Active Measures Working Group

Last updated

The Interagency Active Measures Working Group was a group led by the United States Department of State and later by the United States Information Agency (USIA). [1] The group was formed early during the Reagan administration, in 1981, purportedly as an effort to counter Soviet disinformation.

Contents

Representatives of the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, and the United States Information Agency were among the government agencies that served in the group. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Dennis Kux, was the group's first chairman and served until January, 1984. Three individuals succeeded Kux for brief stints: William Knepper, Tom Thorne, and Lucian Heichler. In 1985, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kathleen C. Bailey was appointed chair of the group and served until her departure in late 1987. An in-depth report by the National Defense University analyzed the history and effectiveness of the working group.

Although the primary focus of group's activities was countering Soviet disinformation, it also reported on front groups and other Soviet active measures. The Active Measures Working Group developed an approach that expanded the U.S. Government's monitoring of Soviet disinformation from an activity conducted exclusively by the CIA into an interagency counter-disinformation effort. [1]

Background

In the early days of the Cold War, the CIA tracked Soviet disinformation and forgeries, but only periodically attempted to expose them. During the 1970s the U.S. chose not to fight back against Soviet active measures for two reasons. The first is that policy makers did not want to let what they saw as "unnecessary confrontation" to sidetrack progress on more important issues such as strategic arms control. [2] The second reason was the disgrace of the CIA. [2] During the Vietnam War, Johnson had ordered the CIA to monitor certain American citizens, notably the Black power and antiwar movements, which he feared were supported and infiltrated by foreign communists. Eventually this and similar monitoring programs were revealed to the public, prompting major public contention and major reforms of the CIA. The CIA was particularly damaged by the Senate (Church Committee) and House (Pike Committee) Intelligence Committees, and then did little to respond to anti-American disinformation. [3]

In October 1979 Stanislav Levchenko, head of the Active Measures Line of the KGB Rezidentura in Tokyo, contacted American officials and was granted political asylum in the United States. Levchenko explained the workings of the Soviet apparatus and how it was carried out, under his direction, in Japan. Levchenko's information, combined with that of Ladislav Bittman, who had been the deputy head of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service's Disinformation Department, was instrumental in helping the CIA understand many of the operations that were being carried out against the United States. [3] This information was also reported to policy makers and Congress.

Under the Reagan Administration, the United States began openly challenging Soviet disinformation and active measures. [3]

The formation of the Interagency Active Measures Working Group was encouraged by William Casey, Director of the CIA, had high level State Department support from Lawrence Eagleburger, and the input of John Lenczowski of the National Security Council. [3]

Interagency cooperation

The Interagency Active Measures Working Group combined the information gathered at USIA international posts, CIA reporting, and FBI investigations. When this information arrived, it was analyzed by both working group analysts and CIA disinformation experts. The group made use of the CIA's computerized database of forgeries, and, through the CIA, had unfettered access to KGB defectors involved in active measures.

The group instructed USIA overseas offices to report all disinformation that they encountered. The group also used the USIA and State Department to distribute its publications both domestically and abroad to journalists, government employees, U.S. embassy staff abroad, and foreign government representatives and staff.

The Active Measures Working Group was used as an outlet for expert knowledge within the government bureaucracy. For example, the group initially published a report by David Hertzberg, a young INR analyst who had started his career with State just two years earlier while he was still an undergraduate at George Washington University. Hertzberg noticed a trend of increased illegal activity that was at odds with the image that the Soviet Union was trying to project: the Soviets were expanding their espionage activities, particularly attempts to steal military technology and defense industry proprietary information, and this corresponded with an increase in the number of Soviet agents expelled from countries for espionage. Hertzberg's report was sanitized, then published in February 1982 under the State Department's imprimatur as an "informal research study for background information" and was eventually converted into a Foreign Affairs Note entitled, "Expulsion of Soviet Representatives from Foreign Countries, 1970–81." (The complete collection of Foreign Affairs Notes can be viewed and downloaded here. The document generated news coverage and commentary on the expansion of Soviet spying and was directly cited by at least two major publications. [1]

Methodology 1981 Through Early 1985

Report-Analyze-Publicize

The Active Measures Working Group developed a methodology named Report-Analyze-Publicize (or RAP). [1] The group's first counter-disinformation effort against the Soviet Union took the form of a report, "State Department Special Report 88, Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations" in October 1981. The document was a four-page overview of soviet active measures techniques and included Soviet disinformation themes and past examples. 14,000 copies of the report were distributed to news organizations, federal agencies, etc.

