Operation Giant Lance

Last updated

Operation "Giant Lance"
Part of the Cold War
Date10–30 October1969
Location
Over Arctic Ocean
Result Inconclusive
Belligerents
Flag of the United States.svg  United States Flag of the Soviet Union.svg  Soviet Union
Flag of North Vietnam (1955-1975).svg  North Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
Flag of the United States.svg Richard Nixon Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Leonid Brezhnev

Operation Giant Lance was a secret U.S. nuclear alert operation by the United States that the Strategic Air Command carried out in late October 1969. [1] Giant Lance was one component of a multi-pronged military exercise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test that the Joint Chiefs developed and carried out during October 1969 in response to White House orders. On 10 October 1969, on the advice of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, U.S. President Richard Nixon issued the order for the readiness test that led to Giant Lance.

Contents

Preparations were made to send a squadron of 18 B-52s, flying in sorties of 6 bombers at a time, of the 92nd Strategic Aerospace Wing loaded with nuclear weapons to fly over northern Alaska in the direction of the Soviet Union. The squadron took off on 27 October and flew towards the Soviet Union. [2] [3] Actions were designed to be detectable by the Soviets. [4] Nixon cancelled the operation on October 30. [1]

According to the U.S. Department of State, there are two main "after-the-fact explanations" regarding the purpose of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test: one was to convince the Soviets that Nixon was willing to resort to nuclear war in order to win the Vietnam War, the other was to deter Soviet's possible nuclear attack against the People's Republic of China. [5] [6] [7] In the first explanation, the Readiness Test was part of Nixon's madman theory, [4] a concept based on game theory, [1] and its details remained unknown to the public until Freedom of Information Act requests in the 2000s revealed documents about the operation. [8] On the other hand, the second interpretation is consistent with U.S. intelligence reports which indicated that the Soviet leadership was considering a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities, and in October 1969 the Soviet indeed abandoned its attack against China. [5] [7] [9] [10] [11] Researchers have also called the second interpretation logically the most likely one. [12]

Background

Soviet's nuclear threat towards China

After the Zhenbao Island incident in March 1969, the Soviet Union planned to launch a massive nuclear strike on the People's Republic of China. [11] [13] [14] [15] [16] Soviet diplomat Arkady Shevchenko mentioned in his memoir that "the Soviet leadership had come close to using nuclear arms on China"; he further mentioned that Andrei Grechko, Soviet's Minister of Defence at the time, called for "unrestricted use of the multimegaton bomb known in the West as the 'blockbuster'", in order to "once and for all to get rid of the Chinese threat". [15] As a turning point during the Cold War, this crisis almost led to a nuclear war, seven years after the Cuban missile crisis. [13] [17] [18] [19]

State of the Vietnam War

Vietnam War tensions were high and were a major driver of Nixon's decision to initiate the operation. [20] The war was one of the primary challenges Nixon sought to address on becoming president, and led to him devising a plan to both end the war and gain international and domestic credibility for the United States as a result. [20] By launching Operation Giant Lance, Nixon aimed to increase war tensions by raising the United States' nuclear threat through a "show of force" alert. [2] These operations acted as a prequel to Nixon's eventual Operation Duck Hook, which was declassified in 2005. [20] The primary goal of these operations was to pressure the Soviets to get their North Vietnamese ally to agree to peace terms favorable to the United States. [4] [2]

Preparation

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler ordered the operation as a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test [3] On 27 October 1969, eighteen B-52 bomber aircraft began the operation, accompanied by KC-135 tankers to refuel and support the extended patrol of the squadron. The bombers flew in sorties of 6 bombers at a time. [4] [2] The U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) was used to deploy the aircraft from air bases both in California and Washington State in secrecy. [2] The bombers were checked throughout the day, standing by for immediate deployment. [3]

Purpose

Even the most senior U.S. military leaders were not informed of the purpose of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, during and after the alert. [7] The operation was intended to be a precautionary measure, boasting operational readiness in case of military retaliation from either East Asia or Russia. [3] [20] [8]

According to the U.S. Department of State, there are two main "after-the-fact explanations" regarding the purpose of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test. [5] [6] [7] In the first interpretation, the operation's intended goal was to directly support Operation Duck Hook as a part of the "show of force" alert; Nixon believed that this would coerce Moscow and Hanoi into a peace treaty through the Paris peace talks with the Soviets, on terms that were advantageous to the United States. [3] In the second interpretation, the outcome of the operation was thought to have deterred Soviet's attack against China and promoted the credibility of the United States intervention in the Sino-Soviet conflict to its general public in the war. [11] [13] [14] [21] Researchers have also called the second interpretation logically the most likely one. [12]

Deterrence against Soviet's strike on China

From left to right: Fritz G. A. Kraemer, Richard Nixon, and Henry Kissinger (White House, January 1970). Pentagon strategist Fritz G.A. Kraemer, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and President Richard Nixon at Oval Office in The White House.png
From left to right: Fritz G. A. Kraemer, Richard Nixon, and Henry Kissinger (White House, January 1970).

According to a number of sources, U.S. President Richard Nixon decided to intervene in the nuclear crisis between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and on October 15, 1969, the Soviet side was informed that the United States would launch nuclear attack on approximately 130 cities in the Soviet Union once the latter began to attack China. [11] [13] [14] [16] The U.S. government confirmed that "the U.S. military, including its nuclear forces, secretly went on alert" in October 1969, which was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, and that Nixon indeed once considered using nuclear weapons. [5] [7] Eventually, the Soviet abandoned its attack on China. [11] [13]

Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs later, that the United States "raised our profile somewhat to make clear that we were not indifferent to these Soviet threats." [5] [7] On July 29, 1985, Time magazine published its interview with Nixon, who recalled that "Henry said, 'Can the U.S. allow the Soviet Union to jump the Chinese?'—that is, to take out their nuclear capability. We had to let the Soviets know we would not tolerate that." [5] [7] Researchers and scholars have also speculated that the U.S. authorities might have ordered a nuclear alert in October 1969 in order to deter a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on China. [7] [12]

Vietnam War

According to one interpretation, the purpose of Operation Giant Lance and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test of which it was a component was to intimidate the foreign contenders in the Vietnam War, primarily the Soviets, through a world-wide alert of U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear forces. By using seemingly irrational actions as a part of Nixon's madman diplomacy, he aimed to push both the Soviet and the Vietnamese to end the war on favourable terms. The squadron of eighteen B-52 bomber aircraft was to patrol the Northern polar ice cap to survey the frozen terrain whilst armed with nuclear weaponry. [3] [20] [4] The patrols consisted of eighteen-hour long vigils, which were intended to appear as suspicious movements by the U.S. [3] These movements were kept secret from the public, whilst also remaining intentionally detectable to the Soviet Union's intelligence systems. [8] [3]

Madman theory

President Richard Nixon was infamous for radical measures as part of his diplomacy. [21] The radicality of sending eighteen armed bombers on patrol was designed to pressure foreign powers by displaying extreme military aggression. [20] [2] Nixon told Henry Kissinger, the national security advisor, that he was willing to use nuclear weapons in order to end the war. [20] Following so-called madman theory, Nixon would often take diplomatic options that seemed irrational even to the United States' own authorities. [20] [4] The idea was to make it impossible for foreign powers to determine Nixon's motives or predict his actions, giving him a unique strategic advantage. [22] This diplomacy, coupled with Nixon's decision to raise the nuclear alert, served as an indirect threat as the Soviets would not be able to understand his actions. [20] [3]

Nixon used this unpredictable diplomacy in a failed attempt to end the war in Vietnam, creating the impression he was willing to take desperate measures including using the United States' nuclear weapons. [3] [2] [22] These actions would also enhance Nixon's reputation as a tough and "mad" leader. [3] The intention was to cause the North Vietnamese and the Soviets to believe that he was an irrational leader, capable of escalating the nuclear threat. [3] [20] The policy failed to produce the concessions desired by the United States.

