The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret.[8] There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Federation of American Scientists estimated in 2025 that China has a stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads,[2][3] making it the third-largest in the world. It is the only nuclear weapons state significantly expanding its arsenal, which has doubled since 2019,[9] and is projected to reach between 750 and 1,500 warheads by 2035. Unlike the US and Russia, nearly all Chinese warheads are thought to be stored separately from their delivery system.[2]
In 1964, China adopted a policy of no-first-use (NFU) and called for an international NFU treaty,[11][8] both of which it continues to renew.[12][13] Some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture in the early 2020s.[14][15]
China denies offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities under the respective treaties, while the US alleges it is not in compliance with all obligations. Scholars agree information on a current offensive chemical weapons program is extremely limited, allowing either a small clandestine program or no program at all.[16] In its declaration to the CWC, China claimed it destroyed three chemical weapon production facilities and its existing stockpile.[17] The Imperial Japanese Armyuse of chemical weapons during the Second Sino-Japanese War resulted in an estimated 700,000 to 2 million abandoned chemical weapons in China. Many are improperly stored, unlocated, or buried. As of 2023[update], less than 100,000 of these have been recovered, with joint work between China and Japan to destroy them. They are estimated to have caused 500 to 2,000 injuries and at least 5 deaths in China.[18][19]
Mao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce.[20]:44 In 1946 comments to American journalist Anne Louise Strong, he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon."[21]:9–10
During the Korean War, the US Eisenhower administration pursued the New Look policy through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force.[21]:11US nuclear weapons were deployed to Guam in 1951, Japan in 1954, the Philippines in 1957, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1958, and in 1962, UK nuclear weapons were deployed to Singapore.[22] The Eisenhower administration's threats during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program.[23]:89–90 Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means."[20]:44–45 While Mao did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, he believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility. As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's position within the Eastern Bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao. The CCP subsequently traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. The Agreement on New Technology for National Defence was later signed in October, which promised Soviet support for Chinese development of nuclear weapons.[24]
Mao's attitude toward nuclear weapons sometimes strained relations with the Soviet Union, which regarded his statements as cavalier, particularly his 1955 assertion that:[21]:11
The Chinese people are not to be cowed by US atomic blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometers. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs. Even if the US atom bombs were so powerful that, when dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even blow it up, that would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, though it might be a major event for the solar system.
In July 1954, one Soviet expert began working with the Chinese on uranium ore exploration. In 1955, the Soviet Union began the granting of student visas for nuclear physics courses to Chinese students. Qian Sanqiang, Jiang Nanxiang, and Yu Wen selected 350 students to study in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, in benefit of Chinese nuclear research. From 1955, the two countries began signing nuclear-related treaties, and in October 1957, concluded the "New Defense Technical Accord", which allowed for nuclear-weapons technology transfer, including a model of a Soviet atomic bomb and two R-2theatre ballistic missiles.[25]
Construction of a uranium refinement plant in Baotou and enrichment plant in Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production. In return, China exported raw uranium ore to the USSR.[26][27][28]
In 1958, Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy of peaceful coexistence. Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation,[28] and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program.[29] As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb.[27]
Independent program
In 1961, Premier Zhou Enlai articulated China's rationale for its conventional and nuclear military strategies, stating, "Once we have missiles and nuclear weapons, we can then prevent the use of missiles and nuclear weapons; if we don't have missiles, the imperialists can use missiles. But to face combat, we still need conventional weapons."[30]:74
According to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director William Foster, the American government, under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was concerned about China's nuclear program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested. China conducted its first nuclear test, code-named 596, on 16 October 1964.[26][28]
In 1966, Chinese leadership established a new branch of the People's Liberation Army, the Second Artillery, to operate nuclear missiles.[30]:75