In addition to special reports, the group published a series of State Department Foreign Affairs Notes that USIA distributed to journalists, academics, and other interested persons abroad. One important publication distributed by the group was the House Intelligence Committee hearing on Soviet Active Measures which showed foreign audiences that there was congressional support for exposing Soviet disinformation. [3] The group also held press conferences to expose Soviet forgeries and distributed copies of the fake documents to attending journalists.

"Truth Squads"

Members of the Active Measures Working Group gave presentations describing Soviet disinformation activities, pointing out the falsehoods or common themes and tell-tale signs of forgery. These presentations were often held internationally; the "squads" visited over 20 countries. [1] The group averaged presentations in two countries per week and visited NATO headquarters annually for meetings on Soviet active measures.

These visits were also geared toward gathering information from foreign governments about Soviet active measures campaigns conducted in their respective countries. [4] Dennis Kux commented on the success of these presentations: "the fact that we made a credible presentation, not an ideological show lent a certain amount of professionalism to the whole effort." [1]

Important cases

1984 Summer Olympics

In an attempt to seek revenge for Carter's boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympics in 1980, the KGB manufactured a public relations crisis by forging letters from the Ku Klux Klan that threatened athletes from African countries and mailed them from Washington, DC, to these countries' Olympic committees.

Grammatical errors in the letters suggested they were originally drafted in Russian, but could not provide a certain conclusion. Then, a source of the FBI in the KGB that had participated in the production of the letters confirmed their origin was the KGB. The Active Measures Working Group then reported conclusively that the letters were Soviet forgeries, which allowed USIA and the State Department to reassure the targeted African countries. As a result, no African country withdrew their athletes from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.

Methodology 1985 – 1987

In 1985, Newt Gingrich, a congressional representative from the state of Georgia, sponsored an amendment promoting a permanent office in the Department of State on "Soviet and communist disinformation and press manipulation" to better inform the American public on these issues. Gingrich also added an amendment to unrelated legislation stipulating that the State Department must produce a public report on Soviet active measures. Responsibility for the report was assigned within the State Department to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which was headed by Ambassador Morton Abramowitz. Abramowitz charged Kathleen C. Bailey with responsibility for the report and named her Chair of the Working Group.

Although Bailey supported continuation of Foreign Affairs Notes as a group product, one of her first decisions was to change the group's focus from single-author, short publications to multi-agency drafted compendiums of more in-depth analyses, of which the "Gingrich Report" was the first. This report, "A Report on the Substance and Process of the anti-US Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns," was published in August 1986. The second major report, entitled "A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–1987" was published in August 1987. This report, as well as a Foreign Affairs Note published the month before, focused on the Soviet disinformation campaign seeking to attribute the AIDS virus to the U.S. Government.

In October 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev waved a copy of this report at U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, complaining that publishing such information undermined relations between their countries. [1] Gorbachev insisted that the report contained "shocking revelations" and that it amounted to "nourishing hatred" for the Soviet Union.

Operation Infektion

The Active Measures Working Group's policy of exposing Soviet disinformation helped to discredit the Soviet disinformation campaign, Operation Infektion, which accused the United States of deliberately creating the AIDS virus in a government laboratory and spreading it. The State Department held a press conference (a video of which is here) to release the Report, which had a copy on its cover of the Pravda cartoon that accused the U.S. of creating the virus. The impact of this 1987 Report has continued to reverberate and was recently a key component of a New York Times documentary on Operation Infektion.

Other cases of Soviet disinformation during the 1980s

Working Group products and publications

The Interagency Active Measures Working Group had two primary categories of written products. The first comprised short special reports and Foreign Affairs Notes, which ranged from 1 page to a maximum of 12 pages in length. INR analyst David Hertzberg authored all of the Foreign Affairs Notes; when he moved on in his career and left the Soviet account, no further Foreign Affairs Notes were published by the State Department. [1] The complete collection of Foreign Affairs Notes can be viewed and downloaded online. This category also included some speeches and articles drafted for presentation by U.S. officials.

The second category of reports was lengthy (many tens of pages), in-depth, interagency-drafted documents.

Special Reports and Foreign Affairs Notes

1981

  • Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations. Special Report 88. October 1981.