Nixon's "madman" diplomacy was in effect briefly during the Vietnam War, amplified by the numerous "show of force" operations. [2] [22] Although this diplomacy could have been seen by opposing states as a bluff, the risk of uncertainty to them was much larger than the risk to the United States. [22] [20] Ultimately, Nixon possessed an advantage as the US could gauge the effectiveness of its threats based on the reactions of the Soviets and the Vietnamese. [22]

Implications

Effects of the operation

The operation did not directly cause any obvious, significant change due to its cancellation; the impact it may have had on the Soviets or the Vietnamese cannot be accurately measured. [3] The operation was terminated on October 30 suddenly without any known reason. [3] [4] The abrupt halt to the operation may have been due to the fact that the Soviets did not show any significant changes in their actions, which may mean that the Soviets suspected Nixon of bluffing. [22] [3] However, some historians have argued that the sudden withdrawal of the SAC's squadron was an intentional effort to display the maneuverability and freedom the US possessed when it came to nuclear warfare. [1]

Operation Giant Lance was intended to jar foreign forces into favourable diplomatic agreements to end the war, to avoid Nixon ordering Operation Duck Hook. [2] [3] Despite the operation ending as a bluff tactic, the operation served to add credibility both to Nixon's madman threats and the proactiveness of the U.S. [3] However this may not have been successful due to the large anti-war movement at the time, which tended to discourage nuclear operations. [23] [2] Seymour Hersh believed that the operation also served as an adjunct to Operation Duck Hook, a proposed mining and bombing operation against North Vietnam. [3]

The Soviets showed no clear reaction in response to the Giant Lance patrols. [3] Whilst there may not have been a direct response to the operation, there was a reaction from Soviet intelligence: a sudden heightened nuclear alert. [2] This was the goal of the operation: to make the operation visible to Soviet intelligence whilst hiding it from the American public. [8] [3] The Soviets may have seen Nixon's move simply as a bluff. [3] In October 1973, a Soviet official exclaimed that "Mr. Nixon used to exaggerate his intentions regularly. He used alerts and leaks to do this", which may have caused the U.S. operational threat to be ignored. [3]

Perception of U.S. nuclear threat

Although both Moscow and Hanoi did not show any reaction to Operation Giant Lance and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, the uncertainty of Nixon's nuclear power posed a significant threat. [3] [22] Nixon's continuous nuclear threat towards Hanoi was undermined by the anti-war sentiment on U.S. home soil. [23] This implied to Hanoi that the U.S. did not wish for further war, or to risk nuclear warfare. [23] The heightened fear of nuclear warfare caused a shared parity of nuclear avoidance across all participants in the war. [2] Neither side wanted a military confrontation that would escalate to that level. [2]

There also existed the danger that excessive reliance on the nuclear threat in times of war would cause other governments to begin to accept this as the norm. [24] [2] Nuclear fear might bring the possibility of increased nuclear use. [23] [2] Continual development of nuclear technology and reliance thereon would inevitably lead to increasing paranoia. [2] Military escalation could lead to “the threat that leaves something to chance”. [24] [2]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Strategic Air Command</span> 1946–1992 US Air Force major command

Strategic Air Command (SAC) was a United States Department of Defense Specified Command and a United States Air Force (USAF) Major Command responsible for command and control of the strategic bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile components of the United States military's strategic nuclear forces from 1946 to 1992. SAC was also responsible for strategic reconnaissance aircraft; airborne command posts; and most of the USAF's aerial refueling aircraft.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear blackmail</span> Military strategy

Nuclear blackmail is a form of nuclear strategy in which one of states uses the threat of use of nuclear weapons to force an adversary to perform some action or make some concessions. It is a type of extortion that is related to brinkmanship.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Melvin Laird</span> American politician and writer (1922–2016)

Melvin Robert Laird Jr. was an American politician, writer and statesman. He was a U.S. congressman from Wisconsin from 1953 to 1969 before serving as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973 under President Richard Nixon. Laird was instrumental in forming the administration's policy of withdrawing U.S. soldiers from the Vietnam War; he coined the expression "Vietnamization," referring to the process of transferring more responsibility for combat to the South Vietnamese forces. First elected in 1952, Laird was the last living Representative elected to the 83rd Congress at the time of his death.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">DEFCON</span> Alert posture used by the United States Armed Forces

The defense readiness condition (DEFCON) is an alert state used by the United States Armed Forces. For security reasons, the US military does not announce a DEFCON level to the public.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sino-Soviet split</span> Conflict between communist blocs

The Sino-Soviet split was the gradual worsening of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. This was primarily caused by doctrinal divergences that arose from their different interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, as influenced by their respective geopolitics during the Cold War of 1947–1991. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sino-Soviet debates about the interpretation of orthodox Marxism became specific disputes about the Soviet Union's policies of national de-Stalinization and international peaceful coexistence with the Western Bloc, which Chinese leader Mao Zedong decried as revisionism. Against that ideological background, China took a belligerent stance towards the Western world, and publicly rejected the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence between the Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc. In addition, Beijing resented the Soviet Union's growing ties with India due to factors such as the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Moscow feared that Mao was too nonchalant about the horrors of nuclear warfare.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">David C. Jones</span> 9th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

David Charles Jones was a United States Air Force general and the ninth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, Jones served as the highest-ranking uniformed officer of the United States Armed Forces. He previously served as the ninth Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force and fifteenth commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Madman theory</span> Feature of Richard Nixons foreign policy

The madman theory is a political theory commonly associated with the foreign policy of U.S. President Richard Nixon and his administration, who tried to make the leaders of hostile Communist Bloc countries think Nixon was irrational and volatile so that they would avoid provoking the U.S. in fear of an unpredictable response.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">George Scratchley Brown</span> United States Air Force general

George Scratchley Brown was a United States Air Force general who served as the eighth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he served as the senior military adviser to the president of the United States, the National Security Council and the secretary of defense. Through the commanders of the unified and specified commands, he was also responsible for executing the decisions of the National Command Authorities regarding worldwide readiness and employment of combat forces of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Larry D. Welch</span> United States Air Force general

General Larry D. Welch is a retired United States Air Force four-star general who served as the 12th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. As Chief of Staff, he served as the senior uniformed Air Force officer responsible for the organization, training and equipping of a combined active duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian force serving at locations in the United States and overseas. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he and the other service chiefs functioned as the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council and the President. He currently serves as the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapon Surety Task Force for the Defense Science Board.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Duck Hook</span> U.S. intelligence operation

Duck Hook was the White House code-name of an operation President Richard Nixon had threatened to unleash against North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, if North Vietnam did not yield to Washington's terms at the Paris peace negotiations. Duck Hook called for the possible-nuclear bombing of military and economic targets in and around Hanoi, the mining of Haiphong harbor and other ports, saturation bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, the bombing of dikes to destroy the food supply of much of the population of North Vietnam, air strikes against North Vietnam's northeast line of communications as well as passes and bridges at the Chinese border, and air and ground attacks on other targets throughout Vietnam.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Menu</span> 1969–1970 US covert military operation in Cambodia

Operation Menu was a covert United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) tactical bombing campaign conducted in eastern Cambodia from 18 March 1969 to 26 May 1970 as part of both the Vietnam War and the Cambodian Civil War. The targets of these attacks were sanctuaries and base areas of the People's Army of Vietnam and forces of the Viet Cong (VC), which used them for resupply, training, and resting between campaigns across the border in the Republic of Vietnam. The impact of the bombing campaign on the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, the PAVN, and Cambodian civilians in the bombed areas is disputed by historians.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Thomas S. Power</span> US Air Force general

General Thomas Sarsfield Power was a United States Air Force officer who served as commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command from 1957-1964. He was an active military flier for more than 30 years.

