China and weapons of mass destruction

People's Republic of China
First nuclear weapon test	October 16, 1964
First thermonuclear weapon test	December 28, 1966
Last nuclear test	July 29, 1996
Largest yield test	4 Mt Atmospheric – 4 Mt (November 17, 1976) Underground – 660~1,000 kt (May 21, 1992)
Current stockpile	600 (estimated) [1] [2] [3]
Maximum missile range	15,000 km [4]
NPT party	Yes (1992, one of five recognized powers)

The People's Republic of China has possessed nuclear weapons since 1964. It was the last to develop them of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984, ^[5] acceded to the NPT in 1992, ^[6] and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. ^[7]

China tested its first nuclear bomb in 1964 and its first full-scale thermonuclear bomb in 1967. It carried out 45 nuclear tests before signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996.

The Federation of American Scientists and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimate China's stockpile at approximately 600 nuclear warheads as of 2025 ^[update] , ^{[8] [3] [9]} making it the third-largest in the world. It is the only NPT nuclear-weapon state significantly expanding its arsenal, which has doubled since 2019, ^[10] and is projected to reach between 750 and 1,500 warheads by 2035, although it has not restarted fissile material production. Unlike the US and Russia, nearly all Chinese warheads are believed to be in central storage, separate from their delivery system. ^[8]

Since 2020, the People's Liberation Army has operated a nuclear triad. ^[11] Of its 600 warheads, it is estimated 376 are assigned to its Rocket Force's Dongfeng intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles, 72 to its Navy's Julang-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles on six Type 094 submarines, and 20 to its Air Force's Jinglei-1 air-launched ballistic missiles on Xi'an H-6N strategic bombers. A remaining 132 warheads await assignment. China is upgrading its triad with the in-development Xi'an H-20 stealth bomber, Type 096 submarine, and a transition towards missile silo fields. ^[8]

In 1964, China adopted a policy of no-first-use (NFU) and called for an international NFU treaty, ^{[12] [13]} both of which it continues to renew. ^{[14] [15]} Some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture in the early 2020s. ^{[16] [17]}

China denies current offensive chemical and biological weapons programs, while the US alleges it is not in compliance with treaty obligations. ^[18] In its declaration to the OPCW, China claimed it destroyed its three chemical weapon production facilities and stockpile. ^[19]

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Imperial Japanese Army's biological warfare department, led by Unit 731, dispersed anthrax, cholera, dysentery, typhoid, plague, and other pathogens, killing between 200,000 and 500,000 people. Japanese forces also used chemical weapons including lewisite and mustard gas, causing over 90,000 deaths or casualties. Some 700,000 to 2 million Japanese chemical weapons were abandoned in China, with less than 100,000 recovered as of 2023 ^[update] . ^{[20] [21]}

Nuclear weapons

History

This section is an excerpt from Nuclear weapons of China § History.[ edit ]

Pre-program

Mao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce. ^{[22] : 44} In 1946 comments to American journalist Anne Louise Strong, he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon." ^{[23] : 9–10}

During the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration pursued the New Look policy through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force. ^{[23] : 11} U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed to Guam in 1951, Japan in 1954, the Philippines in 1957, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1958, and in 1962, UK nuclear weapons were deployed to Singapore. ^[24] Some scholars write that the Eisenhower administration's threats during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program. ^{[25] : 89–90} Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means." ^{[22] : 44–45}

As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's position within the Eastern Bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao. The CCP subsequently traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. The Agreement on New Technology for National Defence was later signed in October 1957, which promised Soviet support for Chinese development of nuclear weapons. ^[26]

Mao's attitude toward nuclear weapons sometimes strained relations with the Soviet Union, which regarded his statements as cavalier, particularly his 1955 assertion that: ^{[23] : 11}

The Chinese people are not to be cowed by US atomic blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometers. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs. Even if the US atom bombs were so powerful that, when dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even blow it up, that would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, though it might be a major event for the solar system.

Soviet cooperation

Lanzhou enrichment plant imaged by a US KH-7 Gambit satellite in 1966.

