Neorealism (international relations)

Last updated

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that emphasizes the role of power politics in international relations, sees competition and conflict as enduring features and sees limited potential for cooperation. [1] The anarchic state of the international system means that states cannot be certain of other states' intentions and their security, thus prompting them to engage in power politics.

Contents

It was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics . [2] Alongside neoliberalism, neorealism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations; the two perspectives dominated international relations theory from the 1960s to the 1990s. [3]

Neorealism emerged from the North American discipline of political science, and reformulates the classical realist tradition of E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Neorealism is subdivided into defensive and offensive neorealism. [4]

Origins

Neorealism is an ideological departure from Hans Morgenthau's writing on classical realism. Classical realism originally explained the machinations of international politics as being based on human nature and therefore subject to the ego and emotion of world leaders. [5] Neorealist thinkers instead propose that structural constraints—not strategy, egoism, or motivation—will determine behavior in international relations. John Mearsheimer made significant distinctions between his version of offensive neorealism and Morgenthau in his book titled The Tragedy of Great Power Politics . [6] [ circular reference ]

Theory

Structural realism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle (anarchy), units of the system (states), and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system), with only the last being considered an independent variable with any meaningful change over time. [7] The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal central authority; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. These states act according to the logic of egoism, meaning states seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states. [8]

States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals. [7] This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures states develop offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and as a means to increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their survival. [9] This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma. [8]

States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other, resulting in a 'balance of power', which shapes international relations. It also gives rise to the 'security dilemma' that all nations face. There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances. [10]

Neorealism sees states as "black boxes," as the structure of the international system is emphasized rather than the units and their unique characteristics within it as being causal. [11]

Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system. A unipolar system contains only one great power, a bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than two great powers. Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances. [12] Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar system, rather than external balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations and therefore less chance of great power war. [13] That is a simplification and a theoretical ideal. [14]

Neorealists argue that processes of emulation and competition lead states to behave in the aforementioned ways. Emulation leads states to adopt the behaviors of successful states (for example, those victorious in war), whereas competition leads states to vigilantly ensure their security and survival through the best means possible. [15] [16] Due to the anarchic nature of the international system and the inability of states to rely on other states or organizations, states have to engage in "self-help." [7] [17]

For neorealists, social norms are considered largely irrelevant. [18] [19] This is in contrast to some classical realists which did see norms as potentially important. [20] Neorealists are also skeptical of the ability of international organizations to act independently in the international system and facilitate cooperation between states. [7] [19]

Defensive realism

Structural realism has become divided into two branches, defensive and offensive realism, following the publication of Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics in 2001. Waltz's original formulation of neorealism is now sometimes called defensive realism, while Mearsheimer's modification of the theory is referred to as offensive realism. Both branches agree that the structure of the system is what causes states to compete, but defensive realism posits that most states concentrate on maintaining their security (i.e. states are security maximizers), while offensive realism claims that all states seek to gain as much power as possible (i.e. states are power maximizers). [17] A foundational study in the area of defensive realism is Robert Jervis' classic 1978 article on the "security dilemma." It examines how uncertainty and the offense-defense balance may heighten or soften the security dilemma. [21] Building on Jervis, Stephen Van Evera explores the causes of war from a defensive realist perspective. [22]

Offensive realism

Offensive realism, developed by Mearsheimer differs in the amount of power that states desire. Mearsheimer proposes that states maximize relative power ultimately aiming for regional hegemony. [17]

In addition to Mearsheimer, a number of other scholars have sought to explain why states expand when opportunities to do so arise. For instance, Randall Schweller refers to states' revisionist agendas to account for their aggressive military action. [23] Eric Labs investigates the expansion of war aims during wartime as an example of offensive behavior. [24] Fareed Zakaria analyzes the history of US foreign relations from 1865 to 1914 and asserts that foreign interventions during this period were not motivated by worries about external threats but by a desire to expand US influence. [25]