In late 1965, Chinese physicists developed a Teller-Ulam design equivalent for thermonuclear weapons. On May 9, 1966, China carried out the 596L nuclear test, of a layer cake design, a type of boosted fission weapon. China's first multi-stage thermonuclear weapon test, "629", occurred on December 28, 1966, at a demonstration 120 kt yield.[27] A full-scale hydrogen bomb was then tested at 3.3 Mt in the Project 639 test on June 17, 1967, outpacing the French hydrogen bomb project's first success in 1968.[31]
China shifted from highly enriched uranium to plutonium weapons beginning with its eighth nuclear test, codenamed "524", also at 3 Mt, on December 27, 1968.[32][33][bettersourceneeded] It subsequently focused on weapon miniaturization, for missile warheads, and for delivery by fighter instead of bomber.[34][35][36]
In 1969, following the border conflict Battle of Zhenbao Island in March, the USSR considered a massive nuclear attack on China, targeting cities and nuclear facilities. It made military activity in the Russian Far East, and informed its allies and the United States of this potential attack. The Chinese government and archives were evacuated from Beijing while the People's Liberation Army scattered from its bases. The crisis abated when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the Soviet Union that an attack on China would be met by a US nuclear attack on 130 Soviet cities.[37][38][39] This threat of attack lead to the development of the Kuangbiao-1tactical nuclear bomb, which could be delivered against invading Soviet tank columns by Nanchang Q-5 ground-attack fighters instead of Xi'an H-6 bombers.[34][35][36]
Despite the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty concluded by the US, UK, and USSR, China, alongside France, continued atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1960s and 1970s. China conducted its first underground nuclear test in 1969.[40] It tested its first boosted fission weapon in 1971.[41] In 1980, China conducted the most recent atmospheric nuclear test in the world, at between 200 kt to 1 Mt, possibly using a missile.[42]
After moving to underground testing in the 1980s and 1990s, China developed advanced and miniaturized nuclear weapons. Tests between 1982 and 1988 developed a neutron bomb, which was ultimately not deployed.[43] In 1992, a two-point implosion aspherical primary was first tested. China was accused using espionage, most notably in the Cox Report, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to acquire the US's W88nuclear warhead design as well as guidedballistic missile technology.[44][45][46][47] Details of US intelligence on Chinese nuclear weapons were released in the US press surrounding the Cox Report and abortive trial of Wen Ho Lee.[41]
In 1982, Deng Xiaoping initiated transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, including the design of the simple "548" codenamed highly enriched uranium implosion bomb. This design was first tested by China in its fourth nuclear test in 1966, mated to a Dongfeng 2 missile. A Pakistani derivative of the device was tested in China in 1990. China is also believed to have conducted "hydronuclear" possibly subcritical testing for France in the 1990s.[40] China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996.[48] In September 1996, China signed but did not ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to enter into force.[49]
During the Cold War, China relied on concealment of its nuclear forces as the primary mechanism for their survivability.[30]:113 Beginning in 1996, China has increasingly relied on the mobility of its land-based nuclear forces as a means of survivability.[30]:113
21st century
In 2020, the United States Department of State alleged that excavation and "explosive containment chambers" at Lop Nur could allow China to return to low-yield nuclear testing, violating the zero-yield standard of the CTBT. China denied the claim, and Jeffrey Lewis pointed to satellite and seismic signatures of such tests being "indistinguishable" from CTBT-compliant subcritical testing.[49][50][51] In 2023, satellite open-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume.[52]
On 25 September 2024, China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force test launched a Dong Feng-31intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile was launched from Hainan island over 11,700 km to just west of French Polynesia, reaching an estimated apogee of 1,200 km. It was the first test of an ICBM into the Pacific for China in over 40 years, typically testing ICBMs at very high apogees within its own borders.[53] China alerted the US, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand ahead of the test, and was criticized by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Fiji, and Kiribati.[54]
In December 2024, the United States updated its assessment of China's nuclear weapon stockpile, assessing that China had 600 nuclear warheads and would have 1,000 by 2030.[55][56]
On 16 August 2025, China transported an uncovered very large unmanned undersea vehicle (XLUUV) via road in Beijing ahead of the 2025 China Victory Day Parade. It had designation number "AJX002" and was analyzed as similar to Russia's Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System, which is a nuclear-powered nuclear weapon used for strategic attacks against coastal cities, however it is not known whether it is nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed.[57]
Satellite image of the testing site 4 days after China's first atomic bomb test
Size
A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb.
In 2022, United States Strategic Command indicated that China has equipped more nuclear warheads on its ICBMs than the United States (550 according to the New START treaty).[58] In October 2024, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that China has approximately 300 missile silos and is estimated to reach at least 1000 operational warheads by 2030.[59] In December 2024, the United States Department of Defense estimated China possesses more than 600 operational nuclear warheads.[1]
China produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons between 1964 and 1987. As of 2018, its total stockpile (including usage in warheads) was estimated at 14 tons of highly enriched uranium and 2.9 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, the smallest fissile material stockpile among the five NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states. Scholar Hui Zhang estimated this stockpile could support 730 thermonuclear warheads, assuming that approximately 4 kg of plutonium are used in the primary and 20 kg of HEU in the secondary of each thermonuclear weapon.[61] The U.S. Department of Defense concluded in 2024 that it was likely that China intended to produce additional fissile material for its military in the near term.[62]
China's nuclear weapons have historically always been kept at a low readiness, with its warheads in a central storage location, physically separated from their launch vehicles. This has historically assuaged leadership fears of an unauthorized or accidental use. Nonetheless, sometime between 1995 and 2019, China is believed to have equipped its nuclear warheads with a technical control mechanism, similar to the US permissive action link. In 2020, the US assessed that some DF-31A units have warheads physically available to them, representing a higher readiness level than central storage.
China has historically had a separate chain of command for nuclear and conventional forces, with nuclear missile brigades undergoing separate training, exclusively for retaliatory attacks. This has changed since the introduction of the DF-26 dual-capable missile, for which brigades are trained in the use of its swappable nuclear and conventional warheads.[30]
No-first-use
China's policy has traditionally been one of no first use while maintaining a secure second-strike capability.[63] Following its first test in 1964, China stated that it would "never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons."[64][65] It also implemented centralized command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons so that they could not be used without orders from top leadership.[30]:75 The 1975 General Combat Regulations for a Combined Army stated, "at any time, under any circumstances, we will absolutely not use nuclear weapons first, only when the enemy uses them first, will we, according to the order of the supreme command, then use this kind of weapon to resolutely counterattack."[30]:75 China maintains its official no-first-use policy as of 2025[update].[30]:108–109
In its 1964 statement, China called for international treaties prohibiting first use and nuclear use and threats against non-nuclear countries. In 1994, China submitted a "Draft Treaty on No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the other four NPT nuclear-weapons states.[13] In 2024, China submitted to the NPT review conference a "No-first-use of Nuclear Weapons Initiative", repeating calls for an NFU treaty between the P5 states and a separate treaty which prohibits nuclear use and threats against non-nuclear states and nuclear-weapon-free zones.[66]
During the Cold War, China developed a neutron bomb but refrained from deploying tactical nuclear weapons on delivery systems such as gravity bombs or artillery.[30]:76 In peacetime, it has traditionally stored nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems.[8][67]
From 1986 to 1993, debates in China addressed the role of China's nuclear forces in potential local wars.[30]:66 Chinese leadership doubted that a first-use posture was credible.[30]:66 After these debates, China decided to remain in a no first use posture.[30]:76Jiang Zemin stated, "We develop strategic nuclear weapons, not in order to attack, but in order to defend. If people don't attack us, we won't attack them, but if people attack us, we must attack them."[30]:86–87
From 2000 to 2006, in the wake of the 1999 United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, PLA strategists and civilian strategists debated whether China should add conditions to its no first use policy.[30]:73 Some proponents of conditioning the no-first use policy pointed to the US Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which discussed US nuclear weapons in the context of a "Taiwan contingency".[30]:98–99 Proponents of adding conditions contended that doing so would make China's nuclear deterrence more effective if a "Taiwan contingency" occurred.[30]:99 Ultimately, Chinese leadership rejected the idea of conditioning its no first use policy.[30]:73
Launch on warning
In the early 2020s, some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture.[14][15] In 2024, the United States Department of State described China's no-first-use policy as "ambiguous".[68] American defense analysts have contended that China is shifting away from a strict no-first-use strategy and toward a LOW posture, which would allow it to retaliate upon the detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first.[15] These concerns increased after China began to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal in the early 2020s. The move was seen as a response to progress made in US missile defense systems (such as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and long-range precision strike abilities (such as Conventional Prompt Strike), which decreases the survivability of a Chinese second strike, as well as the possibility that American strategy may require nukes to compensate for the numerical disadvantage of its conventional forces overseas. There is debate among Chinese strategists regarding the merits and drawbacks of a LOW posture similar to that of Russia and the United States, and as of 2023 the bulk of China's strategic forces had not moved to a LOW posture.[14] Some analysts contend that because a LOW posture empowers the PLA to a greater degree due to compressed decision-making timelines, it could potentially degrade the CCP's control of the military.[69]
Proliferation and non-proliferation
Proliferation to Pakistan
Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue), smaller stockpile with limited range (light blue).
Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program before China ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1992. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon.[70] China also received stolen technology that Abdul Qadeer Khan brought back to Pakistan and Pakistan set up a centrifuge plant in China as revealed in his letters which state "(1)You know we had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km south-west of Xi'an). We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges. Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time. Late minister Liu We, V. M. [vice minister] Li Chew, Vice Minister Jiang Shengjie used to visit us. (2)The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organization to the Khan Research Laboratories] in setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant."[71]
Non-proliferation
Before the 1980s, China viewed arms control and nuclear non-proliferation regimes as mechanisms for Western powers (particularly the US) to restrain China.[72]:266–267 The Chinese government believed that the NPT "[served] the interests of some States" and only favored the countries that already had nuclear weapons.[73] China considered the NPT an attempt to constrain China, which had only just tested them successfully, rather than countries like the US or USSR, which had at least 100 times more nuclear weapons.[74] Based on these suspicions, China chose not to join the NPT at that time.
Beginning in the 1980s, China's policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons and the NPT had changed under the administration of Deng Xiaoping.[73] Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT;[75] China acceded to the treaty in 1992.[76]
China was active in the six-party talks in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s.[72]:71 The six-party talks ultimately failed,[72]:75 and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program.[72]:237
The field of nuclear security has become a well-established area of successful US-China cooperation.[77] In 2009, CCP general secretaryHu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President Barack Obama's earlier calls for a nuclear-free world.[72]:237 Precipitated by a 2010 Nuclear Security Summit convened by the Obama administration, China and the US launched a number of initiatives to secure potentially dangerous, Chinese-supplied, nuclear material in countries such as Ghana or Nigeria.[77] Through these initiatives, China and the US have converted Chinese-origin Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSRs) from using highly enriched uranium to using low-enriched uranium fuel (which is not directly usable in weapons, thereby making reactors more proliferation resistant).[78]
China refused to join talks in 2020 between the US and Russia on extending their bilateral New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, as the Trump administration requested. China's position is that as its nuclear warhead arsenal is a small fraction of the US and Russia arsenals, their inclusion in an arms reduction treaty is unnecessary, and that it will join such talks when both US and Russia has reduced their arsenal to near China's level.[80][81]
The United States has a classified strategy called Nuclear Employment Guidance, updated by president Joe Biden in March 2024, reported to refocus US nuclear deterrence strategy more toward China.[82]
On 27 August 2025, China declined US President Donald Trump's proposal to join nuclear disarmament talks with the United States and Russia, calling the idea "neither reasonable nor realistic." While Beijing said it is in favor of disarmament in principle, it has regularly rejected invitations from Washington to join talks with Moscow regarding reducing these countries' nuclear arsenals, arguing that the two nations with the largest stockpiles should take primary responsibility for reductions.[83]
The PRC makes use of the country's large geographic area as a strategy to protect its nuclear forces against a theoretical first strike against the country.[30]:114 Nuclear missile units are dispersed and missile brigades are not located in the same places as the bases that command them.[30]:114 The nuclear forces are commanded by six missile bases located in Liaoning, Anhui, Yunnan, Hunan, Henan, and Gansu.[30]:114 Most of the nuclear forces are commanded by the three missile bases in the interior of the country (in Hunan, Henan, and Gansu).[30]:114–115
China stores many of its missiles in huge tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael Turner[84] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said "This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces."[85] A People's Liberation Army newspaper calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of China.[86] The PRC has traditionally focused more on its land-based nuclear weapons than other delivery systems as they are more readily controllable by the country's political leadership.[87]
