Grades of the armed forces of China

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The organization of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China is based on grades. Each institution, billet, and officer has a grade. Personnel grades flow from the institution's grade. For example, the grade of a unit commander billet is the same as the unit's, and the officer in that billet receives that grade. Historically, grade, rather than rank, determined or indicated an officer's authority, and various professional and career factors.

Contents

Overview

Hierarchy

Grades determine the command hierarchy from the Central Military Commission (CMC) to the platoon level. Since 1988, all institutions, billets, and officers in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Armed Police (PAP) have a grade. [1] Entities command lower-graded entities, and coordinate with like-graded entities. [2] An institution shares its grade with its leading officers, and all sub-ordinate institutions and officers have lower grades. Under the dual-command structure, an institution's military commanding officer and political officer have the same grade. [3]

Civil–military relations within the wider state bureaucracy is also influenced by grades. The grading systems used by the armed forces and the government are parallel, making it easier for military entities to identify the civilian entities they should coordinate with. [2]

Personnel management

An officer's authority, eligibility for billets, pay, and retirement age is determined by grade [4] [2] ("position grade". [5] ) Career progression includes lateral transfers between billets of the same grade, but which are not considered promotions. [6] [7] An officer retiring to the civil service has their grade translated to the civil grade system; [2] their grade continues to progress and draw retirement benefits through the civil system rather than the armed forces. [3]

Historically, personnel grade — or position (Chinese :职务等级; pinyin :zhiwu dengji [8] ) — was more important than rank (Chinese :军衔; pinyin :junxian [8] ). [2] Historically, time-in-grade and time-in-rank requirements [9] and promotions were not synchronized; [6] multiple ranks were present in each grade [10] with all having the same authority. [3] Rank was mainly a visual aid to roughly determine relative position when interacting with Chinese and foreign personnel. [2] PLA etiquette preferred addressing personnel by position rather than by rank. [11] Reforms to a more rank-centric system began in 2021. [8] In 2023, a revised grade structure associated one rank per grade, with some ranks spanning multiple grades. [12]

Civilians

The highest grade is CMC chairman; [12] the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, a civilian, is the CMC's chair which makes them the armed forces' representative in the Politburo Standing Committee, the country's ruling body. [13] Civilian CMC members have personnel grades but do not have military ranks. [1] During the drafting of the 1988 system, Deng Xiaoping - then CMC chairman - refused the rank of (depending on the report) marshal [14] or "first class general"; first class general was the highest rank under the 1988 system and intended for the top leadership. [15] The practice of an unranked CMC chairman was formalized in 1994 [14] [15] and the rank of first class general was abolished. [15]

History

Early systems

The Chinese Red Army, and the later PLA, did not use grades or during the Chinese Civil War. Personnel were addressed by job titles. [16] Ranks — based on the Kuomintang system — were used by parts of the army from 1937 to 1946; this was not official Chinese Communist Party policy. A 21-grade system was adopted in 1952. In 1955, this changed to 20 grades with 15 Soviet-based ranks; the ranks were abolished in 1965. The number of grades changed to 27 in 1965, 23 in 1972, and 18 in 1979; the 1965 and 1972 changes were based on the State Administrative Grade System. [17]

1988 reforms

The 1988 system had 15 grades and 10 ranks. The grades paralleled the civil grade system. [2] The system had a many-to-many relationship between grades and ranks because grade and rank promotions were unsynchronized. From 1988 to 1994, there were three ranks per grade; by 2021 there were two ranks per grade. [1] A rank could also appear across grades; for example, major general could appear from division leader to military region deputy leader. [18]

The vague relationship between grades and ranks was not the only problem. Further difficulties appeared with the 2015 military reforms - particularly the operational reorganization around theater commands - and the disruption of career paths with the conversion of many divisions and regiments into brigades. [19]

Theater command leader and theater command deputy leader replaced military region leader and military region deputy leader respectively. [8] Brigade leader and deputy brigade leader were also added; they may have been equivalent to division leader and deputy division leader in 2016 [20] and then deputy division leader and regiment leader in 2020. [8]

1988 officer grades and ranks [21]
GradeRanks
Most commonLess common
CMC chairman
CMC Vice-chairman		None
General
CMC memberGeneral
Military region leader General/Admiral Lieutenant general/Vice admiral
Military region deputy leaderLieutenant general/Vice admiralMajor general/Rear admiral
Corps leaderMajor general/Rear admiralLieutenant general/Vice admiral
Corps deputy leaderMajor general/Rear admiral Senior colonel/Senior captain
Division leaderSenior colonel/Senior captainMajor general/Rear admiral
Division deputy leader Colonel/CaptainSenior colonel/Senior captain
Regiment leaderColonel/CaptainLieutenant colonel/Commander
Regiment deputy leaderLieutenant colonel/Commander Major/Lieutenant commander
Battalion leaderMajor/Lieutenant commanderLieutenant colonel/Lieutenant commander
Battalion deputy leader Captain/Lieutenant Major/Lieutenant commander
Company leaderCaptain/Lieutenant First lieutenant/Lieutenant (junior grade)
Company deputy leaderFirst lieutenant/Lieutenant (junior grade)Captain/Lieutenant
Platoon leader Second lieutenant/Ensign First lieutenant/Ensign

