Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Readiness Test was a secret test and alert of U.S. military forces staged by the U.S. Department of Defense. It began on October 12, 1969, and consisted of a variety of military moves around the world, including activities by U.S. air and naval forces from the continental U.S. to the North Atlantic and from the Middle East to the Western Pacific. [1]

Contents

Carried out at the direction of President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, the readiness test was the culmination of months of White House efforts to apply the "Madman theory" and related threats of force to help end the Vietnam War. Nixon and Kissinger hoped that the implied threat of force would make the Soviet and North Vietnamese leadership more cooperative in the negotiation of a Vietnam War settlement. The Readiness Test culminated in a "Giant Lance" airborne alert involving nuclear-armed B-52 flights over northern Alaska. While the Soviet government was aware of the U.S.'s secret military activities, Nixon's and Kissinger's efforts did not convince them or have any discernible impact on the peace negotiations with North Vietnam in Paris. [1] [2]

Origins of the test

Contingency planning

Some of the measures taken during the JCS Readiness Test drew on earlier contingency planning. After the January 1966 B-52 crash in Palomares, Spain, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) began to look at alternatives to the continuous airborne alert posture that it had maintained since 1961. During 1967, SAC planners developed the Selective Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA). Designed to be compatible with Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) targeting and to permit greater dispersal of bombers and tankers in a crisis, SEAGA could provide decision-makers with a bomber force that could make an "instant response to tactical warning" or put forces on higher alert during periods of world tension. When SAC created SEAGA, it gave the nickname "Giant Lance" to this new capability. [3]

"Show of Force" posture

The Thule Air Base B-52 crash on January 21, 1968 brought airborne alert to an end and SAC replaced it with SEAGA. Strategic bombers remained on ground alert as they had since the 1950s. One element of SEAGA was a "Show of Force" posture involving immediate launch of alert forces ("flush launch") with airborne and ground alert bombers switching positions at regular intervals for up to 30 days. The Show of Force posture would put airborne alert B-52 aircraft in a variety of "orbits," or positions, over the Arctic Circle, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or the Pacific. SAC considered such a posture as a "visual deterrent", a demonstration to an adversary of a "national determination to resist with every available resource." [4]

The role of the test in the Nixon Administration's Vietnam exit strategy

The "Madman Strategy"

When Richard Nixon became president in January 1969, one of his top priorities was ending the war in Vietnam. Determined that the war would not end his presidency as it had Lyndon Johnson’s, Nixon believed that it was essential to use threats of massive force to coerce North Vietnam into becoming more more cooperative at the Paris Peace Talks. [1] Nixon and Kissinger wanted to ensure the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu regime in South Vietnam the support it needed to stay in power, or at least last long enough to survive--a "decent interval" or a "reasonable interval" [5] -- once the United States had withdrawn its forces from South Vietnam. [6] Nixon was privately committed to what became known as the "Madman Strategy", which posited that threats of excessive force could make the Soviet government wonder and worry whether the President was a madman who needed to be placated. [1] [7] Kissinger bought into Nixon's coercive approach and, like the President, optimistically believed that Moscow had great influence with Hanoi and that Soviet pressure could induce North Vietnam to take a more conciliatory negotiating position, and that U.S. pressure could influence Moscow. According to Kissinger, Moscow should see risks in not helping Washington: "we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control." [8] Several years into the administration, Kissinger privately described Nixon's approach in this way: "the president’s strategy has been (in the mid-East crisis, in Vietnam, etc.) to 'push so many chips into the pot' that the other side will think we might be 'crazy' and might really go much further." [9]

Threats of force

From the late winter to the spring and summer of 1969, Nixon and Kissinger made various low-level threats and feints to warn Hanoi and its Soviet patron of the risk of escalation. The secret bombing of Cambodia was integral to this approach, with Kissinger justifying it in part as a "way to influence the Soviets." [10] In addition, the White House supported a ruse to create apprehension in Hanoi that the United States was going to mine Haiphong Harbor by ordering the US Navy to conduct secret and elaborate mining exercises in Manila Bay, P.I. [11] [12] Finally, through a French intermediary Kissinger sent a threatening statement to North Vietnamese negotiators, informing them of the risk that the U.S. would take "measures of great consequence and force," using "any means necessary," if they did not accept U.S. negotiating positions. [13]