The Dongfeng5 (simplified Chinese:东风-5; traditional Chinese:東風-5; pinyin:Dōng Fēng Wǔ; lit.'East Wind 5') or DF-5 is a second-generation two stage Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile. It has a length of 32.6 metres (107ft) and a diameter of 3.35 metres (11.0ft). It weighs in at 183,000 kilograms (403,000lb) and it has an estimated range of 13,000 to 16,000 kilometres (8,100 to 9,900mi). The DF-5 had its first flight in 1971 and was in operational service 10years later. One of the limitations of the missile is that it takes between 30 and 60 minutes to load with liquid fuel (UDMH) and NTO oxidizer.[88]
DF-26intermediate-range ballistic missile on display. Unlike most Chinese nuclear weapons, it is dual-capable; brigades are trained to employ both conventional and nuclear warheads on the missile.
The DF-27 (CH-SS-X-24) is an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) warhead.[91] The ballistic missile was in development as of 2021, with a range of 5,000km to 8,000km.[92]
The Dong Feng 31 (or CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land-based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2.[93]
The DF-41 (or CSS-X-10) is an intercontinental ballistic missile believed to be operational. It is designed to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), delivering multiple nuclear warheads.[4]
As of 2025[update], the People's Liberation Army Navy operates six Type 094 ballistic missile submarine. It is capable of carrying 12 JL-3 ballistic missiles, with a range of over 9,000 km.[2]
China is also developing the Type 096 submarine, claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-3 ballistic missiles each. Some Chinese sources state that the submarine is already undergoing trials.[98]
The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as ones with a range between 3000 and 8000km.[99]:103
China "keeps most of its warheads at a central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range, though some are kept at smaller regional storage facilities."[100]
The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS-3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980.[99]:67 The DF-4 has a takeoff thrust of 1,224.00kN, a takeoff weight of 82,000kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a fin span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2,190kg nuclear warhead with 3,300kt explosive yield, and its range is 5,500km.[99]:68 The missile uses inertial guidance, resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.[citation needed]
Medium-range ballistic missiles
Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the medium-range category, targeted at regional theater targets.[99]:61
The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the DH-10 is a second-generation land-attack cruise missile (LACM), with over 4,000km range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system. The missile is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters.
The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile developed by China, based on the Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200km. Although not confirmed, it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also been developed.[105]
There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3. Reportedly based on the Kh-SD/65 missiles, the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the first nuclear-capable cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has a range of 600km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800km, and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000km.[106]
There are two missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind) family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the first domestically developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CF-1 has a range of 400km while the CF-2 has a range of 800km. Both variants can carry a 10kt nuclear warhead.[citation needed]
China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made versions of Soviet aircraft. The People's Liberation Army Air Force has 120 H-6s (a variant of the Tupolev Tu-16). These bombers were outfitted to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons. While the H-6 fleet is aging, it is not as old as the American B-52 Stratofortress.[99]:93–98 The Chinese have also produced the Xian JH-7Flying Leopard fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the F-111 (currently about 80 are in service) which were capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also bought the advanced Sukhoi Su-30 from Russia; currently, about 100 Su-30s (MKK and MK2 variants) have been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.[99]:102
