Conspiracy theories are a prevalent feature of culture and politics in Turkey. Conspiracism is an important phenomenon in understanding Turkish politics. [1] This is explained by a desire to "make up for lost Ottoman grandeur", [1] the humiliation of perceiving Turkey as part of "the malfunctioning half" of the world, [2] and a "low level of media literacy among the Turkish population." [3]
The development of conspiracy theories in Turkey has been connected to the political instability and territorial losses of the late Ottoman Empire. Its collapse remains a painful memory for some Turks who believe Western influences contributed to its collapse [4] . This has shaped conspiracy narratives that portray foreign powers and minority groups as threats to Turkey’s government and national security.
Turkish author and journalist Mustafa Akyol describes the reason for the prevalence of conspiracy theorizing in Turkey as "it makes us feel important. If the world is conspiring against us, we must be really special. It is, I believe, the way we Turks make up for our lost Ottoman grandeur." [1] Turkish economist Selim Koru has pointed to the humiliation of perceiving Turkey as part of the "malfunctioning [half]" of the world. [2]
Turkish consumers are the second-most media illiterate when compared to countries in Europe, leaving them especially vulnerable to fake news, a 2018 report released by the Soros Open Society Institute said. A combination of low education levels, low reading scores, low media freedom and low societal trust went into making the score, which saw Turkey being placed above only North Macedonia. [3] According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018, Turkey with some distance is the country with most made-up news reports in the world. [5] The largest peddlers of conspiracy theories are often Turkish news outlets and social media which makes avoiding conspiracy theories nearly impossible. Social media presents a unique challenge to media literacy due to the fact that "bots" or fake accounts have a financial incentive to produce outrageous content. The more traction social media accounts get, the more money that is generated for the account user. [6]
The Ottoman Empire spanned parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa and included diverse ethnic and religious communities, such as Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Arabs [7] . Those who identified as Muslims generally had more citizen rights. Ottoman leaders introduced reforms that aimed to promote unity. One approach was Ottomanism, which sought to establish an inclusive civic identity and equality among Ottoman subjects regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. However, these efforts were resisted by nationalist movements among minority groups . Turks view the involvement of foreign countries and the nationalist movements as proof that foreign power seek to weaken Turkey.
In 1920 the Treaty of Sèvres proposed dividing former Ottoman territories among the Allied powers and creating arrangements for Kurdish and Armenian territories. It also placed İzmir and other areas under arrangements that threatened Turkish territorial control. Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rejected the treaty and declared War for Independence which lasted from 1919 to 1923. The conflict ended with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which established Turkey's modern borders, and the Republic of Turkey was established that same year. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the proposed division of its territories contributed to fears that foreign powers would use minority groups to weaken the new Turkish Republic.
Widespread conspiratorial views about foreign powers and the internal groups that seek to weaken or divide the Turkish Republic. This conspiracy narrative has shaped educational content, views of the European Union, government policies favoring isolationism, foreign relations, and responses to the Kurdish insurgency. Kerem Karaosmanoğlu refers to it as "mother of all conspiracy theories in Turkey." This fear has been subsequently abused by Turkish politicians who have used political polarization and national distrust to divide people and legitimize their own authoritarian regime. [8]
Mustafa Akyol argues that Turkey's official political discourse is shaped by anti-Western conspiracy narratives that portray terrorist groups as working together to bring about the country's downfall. A distinct feature of conspiracy theorizing in Turkey is that at the alleged command and control end of an alleged conspiracy scheme is usually narrated to be governments because the worldview taught in the Turkish education system is massively focused on the state. [9]
Doğan Gürpınar, a scholar whose areas of study include nationalism, historiography, and ideologies in Turkey, argues that conspiracism's power to shape intellectual discourse and ideological standpoints and to represent the state tradition is "unique to Turkey". [10]
The concept of üst akıl describes a powerful and secretive force believed to control the public sphere in Turkey socially and politically. Politicians use this to justifying government actions, discredit opposing views, protect political power, and gain public support.
Some Turkish right-wing parties use the Sèvres Syndrome to express distrust of Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union. For example, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) viewed EU requirements as part of a Western plan to divide Turkey by creating “artificial minorities.” Since the founding of the Turkish Republic, state ideology has also sought to prevent social divisions based on class and ethnicity.
Conspiracy theories about terrorism can serve the political interests of Turkey's ruling elite by attributing national security threats to foreign plots and portraying the country's leadership as a major force facing powerful international opposition. More broadly, people and political groups may turn to conspiracy theories when they struggle to explain complex social and political developments they oppose or use them to ease fears about perceived
The political divide in Turkey has divided neighbors and friends. 74% of Turks would not engage in business with someone of a differing political party while 68% say they would not want their children to play with other children from families of a differing political party. [40]
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link){{cite journal}}: Check |url= value (help){{cite journal}}: Check |url= value (help)CS1 maint: periodical has ISBN (link){{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)35. Göknar, E. (2019). [Review of the book Conspiracy theory in Turkey: Politics and protest in the age of "post-truth", by Julian de Medeiros]. The Middle East Journal 73(2), 336-337. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/730239./
36. Karaosmanoğlu, K. (2021). The discourse of üst akıl: a search for hegemony in the Turkish media. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 21(1), 77–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2021.1872233/
37. Nefes, T. S. (2026). Rationalities of conspiracy theories: A Weberian analysis of Turkish parliamentary debates. Party Politics, 32(1), 89-99. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688251316067
38. Nefes, T. S. (2017). The impacts of the Turkish government’s conspiratorial framing of the Gezi Park protests. Social Movement Studies, 16(5), 610–622. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2017.1319269/
39. Saglam, E. (2022). Subjectivity, Mobilization, and Everyday Politics: Insights from Reconfigurations of Conspiracy Theories in Turkey. Social Research: An International Quarterly 89(3), 831-857. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sor.2022.0047./
40. Yapp, M.E., Shaw, S.J. (2026, September 18). Ottoman Empire. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire/