Libya and weapons of mass destruction

Last updated
Libya
Location of Libya Libya (orthographic projection).svg
Location of Libya
Nuclear program start date1969
First nuclear weapon testNone
First fusion weapon testNone
Last nuclear testNone
Largest yield testNone
Total testsNone
Peak stockpileNone
Current stockpileNone; the program was dismantled in 2003.
Maximum missile range300 km (Scud-B)
NPT signatoryYes

Libya pursued programs to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction from when Muammar Gaddafi seized control of Libya in 1969 until he announced on 19 December 2003 that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons. This included weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) and long-range ballistic missiles. [1] [2] [3]

Contents

Libya under King Idris signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and Gaddafi ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1980. [4] The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from its nuclear weapons program, with independent verification by IAEA. [3]

In 1982, Libya ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.

In 2004, Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, [5] and declared 24.7 metric tonnes of mustard gas, 1,390 metric tonnes of chemical precursors for making sarin, as well as 3,563 unloaded chemical weapon munitions (aerial bombs). [6] [7] The OPCW set January 2014 as the deadline for the full destruction of Libya's chemical weapons. [8] Libya began destroying its chemical stockpiles and munitions later in 2004, [9] but it missed deadlines for converting one chemical weapons production facility to peaceful use and for destroying its stockpile of mustard agent. [10] In October 2014, Libya asked for foreign assistance to transport its 850 tonne stockpile of precursor chemicals for making nerve gas out of Libya for destruction. [11] In February 2015, Libyan military sources told media that unidentified armed men had captured large amounts of Libya’s chemical weapons, including mustard gas and sarin. [12] [13] Destruction of Libya's chemical weapon precursors was completed in November 2017. [14]

Libya signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 20 September 2017, but has not ratified it. [15]

Nuclear program

King Idris of Libya signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in July 1968. In 1969, Muammar Gaddafi seized control of Libya and had ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. [16] Before the rollback of its clandestine nuclear program from late 2003, Libya had a nuclear weapons program, allegedly to counter the covert Israeli nuclear program. [3] Gaddafi ratified NPT in 1975, and concluded the safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980. In 1981, the Soviet Union completed a 10 MW research reactor at Tajura. [3] Libya purchased more than 2,000 tons of lightly processed uranium from Niger. [1]

During the 1980s, Gaddafi had reportedly used illicit nuclear proliferation networks and various black market sources, including Swiss nuclear engineer Friedrich Tinner, to start developing the nuclear weapons. [3] The IAEA reported that, in July 1995, Libya had made a “strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment,” which can enrich uranium for use in nuclear reactors as well as for fissile material in nuclear weapons. [1] However, at the time its nuclear program was rolled back by Gaddafi (with assistance from the United States and the IAEA), Libya's nuclear program remained in very early initial, developmental stages. [3]

Foreign assistance

Gaddafi‘s most famous buying foray for nuclear weapons was in 1970, when Libyan leaders paid a state visit to China. [17] Gaddafi and his Prime Minister Abdessalam Jalloud made an unsuccessful attempt to convince China to sell tactical nuclear weapons to Libya. [17] In a bilateral meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Gaddafi unsuccessfully attempted to convince Zhou to sell him a nuclear bomb. [3] [18] Gaddafi's justification for seeking nuclear weapons was his concern over the Israeli nuclear capability, and publicly expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons.

After being invited by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to attend the 2nd OIC conference (OIC) in Lahore, Libya negotiated and was delegated to participate in its nuclear program, Project-706, in 1974. [19] In 1977, Libyan technicians left for Pakistan but by the time Libyans joined the program, the martial law had come in effect against Bhutto in response to end the political deadlock. [19] Before Pakistan's A-bomb project succeeded, Libya had been taken out of the equation as the new President General Zia-ul-Haq had distrusted and strongly disliked Gaddafi. [19] On immediate effects, Libyans were asked to leave the country and the Libyan Intelligence made attempts to infiltrate Pakistan's high-powered research institutes, but such attempts were thwarted by ISI who intercepted and arrested these Libyan agents. [18] Investigators have found that nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through a Pakistani smuggling network originated in China. [20] [21]