In July 1954, one Soviet expert began working with the Chinese on uranium ore exploration. In 1955, the Soviet Union began the granting of student visas for nuclear physics courses to Chinese students. Qian Sanqiang, Jiang Nanxiang, and Yu Wen selected 350 students to study in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, in benefit of Chinese nuclear research. From 1955, the two countries began signing nuclear-related treaties, and in October 1957, concluded the "New Defense Technical Accord", which allowed for nuclear-weapons technology transfer, including a model of a Soviet atomic bomb and two R-2 theatre ballistic missiles. ^[27]

Construction of a uranium refinement plant in Baotou and enrichment plant in Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production. In return, China exported raw uranium ore to the USSR. ^{[28] [29] [30]}

Scholar Jeffrey Lewis noted in China's 1958 nuclear program guidelines its explicit rejection of tactical nuclear weapons and view of nuclear weapons as primarily political tools influencing the decision towards a small strategic arsenal. ^[31]

In 1958, Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy of peaceful coexistence. Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation, ^[32] and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program. ^{[33] : 12, 53, 61} As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb. ^[29]

Independent program

The mushroom cloud from Project 596, China's first nuclear test, Lop Nur, 1964.

Celebration of the fourth Chinese nuclear test, launched on a Dongfeng-2 missile, Tiananmen Square, October 1966.

The reactor site near Jiuquan for plutonium production, imaged by a US KH-7 Gambit satellite in 1966.

In July 1960, all Soviet advisers were withdrawn from the Lanzhou enrichment plant, at the time China's only active project for a fissile material production. ^{[33] : 121}

In mid-1961, a heightened factional debate threatened the termination of the nuclear prorgam. The debate was influenced by the Great Leap Forward's Great Chinese Famine, the withdrawal of Soviet advisers, Sino-Indian border tensions, and increased American forces in the Vietnam War. Against the nuclear weapons establishment, a group representing the defense establishment, led by Marshal He Long and Grand General Luo Ruiqing, pushed for its termination, to redirect its large expenses towards conventional weapons. A key issue was the Maoist military doctrine of people's war. The Central Military Commission reaffirmed Mao's statements that "weapons are important elements of war, but they are not decisive", and that "the physical atomic bomb is important, but the spiritual atomic bomb is more important." ^{[33] : 128-130}

At a series of senior leadership meetings, the nuclear weapons establishment emerged on top, with a resolution to accelerate its work ahead of schedule. Marshal Nie Rongzhen presented existing achievements of the nuclear program, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi added "at present I still do not have adequate backup. If you succeed in producing the atomic bomb and guided missiles, then I can straighten my back." ^{[33] : 128-130}

In 1961, Premier Zhou Enlai articulated China's rationale for its conventional and nuclear military strategies, stating, "Once we have missiles and nuclear weapons, we can then prevent the use of missiles and nuclear weapons; if we don't have missiles, the imperialists can use missiles. But to face combat, we still need conventional weapons." ^{[34] : 74}

According to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director William Foster, the American government, under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was concerned about China's nuclear program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested. China conducted its first nuclear test, code-named 596, on 16 October 1964. ^{[35] [30]} It was an implosion design, with a spherical core of highly enriched uranium, ^[29] produced by the Lanzhou plant. ^[36]

In 1966, Chinese leadership established a new branch of the People's Liberation Army, the Second Artillery, to operate nuclear missiles. ^{[34] : 75}

Project 639, China's first megaton-range thermonuclear weapon test, June 1967.

In late 1965, Chinese physicists developed a Teller-Ulam design equivalent for thermonuclear weapons. On May 9, 1966, China carried out the 596L nuclear test, of a layer cake design, a type of boosted fission weapon. China's first multi-stage thermonuclear weapon test, "629", occurred with a tower shot on December 28, 1966, at a demonstration yield of 120 kt. ^[29] A more powerful hydrogen bomb was air-drop tested at 3.3 Mt in the Project 639 test on June 17, 1967. ^{[29] [37]} This was the test announced by the People's Daily and interpreted internationally as China's first hydrogen bomb test. ^{[38] [39]} The test was planned for October 1, but was moved after project leader Peng Huanwu speculated France may test a hydrogen bomb before then. The mentality of outpacing France's program influenced the assembly of the 639 device amid the fervor of the Cultural Revolution. ^[38]