1982

  • Expulsion of Soviet Representatives from Foreign Countries, 1970–81. Foreign Affairs Note. February 1982.
  • World Peace Council: Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs Note. April 1982.
  • Religion in the U.S.S.R.: Laws, Policy, and Propaganda. Foreign Affairs Note. May 1982.
  • Soviet Active Measures: An Update. Special Report 101. July 1982.
  • Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress. Foreign Affairs Note. August 1982.
  • Communist Clandestine Broadcasting. Foreign Affairs Note. December 1982.

1983

  • Lawrence Eagleburger. "Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures." NATO Review 31, no. 1 (April 1983), 6–11.
  • Expulsions of Soviet Officials Worldwide, 1982. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1983.
  • Soviet Active Measures: Focus on Forgeries. Foreign Affairs Note. April 1983.
  • The World Peace Council's "Peace Assemblies." Foreign Affairs Note. May 1983.
  • Lawrence Eagleburger. "Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures." Department of State Bulletin #2077, August 1983, 45–49. Reprinted from NATO Review 31, no. 1 (1983).
  • World Federation of Trade Unions: Soviet Foreign Policy Tool. Foreign Affairs Note. August 1983.
  • Soviet Active Measures. Special Report 110. September 1983.

1984

  • Expulsions of Soviets Worldwide, 1983. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1984.
  • "Soviet Active Measures." An Address by William E. Knepper, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Intelligence and Research, before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Current Policy, no. 595 (May 30, 1984).
  • Soviet Fronts: Women and Youth. Foreign Affairs Note. July 1984.

1985

  • Expulsions of Soviets Worldwide, 1984. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1985.
  • Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council. Foreign Affairs Note. April 1985.
  • Soviet Active Measures: Christian Peace Conference. Foreign Affairs Note. May 1985.
  • Soviet Active Measures: The 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow. Foreign Affairs Note. June 1985.
  • Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation: A Conference Report. June 1985.
  • "Soviet Use of Active Measures." An address by William J. Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Dallas Council on World Affairs. Current Policy, no. 761 (September 18, 1985).
  • Update: The 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow. Foreign Affairs Note. December 1985.

1986

1987

  • Expulsion of Soviet Officials, 1986. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1987.
  • Moscow and the Peace Movement: The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. Foreign Affairs Note. May 1987.
  • Recent Anti-American Forgeries: An Update. Foreign Affairs Note. July 1987.
  • The U.S.S.R.'s AIDS Disinformation Campaign. Foreign Affairs Note. July 1987.

1988

  • Expulsions of Soviet Officials, 1987. Foreign Affairs Note. January 1988.

Major interagency publications

U.S. Department of State, Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns . August 1986.

U.S. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–1987 August 1987.

U.S. Department of State, "Disinformation, The Media, and Foreign Policy." Conference Report. May 1987.

U.S. Information Agency, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost . March 1988

U.S. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987–1988 August, 1989.

Abolition

Support for the group began to deteriorate in the late 1980s because Soviet disinformation seemed less of a threat in light of Gorbachev's Glasnost and the Soviets' promise to cease all disinformation operations. The group's mission to counter Soviet disinformation lost its pertinence upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and along with it bureaucratic interest in the group's efforts.

The quality of the group's membership declined as both the CIA's and FBI's longest serving group members distanced themselves and began sending younger, less experienced participants in their place. Furthermore, many of the Reagan appointees who supported the working group had left the NSC in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal.

The counter disinformation effort shifted to USIA's Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation headed by Charles Wick and included Herbert Romerstein and Todd Leventhal.

The Active Measures Working Group's final report, "Soviet Active Measures in the 'Post-Cold War' Era 1988–1991," came out in June 1992 and was written by Todd Leventhal under the auspices of USIA. By the time of publication, the Soviet Union no longer existed, the report warned that even though the Soviet Union had collapsed, active measures were still a threat to U.S. interests because a number of anti-American groups and countries were adopting and expanding the use of active measures: "As long as states and groups interested in manipulating world opinion, limiting U.S. Government actions, or generating opposition to U.S. policies and interests continue to use these techniques, there will be a need for the United States Information Agency to systematically monitor, analyze, and counter them."

Lessons learned

  1. "In responding to disinformation, the United States has the tremendous advantage that the truth is inherently more powerful than lies. But if the lies go unchallenged, then they can have a damaging effect." —Charles Wick, 1988
  2. Simply exposing acts of disinformation was an extremely powerful tool in undermining their efficacy.
  3. Effective strategic communication necessitates interagency collaboration because of its ability to pull together diverse expertise from multiple organizations.