Scholarly debate

Within realist thought

While neorealists agree that the structure of the international relations is the primary impetus in seeking security, there is disagreement among neorealist scholars as to whether states merely aim to survive or whether states want to maximize their relative power. [26] [17] The former represents the ideas of Kenneth Waltz, while the latter represents the ideas of John Mearsheimer and offensive realism. Other debates include the extent to which states balance against power (in Waltz's original neorealism and classic realism), versus the extent to which states balance against threats (as introduced in Stephen Walt's 'The Origins of Alliances' (1987)), or balance against competing interests (as introduced in Randall Schweller's 'Deadly Imbalances' (1998)).

With other schools of thought

Neorealists conclude that because war is an effect of the anarchic structure of the international system, it is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, neorealists often argue that the ordering principle of the international system has not fundamentally changed from the time of Thucydides to the advent of nuclear warfare. The view that long-lasting peace is not likely to be achieved is described by other theorists as a largely pessimistic view of international relations. One of the main challenges to neorealist theory is the democratic peace theory and supporting research, such as the book Never at War . Neorealists answer this challenge by arguing that democratic peace theorists tend to pick and choose the definition of democracy to achieve the desired empirical result. For example, the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Dominican Republic of Juan Bosch, and the Chile of Salvador Allende are not considered to be "democracies of the right kind" or the conflicts do not qualify as wars according to these theorists. Furthermore, they claim several wars between democratic states have been averted only by causes other than ones covered by democratic peace theory. [27]

Advocates of democratic peace theory see the spreading of democracy as helping to mitigate the effects of anarchy. [28] With enough democracies in the world, Bruce Russett thinks that it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice ... since at least the seventeenth century." [29] John Mueller believes that it is not the spreading of democracy but rather other conditions (e.g., power) that bring about democracy and peace. [30] In consenting with Mueller's argument, Kenneth Waltz notes that "some of the major democracies—Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century—have been among the most powerful states of their eras." [30]

One of the most notable schools contending with neorealist thought, aside from neoliberalism, is the constructivist school, which is often seen to disagree with the neorealist focus on power and instead emphasises a focus on ideas and identity as an explanatory point for international relations trends. Recently, however, a school of thought called the English School merges neo-realist tradition with the constructivist technique of analyzing social norms to provide an increasing scope of analysis for international relations.

Criticism

Neorealism has been criticized from various directions. Other major paradigms of international relations scholarship, such as liberal and constructivist approaches have criticized neorealist scholarship in terms of theory and empirics. Within realism, classical realists [31] and neoclassical realists [32] have also challenged some aspects of neorealism.

Among the issues that neorealism has been criticized over is the neglect of domestic politics, [33] [34] race, [35] [36] gains from trade, [37] the pacifying effects of institutions, [38] and the relevance of regime type for foreign policy behavior. [39]

David Strang argues that neorealist predictions fail to account for transformations in sovereignty over time and across regions. These transformations in sovereignty have had implications for cooperation and competition, as polities that were recognized as sovereign have seen considerably greater stability. [40]

In response to criticisms that neorealism lacks relevance for contemporary international policy and does a poor job explaining the foreign policy behavior of major powers, Charles Glaser wrote in 2003, "this is neither surprising nor a serious problem, because scholars who use a realist lens to understand international politics can, and have, without inconsistency or contradiction also employed other theories to understand issues that fall outside realism's central focus." [41]