China shifted from highly enriched uranium to plutonium weapons beginning with its eighth nuclear test, codenamed "524", also at 3 Mt, on December 27, 1968. ^{[40] [41]} It subsequently focused on weapon miniaturization, for missile warheads, and for delivery by fighter instead of bomber. ^{[42] [43] [44]}

In 1969, following the border conflict Battle of Zhenbao Island in March, the USSR considered a massive nuclear attack on China, targeting cities and nuclear facilities. It made military activity in the Russian Far East, and informed its allies and the United States of this potential attack. The Chinese government and archives were evacuated from Beijing while the People's Liberation Army scattered from its bases. The crisis abated when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the Soviet Union that an attack on China would be met by a US nuclear attack on 130 Soviet cities. ^{[45] [46] [47]} This threat of attack lead to the development of the Kuangbiao-1 tactical nuclear bomb, which could be delivered against invading Soviet tank columns by Nanchang Q-5 ground-attack fighters instead of Xi'an H-6 bombers. ^{[42] [43] [44]}

Despite the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty concluded by the US, UK, and USSR, China, alongside France, continued atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1960s and 1970s. China conducted its first underground nuclear test in 1969. ^[48] It tested its first boosted fission weapon in 1971. ^[49] In 1980, China conducted the most recent atmospheric nuclear test in the world, at between 200 kt to 1 Mt, possibly using a missile. ^[50]

After moving to underground testing in the 1980s and 1990s, China developed advanced and miniaturized nuclear weapons. Tests between 1982 and 1988 developed a neutron bomb, which was ultimately not deployed. ^[51] In 1992, a two-point implosion aspherical primary was first tested. China was accused using espionage, most notably in the Cox Report, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to acquire the US W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile technology. ^{[52] [53] [54] [55]} Details of US intelligence on Chinese nuclear weapons were released in the US press surrounding the Cox Report and abortive trial of Wen Ho Lee. ^[49] In July 1970, a JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile mockup underwent water-drop tests from a crane on the Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge. On 7 October 1982, the JL-1 was first tested at sea, launched from a Golf-class submarine, and experienced an attitude control failure, self-destructing. ^[56] On 12 October 1982, the JL-1 was successfully test-launched from a submarine. ^[57] The Chinese submarine Changzheng 6, designed as the country's first ballistic missile submarine and deployed to Jianggezhuang Naval Base, is not believed to have conducted any patrols with nuclear weapons on board, ^[58] but conducted its first successful test-launch of a JL-1 on 27 September 1988. ^[59]

In 1982, Deng Xiaoping initiated transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, including the design of the simple "548" codenamed highly enriched uranium implosion bomb. This design was first tested by China in its fourth nuclear test in 1966, mated to a Dongfeng 2 missile. A Pakistani derivative of the device was tested in China in 1990. China is also believed to have conducted "hydronuclear" possibly subcritical testing for France in the 1990s. ^[48] China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996. ^[60] In September 1996, China signed but did not ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to enter into force. ^[61]

During the Cold War, China relied on concealment of its nuclear forces as the primary mechanism for their survivability. ^{[34] : 113} Beginning in 1996, China has increasingly relied on the mobility of its land-based nuclear forces as a means of survivability. ^{[34] : 113}

21st century

DF-61 ICBMs on display during the 2025 China Victory Day Parade.

On 1 January 2016, the Second Artillery Corps was renamed to the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force. ^{[62] [63]} Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation of People's Liberation Army Navy ballistic-missile submarines came under PLARF control. ^{[64] [65]}

In November 2024, China conducted its first joint patrol with its nuclear-capable Xi'an H-6N bomber and a Russian Tupolev Tu-95MS over the Sea of Japan. ^[66] China had previously conducted eight joint flights of its Xi'an H-6K non-nuclear-capable strategic bombers with Russian Tu-95s. ^{[67] [68]}

Between 2020 and 2021, China began construction of three large intercontinental ballistic missile silo fields near Yumen City in Gansu, Hami in Xinjiang, and Ordos City in Inner Mongolia. ^[69] By 2025 these were assessed to total 320 silos for solid-fueled missiles and 30 silos for liquid-fuel DF-5 missiles. ^[70] They are China's first silos for solid-fuel missiles. ^[69]

On 25 September 2024, China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force test launched a Dong Feng-31 intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile was launched from Hainan island over 11,700 km to just west of French Polynesia, reaching an estimated apogee of 1,200 km. It was the first test of an ICBM into the Pacific for China in over 40 years, typically testing ICBMs at very high apogees within its own borders. ^[71] China alerted the US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand ahead of the test, and was criticized by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Fiji, and Kiribati. ^[72]

In December 2024, the United States updated its assessment of China's nuclear weapon stockpile, assessing that China had 600 nuclear warheads and would have 1,000 by 2030. ^{[73] [74]}

In March 2025, the Federation of American Scientists assessed that China no longer maintained a small stockpile nuclear gravity bombs for contingency use by H-6 bombers. ^[70]

On 16 August 2025, China transported an uncovered very large unmanned undersea vehicle (XLUUV) via road in Beijing ahead of the 2025 China Victory Day Parade. It had designation number "AJX002" and was analyzed as similar to Russia's Poseidon UUV, which is a nuclear-powered nuclear weapon used for strategic attacks against coastal cities, however it is not known whether it is nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed. ^[75] The parade also marked the first public display of the road-mobile solid-fuel DF-61 ICBM, potentially a modification of the DF-41 ICBM, as well as the silo-based liquid-fuel DF-5C ICBM variant, believed by the US Department of Defense to be assigned a multi-megaton warhead. ^[76]

In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that China had loaded more than 100 DF-31 ICBMs in silos near its border with Mongolia. ^[77]

Potential resumed testing

In 2020, the United States Department of State alleged that excavation and "explosive containment chambers" at Lop Nur could allow China to return to low-yield nuclear testing, violating the zero-yield standard of the CTBT. China denied the claim, and Jeffrey Lewis pointed to satellite and seismic signatures of such tests being "indistinguishable" from CTBT-compliant subcritical testing. ^{[61] [78] [79]}

In December 2023, satellite open-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume. ^[79] Satellite imagery provided evidence of these preparations, revealing the presence of a drilling rig that had created a deep vertical shaft. This shaft was believed to be designed to contain the destructive power of radiation resulting from large nuclear explosions. ^[79] Some analysts believe that China has been conducting "supercritical tests that create a self-sustained chain reaction in an underground containment vessel but stop well short of a full yield." ^[80] In January 2025, analysts detected newly excavated soil in the northern rim of the Lop Nur complex, believed to be from horizontal tunnels used for lower-yield nuclear weapons tests. ^[81]

Satellite image of the testing site 4 days after China's first atomic bomb test

Size

This section is an excerpt from Nuclear weapons of China § Size.[ edit ]

A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb.

In 2022, United States Strategic Command indicated that China has equipped more nuclear warheads on its ICBMs than the United States (550 according to the New START treaty). ^[82] In October 2024, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that China has approximately 300 missile silos and is estimated to reach at least 1000 operational warheads by 2030. ^[83] In December 2024, the United States Department of Defense estimated China possesses more than 600 operational nuclear warheads. ^[84]

In March 2025, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Federation of American Scientists estimated that China has approximately 600 nuclear warheads. ^{[85] [86]} In June 2025, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated the country operates at least 600 nuclear warheads, growing by approximately 100 new warheads per year. ^[87]

Policy

This section is an excerpt from Nuclear weapons of China § Policy.[ edit ]

Command and control

China's nuclear command and control requires the agreement of both the Politburo and Central Military Commission for alerting and use of weapons. ^{[34] : 119} As a contingency if communications are disrupted, arrangements exist for teams dispatched from central command to personally deliver launch orders. ^{[34] : 120} Academic Fiona Cunningham writes that because such arrangements are difficult to replicate for sea-based nuclear deterrents, the possibility for pre-delegation of nuclear launch authority "cannot be ruled out" but if these arrangements exist, "they are likely to be one of the most closely held secrets of China's nuclear posture." ^{[34] : 120}

