Franz Brentano introduced the problem of intentionality.
Analytic philosophy was deeply influenced by Austrian realism in the former state of Austria-Hungary, so much so that Michael Dummett has remarked it is better characterized as Anglo-Austrian rather than the usual Anglo-American.[30]
For Brentano, all mental events or acts of consciousness have a real, non-mental intentional object, which the thinking is directed at or "about".[32] Intentionality is "the mark of the mental."[32] Intentionality is to be distinguished from intention or intension.
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.
Gottlob Frege was a German geometry professor at the University of Jena, logician, and philosopher who is understood as the father of analytic philosophy.[37] He advocated logicism, the project of reducing arithmetic to pure logic.
In contrast to this "psychologism", Frege in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) and The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (German: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, 1893–1903), argued that mathematics and logic have their own public objects, independent of one's private judgments or mental states.[40] Following Frege, the logicists tended to advocate a kind of mathematical Platonism.[41]
Frege also proved influential in the philosophy of language. Dummett traces the linguistic turn to Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic and his context principle.[44] Frege writes "never ... ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition."[45] As Dummett explains, in order to answer a Kantian question, "How are numbers given to us, granted that we have no idea or intuition of them?" Frege finds the solution in defining "the sense of a proposition in which a number word occurs."[46] Thus a problem, traditionally solved along idealist lines, is instead solved along linguistic ones.[44]
Frege's paper "On Sense and Reference" (1892) is seminal, containing Frege's puzzles about identity and advancing a mediated reference theory.[47] Frege points out the reference of "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" is the same: both refer to the planetVenus.[q] Therefore, substituting one term for the other doesn't change the truth value (salva veritate). However, they differ in what Frege calls cognitive value or the mode of presentation. One has to distinguish between two notions of meaning: the reference of a term and the sense of a term. As Frege points out "the Morning Star is the Morning Star" is uninformative, but "the Morning Star is the Evening Star" is informative. So the two expressions must differ in a way other than reference.[47]
A related puzzle is also known as Frege's puzzle, concerning intensional contexts and propositional attitude reports. Consider the statement "The ancients believed the morning star is the evening star." This statement might be false. However, the statement "The ancients believed the morning star is the morning star" is trivially true. Here again, the morning star and the evening star have different meanings, despite having the same reference.[47][49]
Thought
A diagram of the "three realms".
The paper "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry" (1918) reflects Frege's anti-idealism.[50] He argues for a Platonist account of propositions or thoughts. Frege claims propositions are intangible, like ideas; yet publicly available, like an object. In addition to the physical, public "first realm" of objects, and the private, mental "second realm" of ideas, Frege posits a "third realm" of Platonic propositions, such as the Pythagorean theorem.[50]
Analytic philosophy in the narrower sense of twentieth-century anglophone philosophy is usually thought to begin with Cambridge philosophers Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore's rejection of Hegelianism for being obscure; or the "revolt against idealism."[55][56][s] Russell summed up Moore's common sense influence:[t]
"G. E. Moore...took the lead in rebellion, and I followed, with a sense of emancipation. Bradley had argued that everything common sense believes in is mere appearance; we reverted to the opposite extreme, and that everything is real that common sense, uninfluenced by philosophy or theology, supposes real. With a sense of escaping from prison, we allowed ourselves to think that grass is green, that the sun and stars would exist if no one was aware of them, and also that there is a pluralistic timeless world of Platonic ideas."[59]
An important aspect of Hegelianism and British idealism was logical holism—the belief that aspects of the world can be known only by knowing the whole world. This is closely related to the doctrine of internal relations, the belief that relations between items are internal relations, or essentialproperties the items have by nature. Russell and Moore in response promulgated logical atomism and the doctrine of external relations—the belief that the world consists of independent facts.[56][61][62][u]
During his early career, Russell adopted Frege's predicate logic as his primary philosophical method, thinking it could expose the underlying structure of philosophical problems. This was done most famously in his theory of definite descriptions in "On Denoting", published in Mind in 1905.[66] The essay has been called a "paradigm of philosophy."[67]
In this essay, Russell responds to both Meinong and Frege. Russell uses his analysis of descriptions to solve ascriptions of nonexistence, such as with "the present King of France". He argues all proper names (aside from demonstratives like this or that) are disguised definite descriptions, for example "Walter Scott" can be replaced with "the author of Waverley".[v] This position came to be called descriptivism.[69]
Russell presents his own version of Frege's second puzzle.
"If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley; and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence we may substitute “Scott” for “the author of Waverley” and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.”[66]
The essay also illustrates the concept of scopeambiguity by showing how denying "The present King of France is bald" can mean either "There is no King of France" or "The present King of France is not bald". Russell quips "Hegelians, who love a synthesis, will probably conclude that he wears a wig."[66]
Russell claimed the problems of philosophy can be solved by showing the simple constituents of complex notions.[5]Logical form would be made clear by syntax.
For example, the English word is has three distinct meanings, which predicate logic can express as follows:
For the sentence 'the cat is asleep', the is of predication means that "x is P" (denoted as P(x)).
For the sentence 'there is a cat', the is of existence means that "there is an x" (∃x).
For the sentence 'three is half of six', the is of identity means that "x is the same as y" (x=y).
