Africa
Egypt: since taking power, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was accused of hacking to promote support for el-Sisi. [1] [2]
State-sponsored Internet propaganda is Internet manipulation and propaganda that is sponsored by a state. States have used the Internet, particularly social media to influence elections, sow distrust in institutions, spread rumors, spread disinformation, typically using bots to create and spread contact. Propaganda is used internally to control populations, and externally to influence other societies.
Egypt: since taking power, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was accused of hacking to promote support for el-Sisi. [1] [2] 
Mexico: According to researchers quoted by the BBC, the government and multiple competing political parties have used bots. According to a 2017 paper, government-sponsored "spam-bots" have been used to "target journalists" and "spread misinformation". [3] 
United States: 
Venezuela: Bolivarian Army of Trolls, founded in 2017, is tasked with disseminating Bolivarian propaganda and spreading disinformation. [8] According to a document of the Venezuela's Ministry of the Interior and Justice leaked in 2017, the Bolivarian Army of Trolls has five squads: pro-government, opponents, neutrals, distraction, and fake news. [9] 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: The former government of Afghanistan used a state-sponsored Internet troll army to push their narrative and exaggerate Afghan Taliban casualties. [10] Sometimes the information posted by the army was picked up by uncritical sections of Afghanistan's media and reported without any additional confirmation. [10] 
Bahrain: Since the Arab Spring and subsequent uprising, the Government of Bahrain has increased its political and media censorship, as well as launching propaganda disinformation. In 2019, Bahrain was listed as one of 70 countries with widespread Internet propaganda misinformation and hiring cyber hackers to censor bad news about Bahraini Government. [11] From 2017 when conflict with Qatar emerged, Bahrain also participated on an Internet propaganda campaign against Qatar and trying to spread sectarian conflicts. [12] 
China: The 50 Cent Party and Internet Water Army are terms used to describe different types of state-sponsored pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Internet propaganda and disinformation operations. [13] [14] [15] According to an article by the South China Morning Post , supporters of the 2019–20 Hong Kong protests remarked on the number of "50 cent trolls", but Fang Kecheng, a professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong who has researched Chinese internet nationalism, stated that "the CCP is also acutely aware that radical nationalists may go out of control and cause trouble. So the endorsement is specific to several organs rather than an overall strategy." [16] In June 2020, Twitter deleted over 170,000 accounts allegedly linked to a Chinese government disinformation campaign that targeted Hong Kong and sought to discredit the United States. [17] [18] In December 2021, Twitter removed accounts linked to the Chinese government that aimed to deny human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. [19] In 2022, Chinese public relations firm Shanghai Haixun Technology Co. began planting pro-Beijing stories in almost three dozen news outlets in an effort to help the Chinese government improve its image. [20] [21] [22] In September 2022, Meta Platforms said it disrupted the first known China-based influence operation aimed at targeting U.S. users with political content ahead of the U.S. November midterm elections. [23] In May 2023, Meta Platforms detailed new tactics by the Chinese government in its online disinformation efforts including the creation of a front media company in the West, hiring freelance writers around the world, offering to recruit protesters, and co-opting an NGO. [24] Disinformation networks known as Spamouflage or "Dragonbridge" have been linked to China's Ministry of Public Security and used to attempt to influence U.S. elections. [25] [26] In April 2024, Microsoft Threat Analysis Center observed that deceptive CCP-affiliated social media accounts have started to pose contentious questions on controversial U.S. domestic issues to collect information on key voting demographics before the November 2024 U.S. presidential election. [27] [28] 
India: Sponsored trolls are reported to include BJP IT Cell. [29] [30] The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has allegedly used troll disinformation to repress and monitor government opponents. [31] In 2019, a European watchdog discovered 265 bogus media outlets in 65 countries which are managed by an "Indian influence network". [32] The network of fake news websites were said to be used to target policy makers in the United States and the European Union to act against Pakistan. [33] The aim of those websites is to spread propaganda and influence public perception on Pakistan. [34] Now defunct, the Tek Fog was a software application operable via a mobile phone. Indian news portal The Wire stated that it was used by the BJP to infiltrate social media platforms in order to promote favourable viewpoints and target perceived opponents. [35] However, it turned out to be a social media disinformation hoax against the BJP. [36] The Wire issued a formal apology to its readers and took down the Meta and Tek Fog reports. [37] The Washington Post and the Byline Times also reported that a lieutenant colonel of India's foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, established a fake news site called the "Disinfo Lab" to spread disinformation against critics of the Modi government. [38] [39] 