China's nuclear weapons have historically always been kept at a low readiness, with its warheads in a central storage location, physically separated from their launch vehicles. This has historically assuaged leadership fears of an unauthorized or accidental use. Nonetheless, sometime between 1995 and 2019, China is believed to have equipped its nuclear warheads with a technical control mechanism, similar to the US permissive action link. In 2020, the United States assessed that some DF-31A units have warheads physically available to them, representing a higher readiness level than central storage. ^{[34] [ page needed ]}

China has historically had a separate chain of command for nuclear and conventional forces, with nuclear missile brigades undergoing separate training, exclusively for retaliatory attacks. This has changed since the introduction of the DF-26 dual-capable missile, for which brigades are trained in the use of its swappable nuclear and conventional warheads. ^{[34] [ page needed ]}

No first use

China's policy has been one of no first use while maintaining a secure second-strike capability. ^[88] Following its first test in 1964, China stated that it would "never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons." ^{[89] [90]} It also implemented centralized command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons so that they could not be used without orders from top leadership. ^{[34] : 75} The 1975 General Combat Regulations for a Combined Army stated, "at any time, under any circumstances, we will absolutely not use nuclear weapons first, only when the enemy uses them first, will we, according to the order of the supreme command, then use this kind of weapon to resolutely counterattack." ^{[34] : 75} China maintains a no-first-use policy as of 2025 ^[update] . ^{[91] [34] : 108–109}

In its 1964 statement, China called for international treaties prohibiting first use and nuclear use and threats against non-nuclear countries. In 1994, China submitted a "Draft Treaty on No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the other four NPT nuclear-weapon states. ^[92] In 2024, China submitted to the NPT review conference a "No-first-use of Nuclear Weapons Initiative", repeating calls for an NFU treaty between the P5 states and a separate treaty which prohibits nuclear use and threats against non-nuclear states and nuclear-weapon-free zones. ^[93]

During the Cold War, China developed a neutron bomb but refrained from deploying tactical nuclear weapons on delivery systems such as gravity bombs or artillery. ^{[34] : 76} In peacetime, it has traditionally stored nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems. ^{[94] [95]}

From 1986 to 1993, debates in China addressed the role of China's nuclear forces in potential local wars. ^{[34] : 66} Chinese leadership doubted that a first-use posture was credible. ^{[34] : 66} After these debates, China decided to remain in a no first use posture. ^{[34] : 76} Jiang Zemin stated, "We develop strategic nuclear weapons, not in order to attack, but in order to defend. If people don't attack us, we won't attack them, but if people attack us, we must attack them." ^{[34] : 86–87}

From 2000 to 2006, in the wake of the 1999 United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, PLA strategists and civilian strategists debated whether China should add conditions to its no first use policy. ^{[34] : 73} China has not publicly clarified whether U.S. allies covered by U.S. nuclear guarantees are exempt from Chinese nuclear use. ^[96] Some Chinese proponents of conditioning the no-first use policy pointed to the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which discussed US nuclear weapons in the context of a "Taiwan contingency". ^{[34] : 98–99} Proponents of adding conditions contended that doing so would make China's nuclear deterrence more effective if a "Taiwan contingency" occurred. ^{[34] : 99} Ultimately, Chinese leadership rejected the idea of conditioning its no first use policy. ^{[34] : 73}

The 2023 U.S. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission assessed that China would likely use nuclear weapons if non-nuclear attacks threaten its nuclear forces or command system. ^[97]

Academic Hui Zhang wrote in 2025 that so far there was little evidence to suggest China had changed its nuclear strategy and doctrine, but it has deviated from a minimal deterrence policy. ^{[98] : 215} Others observers also stated that a policy of minimal deterrence no longer applies to China. ^{[88] : 8}