Duck Hook

During the summer of 1969, Kissinger presided over contingency planning to escalate the war through bombing raids and mining operations. U.S. Navy planners developed a mining plan, codenamed Duck Hook, which was soon folded into ongoing work at the National Security Council and the Pentagon. [14] With Kissinger’s threats to North Vietnamese negotiators focusing on November 1, 1969 as a deadline, the escalation plans became known as the “November Option." Nixon and Kissinger, however, had overestimated Moscow’s clout with Hanoi and the threats failed. Determined to keep their forces in the South and refusing to recognize the South Vietnamese regime, Hanoi ignored the threats and made no concessions. [1] [15]

While developing plans for military escalation, Kissinger's White House staff considered risky options such as ground incursions into North Vietnam and tactical nuclear weapons use, but they did not survive further scrutiny. [16] [17] Subsequent planning focused on conventional military operations, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing military officials in Saigon and the Western Pacific to develop a parallel bombing-mining plan nicknamed "Pruning Knife". [18] By late September, however, Nixon reluctantly set aside escalation proposals, to Kissinger's displeasure. With major national anti-war demonstrations scheduled for mid-October and mid-November, Nixon was concerned that major escalation could exacerbate civil unrest and produce "horrible results" domestically. [19] [20] Top advisers such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shared those concerns, also observing that the U.S. could not point to any “provocative” action by North Vietnam to justify an attack. [21]

Raising readiness levels

As a fallback to the November Option, Nixon chose to signal his anger toward Moscow through the application of the "madman" approach by raising military alert and readiness levels. Kissinger’s military assistant, Colonel Alexander Haig, requested Pentagon officials to prepare plans and proposals for higher readiness levels, which Haig and Kissinger packaged into a report to Nixon on measures to “convey the impression of increased US readiness to the Soviets.” [22] Nixon and Kissinger may have seen this as a way to lend credibility to the prior warnings to Moscow and Hanoi. While the Pentagon's instructions to top commanders emphasized military measures that would be "discernible" to Moscow, they were "not to be threatening," apparently so as not to spark a crisis. Kissinger had written about threats and bluffs in the past [23] and may have hoped that the Soviets perceived the readiness measures as a threat, even if they were only a bluff. Several days into the readiness test, on October 17, 1969, Kissinger explained to White House Chief of State H. R. Haldeman that the United States had all "sorts of signal-type activity going on around the world to jar Soviets + NVN." [24] Nixon and Kissinger shared with only a few senior officials their purpose in ordering the readiness activities, although some SAC officers suspected that they had to do with Vietnam. [25]

Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test

Operation Giant Lance

At the request of the White House, the Pentagon's Joint Staff worked up the details of a secret plan, which was called the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test. The readiness test involved military operations around the world, from the continental United States and the Atlantic to the Middle East and the Western Pacific. Carried out between October 13th and 30th, the activities included higher readiness levels for SAC bombers, tactical air, and air defenses, and a variety of naval maneuvers, from sudden movements of aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines to the shadowing of Soviet merchant ships sailing toward Haiphong. [1]  For example, SAC stood down B-52 bombers at their bases, placing them on expanded ground alert, with no flights for about a week, and then after allowing flights resumed the stand-down on 23 October 1969. [25]

After JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler canvassed military commands for suggestions and from them, the Joint Staff developed a master list of additional actions that were to be taken, some almost immediately and some later in October. As a whole, they were to "reflect an increase in the intensity of signals received by the Soviets." The measures to be taken were world-wide, involving U.S. naval, air, and ground forces in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, Western Europe, and the United States. Among the measures to be taken by SAC were the SEAGA "Show of Force Option" involving nuclear-armed B-52s in the "Eielson Orbit- East" (over northern Alaska) on 27 October and the "maximum feasible number" of nuclear-armed SAC bombers "in the highest state of maintenance readiness." The U.S. Pacific Command took steps to "enhance SIOP forces" with the "maximum feasible" number of Polaris missile submarines at sea, to "increase surveillance" of Soviet ships heading toward North Vietnam, and to increase the readiness of tactical air and air defense missiles. The U.S. Atlantic Command undertook a variety of aircraft carriers maneuvers, with, for example, the USS Yorktown (CV-10) cancelling a port visits so it could rendezvous with the USS Newport News (CA-148). The U.S. European Command had instructions to "selectively increase border surveillance" (the East-West German border) and to increase intelligence gathering at the border, among other measures. [26]

The SEAGA/Giant Lance "Show of Force" option played a role when SAC's commander-in-chief directed the 92nd Strategic Aerospace Wing to implement it. [27] Beginning on 27th October, SAC put 6 B-52s in the air over Northern Alaska for eighteen hour stretches, each day for three days in a row, for a total of eighteen sorties. This was the first time that nuclear-armed airborne alert flights had been launched since the accident at Thule, Greenland in January 1968. It was one of the last major moves in the Readiness Test, which Joint Chiefs instructed the commands to end on 30 October 1969. [28]

None of the JCS Readiness Test activities were announced and all were conducted in secret; the media only noticed those that were most difficult to conceal, such as the abrupt sailing of aircraft carriers. For example, the sudden departure of the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV-10) from Rotterdam leaving 200 baffled sailors behind, was hard to overlook and received media attention. [29] Also difficult to keep secret were stand-downs at SAC bomber bases; phone calls to the bases from people in nearby residential areas indicated curiosity about why bomber flights suddenly stopped and then restarted. [19]

Impact

Higher U.S. alert levels and unusual military actions, even if not designed to be threatening, carried the risk that they could provoke a Soviet military reaction and an unwanted, spiraling crisis. [2] To track Soviet military posture, early in the readiness test, Kissinger tasked the intelligence agencies to monitor Soviet reactions. As part of an "all source" intelligence watch, both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) turned in reports, [30] with DIA preparing a series, "Summary of Soviet Reactions to U.S. Operations."[ citation needed ] One of the DIA reports, dated 28 October 1969, with Kissinger's initials on it, has been massively excised, probably because its contents drew from highly secret communications intelligence. [31] This document and others in the "Special Intelligence" series is located in the Vietnam files at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, further indicating the readiness test's connection to Nixon White House Vietnam strategy.[ citation needed ]

From the Soviet government's side, evidence concerning their awareness of the JCS Readiness Test and its elements, such as the "Giant Lance" SEAGA operation, has yet to surface.[ as of? ] Because the readiness measures were relatively low key and non-threatening, Soviet officials probably downplayed them. Years later, former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko recalled that "the Americans put forces on alert so often it is hard to know what it meant." Another Soviet diplomat, Aleksandr Kislov, stated, "Mr. Nixon used to exaggerate his intentions regularly" by using alerts, an approach that was the opposite of Moscow's, which was to "understate our military intentions." Given such perceptions, the Soviet government may have seen the October 1969 alert as the bluff that it was. [32] Notwithstanding Nixon and Kissinger's hope that threats could persuade North Vietnamese negotiators to accept U.S. positions, Hanoi made no change in its approach. The North Vietnamese leadership believed that eventually they could reach an agreement with Washington once they had changed the facts on the ground in South Vietnam. [33]

