Coercion (international relations)

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In international relations, coercion refers to the imposition of costs by a state on other states and non-state actors to prevent them from taking an action (deterrence) or to compel them to take an action (compellence). [1] [2] [3] Coercion frequently takes the form of threats or the use of limited military force. [4] It is commonly seen as analytically distinct from persuasion (which may not necessarily involve the imposition of costs), brute force (which may not be intended to shape the adversary's behavior), or full-on war (which involves the use of full military force). [1] [5] [3]

Contents

Coercion takes the form of either deterrence or compellence. Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence because of difficulties in getting actors to withdraw actions. [3] [2] One influential typology of coercion distinguishes between strategies to punish an adversary, raise the risk for an adversary, or deny the adversary from achieving their objectives. [3] [2] Successful instances of coercive diplomacy in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states, [6] [7] [3] whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence [8] and future compellence. [9]

Successful coercive diplomacy entails clearly communicated threats, a cost-benefit calculus, credibility, and reassurance. [10] It frequently revolves around a demonstration of capabilities and resolve, both of which enhance the credibility of attempts to coerce others. Scholars have identified several factors as contributing to successful coercion, such as power, interests, [11] reputation, [8] [9] credibility, resolve, and ability to signal. [12]

Definition

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define coercion as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force". [4]

Robert Pape uses the term coercion as a synonym for compellence. [2]

Coercion

Thomas Schelling and Robert Pape distinguished between coercive strategies that sought to:

  1. Punish: Raise the costs for the adversary
  2. Risk: Raise the probability of future costs for the adversary
  3. Deny: Prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives. [3] [2]

Pape also added the strategy of decapitation, which typically entails targeting leaders. [2] Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran distinguish between two punishment strategies: (i) Coercive victimization (which raises the costs of war for a government by targeting its civilians) and (ii) Eliminationist victimization (which removes civilians from territory). [13]

According to Richard Ned Lebow, successful coercion tends to involve: [14]

  1. A formulated commitment
  2. A communication of that commitment to the other side
  3. The capability to back up the commitment
  4. The will to back up the commitment

According to Robert Art, the perquisites for coercion success are: [15]

  1. Clear objectives
  2. Strong motivation
  3. Domestic and international support
  4. Strong leadership
  5. Clearly stated demands
  6. Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
  7. Making the target fear unacceptable escalation
  8. Asymmetry in motivation

Deterrence

Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to dissuade an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo). [16] [17]

Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. [18] Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about nuclear weapons. [17]

Compellence

Compellence is the attempt to get an actor to change its behavior through threats to use of force or the actual use of limited force. As distinguished from deterrence theory, which is a strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo (dissuading adversaries from undertaking an action), compellence entails efforts to change the status quo (persuading an opponent to change their behavior).

Credibility

Credibility in international relations refers to the perceived likelihood that a leader or a state follows through on threats and promises that have been made. [19] Credibility is a key component of coercive diplomacy and deterrence, as well as the functioning of military alliances. Credibility is related to concepts such as reputation (how past behavior shapes perceptions of an actor's tendencies) and resolve (the willingness to stand firm while incurring costs).

Credibility may be determined through assessments of past reputation, [8] [9] [20] current interests, [11] and signaling. [12] Misperception and miscommunication can lead to erroneous assessments of credibility. [21] Assessments of reputation may be linked to specific leaders, [22] [23] as well as states. Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes. [11] [24]

Credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint. [25] One of the main problems in coercive diplomacy is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment. [25] [26] [27] [28] If the coerced state perceives that it will be punished regardless of whether it complies or not, then that might increase the likelihood of non-compliance. [25] [26] [27] [28]

Some scholarship suggests that the credibility of threats is enhanced by costly signaling, which means that the threats themselves incur costs, which signify that the threats are genuine. [29] Other scholars argue that sunk-cost signaling is exceedingly rare in practice, as states prefer to signal credibility and resolve in other ways. [30]

Some scholars argue that incurring audience costs effectively enhance the credibility of threats. [31] [32] [33] Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility. [34] [35]

Related Research Articles

Coercion involves compelling a party to act in an involuntary manner by the use of threats, including threats to use force against that party. It involves a set of forceful actions which violate the free will of an individual in order to induce a desired response. These actions may include extortion, blackmail, or even torture and sexual assault.