Launch on warning

In the early 2020s, some of China's nuclear forces were reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture. ^{[99] [100]} PLA doctrine first stated in 2013 that it viewed launch-on-warning as consistent with no-first-use. ^{[34] [ page needed ]} In 2024, the United States Department of State described China's no-first-use policy as "ambiguous". ^[101] The U.S. Department of Defense's 2024 China Military Power Report stated that China was shifting toward a LOW posture for early-warning second strike capabilities. ^{[102] [103]} Defense analysts have contended that China's shift away from a strict no-first-use strategy and toward a LOW posture would allow it to retaliate upon the detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first. ^{[100] [102]} In November 2025, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency reported that China had already developed infrastructure and command structures to support a LOW posture. ^[104] In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense's 2025 China Military Power Report reiterated China's move toward a LOW posture. ^[102]

The move to LOW was seen as a response to progress made in U.S. missile defense systems (such as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and long-range precision strike abilities (such as Conventional Prompt Strike), which decreases the survivability of a Chinese second strike, as well as the possibility that American strategy may require nuclear weapons to compensate for the numerical disadvantage of its conventional forces overseas. There is debate among Chinese strategists regarding the merits and drawbacks of a LOW posture similar to that of Russia and the United States, and as of 2023 the bulk of China's strategic forces had not moved to a LOW posture. ^[99] Some analysts contend that because a LOW posture empowers the PLA to a greater degree due to compressed decision-making timelines, it could potentially degrade the CCP's absolute control of the military. ^[105]

Proliferation and non-proliferation

This section is an excerpt from Nuclear weapons of China § Proliferation and non-proliferation.[ edit ]

Proliferation to Pakistan

Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue), smaller stockpile with limited range (light blue).

Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program before China acceded to the NPT in 1992. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon. ^[106] China also received stolen technology that Abdul Qadeer Khan brought back to Pakistan and Pakistan set up a centrifuge plant in China as revealed in his letters which state "(1)You know we had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km south-west of Xi'an). We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges. Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time. Late minister Liu We, V. M. [vice minister] Li Chew, Vice Minister Jiang Shengjie used to visit us. (2)The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organization to the Khan Research Laboratories] in setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant." ^[107]

Non-proliferation

Before the 1980s, China viewed arms control and nuclear non-proliferation regimes as mechanisms for Western powers (particularly the US) to restrain China. ^{[108] : 266–267} The Chinese government believed that the NPT "[served] the interests of some States" and only favored the countries that already had nuclear weapons. ^[109] China considered the NPT an attempt to constrain China, which had only just tested them successfully, rather than countries like the United States or the Soviet Union, which at the time had at least 100 times more nuclear weapons. ^[110]

Beginning in the 1980s, China's policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons and the NPT had changed under the administration of Deng Xiaoping. ^[109] Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT; ^[111] China acceded to the treaty in 1992. ^[112]

China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, ^[113] but continued to build nuclear reactors for Pakistan. The NSG Guidelines prohibit new nuclear exports to countries like Pakistan that do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards, but China claimed its exports to Pakistan were "grandfathered" under prior supply arrangements. ^[114]

China was active in the six-party talks in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s. ^{[108] : 71} The six-party talks ultimately failed, ^{[108] : 75} and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program. ^{[108] : 237}

The field of nuclear security has become a well-established area of successful US-China cooperation. ^[115] In 2009, CCP general secretary Hu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President Barack Obama's earlier calls for a nuclear-free world. ^{[108] : 237} Precipitated by a 2010 Nuclear Security Summit convened by the Obama administration, China and the United States launched a number of initiatives to secure potentially dangerous, Chinese-supplied, nuclear material in countries such as Ghana or Nigeria. ^[115] In 2017, they converted the GHARR-1 research reactor in Accra, Ghana, a China-supplied Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), from highly enriched uranium to using low-enriched uranium, thus no longer directly weapons-usable. ^[116] China-supplied MNSRs with HEU cores remain in Nigeria, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria. ^[117]

Arms control and disarmament

China, along with all other nuclear weapon states and all members of NATO, decided not to sign the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a binding agreement for negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. ^[118]