Indonesia: Indonesia has engaged by using state-sponsored troll army to spread propaganda against independence movement of West Papua and accused of promoting pro-incumbent campaign in 2019 Indonesian presidential election. [40] [41] At the other hand, Indonesian president Joko Widodo has accused his opposition group for using propaganda, especially from Russia, to spread hoaxes against his administration. [42] 
Iran: Islamic Republic's troll army, known to be supportive for Ayatollah Khomeini and the current government of Iran, and also criticizing any attempts that against it. [43] In April 2019, the Oxford Internet Institute Computational Propaganda Project published a study on an Iranian-related campaign on Twitter targeting Arab users. [44] The Computational Propaganda team found that this Iranian-related campaign on Twitter focused on masquerading as Arabic news outlets to gain the trust of Arab Twitter users. [44] 
Iraq: Due to the sectarian nature of the country, Iraqi Internet propaganda is also ranged between different groups. During the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the group had managed to operate a systematic propaganda indoctrination on the Internet to confuse Iraqi civilians. [45] [46] According from human rights activist Faisal Al Mutar, Iraqi online propaganda has been in full speed even after the death of Saddam Hussein. [47] 
Israel: Israeli State-sponsored Internet propaganda include the Hasbara, Hasbara Fellowships, Act.IL, and the Jewish Internet Defense Force. [48] [49] [50] Supporters generally frame this "hasbara" as part of its fight towards improving their image abroad given continued Israeli human rights abuses, [50] and also against anti-Israeli agitation and attempts to criticize it. [51] [50] There is substantive evidence that Israel heavily uses data-driven strategies, trolling and disinformation and manipulated media, as well as dedicating funds to state-sponsored media, for overt propaganda campaigns. [52] 
Japan: Between 2019 and 2021, an anonymous Twitter account Dappi (@dappi2019) posted a number of tweets praising the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and conservative opposition parties, while attacking against left-wing opposition parties and news outlets critical of the LDP through false claims and defamation. [53] [54] [55] Dappi's aim was to sway public opinion against the opposition parties. [56] The tweets were primarily posted during regular office hours, and rarely on weekends, leading to speculation that coordinated efforts were behind the account. [57] In 2021, the individual behind Dappi was identified through a legal request filed by two members of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) in the House of Councillors, who sought compensation for the damages caused by the tweets. [53] [54] The individual was revealed to be an employee of the IT company called Ones Quest (ワンズクエスト), which had business dealings with the LDP. [53] 
Jordan: Recent widespread protests in regard to the Arab Spring have led to increasing propaganda and Internet censorship in Jordan, laws have been passed threatening freedom of speech. [58] Internet operation by the state propaganda also seeks to weaken the independent voices of journalists in the country. By 2019, freedom of media in Jordan has declined with regard to growing Internet propaganda by the Government. [59] 
Kazakhstan: Kazakhstani government of Nursultan Nazarbayev had historically sponsored a group of internet trolls called "Nurbots" to spread disinformation and divert attention from inner issues. [60] Nazarbayev's successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has largely continued its legacy of stifling dissent using internet propaganda while masquerading under the mask of democratisation and reforms. [61] [62] 
Malaysia:
Myanmar: The Tatmadaw and the Burmese Government has sponsored propaganda through Internet and dismiss its atrocities towards its minorities like the Rohingya, Shan, Kachin and Karen people. [69] 
North Korea: the troll army of North Korea, which is known to be supportive for the Kim dynasty's rule, and anti-South Korean, anti-American, and pro-North Korean regime. They first appeared in 2013. [70] [71] Reportedly, North Korea has 200 agents to post propaganda messages on South Korean portals under assumed identities stolen from South Koreans, with 27,000 posts in 2011 and over 41,000 posts in 2012. [72] [ needs update ]