Regime change is the partly forcible or coercive replacement of one government regime with another. Regime change may replace all or part of the state's most critical leadership system, administrative apparatus, or bureaucracy. Regime change may occur through domestic processes, such as revolution, coup, or reconstruction of government following state failure or civil war. It can also be imposed on a country by foreign actors through invasion, overt or covert interventions, or coercive diplomacy. Regime change may entail the construction of new institutions, the restoration of old institutions, and the promotion of new ideologies.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ultimatum</span> Final demand backed up by a threat

An ultimatum is a demand whose fulfillment is requested in a specified period of time and which is backed up by a threat to be followed through in case of noncompliance. An ultimatum is generally the final demand in a series of requests. As such, the time allotted is usually short, and the request is understood not to be open to further negotiation. The threat which backs up the ultimatum can vary depending on the demand in question and on the other circumstances.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Military alliance</span> Alliance between different states with the purpose to cooperate militarily

A military alliance is a formal agreement between nations that specifies mutual obligations regarding national security. In the event a nation is attacked, members of the alliance are often obligated to come to their defense regardless if attacked directly. Military alliances can be classified into defense pacts, non-aggression pacts, and ententes. Alliances may be covert or public.

In international relations, the liberal international order (LIO), also known as rules-based order(RBO), describes a set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on political liberalism, economic liberalism and liberal internationalism since the late 1940s. More specifically, it entails international cooperation through multilateral institutions and is constituted by human equality, open markets, security cooperation, promotion of liberal democracy, and monetary cooperation. The order was established in the aftermath of World War II, led in large part by the United States.

International political economy (IPE) is the study of how politics shapes the global economy and how the global economy shapes politics. A key focus in IPE is on the power of different actors such as nation states, international organizations and multinational corporations to shape the international economic system and the distributive consequences of international economic activity. It has been described as the study of "the political battle between the winners and losers of global economic exchange."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deterrence theory</span> Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons

Deterrence theory refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats of using force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some other course of action. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to but distinct from the concept of mutual assured destruction, according to which a full-scale nuclear attack on a power with second-strike capability would devastate both parties. The central problem of deterrence revolves around how to credibly threaten military action or nuclear punishment on the adversary despite its costs to the deterrer. Deterrence in an international relations context is the application of deterrence theory to avoid conflict.

Economic interdependence is the mutual dependence of the participants in an economic system who trade in order to obtain the products they cannot produce efficiently for themselves. Such trading relationships require that the behavior of a participant affects its trading partners and it would be costly to rupture their relationship. The subject was addressed by A. A. Cournot who wrote: "...but in reality the economic system is a whole in which all of the parts are connected and react on one another. An increase in the income of the producers of commodity A will affect the demands for commodities B, C, etc. and the incomes of their producers, and by its reaction will affect the demand for commodity A." Economic Interdependence is evidently a consequence of the division of labour.

In international relations theory, the concept of anarchy is the idea that the world lacks any supreme authority or sovereignty. In an anarchic state, there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce law, or order the system of international politics. In international relations, anarchy is widely accepted as the starting point for international relations theory.

Liberal institutionalism is a theory of international relations that holds that international cooperation between states is feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can reduce conflict and competition. Neoliberalism is a revised version of liberalism. Alongside neorealism, liberal institutionalism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations.

The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, or commercial peace, posits that market openness contributes to more peaceful behavior among states, and that developed market-oriented economies are less likely to engage in conflict with one another. Along with the democratic peace theory and institutionalist arguments for peace, the commercial peace forms part of the Kantian tripod for peace. Prominent mechanisms for the commercial peace revolve around how capitalism, trade interdependence, and capital interdependence raise the costs of warfare, incentivize groups to lobby against war, make it harder for leaders to go to war, and reduce the economic benefits of conquest.