China refused to join talks in 2020 between the United States and Russia on extending their bilateral New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, as the Trump administration requested. China's position is that as its nuclear warhead arsenal is a small fraction of the US and Russian arsenals, their inclusion in an arms reduction treaty is unnecessary, and that it will join such talks when both US and Russia has reduced their arsenal to near China's level. ^{[119] [120]}

The United States has a classified strategy called Nuclear Employment Guidance, updated by president Joe Biden in March 2024, reported to refocus US nuclear deterrence strategy more toward China. ^[121]

In April 2025, the China Institute of Atomic Energy announced a deep learning algorithm for differentiating genuine nuclear weapons from decoys, without revealing design details such as geometry, for arms control inspection purposes. ^[122] The system analyses weapon neutron flux obscured by a wall, and compares it against a generated data set of nuclear components including highly enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and lead. ^[122]

On 27 August 2025, China declined US President Donald Trump's proposal to join nuclear disarmament talks with the United States and Russia, calling the idea "neither reasonable nor realistic." While Beijing said it is in favor of disarmament in principle, it has regularly rejected invitations from Washington to join talks with Moscow regarding reducing these countries' nuclear arsenals, arguing that the two nations with the largest stockpiles should take primary responsibility for reductions. ^[123]

Regional reactions

Indian sources cite China's development of nuclear weapons as a factor in the decision to initiate India's nuclear weapons program. ^{[124] [125]}

President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China (Taiwan) believed, prior to China's first nuclear test in 1964, that such a capability would only be possible from 1967. The shock prompted Taiwan to accelerate development of its nuclear weapons infrastructure. ^{[126] : 9–10}

Delivery systems

Main articles: People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, Nuclear weapons of China § Current and upcoming delivery systems, and Nuclear weapons of China § Former delivery systems

The PRC makes use of the country's large geographic area as a strategy to protect its nuclear forces against a theoretical first strike against the country. ^{[127] : 114} Nuclear missile units are dispersed and missile brigades are not located in the same places as the bases that command them. ^{[127] : 114} The nuclear forces are commanded by six missile bases located in Liaoning, Anhui, Yunnan, Hunan, Henan, and Gansu. ^{[127] : 114} Most of the nuclear forces are commanded by the three missile bases in the interior of the country (in Hunan, Henan, and Gansu). ^{[127] : 114–115}

China stores many of its missiles in huge tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael Turner ^[128] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said "This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces." ^[129] A People's Liberation Army newspaper calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of China. ^[130] The PRC has traditionally focused more on its land-based nuclear weapons than other delivery systems as they are more readily controllable by the country's political leadership. ^[131]

Biological weapons

This paragraph is an excerpt from Chinese biological weapons program.[ edit ]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) was reported to have operated a biological weapons program during the Cold War. ^{[132] : 147} The United States Department of State stated that two facilities in Beijing and Lingbao City, from the 1950s to 1987, weaponized large quantities of ricin, botulinum toxin, anthrax, plague, cholera, and tularemia. ^{[133] [134]} Some security analysts believe the program remains covertly active, ^{[135] [136]} and involves dual-use technology. ^[137] The PRC ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chinese officials have claimed that the country has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. Members of the US intelligence community strongly suspect that the PRC has, as of 2015, at least 42 facilities that may be involved in research, development, production, or testing of biological agents. ^{[138] [135]}

Historical

This section is an excerpt from Japan and weapons of mass destruction § Biological weapons.[ edit ]

Ping Fan Facility of Japanese Army Unit 731, Pingfang District, Manchuria during World War II

The Empire of Japan's use of biological weapons in the Second Sino-Japanese War is estimated to have killed between 200,000 ^[139] and 500,000 people, almost entirely in China. ^{[140] [141] [142]} Following research and production at its biological warfare units led by Unit 731, Japanese forces dispersed anthrax, cholera, dysentry, glanders, typhoid, and plague via airplane-dropped bombs containing infected fleas, a form of entomological warfare. Shirō Ishii, the leader of Unit 731, carried out two major anti-civilian campaigns. The first from 1940 to 1942 dispersed plague-infected fleas in port cities in northern China. The second in 1943 used anthrax and glanders against villages southwest of Shanghai. ^[143]