Pakistan: Pakistan Armed Forces have used propaganda to influence Pakistani Government, to bolster the military's image, and to protect the power of the military's authority in the country by labelling the critics as "anti-state". [73] [74] [75] In 2019, Meta discovered and removed a network of 103 pages, groups and accounts linked to employees of the Inter-Service Public Relations of the Pakistani military "for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior on Facebook and Instagram." [76] 
Philippines: The Oxford University released a study claiming that hired "keyboard trolls" played a role in President Rodrigo Duterte's presidential campaign in 2016. The study said that the Duterte campaign team spent at least $200 thousand and hired 400 to 500 people to defend Duterte from online critics. It also added that the hired "trolls" remain to support Duterte and his administration after he was elected. Online trolls were allegedly used by the administration to silence critics through threats of violence and rape to people critical of Duterte's policies. [77] Duterte, while admitted to paying people to support him online during the elections said he has followers referring to his staunch supporter, Mocha Uson who runs the support group Mocha Uson Blog but insists that Uson offers her services free. [78] 
Qatar: Qatari propaganda has previously been in line with Saudi and Emirati until the 2017–19 Qatar diplomatic crisis, with Al Jazeera being a notable evidence of Qatari propaganda spreading in promotion of violence, its anti-American view and nurturing Islamist movements. [79] Since 2017, Al Arabiya, a Saudi-based channel, accused Qatari Government for ongoing media onslaught by sponsoring massive propaganda networks in Politico to defame the Saudis and raise support for Qatar. [80] 
Saudi Arabia:
Syria: Owing to its long history of censorship, Syria has some of the most extensive state-sponsored propaganda. Since the Syrian Civil War began, President Bashar al-Assad has frequently allowed pro-regime sockpuppets to disinform about the conflict in favor for his regime. [92] The White Helmets, a humanitarian organization rescuing Syrian civilians from conflict zones, is a major target of the Syrian government's disinformation campaign. [93] 
Thailand: The Royal Thai Army have been coordinating with the Russian government to sow Anti-Americanism, support the Prayuth government, and discredit Thailand's democratic movements since 2010. [94] 
Turkey: 6,000 paid social media commentators known as "AK Trolls" mainly spreading pro-Erdogan propaganda and attack those opposing Erdogan (2016). [95] In June 2020 Twitter removed 7,340 accounts engaging in "coordinated inauthentic activity" targeted at Turkish citizens; [96] the removal prompted Erdogan's administration to appear to threaten Twitter with government restrictions. [97] 
United Arab Emirates: During the 2017–19 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the Emirati Government openly allowed and funded the troll propaganda army to dismiss Qatari rejection and spread anti-Qatari propaganda. [98] [99] 
Uzbekistan: In order to control its population, the Uzbek government established its own social network to spread Internet censorship and propaganda. [100] Even with the death of Islam Karimov, Tashkent remains firm to ongoing political censorship on social media. [101] 
Vietnam:
Azerbaijan: Multiple sources have documented evidence of coordinated pro-Azerbaijani influence operations on Wikipedia promoting government narratives related to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. [106] [107] [108] These actions are viewed as part of a broader issue of media freedom in Azerbaijan, in which authorities engage in digital propaganda, public relations manipulation, [109] and efforts to suppress or distort Armenian-related content. [110] One investigation cites evidence suggestive of the involvement of state-linked actors. [111] In 2011, Azerbaijani targeted Wikipedia as a potential threat to national security. [112] The Azerbaijani government has hired public relations firms, some of which are documented to have previously rewritten Wikipedia articles. [113] 
Belarus: the Lukashenko Government has taken a step to spread disinformation in accordance with his rule and, sometimes, in line with Russian troll propaganda, from blaming Poland and Ukraine for instigating problems to lethal threats against activists. [118] [119] Disinformation became increasingly intensified following the 2020 Belarusian protests, with trolls from Russia and Serbia actively participated to spread disinformation and igniting fears for Belarusian population to turn against the protests. [120] 
Bulgaria: Internet trolls have become a problem in Bulgaria since the 2010s, with troll armies being used by various political parties to attack and threaten each other. [121] Despite attempts to reduce and end the internet trolls since 2014, the issue remains unaddressed and becomes increasingly intensified by 2020 under the corruption of Boyko Borisov's government. [122] [123] 