An audience cost, in international relations theory, is the domestic political cost that leaders incur from their constituency if they escalate a foreign policy crisis and are then seen as backing down. It is considered to be one of the potential mechanisms for democratic peace theory. It is associated with rational choice scholarship in international relations.

In international relations theory, the bargaining model of war is a method of representing the potential gains and losses and ultimate outcome of war between two actors as a bargaining interaction. A central puzzle that motivates research in this vein is the "inefficiency puzzle of war": why do wars occur when it would be better for all parties involved to reach an agreement that goes short of war? In the bargaining model, war between rational actors is possible due to uncertainty and commitment problems. As a result, provision of reliable information and steps to alleviate commitment problems make war less likely. It is an influential strand of rational choice scholarship in the field of international relations.

Compellence is a form of coercion that attempts to get an actor to change its behavior through threats to use force or the actual use of limited force. Compellence can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."

In international relations, international order refers to patterned or structured relationships between actors on the international level.

In international relations, migration diplomacy is 'the use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility,' including 'both the strategic use of migration flows as a means to obtain other aims, and the use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to migration.' Migration has come to constitute an increasingly-important area of states' engagement with one another, with bilateral multilateral strategies including the promotion or discouragement of bilateral migratory flows; agreements on preferential treatment to certain foreign nationals; the initiation of guest-worker programmes or other short-term labor migration schemes; the deportation of foreign nationals; and so on.

Constructivism presumes that ethnic identities are shapeable and affected by politics. Through this framework, constructivist theories reassesses conventional political science dogmas. Research indicates that institutionalized cleavages and a multiparty system discourage ethnic outbidding and identification with tribal, localized groups. In addition, constructivism questions the widespread belief that ethnicity inherently inhibits national, macro-scale identification. To prove this point, constructivist findings suggest that modernization, language consolidation, and border-drawing, weakened the tendency to identify with micro-scale identity categories. One manifestation of ethnic politics gone awry, ethnic violence, is itself not seen as necessarily ethnic, since it attains its ethnic meaning as a conflict progresses.

Rational choice is a prominent framework in international relations scholarship. Rational choice is not a substantive theory of international politics, but rather a methodological approach that focuses on certain types of social explanation for phenomena. In that sense, it is similar to constructivism, and differs from liberalism and realism, which are substantive theories of world politics. Rationalist analyses have been used to substantiate realist theories, as well as liberal theories of international relations.

Gender in security studies is a subfield of international relations and comparative politics. Feminist security studies and queer security studies have provided a gender lens which shows that the study of wars, conflicts, and the institutions involved in peace and security decision-making cannot be done fully without examining the role of gender and sexuality. Praising of masculine qualities has created a hierarchy of power and gender where femininity is looked down upon. Institutions reflect these power dynamics, creating systemic obstacles where women, who are seen as less capable than men, are prevented from holding high positions. Evolutionary theory and political sociology provides an understanding of how institutions like the patriarchy were created and how perceptions around national security formed between men and women.

In international relations, credibility is the perceived likelihood that a leader or a state follows through on threats and promises that have been made. Credibility is a key component of coercion, as well as the functioning of military alliances. Credibility is related to concepts such as reputation and resolve. Reputation for resolve may be a key component of credibility, but credibility is also highly context-dependent.