With relations severed with Pakistan, Gaddafi normalized relations with India in 1978, and Gaddafi reached a mutual understanding with India for civil nuclear cooperation, as part of India's Atoms for Peace program. With the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visiting Libya in 1984, a nuclear energy pact was signed by Libya and India, but it is unclear how much interaction and cooperation took place. [3] [22] Throughout the 1980s, Libyan efforts continued to push for acquiring nuclear weapons from various sources. In an ingenious persuasion to uranium enrichment in 1978, Libya made an effort to gain access to uranium ore, uranium conversion facilities, and enrichment techniques that together would have enabled Libya to produce weapons-grade uranium. The approach failed in 1979, and in 1980 Libya decided to pursue a plutonium-based pathway to nuclear weapons. Libya imported 1,200 tons of uranium ore concentrate from French-controlled mines in Niger without declaring it to the IAEA, as required by its safeguards agreement. In 1982, Libya attempted to enter into an agreement with Belgium for purchasing a small plant for manufacturing UF4. At the time, Libya had no declared nuclear facilities that required UF4, and the purchase was refused. [3]

In 1980, Libya began to build its nuclear infrastructure from various nuclear black market sources. The centrifuges materials and expertise were provided by Swiss national, Friedrich Tinner. Tinner's work on centrifuges took place at the TNRF aimed at producing gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. By the late 1980s, financial constraints and economic sanctions were imposed by the United States in the 1980s, further hampering the nuclear program. Work was completed by Tinner in 1992, but Libya remained unable to produce an operating centrifuge. [3] After the end of Cold War, Gaddafi bluntly persuaded the U.S. President Bill Clinton to uplift the sanctions by allowing the disarmament of its nuclear program. [23]

In 1995, Gaddafi renewed calls for nuclear weapons and pursued new avenues for nuclear technology procurement, while publicizing the NPT. [24] In 1997, Libya received technical documentation and materials on gas centrifuges from various sources, as Libya had made a strategic decision to start the program with a new attitude. [3] Libya employed a large number of black market network, first reeving the 20 pre-assembled centrifuges and components for an additional 200 centrifuges and related parts from foreign suppliers. [22] The pre-assembled rotors for centrifuges were used to install a completed single centrifuge at the Al Hashan site, which was first successfully tested in October 2000.

In 2000, Libya accelerated its efforts, still headed by Tinner. Libya received many documents on the design and operation of centrifuges, but the program suffered many setbacks in evaluating these designs as they were too difficult to interpret and bring into operation. Libya ultimately told IAEA investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs at that time, and due to its extreme difficulty, Libya would have had to ask the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. [3]

Soviet Union

In 1979, Libya pursued peaceful nuclear cooperation with the Soviet Union, under IAEA safeguards. In 1981, the Soviet Union agreed to build a 10 MW research reactor at Tajoura, under IAEA safeguards. The Libyan nuclear program repeatedly suffered under mismanagement and loss of academic generation. The Tajura facility was run under the Soviet experts and staffed by a small number of inexperienced Libyan specialists and technicians. Known as the Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF), Libya conducted illegal uranium conversion experiments there. An unnamed nuclear weapon state, whose name has been kept secret by the IAEA, also allegedly assisted Libya in these experiments. Nuclear expert David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security said the Soviet Union and China were the most likely suspects. [3]

In 1984, Libya negotiated with the Soviet Union for a supply of nuclear power plants, but its out-of-date technology dissatisfied Colonel Gaddafi. Gaddafi negotiated with Belgium but the talks failed. In 1984, Libya negotiated with Japan for a pilot-scale uranium conversion facility. A Japanese company supplied Libya with the technology, and the sale was apparently arranged directly with the Japanese instead of through middlemen. [22]

In 1991, Libya tried to exploit the chaos generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to nuclear technology, expertise, and materials. [25] In 1992, it was reported by an official of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow claimed that Libya had unsuccessfully tried to recruit two of his colleagues to work at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center in Libya. [25] Other reports also suggested that Russian scientists had been hired to work on a covert Libyan nuclear program. [25] In March 1998, Russia and Libya signed a contract with the Russian consortium, the Atomenergoeksport for a partial overhaul of the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center. [26]