Chemical weapons

Scholars agree that information on a current offensive chemical weapons program is extremely limited, allowing either a small clandestine program or no program at all. Chinese officials have never publicly admitted to an offensive chemical weapons program, and there is no unclassified confirmation of one. ^[18] Per a 1999 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), China had a significant quantity of chemical weapons until the 1980s, and in its 1997 declaration to the CWC, China claimed it destroyed three chemical weapon production facilities and its existing stockpile. The think tank speculated based on Chinese infrastructure that blister agents such as mustard gas and lewisite could be mass-produced from the mid-1950s, but nerve agents could only be mass-produced from the late 1970s. ^[19] China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on April 25, 1997. ^[7]

Albania

Further information: Albania–China relations

The PRC is believed to have supplied Albania with chemical weapons in the 1970s during the Cold War. ^{[144] [145]} In 1999, the Federation of American Scientists mentioned in passing an allegation of Chinese-origin mustard gas potentially intended for training found in Albania. ^[19] In 2003, Albania declared 16 tons of mustard gas to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which was later destroyed. Scholars have questioned the extent to which the stockpile was previously known to Albanian and Western officials. In regard to China, Matthew V. Tompkins writing in the Nonproliferation Review posited the reluctance of the OPCW, United States, and European Union to confront China over a tacitly acknowledged offensive chemical weapons capability. ^[146]

Cultural Revolution

During the Cultural Revolution, weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons were seized during conflicts, but not directly used. Citizens wrote letters to the Zhongnanhai residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored poisonous plant samples, poison gas, toxicants, and other dangerous substances. ^{[147] : 218–220}

Historical

See also: History of chemical warfare § China

Republic of China

During Republic of China's Warlord Era, the warlords Zhao Hengti, Cao Kun, Feng Yuxiang, and Zhang Zuolin. Zhang secured an agreement to build a factory in Shenyang to manufacture mustard gas, phosgene, and chlorine, with the German company Witte and German and Russian chemical engineers. Zhao received a small shipment of "gas-producing shells" in August 1921. ^[19]

Second Sino-Japanese War

See also: History of chemical warfare § Imperial Japanese Army

Japanese soldiers wearing gas masks fire chemical artillery shells during the Battle of Wuhan, 1938.

The Imperial Japanese Army used chemical weapons during the Second Sino-Japanese War, including lewisite, mustard, cyanide, phosgene, and probably a range of irritating gases. Chinese historians estimate that Japanese forces used chemical weapons on over 2,000 instances, killing or wounding 90,000 to 100,000 people. ^{[19] [148]} More recent scholars suggest that the numbers may be even higher, as many survivors did not realize that they had experienced chemical attacks. ^[148] In spring 1944, the US began to discuss retaliatory chemical use against Japan, significantly decreasing Japanese chemical attacks in China for the remainder of the war. ^[148]

This resulted in an estimated 700,000 to 2 million abandoned chemical weapons in China. Many are improperly stored, unlocated, or buried. As of 2023 ^[update] , less than 100,000 of these have been recovered, with joint work between China and Japan to destroy them. They are estimated to have caused 500 to 2,000 injuries and at least 5 deaths in China. ^{[20] [21]}

Korean War

Some Chinese sources allege that during the Korean War, the United States Army and Republic of Korea Army used chemical weapons against units of the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) and Korean People's Army. This included rocket artillery, artillery shells, and hand grenades. A mixture of chloropicrin and phenacyl chloride, as well as a "sneezing powder" are alleged to have been used, with grenades being targeted against the PVA's tunnel warfare. ^[149]

Radiological weapons

During the Cultural Revolution, in Changchun, rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested a dirty bomb, a crude radiological weapon, testing two "radioactive self-defense bombs" and two "radioactive self-defense mines" on 6 and 11 August 1967. ^{[147] : 218–220}

See also

• China portal
• Nuclear technology portal

• 863 Program
• List of nuclear weapons tests of China
• List of states with nuclear weapons
• People's Liberation Army
• Project 596
• Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction
• Two Bombs, One Satellite
• Underground Great Wall of China
• Japan and weapons of mass destruction
• Unit 731
• Unit 516

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