References

  1. 1 2 Greenhill, Kelly M.; Krause, Peter (2018). Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-084633-6.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pape, Robert A. (1996). Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1 ed.). Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-0-8014-3134-0. JSTOR   10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. ISBN   978-0-300-00221-8. JSTOR   j.ctt5vm52s.
  4. 1 2 Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might New York. Cambridge University Press. 2002.
  5. ↑ Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. SAGE Publications. pp. 26–30. ISBN   978-0-8039-0819-2.
  6. ↑ Zhang, Ketian (2019). "Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea". International Security. 44 (1): 117–159. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00354. ISSN   0162-2889. S2CID   198952376.
  7. ↑ Miller, Nicholas L. (2014). "The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions". International Organization. 68 (4): 913–944. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000216. ISSN   0020-8183. S2CID   154519741.
  8. 1 2 3 Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi: 10.1017/S0020818314000393 . ISSN   0020-8183.
  9. 1 2 3 Peterson, Timothy M. (2013). "Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior". International Studies Quarterly. 57 (4): 672–682. doi: 10.1111/isqu.12017 . ISSN   0020-8833.
  10. ↑ Borghard, Erica D.; Lonergan, Shawn W. (2017). "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace". Security Studies. 26 (3): 452–481. doi:10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396. ISSN   0963-6412. S2CID   46356854.
  11. 1 2 3 Press, Daryl G. (2007). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-0-8014-7415-6.
  12. 1 2 Fearon, James D. (1997). "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41 (1): 68–90. doi:10.1177/0022002797041001004. ISSN   0022-0027. S2CID   42473249.
  13. ↑ Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, "It’s a Crime, but Is It a Blunder? Investigating the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization," in Civilians and Warfare in History, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 288-312.
  14. ↑ Lebow, Richard Ned (1981). Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN   978-0-8018-2311-4.
  15. ↑ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC.
  16. ↑ Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. SAGE Publications. pp. 26–30. ISBN   978-0-8039-0819-2.
  17. 1 2 Gartzke, Eric; Lindsay, Jon R. (2019). Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190908645.001.0001. ISBN   978-0-19-090960-4.
  18. ↑ Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015). The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 3. ISBN   978-1-4422-3306-5.
  19. ↑ Jervis, Robert; Yarhi-Milo, Keren; Casler, Don (2021). "Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship". World Politics. 73 (1): 167–203. doi:10.1017/S0043887120000246. ISSN   0043-8871. S2CID   230529327.
  20. ↑ Reiter, Dan (1996). Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-0-8014-3188-3.
  21. ↑ Jervis, Robert (2017). Perception and Misperception in International Politics (new ed.). Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-1-4008-8511-4.
  22. ↑ Renshon, Jonathan; Dafoe, Allan; Huth, Paul (2018). "Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics". American Journal of Political Science. 62 (2): 325–339. doi:10.1111/ajps.12335. ISSN   1540-5907. S2CID   158373803.
  23. ↑ Lupton, Danielle L. (2020). Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-1-5017-4773-1.
  24. ↑ Mercer, Jonathan (2010). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-0-8014-7489-7.
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  26. 1 2 Bowen, Wyn; Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Moran, Matthew (2020). "The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the "Resolve plus Bombs" Formula". Security Studies. 29 (5): 797–831. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130 . ISSN   0963-6412.
  27. 1 2 Sechser, Todd S. (2010). "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power". International Organization. 64 (4): 627–660. doi:10.1017/S0020818310000214. ISSN   0020-8183. JSTOR   40930451. S2CID   46107608.
  28. 1 2 Pauly, Reid B. C. (2024). "Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Assurance Dilemma in International Coercion". International Security. 49 (1): 91–132. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00488. ISSN   0162-2889.
  29. ↑ Gartzke, Erik A.; Carcelli, Shannon; Gannon, J. Andres; Zhang, Jiakun Jack (2017). "Signaling in Foreign Policy". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.481. ISBN   978-0-19-022863-7. Archived from the original on 2018-11-28.
  30. ↑ Altman, Dan; Quek, Kai (2024). "Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve?". Journal of Global Security Studies.
  31. ↑ Fearon, James D. (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". The American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. ISSN   0003-0554. JSTOR   2944796. S2CID   36315471.
  32. ↑ Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658. ISBN   978-0-521-79227-1.
  33. ↑ Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94". American Political Science Review. 95 (3): 633–647. doi:10.1017/S0003055401003148. ISSN   0003-0554. S2CID   146346368.
  34. ↑ Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012). "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility". International Organization. 66 (3): 457–489. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000161. ISSN   0020-8183. JSTOR   23279964. S2CID   154325372.
  35. ↑ Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011). "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound". American Political Science Review. 105 (3): 437–456. doi:10.1017/s000305541100027x. ISSN   0003-0554. S2CID   144584619.
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