Legacy

In June 2020, Michael McCaul announced that he would introduce legislation to recreate a modern version of the Active Measure Working Group to combat Chinese Communist Party propaganda and disinformation. [5]

See also

Related Research Articles

Disinformation is false information deliberately spread to deceive people. It should not be confused with misinformation, which is false information but is not deliberate. "Fake news" has sometimes been categorized as a type of disinformation, but scholars have advised not using these two terms interchangeably or using "fake news" altogether in academic writing since politicians have weaponized it to describe any unfavorable news coverage or information.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States Information Agency</span> Former government agency

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was a United States government agency devoted to the practice of public diplomacy which operated from 1953 to 1999.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Active measures</span> Term for the actions of political warfare conducted by the Soviet and Russian security services

Active measures is a term used to describe political warfare conducted by the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The term, which dates back the 1920s, includes operations such as espionage, propaganda, sabotage and assassination, based on foreign policy objectives of the Soviet and Russian governments. Active measures have continued to be used by the administration of Vladimir Putin.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">First Chief Directorate</span> Department of the Soviet KGB concerned with external intelligence

The First Main Directorateof the Committee for State Security under the USSR council of ministers was the organization responsible for foreign operations and intelligence activities by providing for the training and management of covert agents, intelligence collection administration, and the acquisition of foreign and domestic political, scientific and technical intelligence for the Soviet Union. The First Chief Directorate was formed within the KGB directorate in 1954, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union became the Foreign Intelligence Service. The primary foreign intelligence service in Russia and the Soviet Union has been the GRU, a military intelligence organization and special operations force.

Blowback is a term originating from within the Central Intelligence Agency, explaining the unintended consequences and unwanted side-effects of a covert operation. To the civilians suffering the blowback of covert operations, the effect typically manifests itself as "random" acts of political violence without a discernible, direct cause; because the public—in whose name the intelligence agency acted—are unaware of the effected secret attacks that provoked revenge (counter-attack) against them.

As early as the 1920s, the Soviet Union, through its GRU, OGPU, NKVD, and KGB intelligence agencies, used Russian and foreign-born nationals, as well as Communists of American origin, to perform espionage activities in the United States, forming various spy rings. Particularly during the 1940s, some of these espionage networks had contact with various U.S. government agencies. These Soviet espionage networks illegally transmitted confidential information to Moscow, such as information on the development of the atomic bomb. Soviet spies also participated in propaganda and disinformation operations, known as active measures, and attempted to sabotage diplomatic relationships between the U.S. and its allies.

The Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group (ISOG) was an interagency organization formed in early 2006 within the U.S. government, consisting of officials from the State Department, White House, Central Intelligence Agency, Treasury Department, and other agencies that worked, to influence regime change in Iran, and to influence its access to world banking and credit institutions. Co-chaired by Liz Cheney and Elliott Abrams, the secretive group met weekly for about a year, also working to a lesser extent to encourage regime change of Syria's government. Other members of the group's steering committee were James F. Jeffrey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, who had headed the Iraq Policy group, and Michael Doran, a Middle East specialist from the White House.

<i>U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B</i> Document claiming to be a classified appendix to a U.S. Army Field Manual

The US Army Field Manual 30-31B is an alleged Cold War-era hoax conducted by the Soviet intelligence services. It supposedly identified a "strategy of tension" involving violent attacks which are then blamed on radical left-wing groups in order to convince allied governments of the need for counter-action. It has been called the Westmoreland Field Manual because it is signed with the alleged signature of General William Westmoreland. It was labelled as supplement B, although the publicly released version of FM30-31 only has one appendix, Supplement A.

While the United States was involved in the prosecution of people involved in the war crimes of World War II, US military and intelligence agencies protected some war criminals in the interest of obtaining technical or intelligence information from them, or to recruit them for intelligence work. The relationships with German war criminals started immediately after the end of the Second World War, but some of the relationships with Japanese war criminals were slower to develop.

During the Cold War (1947–1991), when the Soviet Union and the United States were engaged in an arms race, the Soviet Union promoted its foreign policy through the World Peace Council and other front organizations. Some writers have claimed that it also influenced non-aligned peace groups in the West.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation INFEKTION</span> KGB disinformation campaign claiming that HIV was a U.S. bioweapon

Operation INFEKTION was an active measure disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Historian Thomas Boghardt popularized the codename "INFEKTION" based on the claims of former East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) officer Günter Bohnsack, who claimed that the Stasi codename for the campaign was either "INFEKTION" or perhaps also "VORWÄRTS II". However, historians Christopher Nehring and Douglas Selvage found in the former Stasi and Bulgarian State Security archives materials that prove the actual Stasi codename for the AIDS disinformation campaign was Operation DENVER. The operation involved "an extraordinary amount of effort — funding radio programs, courting journalists, distributing would-be scientific studies", according to journalist Joshua Yaffa, and even became the subject of a report by Dan Rather on the CBS Evening News.