The "Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs" was a speech delivered on November 25, 1969, by U.S. President Richard Nixon. In the speech, Nixon announced the end of the U.S. offensive biological weapons program and reaffirmed a no-first-use policy for chemical weapons. The statement excluded toxins, herbicides and riot-control agents as they were not chemical and biological weapons, though herbicides and toxins were both later banned. The decision to ban biological weapons was influenced by a number of domestic and international issues.

This timeline of nuclear weapons development is a chronological catalog of the evolution of nuclear weapons rooting from the development of the science surrounding nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. In addition to the scientific advancements, this timeline also includes several political events relating to the development of nuclear weapons. The availability of intelligence on recent advancements in nuclear weapons of several major countries is limited because of the classification of technical knowledge of nuclear weapons development.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear close calls</span> List of incidents which could have led to a nuclear exchange

A nuclear close call is an incident that might have led to at least one unintended nuclear detonation or explosion, but did not. These incidents typically involve a perceived imminent threat to a nuclear-armed country which could lead to retaliatory strikes against the perceived aggressor. The damage caused by international nuclear exchange is not necessarily limited to the participating countries, as the hypothesized rapid climate change associated with even small-scale regional nuclear war could threaten food production worldwide—a scenario known as nuclear famine. There have also been a number of accidents involving nuclear weapons, such as crashes of nuclear armed aircraft.

The US foreign policy during the presidency of Richard Nixon (1969–1974) focused on reducing the dangers of the Cold War among the Soviet Union and China. President Richard Nixon's policy sought on détente with both nations, which were hostile to the U.S. and to each other in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split. He moved away from the traditional American policy of containment of communism, hoping each side would seek American favor. Nixon's 1972 visit to China ushered in a new era of U.S.-China relations and effectively removed China as a Cold War foe. The Nixon administration signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union and organized a conference that led to the signing of the Helsinki Accords after Nixon left office.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Formation Star</span> US military operation in 1968 off North Korea

Operation Formation Star was the code name for the emergency re-deployment of U.S. Seventh Fleet warships to the Sea of Japan off the eastern coast of North Korea following that country's seizure of the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) in international waters on 23 January 1968.

Jeffrey P. Kimball is an American historian and emeritus professor at Miami University. Among the ideas that Kimball developed was the idea of a Vietnam stab-in-the-back myth. He also argued that threats to use nuclear weapons had not been effective at advancing the United States' foreign policy goals either in the Korean War, Vietnam War, or the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Historian Luke Nichter wrote that Kimball's books "shaped future works, and these volumes on my shelves stand as a reminder that my own work on the Nixon tapes would not have happened without them". According to historian Ken Hughes, Kimball is "the leading scholar of the 'decent interval'": the idea that Nixon eventually settled for securing a "decent interval" before South Vietnamese defeat. Hughes regrets that Kimball's work is "virtually unknown" outside academia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test</span> 1969 US military test

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Readiness Test was a secret test and alert of U.S. military forces staged by the U.S. Department of Defense. It began on October 12, 1969, and consisted of a variety of military moves around the world, including activities by U.S. air and naval forces from the continental U.S. to the North Atlantic and from the Middle East to the Western Pacific.