Dismantlement

The Clinton administration diplomat, Martin Indyk, maintained that the negotiations and diplomatic efforts rolling back Libyan nuclear program were started as early as Bill Clinton assuming the presidency in the 1990s. [26]

Chemical weapons

Libya under Gaddafi actively maintained a chemical weapons program, which was ostensibly decommissioned in the 2000s and early 2010s as Gaddafi sought to normalise relations with the Western world. Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention with effect on 5 February 2004, [5] and declared 24.7 metric tonnes of mustard gas, 1,390 metric tonnes of chemical precursors for making sarin, as well as 3,563 unloaded chemical weapon munitions (aerial bombs). [6] [7]

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) supervised the destruction of Libya's chemical weapons caches through February 2011, when it was forced to suspend its operations due to the uprising against Gaddafi and the resulting deterioration of the country's stability. By then, Libya had destroyed 40% of its precursor materials and 55% of its mustard gas, as well as 3,500 chemical weapon munitions. [27] In early September 2011, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü said reports he had received indicated that the remaining weapons were secure and had not fallen into the hands of militant groups. [28] A stockpile of mustard gas, which the OPCW reported the regime may have attempted to hide from inspectors overseeing the chemical weapons program's dismantlement, was reportedly found in the Jufra District by anti-Gaddafi fighters less than two weeks later. [29] In late September it was reported by the Wall Street Journal that a major ammunition complex, including chemical-weapons-capable artillery shells, was unguarded and open to looting. [30] In December 2012 a senior Spanish intelligence official said that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb "probably also has non-conventional arms, basically chemical, as a result of the loss of control of arsenals", with Libya the most likely source. [31]

Libya's National Transitional Council cooperated with the OPCW in the destruction of the remaining chemical weapons. [32] After assessing the chemical stockpiles, the OPCW set a deadline for the destruction of the weapons by the Libyan government. [33] As of September 2013, 1.6 metric tons of mustard blister agent loaded in artillery rounds, 2.5 metric tons of congealed mustard agent, and 846 metric tons of chemical weapons ingredients remained to be destroyed. [34]

According to The New York Times, in February 2014, the remnants of Libya's chemical weapons had been discreetly destroyed by the United States and Libya, using a transportable oven technology to destroy hundreds of bombs and artillery rounds filled with deadly mustard agent. [35] [36]

In September 2014, OPCW said Libya still had around 850 tonnes of industrial chemicals that could be used to produce chemical weapons. [37] In October 2014, Libya asked for foreign assistance to transport that stockpile of raw materials for making nerve gas out of Libya for destruction. [11] On 5 February 2015, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of OPCW agreed on the need to complete the destruction of the remaining precursor chemicals. [38]

On 21 February 2015, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that an anonymous Libyan army official stated extremists had seized large amounts of Gaddafi’s chemical weapons from multiple locations. The official warned that the targeted caches included mustard gas and sarin. [12] [39] [40] The North Africa Post later reported that chemical weapons were stolen by armed men who stormed the chemical factory in the Jufra district where the weapons were stored. Military sources reportedly stated that among the chemical weapons are mustard gas and sarin. [13] On 31 August 2016, the last stockpile of ingredients for chemical weapons in the country was removed to Germany to avoid it falling into the hands of militants and was slated for destruction. [41] Destruction of Libya's chemical weapon precursors was completed in November 2017. [14]

Ballistic missiles

Ranges of Hwasong-7, Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 Threat ranges of Libyan North Korean-built missiles.svg
Ranges of Hwasong-7, Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2

Libyan Army forces loyal to Gaddafi reportedly fired several Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles at areas in revolt against the regime, including Misrata and Ajdabiya, during the Libyan Civil War of 2011, but the weapons missed their targets. [42] [43] [44] Several more Scuds, with launchers, were found by anti-Gaddafi fighters near Tripoli and Sirte. [45] [46]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</span> International treaty to prevent spread of nuclear weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear proliferation</span> Spread of nuclear weapons

Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chemical warfare</span> Using poison gas or other toxins in war

Chemical warfare (CW) involves using the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons. This type of warfare is distinct from nuclear warfare, biological warfare and radiological warfare, which together make up CBRN, the military acronym for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, all of which are considered "weapons of mass destruction" (WMDs), a term that contrasts with conventional weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chemical Weapons Convention</span> Multilateral treaty prohibiting the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, is an arms control treaty administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an intergovernmental organization based in The Hague, The Netherlands. The treaty entered into force on 29 April 1997, and prohibits the large-scale use, development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons and their precursors, except for very limited purposes. The main obligation of member states under the convention is to effect this prohibition, as well as the destruction of all current chemical weapons. All destruction activities must take place under OPCW verification.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">North Korea and weapons of mass destruction</span>

North Korea has a military nuclear weapons program and, as of early 2020, is estimated to have an arsenal of approximately 30 to 40 nuclear weapons and sufficient production of fissile material for six to seven nuclear weapons per year. North Korea has also stockpiled a significant quantity of chemical and biological weapons. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since 2006, the country has been conducting a series of six nuclear tests at increasing levels of expertise, prompting the imposition of sanctions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iraq and weapons of mass destruction</span> Research and development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq

Iraq actively researched and later employed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from 1962 to 1991, when it destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile and halted its biological and nuclear weapon programs as required by the United Nations Security Council. The fifth president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was internationally condemned for his use of chemical weapons during the 1980s campaign against Iranian and Kurdish civilians during and after the Iran–Iraq War. In the 1980s, Saddam pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was built. After the Gulf War (1990–1991), the United Nations located and destroyed large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons and related equipment and materials; Iraq ceased its chemical, biological and nuclear programs.

The nuclear program of Iran is an ongoing scientific effort by Iran to research nuclear technology that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Iran has several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chemical weapon proliferation</span> Prevalence and spread of chemical weapons

Many nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical weapon agents despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them. Most states have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which required the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2012. Twelve nations have declared chemical weapons production facilities and six nations have declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. All of the declared production facilities have been destroyed or converted to civilian use after the treaty went into force.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iran and weapons of mass destruction</span> WMD programs in Iran

Iran is not known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of WMDs including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has first-hand knowledge of WMD effects—over 100,000 Iranian troops and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.

Pine Bluff Chemical Activity is a subordinate organization of the United States Army Chemical Materials Agency located at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The U.S. Army stored approximately twelve percent of its original chemical weapons at the Pine Bluff Arsenal since 1942. Destruction of the last chemical weapons occurred on November 12, 2010.

Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF), also known as EA-1251 or difluoro, is a chemical weapon precursor. Its chemical formula is CH3POF2. It is a Schedule 1 substance under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is used for production of sarin and soman as a component of binary chemical weapons; an example is the M687 artillery shell, where it is used together with a mixture of isopropyl alcohol and isopropyl amine, producing sarin.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Albania and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Albania once possessed a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This stockpile of chemical weapons included 16,678 kilograms (36,769 lb) of mustard gas, lewisite, adamsite, and phenacyl chloride (chloroacetophenone).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Syria and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Syria and weapons of mass destruction deals with the research, manufacture, stockpiling and alleged use by Syria of weapons of mass destruction, which include chemical and nuclear weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sweden and weapons of mass destruction</span> Cold War-era nuclear weapons strategy in Sweden

During the late 1940s and 1950s, Sweden had programs for both nuclear and chemical weapons. During the first decades of the Cold War, a nuclear weapons program was active.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chemical weapon</span> Device that uses chemicals to kill or harm individuals

A chemical weapon (CW) is a specialized munition that uses chemicals formulated to inflict death or harm on humans. According to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), this can be any chemical compound intended as a weapon "or its precursor that can cause death, injury, temporary incapacitation or sensory irritation through its chemical action. Munitions or other delivery devices designed to deliver chemical weapons, whether filled or unfilled, are also considered weapons themselves."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Disarmament of Libya</span>

The Libyan disarmament issue was peacefully resolved in December 2003 when Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi agreed to eliminate his country's weapons of mass destruction program, including a decades-old nuclear weapons program. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Libya's nuclear program was "in the very initial stages of development" at the time.

The United States chemical weapons program began in 1917 during World War I with the creation of the U.S. Army's Gas Service Section and ended 73 years later in 1990 with the country's practical adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons began in 1985 and is still ongoing. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, continues to operate.

