of the most secret and sensitive issues in U.S. national security policy.
Massive retaliation, also known as a massive response or massive deterrence, is a military doctrine and nuclear strategy in which a state commits itself to retaliate in much greater force in the event of an attack.
Flexible response was a defense strategy implemented by John F. Kennedy in 1961 to address the Kennedy administration's skepticism of Dwight Eisenhower's New Look and its policy of massive retaliation. Flexible response calls for mutual deterrence at strategic, tactical, and conventional levels, giving the United States the capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of war, not limited only to nuclear arms.
Able Archer 83 was the annual NATO Able Archer exercise conducted in November 1983. The purpose for the command post exercise, like previous years, was to simulate a period of conflict escalation, culminating in the US military attaining a simulated DEFCON 1 coordinated nuclear attack. The five-day exercise, which involved NATO commands throughout Western Europe, was coordinated from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters in Casteau, Belgium.
Bernard Brodie was an American military strategist well known for establishing the basics of nuclear strategy. Known as "the American Clausewitz," and "the original nuclear strategist," he was an initial architect of nuclear deterrence strategy and tried to ascertain the role and value of nuclear weapons after their creation.
The New Look was the name given to the national security policy of the United States during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. It reflected Eisenhower's concern for balancing the Cold War military commitments of the United States with the nation's financial resources. The policy emphasised reliance on strategic nuclear weapons as well as a reorganisation of conventional forces in an effort to deter potential threats, both conventional and nuclear, from the Eastern Bloc of nations headed by the Soviet Union.
A strategic nuclear weapon (SNW) refers to a nuclear weapon that is designed to be used on targets often in settled territory far from the battlefield as part of a strategic plan, such as military bases, military command centers, arms industries, transportation, economic, and energy infrastructure, and heavily populated areas such as cities and towns, which often contain such targets. It is in contrast to a tactical nuclear weapon, which is designed for use in battle as part of an attack with and often near friendly conventional forces, possibly on contested friendly territory.
The "nuclear umbrella" is a guarantee by a nuclear weapons state to defend a non-nuclear allied state. The context is usually the security alliances of the United States with Japan, South Korea, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Those alliances were formed because of the Cold War and the Soviet Union. For some countries, it was an alternative to acquiring nuclear weapons themselves; other alternatives include regional nuclear-weapon-free zones or nuclear sharing.
The "Schlesinger Doctrine" is the name, given by the press, to a major re-alignment of United States nuclear strike policy that was announced in January 1974 by the US Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger. It outlined a broad selection of counterforce options against a wide variety of potential enemy actions, a major change from earlier SIOP policies of the Kennedy and Johnson eras that focused on Mutually Assured Destruction and typically included only one or two "all-out" plans of action that used the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal in a single strike. A key element of the new plans were a variety of limited strikes solely against enemy military targets while ensuring the survivability of the U.S. second-strike capability, which was intended to leave an opening for a negotiated settlement.
The Nuclear Planning Group was established in December 1966 to allow better communication, consultation and involvement among NATO member nations to deal with matters related to nuclear policy issues. During the period of the Cold War, NATO members recognized the need for incorporation of nuclear weapons as part of their defense strategy. Because of the lack of information sharing caused by restrictive US nuclear information sharing policy, many attempts were made to increase US-NATO communication and information sharing in relation to nuclear weapons such as the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, the US-NATO Information Agreement, and the proposal of the Multilateral Force (MLF). Eventually, the Nuclear Planning Group was established as a finalized effort to deal with nuclear information sharing issues. There are three main levels to the Nuclear Planning Group. These are the ministerial level of the Nuclear Planning Group, the Permanent Representatives Group, and the Staff Group. In addition, the High-Level Group is a closely related organization that works in an advisory manner with the Nuclear Planning Group. Deliberations upon agenda topics will begin from the Staff Group level and eventually ascend to the ministerial level. The Nuclear Planning Group consists of all NATO members with the exception of France. Overall, the Nuclear Planning Group has created policy guidelines for nuclear-related topics while seeking to minimize the threat of nuclear conflict.