<i>National Security Decision Directive 77</i>

National Security Decision Directive 77, was a U.S. National Security Directive signed on January 14, 1983, by President Ronald Reagan. The directive established a Special Planning Group (SPG) under the National Security Council (NSC) whose purpose was to strengthen, organize, plan, and coordinate public diplomacy of the United States relative to national security. This NSDD positioned the White House and the National Security Staff at the helm of public diplomacy coordination across government agencies. NSDD-77 lay the groundwork for the Reagan administration's aggressive public diplomacy strategy and included guidance for inter-agency working groups to execute wide-ranging tactics for information dissemination both domestically and internationally.

Forgery is used by some governments and non-state actors as a tool of covert operation, disinformation and black propaganda. Letters, currency, speeches, documents, and literature are all falsified as a means to subvert a government's political, military or economic assets. Forgeries are designed to attribute a false intention and aspirations on the intended target. They force the targeted government to spend a large amount of resources to refute the forgery. Forgeries are an effective tool because of their ability to hold influence even after being proven false.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Political warfare</span> Use of political means to compel an opponent with hostile intent

Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience, including another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent. The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations ("PsyOps"), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1995 CIA disinformation controversy</span>

In 1995 it was revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency had delivered intelligence reports to the U.S. government between 1986 and 1994 which were based on agent reporting from confirmed or suspected Soviet operatives. From 1985 to his arrest in February 1994, CIA officer and KGB mole Aldrich Ames compromised Agency sources and operations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, leading to the arrest of many CIA agents and the execution of at least ten of them. This allowed the KGB to replace the CIA agents with its own operatives or to force them to cooperate, and the double agents then funneled a mixture of disinformation and true material to U.S. intelligence. Although the CIA's Soviet-East European (SE) and Central Eurasian divisions knew or suspected the sources to be Soviet double agents, they nevertheless disseminated this "feed" material within the government. Some of these intelligence reports even reached Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, as well as President-elect Bill Clinton.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act</span> 2016 American anti-propaganda legislation

Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act is a bipartisan bill that was introduced by the United States Congress on 10 May 2016. The bill was initially called the Countering Information Warfare Act.

<i>Disinformation</i> (book) 2015 nonfiction book by Ion Mihai Pacepa and Ronald J. Rychlak

Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism is a 2015 non-fiction book about disinformation tactics and history rooted in information warfare. It was written by former general in the Securitate, the secret police of Socialist Republic of Romania, Ion Mihai Pacepa, and law professor Ronald J. Rychlak. It was published in 2013 along with a companion film, Disinformation: The Secret Strategy to Destroy the West.

<i>The KGB and Soviet Disinformation</i> Book by Ladislav Bittman

The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View is a 1983 non-fiction book by Lawrence Martin-Bittman, a former intelligence officer specializing in disinformation for the Czech Intelligence Service and retired professor of disinformation at Boston University. The book is about the KGB's use of disinformation and information warfare during the Soviet Union period.

<i>Dezinformatsia</i> (book) 1984 non-fiction book

Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy is a non-fiction book about disinformation and information warfare used by the KGB during the Soviet Union period, as part of their active measures tactics. The book was co-authored by Richard H. Shultz, professor of international politics at Tufts University, and Roy Godson, professor emeritus of government at Georgetown University.

Kathleen Cordelia Bailey is an American political scientist and artist. She served as deputy assistant secretary of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and as assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. She is a senior associate at the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Schoen, Fletcher; Lamb, Christopher J. (2012). Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference. National Defense University. OCLC   919090922.
  2. 1 2 Gorka, Katherine. "Re-engaging in the War of Ideas: Lessons from the Active Measures Working Group". Westminster Institute. Retrieved 7 April 2013.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 Waller, J. Michael (2008). Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare. Washington: The Institute of World Politics Press. ISBN   978-0-9792236-4-8.
  4. Waller, J. Michael (2007). The Public Diplomacy Reader. Washington: The Institute of World Politics Press. ISBN   9780615154657.
  5. McCaul, Michael (June 18, 2020). "The US must meaningfully confront Chinese Communist Party propaganda". The Hill. Retrieved June 23, 2020.

Further reading