Scholars agree that information on a current offensive chemical weapons program is extremely limited, allowing either a small clandestine program or no program at all. Chinese officials have never publicly admitted to an offensive chemical weapons program, and there is no unclassified confirmation of one.[16] Per the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), China had a significant quantity of chemical weapons until the 1980s, and in its 1997 declaration to the CWC, China claimed it destroyed three chemical weapon production facilities and its existing stockpile.[17] China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on April 25, 1997.[7]
The PRC is believed to have supplied Albania with chemical weapons in the 1970s during the Cold War.[118][119] In 1999, the Federation of American Scientists mentioned in passing an allegation of Chinese-origin mustard gas potentially intended for training found in Albania.[17] In 2003, Albania declared 16 tons of mustard gas to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which was later destroyed. Scholars have questioned the extent to which the stockpile was previously known to Albanian and Western officials. In regard to China, Matthew V. Tompkins writing in the Nonproliferation Review posited the reluctance of the OPCW, United States, and European Union to confront China over a tacitly acknowledged offensive chemical weapons capability.[120]
Cultural Revolution
During the Cultural Revolution, weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons were seized during conflicts, but not directly used. Citizens wrote letters to the Zhongnanhai residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored poisonous plant samples, poison gas, toxicants, and other dangerous substances.[121]:218–220
The Imperial Japanese Armyused chemical weapons during the Second Sino-Japanese War, including lewisite, mustard, cyanide, phosgene, and probably a range of irritating gases. Chinese historians estimate that Japanese forces used chemical weapons on over 2,000 instances, killing 90,000 people,[17] but more recent scholars imply numbers may be even higher, as many survivors lacked understanding that they had experienced chemical attacks.[122] In spring 1944, the US began to discuss retaliatory chemical use against Japan, significantly decreasing Japanese chemical attacks in China for the remainder of the war.[122]
This resulted in an estimated 700,000 to 2 million abandoned chemical weapons in China. Many are improperly stored, unlocated, or buried. As of 2023[update], less than 100,000 of these have been recovered, with joint work between China and Japan to destroy them. They are estimated to have caused 500 to 2,000 injuries and at least 5 deaths in China.[18][19]
Radiological weapons
During the Cultural Revolution, in Changchun, rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested a dirty bomb, a crude radiological weapon, testing two "radioactive self-defense bombs" and two "radioactive self-defense mines" on 6 and 11 August 1967.[121]:218–220
1 2 Deng, Hongmei; Evans, Peter O'Meara (September 1, 1997). "Social and environmental aspects of abandoned chemical weapons in China". The Nonproliferation Review. 4 (3): 101–108. doi:10.1080/10736709708436684. ISSN1073-6700.
↑ Crean, Jeffrey (2024). The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History. New Approaches to International History series. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN978-1-350-23394-2.
↑ "防化兵忆中国原子弹爆炸现场：田鼠长得像狗一样大"[Chemical defense soldier recalls the scene of China's atomic bomb explosion: field mice grew as big as dogs]. People's Daily (in Chinese). October 16, 2014. Archived from the original on June 29, 2025. Retrieved June 29, 2025.
↑ "俄媒：中国新型战略核潜艇技术落后美俄三代"[Russian media: China's new strategic nuclear submarine technology lags behind the United States and Russia by three generations]. China News Service (in Chinese). January 22, 2014. Archived from the original on February 7, 2014. Retrieved June 29, 2025.
1 2 "《世纪伟人腾飞梦——周恩来与两弹一星》全国巡展亮点多 观众自发求延展"[The National Tour of "The Great Man of the Century's Dream of Soaring - Zhou Enlai and the Two Bombs and One Satellite" has many highlights, and the audience spontaneously asks for an extension]. People's Daily (in Chinese). February 14, 2019. Archived from the original on June 28, 2025. Retrieved June 28, 2025.
1 2 "战术氢弹爆炸，这部电影细节严谨_澎湃号·媒体_澎湃新闻"[Tactical hydrogen bomb explosion, this movie has rigorous details]. The Paper (in Chinese). January 8, 2023. Archived from the original on June 28, 2025. Retrieved June 28, 2025.
↑ Zhao, Tong (September 2, 2022). "China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons". Asian Security. 18 (3): 205–213. doi:10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654. ISSN1479-9855.
↑ "Document Viewer". docs.un.org. Archived from the original on February 24, 2025. Retrieved October 2, 2025.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