Notable neorealists

See also

Notes

  1. Jervis, Robert (1999). "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate". International Security. 24 (1): 42–63. doi:10.1162/016228899560040. ISSN   0162-2889. JSTOR   2539347. S2CID   57572295.
  2. According to Sagan 2004 , p. 91 n.4, Waltz's book remains "the seminal text of neorealism".
  3. Powell 1994 , p. 313.
  4. "Security Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered". ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu. Retrieved 2023-07-31.
  5. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Edition, Revised. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4–15)
  6. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
  7. 1 2 3 4 Waltz, Kenneth (2003). "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics". International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 6th Edition.
  8. 1 2 Mearsheimer, John J. (2014). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: Norton. pp.  3. ISBN   978-0393020250. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) The absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other (anarchy), 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions. Given this fear - which can never be wholly eliminated - states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival.
  9. Rosato, Sebastian (2021). Intentions in Great Power Politics: Uncertainty and the Roots of Conflict. Yale University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9. ISBN   978-0-300-25302-3. JSTOR   j.ctv1k03gb9. S2CID   233588498.
  10. Waltz 2000
  11. Kapstein, Ethan B. (1995). de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno; Lalman, David; Rosecrance, Richard; Stein, Arthur A.; Snyder, Jack (eds.). "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics" . International Organization. 49 (4): 751–774. doi:10.1017/S0020818300028502. ISSN   0020-8183. JSTOR   2706925. S2CID   143895142.
  12. Waltz 1979 , pp. 132–3.
  13. Waltz 1979 , p. 133.
  14. Humphreys 2012.
  15. Waltz 1979.
  16. Posen, Barry R. (1993). "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power". International Security. 18 (2): 80–124. doi:10.2307/2539098. ISSN   0162-2889. JSTOR   2539098. S2CID   154935234.
  17. 1 2 3 4 Mearsheimer 2001.
  18. Sandholtz, Wayne; Stiles, Kendall W. (2009). International Norms and Cycles of Change. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN   978-0-19-538008-8.
  19. 1 2 Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). "The False Promise of International Institutions". International Security. 19 (3): 5–49. doi:10.2307/2539078. ISSN   0162-2889. JSTOR   2539078. S2CID   153472054.
  20. Carr, Edward H. (1939). Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. Harper Collins. ISBN   978-0-06-131122-2.
  21. Jervis, Robert (1978). "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30 (2): 167–214.
  22. Van Evera, Stephen (1999). Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  23. Schweller, Randall L. (1994). "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." International Security 19 (1): 72–107.
  24. Labs, Eric J. (1997). "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims." Security Studies 6 (4): 1–49.
  25. Zakaria, Fareed (1998). From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  26. Mearsheimer 1995 , p. 11 n.27, 16 n.27.
  27. Waltz 2001 , pp. 5–41.
  28. Waltz 2000 , p. 4.
  29. Russett 1993 , p. 24.
  30. 1 2 Waltz 2000 , p. 9.
  31. Kirshner, Jonathan (2015). "The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative". World Politics. 67 (1): 155–183. doi:10.1017/S0043887114000318. ISSN   0043-8871. S2CID   146756741.
  32. Rose, Gideon (1998). "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy". World Politics. 51 (1): 144–172. doi:10.1017/S0043887100007814. ISSN   0043-8871. JSTOR   25054068. S2CID   154361851.
  33. Milner, Helen V. (2020-06-30). Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-0-691-21449-8.
  34. Milner, Helen (1991). "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique". Review of International Studies. 17 (1): 67–85. doi:10.1017/S026021050011232X. ISSN   0260-2105. JSTOR   20097244. S2CID   145793567.
  35. Freeman, Bianca; Kim, D.G.; Lake, David A. (2022-05-11). "Race in International Relations: Beyond the "Norm Against Noticing"". Annual Review of Political Science. 25 (1): annurev–polisci–051820-120746. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051820-120746. ISSN   1094-2939. S2CID   244446582.
  36. Maass, Richard W. (2020). The Picky Eagle: How Democracy and Xenophobia Limited U.S. Territorial Expansion. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-1-5017-4875-2.
  37. Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics". International Organization. 51 (4): 513–553. doi:10.1162/002081897550447. ISSN   1531-5088. S2CID   7058364.
  38. Keohane, Robert O. (2005). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-1-4008-2026-9.
  39. Owen, John M (2004). "Democratic Peace Research: Whence and Whither?". International Politics. 41 (4): 605–617. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800096. ISSN   1740-3898. S2CID   144053631.
  40. Strang, David (1991). "Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: realist and institutional accounts" . International Organization. 45 (2): 143–162. doi:10.1017/S002081830003304X. ISSN   1531-5088. S2CID   154734299.
  41. Glaser, Charles L. (2003). "Structural Realism in a more complex world" . Review of International Studies. 29 (3): 403–414. doi:10.1017/S0260210503004030. ISSN   1469-9044. S2CID   36248283.