Syria's chemical weapons program began in the 1970s with weapons and training from Egypt and the Soviet Union, with production of chemical weapons in Syria beginning in the mid-1980s. For some time, Syria was believed to have the world's third-largest stockpile of chemical weapons, after the United States and Russia. Prior to September 2013 Syria had not publicly admitted to possessing chemical weapons, although Western intelligence services believed it to hold one of the world's largest stockpiles. In September 2013, French intelligence put the Syrian stockpile at 1,000 tonnes, including Yperite, VX and "several hundred tonnes of sarin". At the time, Syria was one of a handful of states which had not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. In September 2013, Syria joined the CWC, and agreed to the destruction of its weapons, to be supervised by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as required by the convention. A joint OPCW-United Nations mission was established to oversee the destruction process. Syria joined OPCW after international condemnation of the August 2013 Ghouta chemical attack, for which Western states held the Syrian government responsible and agreed to the prompt destruction of its chemical weapons, resulting in U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry declaring on 20 July 2014: "we struck a deal where we got 100 percent of the chemical weapons out." The destruction of Syria's chemical weapons that the Assad government had declared was completed by August 2014, yet further disclosures, incomplete documentation, and allegations of withholding part of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile since mean that serious concerns regarding chemical weapons and related sites in Syria remain. On 5 April 2017, the government of Syria allegedly unleashed a chemical attack that killed 70 civilians. A suspected chemical attack on Douma on 9 April 2018 that killed at least 49 civilians has been blamed on the Syrian Government.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Destruction of Syria's chemical weapons</span> Part of the Syrian peace process

The destruction of Syria's chemical weapons began on 14 September 2013 after Syria entered into several international agreements which called for the elimination of Syria's chemical weapon stockpiles and set a destruction deadline of 30 June 2014. Also on 14 September 2013, Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and agreed to its provisional application pending its entry into force on 14 October. Having acceded to the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council on 27 September approved a detailed implementation plan that required Syria to assume responsibility for and follow a timeline for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and Syrian chemical weapon production facilities. Following the signing of the Framework Agreement on 14 September 2013 and after the OPCW implementation plan, on 27 September the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118 which bound Syria to the timetable set out in the OPCW implementation plan. The joint OPCW-UN mission was established to oversee the implementation of the destruction program.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Muthana State Establishment</span>

Muthana State Establishment or Muthanna was Iraq's main chemical weapons research, development, and production facility. It is located in Saladin Governorate 40 km south west of Samarra, 140 km north west of Baghdad. This mega facility covering an area 100 km², contained three main production areas.