2021 reforms

Changing to a rank-centric system was being considered by 2016 and became policy as part of the 2021 "interim" reforms to officer management and recruitment policies to improve professionalism. [19] The reforms created a four-grade structure for technical specialists (senior professional, deputy senior professional, intermediate professional and junior professional), a separate pay level structure, and linked pay and benefits to rank rather than grade. [5]

The revised officer grade system associated each grade to one rank, although a rank could be associated with multiple grades. [12]

Post-2021 officer grades and ranks [12] [ additional citation(s) needed ]
Pay Level [5] [ additional citation(s) needed ]GradeRankEquivalent civil service gradeNotes
1CMC chairmanNoneNational leader
2CMC deputy chairmanGeneralDeputy national leader
3CMC memberQuasi-national deputy leader
4Theater command leaderProvincial/ministry leader
5Theater command deputy leaderLieutenant general
6Corps leaderMajor general
7Corps Deputy LeaderProvincial/ministry deputy leader
Division leaderSenior colonelTreated as corps deputy leader for salary and benefits
8Division officerDepartment leader
9Division deputy leaderDepartment deputy leader
8–11Regiment leaderColonelCounty leader
10–13Regiment deputy leaderLieutenant colonelCounty deputy leader
12–16Battalion leaderMajorTownship leader
Battalion deputy leaderTownship deputy leader
14–17Company leaderCaptain
15–18Company deputy leaderFirst lieutenant
17–19Platoon leaderSecond lieutenant

Insignia

Grade is indicated on a uniform by a ribbon bar and the number of rows of ribbons. [22]

See also

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References

Citations

  1. 1 2 3 Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 18.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 16.
  3. 1 2 3 Kaufman & Mackenzie 2009, p. 74.
  4. ↑ Kaufman & Mackenzie 2009, pp. 73–74.
  5. 1 2 3 Huang, Panyue, ed. (1 February 2021). "Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of National Defense on January 28". Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China . Retrieved 5 July 2024.
  6. 1 2 Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 17.
  7. ↑ Kaufman & Mackenzie 2009, p. 73.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 Wuthnow, Joel; Saunders, Phillip C. (16 March 2021). "A New Step Forward in PLA Professionalization". Jamestown Foundation . Archived from the original on 22 June 2024. Retrieved 22 June 2024.
  9. ↑ Allen, Kenneth (22 July 2010). "Assessing the PLA's Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks – Part 1". Jamestown Foundation . Archived from the original on 2024-05-11. Retrieved 2024-05-12.
  10. ↑ Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 19.
  11. ↑ Kaufman & Mackenzie 2009, p. 77.
  12. 1 2 3 4 "中国公务员的级别和职级" [Chinese civil service grades and ranks]. Dalate Banner Party Building Network (in Chinese). 9 March 2023. Archived from the original on 2024-06-14. Retrieved 2024-06-14.
  13. ↑ Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 87.
  14. 1 2 Kan, Ke (5 May 2016). Le, Yi; Qin, Jing (eds.). "形成中央军委主席不授予军衔的惯例" [It has become a practice that the Chairman of the Central Military Commission does not confer military ranks]. People's Daily (in Chinese). 中国共产党新闻网. Guang'an Daily. Archived from the original on 2020-11-09. Retrieved 2018-06-02.
  15. 1 2 3 Gao, Xin (2 August 2017). Guo, Du (ed.). "习近平的下一个头衔怎么说也该是元帅了" [Xi Jinping's next rank should be marshal, I'd say!]. Radio Free Asia (in Chinese). Retrieved 2024-07-02. 一级上将军衔在87年条例中是高于上将，是全国最高军衔，主要授予军委主席，也可以授予副主席。但87年设置一级上将时，说白了，就是给邓的。但是邓主动要求不授衔。这个军衔也就一直空着。而且当时也规定一级上将在战时授予军委主席，后来又觉得战时再搞个授衔什么的很麻烦军委主席直接就是军队最高领导，没必要特意授衔，所以后来就取消了
  16. ↑ Kaufman & Mackenzie 2009, p. 46.
  17. ↑ Allen, Kenneth (30 January 2017). "China Announces Reform of Military Ranks". Jamestown Foundation . Archived from the original on 13 October 2019. Retrieved 23 June 2024.
  18. ↑ Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 21.
  19. 1 2 Char, James (31 March 2021). "What a Change in China's Officer Rank and Grade System Tells Us About PLA Reform". The Diplomat . Archived from the original on 2024-05-11. Retrieved 2024-05-11.
  20. ↑ Allen, Kenneth; Blasko, Dennis J.; Corbett, John F. (4 February 2016). "The PLA's New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part 1)". Jamestown Foundation . Archived from the original on 2020-11-13. Retrieved 2024-06-13.
  21. ↑ Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 18-19.
  22. ↑ Pollpeter & Allen 2012, p. 20.

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