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">International relations</span> Study of relationships between two or more states

International relations (IR) are the interactions among sovereign states. The scientific study of those interactions is also referred to as international studies, international politics, or international affairs. In a broader sense, the study of IR, in addition to multilateral relations, concerns all activities among states—such as war, diplomacy, trade, and foreign policy—as well as relations with and among other international actors, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), international legal bodies, and multinational corporations (MNCs). There are several schools of thought within IR, of which the most prominent are realism, liberalism, constructivism, and rationalism.

International relations theory is the study of international relations (IR) from a theoretical perspective. It seeks to explain behaviors and outcomes in international politics. The four most prominent schools of thought are realism, liberalism, constructivism, and rational choice. Whereas realism and liberalism make broad and specific predictions about international relations, constructivism and rational choice are methodological approaches that focus on certain types of social explanation for phenomena.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hans Morgenthau</span> American political scientist (1904–1980)

Hans Joachim Morgenthau was a German-American jurist and political scientist who was one of the major 20th-century figures in the study of international relations. Morgenthau's works belong to the tradition of realism in international relations theory; he is usually considered among the most influential realists of the post-World War II period. Morgenthau made landmark contributions to international relations theory and the study of international law. His Politics Among Nations, first published in 1948, went through five editions during his lifetime and was widely adopted as a textbook in U.S. universities. While Morgenthau emphasized the centrality of power and "the national interest," the subtitle of Politics Among Nations—"the struggle for power and peace"—indicates his concern not only with the struggle for power but also with the ways in which it is limited by ethical and legal norms.

The concept of balancing derives from the balance of power theory, the most influential theory from the realist school of thought, which assumes that a formation of hegemony in a multistate system is unattainable since hegemony is perceived as a threat by other states, causing them to engage in balancing against a potential hegemon.

Bandwagoning in international relations occurs when a state aligns with a stronger, adversarial power and concedes that the stronger adversary-turned-partner disproportionately gains in the spoils they conquer together. Bandwagoning, therefore, is a strategy employed by states that find themselves in a weak position. The logic stipulates that an outgunned, weaker state should align itself with a stronger adversary because the latter can take what it wants by force anyway. Thucydides' famous dictum that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" captures the essence of bandwagoning.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kenneth Waltz</span> American political scientist (1924–2013)

Kenneth Neal Waltz was an American political scientist who was a member of the faculty at both the University of California, Berkeley and Columbia University and one of the most prominent scholars in the field of international relations. He was a veteran of both World War II and the Korean War.

In international relations, the security dilemma is when the increase in one state's security leads other states to fear for their own security. Consequently, security-increasing measures can lead to tensions, escalation or conflict with one or more other parties, producing an outcome which no party truly desires; a political instance of the prisoner's dilemma.

Regime theory is a theory within international relations derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes affect the behavior of states or other international actors. It assumes that cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, as regimes are, by definition, instances of international cooperation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">International security</span> Measures taken by states and international organizations to ensure mutual safety and survival

International security is a term which refers to the measures taken by states and international organizations, such as the United Nations, European Union, and others, to ensure mutual survival and safety. These measures include military action and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. International and national security are invariably linked. International security is national security or state security in the global arena.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Realism (international relations)</span> Belief that world politics is always and necessarily a field of conflict among actors pursuing power

Realism, a school of thought in international relations theory, is a theoretical framework that views world politics as an enduring competition among self-interested states vying for power and positioning within an anarchic global system devoid of a centralized authority. It centers on states as rational primary actors navigating a system shaped by power politics, national interest, and a pursuit of security and self-preservation.