References

  1. 1 2 3 Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States, Arms Control Association.
  2. ↑ News Update on IAEA & Libya Archived 2012-03-28 at the Wayback Machine , Chronology of Key Events, (December 2003 - September 2008), International Atomic Energy Agency.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Rohlfing, Joan. "Libya: Nuclear Programme Overview". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 11 August 2011.
  4. ↑ GOV/2004/12, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004.
  5. 1 2 The Chemical Weapons Convention Enters Into Force in Libya, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2 February 2004.
  6. 1 2 OPCW, Libya: Facts and Figures Archived 2013-09-27 at the Wayback Machine
  7. 1 2 "Libya's CW Capabilities" (PDF). June 2011.
  8. ↑ "Libya Completes Destruction of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons". OPCW. 4 February 2014.
  9. ↑ Zanders, Jean Pascal (19 May 2011). "Destroying Libya's Chemical Weapons: Deadlines and Delays". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Retrieved 13 August 2011.
  10. ↑ Zanders, Jean Pascal (May 19, 2011). "Uprising in Libya: The False Specter of Chemical Warfare". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Retrieved 13 August 2011.
  11. 1 2 "NBC Weapons: Libya Needs Help To Be Gas Free". StrategyPage.com. 30 October 2014.
  12. 1 2 "Libya militias capture chemical weapons: army official". Asharq Al-Awsat . 21 February 2015.
  13. 1 2 "Libya: Unidentified armed men attack chemical factory, flee with chemical weapons". The North Africa Post . 23 February 2015.
  14. 1 2 "OPCW Director-General Praises Complete Destruction of Libya's Chemical Weapon Stockpile". www.opcw.org. Retrieved 2018-02-10.
  15. ↑ "UNODA Treaties". treaties.unoda.org.
  16. ↑ "The Program begins: 1968". NTI. 2003. Retrieved 24 April 2013.
  17. 1 2 The Risk Report Volume 1 Number 10 (December 1995) Page 1, 3-4. "Libya Has Trouble Building the Most Deadly Weapons". The Risk Report Volume 1 Number 10 (December 1995) Page 1, 3-4. Wisconsin Project reports. Archived from the original on 20 April 2013. Retrieved 24 April 2013.
  18. 1 2 Nazi, Nazir Naji (2010). "Colonel Gaddafi's Libya and his Nuclear ambitions". Nazir Nazi and Jang Group of Media.{{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
  19. 1 2 3 Stengel, Richard (3 June 1985). "Who has the Bomb?". Time . pp. 7/13. Archived from the original on 3 June 1985. Retrieved 23 February 2011.
  20. ↑ "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China". Washington Post . 2004-02-15. Retrieved 2020-01-01.
  21. ↑ "China 'link' to Libya nuke design". BBC. 2004-02-16. Retrieved 2020-01-01.
  22. 1 2 3 Pike, John E. "Libyan nuclear programme". Global Security. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
  23. ↑ The Iraq War did not Force Gadaffi's Hand | Brookings Institution
  24. ↑ Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Nonproliferation Review 4, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 97.
  25. 1 2 3 jack Kelley, "Russian Nuke Experts Wooed," USA Today, 8 January 1992; "Libya Denies Offers to Soviets," Washington Post, 11 January 1992.
  26. 1 2 Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.
  27. ↑ Nuclear Threat Initiative, 30 September 2011, Senate Delegation Positive About Security of Libyan WMD Materials
  28. ↑ "Libya: Chemical Weapons Secure According To U.N. Watchdog". The Huffington Post. 7 September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
  29. ↑ Black, Ian (22 September 2011). "Libyan rebels discover Gaddafi's chemical weapons". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
  30. ↑ Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3 October 2011, Libyan Weapons Depot Unguarded, Open to Looters
  31. ↑ Daily Telegraph , 10 December 2012, Al Qaeda may have chemical weapons, Spain's counter-terror chief warns
  32. ↑ Libya's NTC pledges to destroy chemical weapons: OPCW
  33. ↑ Chemical weapons inspectors to return to Libya
  34. ↑ Barnes, Diane (11 September 2013). "Destruction of Libyan Chemical-Loaded Arms Remains on Hold". Global Security Newswire (NTI). Retrieved 26 October 2013.
  35. ↑ "Libya's Cache of Toxic Arms All Destroyed". New York Times. 2 February 2014. Retrieved 4 February 2014.
  36. ↑ Text by FRANCE 24. "Libya destroys last of Gaddafi's chemical weapons – France". France 24. Archived from the original on 5 February 2014. Retrieved 5 February 2014.
  37. ↑ "Libya asks chemical weapons watchdog to remove stockpile". Daily Times . 24 September 2014. Retrieved 27 September 2014.
  38. ↑ "Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Visits the OPCW". OPCW . 5 February 2015.
  39. ↑ "Report: Chemical weapons in Libya 'seized by extremists'". i24news . 21 February 2015.
  40. ↑ "Libyan Army official tells Arab paper that militias captured chemical weapons". The Jerusalem Post . 22 February 2015.
  41. ↑ "Libya hands over last stockpile of chemical weapon ingredients". The Guardian . 1 September 2016.
  42. ↑ "Libya conflict: Gaddafi forces 'launched Scud missile'". BBC News. 16 August 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
  43. ↑ "Gadhafi's Forces Fired 3 Scuds at Misrata: NATO". DefenseNews. 23 August 2011. Archived from the original on July 29, 2012. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
  44. ↑ "Libyan Rebels Advance on Sirte Amid Protests Over Appointments". San Francisco Chronicle. 29 August 2011. Archived from the original on 7 September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
  45. ↑ "Gaddafi missiles could be scrapped". IOL News. 22 September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
  46. ↑ "Scud missile battery sits unguarded outside Tripoli". TVNZ. 5 September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.