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References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Kimball, Jeffrey; Burr, William (2015). Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. pp. 231–309.
  2. 1 2 Sagan, Scott Douglas; Suri, Jeremi (Spring 2003). "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969". International Security. 27 (4): 150–183. doi:10.1162/016228803321951126. S2CID   57564244.
  3. ↑ "U.S. Strategic Air Command, History Study #129, The SAC Alert System 1956-1970" (PDF). National Security Archive. 19 September 1973.
  4. ↑ "U.S. Strategic Air Command, History Study #129, The SAC Alert System 1956-1970" (PDF). National Security Archive. 19 September 1973.
  5. ↑ "Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Dobrynin". National Security Archive. 14 May 1969.
  6. ↑ Herring, George (2002). America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (4th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 271–279.
  7. ↑ Jacobson, Zachary (2023). On Nixon's Madness: An Emotional History. Johns Hopkins University Press.
  8. ↑ "Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, "Vietnam Papers"" (PDF). National Security Archive. 22 March 1969.
  9. ↑ "Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of Defense Gardner Tucker, "Kissinger"". National Security Archive. 10 August 1972.
  10. ↑ Kimball, Jeffrey; Burr, William (2015). Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. p. 101.
  11. ↑ "Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to Dr. Henry Kissinger, enclosing memorandum to Laird from JCS Chairman Wheeler, and paper, subj: Plan for a Mining Feint of Haiphong Harbor" (PDF). National Security Archive. 11 April 1969.
  12. ↑ "U.S. Embassy Philippines telegram 8452 to State Department, subj: Pincus/Paul Visit" (PDF). National Security Archive. 8 August 1969.
  13. ↑ "Memorandum by Tony Lake, July 16, 1969, enclosing statement to be used by Jean Sainteny" (PDF). National Security Archive. July 16, 1969.
  14. ↑ "Chief of Naval Operations, "Duck Hook"" (PDF). National Security Archive. 21 July 1969.
  15. ↑ Herring, George (2002). America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (4th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill. p. 275.
  16. ↑ "Vietnam Contingency Planning, Concept of Operations" (PDF). National Security Archive. 13 September 1969.
  17. ↑ "Initial Comments on Concepts of Operations" (PDF). National Security Archive. 17 September 1969.
  18. ↑ "Message, Rear Admiral Frederic A. Bardshar to JCS Chairman Wheeler, subj: PRUNING KNIFE Status Report No. 1" (PDF). National Security Archive. 15 September 1969.
  19. 1 2 Kimball, Jeffrey &, Burr, William (2015). Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. p. 297.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  20. ↑ Wells, Tom (1994). The War Within: America's Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. pp. 347–355.
  21. ↑ "Secretary of Defense Laird Memorandum for the President, "Air and Naval Operations Against North Vietnam"" (PDF). National Security Archive. October 8, 1969.
  22. ↑ "Kissinger to Nixon, "Military Alerts,"". National Security Archive. 9 October 1969.
  23. ↑ Burr, William; Kimball, Jeffrey (2015). Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The October Alert, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. p. 59.
  24. ↑ "Entry in the diary of H.R. Haldeman" (PDF). National Security Archive. October 17, 1969.
  25. 1 2 "History of Strategic Air Command FY 1970 Historical Study No. 117" (PDF). National Security Archive. April 20, 1971.
  26. ↑ "Secretary of Defense Laird to National Security Adviser Kissinger, enclosing memorandum from JCS Chairman Wheeler to Secretary of Defense, subj: "Additional Actions for US Military Readiness Tests – Worldwide"". National Security Archive. 16 October 1969.
  27. ↑ "Message from Strategic Air Command Headquarters to 12 Air Division et al., "Increased Readiness Posture,"" (PDF). National Security Archive. October 23, 1969.
  28. ↑ "Message from JCS to all Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, "Increased Readiness Posture"" (PDF). National Security Archive. October 28, 1969.
  29. ↑ "U.S. Won't Explain Warship Movement". The New York Times. October 20, 1969.
  30. ↑ "Possible Communist Reactions to US Military Readiness Tests" (PDF). National Security Archive. October 27, 1969.
  31. ↑ "Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Intelligence Report, Summary of Soviet Reactions to US Operations, #9" (PDF). National Security Archive. 28 October 1969.
  32. ↑ Lebow, Richard Ned; Stein, Janice Gross (1994). We All Lost the Cold War. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp. 488, note 38.
  33. ↑ Goscha, Christoper (2016). Vietnam: A New History. New York: Basic Books. pp. 335–336.
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