The Movement and the "Madman" (2023) is a feature documentary directed by Stephen Talbot. The documentary covers the 1969 showdown over the war in Vietnam between the peace movement in the United States and President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Based on interviews with antiwar activists, historians, and former Kissinger aides, the film shows how two enormous demonstrations in the fall of 1969 pressured Nixon to cancel what he called his “madman” plans to drastically escalate the war, including threats to use nuclear weapons.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Suri, Jeremi (25 February 2008). "The Nukes of October: Richard Nixon's Secret Plan to Bring Peace to Vietnam". Wired Magazine . Retrieved 28 January 2012.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Sagan, Scott; Suri, Jeremi (2003). "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969". International Security. 27 (4): 150–183. doi:10.1162/016228803321951126. JSTOR   4137607. S2CID   57564244.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Burr, William; Kimball, Jeffrey (2003). "Nixon's Nuclear Ploy". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 59 (1): 28–73. doi:10.2968/059001011 – via Taylor & Francis Online.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Jesse Ventura (4 April 2011). 63 Documents The Government Doesn't Want You To Read . Skyhorse Publishing, 2011. p.  170. ISBN   978-1-61608-226-0.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972: 59. Editorial Note". United States Department of State . 2011. Archived from the original on 17 December 2024.
  6. 1 2 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test". United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 14 January 2025. Retrieved 19 January 2025.
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Aftergood, Steven (25 October 2011). "Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery". Federation of American Scientists . Archived from the original on 12 September 2024.
  8. 1 2 3 4 Burr, William; Kimball, Jeffry (23 December 2002). "Nixon's Nuclear Ploy: The Vietnam Negotiations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test". The National Security Archive.
  9. ↑ "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: The Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Chinese Nuclear Facilities" (PDF). The George Washington University. United States Department of State. 10 September 1969. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 November 2024.
  10. ↑ "63. Memorandum of Conversation". United States Department of State . 18 August 1969. Archived from the original on 4 November 2024.
  11. 1 2 3 4 5 O'Neill, Mark (12 May 2010). "Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack". South China Morning Post . Archived from the original on 12 September 2015.
  12. 1 2 3 Sagan, Scott D.; Suri, Jeremi (2003). "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969". International Security. 27 (4): 156–158. doi:10.1162/016228803321951126. ISSN   0162-2889. JSTOR   4137607.
  13. 1 2 3 4 5 "USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969". The Telegraph . 13 May 2010. Archived from the original on 16 May 2010.
  14. 1 2 3 Xu, Ni (2008). "1969年, 中苏核危机始末" [The nuclear crisis between China and the Soviet Union in 1969]. People's Net (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 3 March 2022.
  15. 1 2 Shevchenko, Arkady (11 February 1985). "Breaking with Moscow". Time . Archived from the original on 14 January 2025.
  16. 1 2 Gerson, Michael S. (November 2010). "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict—Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969" (PDF). Center for Naval Analyses . Archived (PDF) from the original on 18 December 2024.
  17. ↑ Yu, Miles (13 December 2022). "The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts As A Key Turning Point Of The Cold War". Hoover Institution . Archived from the original on 22 December 2024. Retrieved 30 December 2024.
  18. ↑ Rajagopalan, Rajesh (1 June 2000). "Deterrence and nuclear confrontations: The Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-soviet border war". Strategic Analysis. 24 (3): 441–457. doi:10.1080/09700160008455225. ISSN   0970-0161.
  19. ↑ Radchenko, Sergey (2 March 2019). "The Island That Changed History". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on 1 January 2025. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
  20. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Delpech, Therese (2012). Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. ISBN   9780833059307. JSTOR   10.7249/mg1103rc.
  21. 1 2 Cressman, Dale (28 July 2015). "The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization". Presidential Studies Quarterly. 45 (3): 144. doi:10.1111/psq.12214.
  22. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 McManus, Roseanne (13 September 2019). "Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Perceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining". Security Studies. 28 (5): 976–1009. doi:10.1080/09636412.2019.1662482. S2CID   203470748.
  23. 1 2 3 4 Stone, Oliver; Kuznick, Peter (2012). The untold history of the United States. New York: Gallery Books. p. 364.
  24. 1 2 Schelling, Thomas (15 May 1981). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 187–203. ISBN   9780674840317.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.