France: Facebook alleges in December 2020, that accounts linked to the French military have been posing as Africans in French and Arabic language websites catering to the region to promote views in favor of France. The accounts promoted claims of Russian interference in the election in the Central African Republic, expressed supportive views on the French military involvement in the region and criticized Russian military involvement in the region. These accounts also interacted with alleged Russian accounts. [124] 
Poland: once a leading nation in democratization efforts during the post-Soviet era, since the election of Andrzej Duda to the presidency in the 2010s, freedom of media in Poland has suffered significant deterioration, with state-sponsored Internet media that aligned to conservative movement attacking liberal groups in Poland, and criticizing European leaders for its politics that is seen to be abnormal. [125] In 2019, a troll farm group aligned to the conservative movement close to the Polish government was discovered in Wrocław. [126] In 2020 Polish presidential election, Duda Government was accused of spreading propaganda to manipulate public and to enhance the authoritarian rule. [127] In the 2023 Polish parliamentary elections however, Pis majority government, of which Duda is a member, has been ousted, following an establishment of a new ruling liberal coalition, [128] which partially depoliticised public media. [129] 
Russia:
Serbia: Serbian government since 2017 has been accused of sponsoring a troll army (known by locals as bots, Serbian : ботови) to silence critics and inflame anti-Albanian sentiment with regard to Kosovo. The troll army is believed to be sponsored by Aleksandar Vučić, currently President of Serbia and an expert in propaganda during the Yugoslav Wars. [133] [134] 
United Kingdom: "Online Covert Action" and other missions (like the "77th Brigade) by the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group, revealed by Edward Snowden in February 2014. [135] The Disinfo Lab, which at one point consisted of about a dozen private contractors working out of a four-story whitewashed building on a leafy street in New Delhi, was created in mid-2020 by Lt. Col. Dibya Satpathy, now 39, an intelligence officer who has worked to shape international perceptions of India, said the three people familiar with the operation.
... anonymous posts on a Twitter account intended to sway public opinion, such as the Dappi account assailing opposition parties ...
{{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)Another organized attempt to doctor conflict-related content on...Wikipedia is the...'Azerbaijani mailing list.' In 2009, 24 users — later nicknamed 'Baku commissars' in internal correspondence — decided to coordinate edits to articles on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict...'Some of them were even associated with the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences...'
According to pro-government media, Pardashunas created a bot that 'worked' during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War to promote Azerbaijani news in Armenia and to collect Armenian data. According to Pardashunas, he believed 'Armenians also had the right to trusted information'. In 2021, he received a Presidential Award for Youth from President Ilham Aliyev.
The most clear signals of coordination included recruiting potential editors on Facebook, copy-pasting wording from government press releases, and uploading high-quality photos of the President of Azerbaijan which presumably could only have been taken by an official press pool. Additional signals of coordination involved an "unlimited supply of editors on the Azeri side" who did not mind being banned or blocked, "a whole scale Azerification of names, places, everything" on even the most obscure of articles, and "cloying praising" of the Azerbaijani government...Participant 06 considered only the Azeri-aligned disruptive editing to be "relatively transparent, bad coordination of state actors."
The [Azeri] government has spent heavily on British PR firms, including Bell Pottinger, whose expertise in the industry's darker arts – such as rewriting clients' Wikipedia entries – is well documented. Some suspect the firm of being behind Aliyev's appearance on the Times's list of 100 people to watch in 2012. But the PR firm with the closest ties to Azerbaijan's first family is Freud Communications, headed by Matthew Freud, a great-grandson of Sigmund Freud. It has, as one former associate puts it, been tasked with "branding the despot's daughter", Leyla Aliyeva.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)For example, in a now-closed RFC titled "Do something about azwiki," editors document a series of issues with the local governance of Azerbaijani Wikipedia: …the abuse of administrative block tools, sockpuppetry, and the regulation of key decision-making about community governance to private, off-wiki channels, such as WhatsApp and Facebook Groups, steered by a few individuals. …The RFC also connects this behavior to a pattern of systematic historical revisionism on the project. …The last update posted by a steward on the RFC acknowledged that the problems of governance on the Azerbaijani Wikipedia would require deeper engagement to address.