Polarity in international relations is any of the various ways in which power is distributed within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. One generally distinguishes three types of systems: unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity for three or more centers of power. The type of system is completely dependent on the distribution of power and influence of states in a region or globally.

In international relations (IR), constructivism is a social theory that asserts that significant aspects of international relations are shaped by ideational factors. The most important ideational factors are those that are collectively held; these collectively held beliefs construct the interests and identities of actors.

Offensive realism is a structural theory in international relations that belongs to the neorealist school of thought and was put forward by the political scholar John Mearsheimer in response to defensive realism. Offensive realism holds that the anarchic nature of the international system is responsible for the promotion of aggressive state behavior in international politics. The theory fundamentally differs from defensive realism by depicting great powers as power-maximizing revisionists privileging buck-passing and self-promotion over balancing strategies in their consistent aim to dominate the international system. The theory brings important alternative contributions for the study and understanding of international relations but remains the subject of criticism.

In international relations theory, the concept of anarchy is the idea that the world lacks any supreme authority or sovereignty. In an anarchic state, there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce law, or order the system of international politics. In international relations, anarchy is widely accepted as the starting point for international relations theory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Balance of power (international relations)</span> Theory in international relations

The balance of power theory in international relations suggests that states may secure their survival by preventing any one state from gaining enough military power to dominate all others. If one state becomes much stronger, the theory predicts it will take advantage of its weaker neighbors, thereby driving them to unite in a defensive coalition. Some realists maintain that a balance-of-power system is more stable than one with a dominant state, as aggression is unprofitable when there is equilibrium of power between rival coalitions.

Defensive neorealism is a structural theory in international relations that is derived from the school of neorealism. The theory finds its foundation in the political scientist Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics in which Waltz argues that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain national security. In contrast, offensive realism assumes that states seek to maximize their power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. Defensive neorealism asserts that aggressive expansion as promoted by offensive neorealists upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue to be the ensuring of its security. Defensive realism denies neither the reality of interstate conflict or that incentives for state expansion exist, but it contends that those incentives are sporadic, rather than endemic. Defensive neorealism points towards "structural modifiers," such as the security dilemma and geography, and elite beliefs and perceptions to explain the outbreak of conflict.

<i>Theory of International Politics</i> 1979 book by Kenneth Waltz

Theory of International Politics is a 1979 book on international relations theory by Kenneth Waltz that creates a structural realist theory, neorealism, to explain international relations. Taking into account the influence of neoclassical economic theory, Waltz argued that the fundamental "ordering principle" (p. 88) of the international political system is anarchy, which is defined by the presence of "functionally undifferentiated" (p. 97) individual state actors lacking "relations of super- and subordination" (p. 88) that are distinguished only by their varying capabilities.

Liberal institutionalism is a theory of international relations that holds that international cooperation between states is feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can reduce conflict and competition. Neoliberalism is a revised version of liberalism. Alongside neorealism, liberal institutionalism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Classical realism (international relations)</span> Theory of international relations

Classical realism is an international relations theory from the realist school of thought. Realism makes the following assumptions: states are the main actors in the international relations system, there is no supranational international authority, states act in their own self-interest, and states want power for self-preservation. Classical realism differs from other forms of realism in that it places specific emphasis on human nature and domestic politics as the key factor in explaining state behavior and the causes of inter-state conflict. Classical realist theory adopts a pessimistic view of human nature and argues that humans are not inherently benevolent but instead they are self-interested and act out of fear or aggression. Furthermore, it emphasizes that this human nature is reflected by states in international politics due to international anarchy.

Charles Louis Glaser is a scholar of international relations theory, known for his work on defensive realism, as well as nuclear strategy. He is the founding director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, as well as a professor of political science and international affairs. His best-known book, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation received an Honorable Mention for 2011 Best Book from the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.

References

Further reading

Books

Articles