From about 1910 to 1930, analytic philosophers emphasized creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language that, in their opinion, often led philosophers astray.[75]
The book starts "The world is all that is the case."[79] Wittgenstein claims the universe is the totality of actual states of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed and mirrored by the language of first-order predicate logic. Thus, a picture of the universe can be constructed by expressing facts in the form of atomic propositions and linking them using logical operators.[80][81][82]
Wittgenstein has been labeled a mystic who believed in the ineffable by some readers.[86] The Tractatus further ultimately concludes that all of its propositions are meaningless, illustrated with a ladder one must toss away after climbing up it.[87] The book ends "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."[88]
Logical positivism
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Members of the Vienna Circle: (1) Moritz Schlick (2) Otto Neurath; (3) Hans Hahn (4) Rudolf Carnap
During the late 1920s to 1940s, a group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, and another one known as the Berlin Circle, developed Russell and Wittgenstein's philosophy into a doctrine known as "logical positivism" (or logical empiricism).[89][90] The Vienna Circle (previously the Ernst Mach Society) was led by Moritz Schlick and included Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath.[91][92] The Berlin Circle was led by Hans Reichenbach and included Carl Hempel and mathematician David Hilbert.[89]
Logical positivists used formal logical methods to develop an empiricist account of knowledge. They adopted the verification principle, according to which every meaningful statement is either analytic or synthetic.[93] The truths of logic and mathematics were tautologies, and those of science were verifiable empirical claims. These two constituted the entire universe of meaningful judgments; anything else was nonsense. Thus the principle rejected statements of metaphysics, theology, ethics and aesthetics as cognitively meaningless.[87]
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.[94][95]
This led the logical positivists to reject many traditional problems of philosophy. Logical positivists typically considered philosophy as having a minimal function, concerning the clarification of thoughts, rather than having a distinct subject matter of its own.
Epistemology was still discussed. Schlick was a foundationalist, believing knowledge was like a pyramid, built on prior layers of knowledge except for the first layer.[96] Neurath was an anti-foundationalist, coherentist who famously gave the analogy of reconstructing a ship while on the open sea.[96][97]
Friedrich Waismann introduced the concept of open texture to describe the universal possibility of vagueness in empirical statements.[98] Waismann never finished a book titled Logik, Sprache, Philosophie intended to present the ideas of logical positivism to a wider audience.[99]
Carnap and Reichenbach started the journal Erkenntnis.[100] Carnap distinguished between trivial internal questions, and meaningless external questions.[101] He is best known for works like Der logische Aufbau der Welt (translated as The Logical Structure of the World, 1967), sometimes simply the Aufbau, and The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language (1959).[102][103][x]
Several logical positivists were Jewish, such as Neurath, Waismann, Hans Hahn, and Reichenbach. Others, like Carnap, were gentiles but socialists or pacifists. With the coming to power of Adolf Hitler and Nazism in 1933, many members of the Vienna and Berlin Circles fled to Britain and the United States, which helped to reinforce the dominance of logical positivism and analytic philosophy in anglophone countries.[105][106]
After World War II, analytic philosophy became interested in ordinary language philosophy, in contrast to ideal language philosophy. Rather than rely on logical constructions, philosophers emphasized the use of natural language. There were two strains of ordinary language philosophy: the later Wittgenstein and Oxford philosophy.
Later Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, from the posthumous Philosophical Investigations (1953), differed dramatically from his early work of the Tractatus.[109] Philosophers refer to them like two different philosophers: "early Wittgenstein" and "later Wittgenstein".
Ramsey
The criticisms of Frank Ramsey on the "color-exclusion problem," led to some of Wittgenstein's first doubts with regard to his early philosophy.[110] Wittgenstein in the Tractatus thought the only necessity is logical necessity; yet that no point in space can have two different colors at the same time seems a necessary truth but not a logical one.[78][111] Wittgenstein responded to Ramsey in "Some Remarks on Logical Form" (1929), the only academic paper he ever published.[112][113] Ramsey died of jaundice the next year at the age of 26.[114]
Sraffa's gesture
Norman Malcolm also famously credits Piero Sraffa for providing Wittgenstein with the conceptual break from his earlier philosophy, by means of a rude gesture:[115][116]
Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and what it describes must have the same 'logical form', the same 'logical multiplicity'. Sraffa made a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the fingertips of one hand. And he asked: 'What is the logical form of that?'
Prior to the publication of the Philosophical Investigations, philosophers like John Wisdom and Rush Rhees were some of the few sources of information about Wittgenstein's later philosophy, for example Wisdom's work Other minds (1952) on the problem of other minds.[107][117][118][y] One notion found in both early and later Wittgenstein is that "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."[119] Philosophers had been misusing language and asking meaningless questions, and it was Wittgenstein's job "to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle."[120][82]
The later Wittgenstein develops a therapeutic approach. He introduces the concept of a "language-game" as a "form of life". By "language-game" he meant a language simpler than an entire language.[121] Wittgenstein argued that a word or sentence has meaning only as a result of the "rule" of the "game" being played. Depending on the context, for example, the utterance "Water!" could be an order, the answer to a question, or some other form of communication. Rather than his prior picture theory of meaning, the later Wittgenstein advocates a theory of meaning as use, according to which words are defined by how they are used within the language-game.[109]
The duck-rabbit illusion became famous when Wittgenstein used it to distinguish "seeing that" from "seeing as".
The notion of family resemblance thinks things thought to be connected by one essential, common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all of them. Games, which Wittgenstein used as an example to explain the notion, have become the classic example of a group that is related by family resemblance.[109]
Philosophical Investigations also contains the private language argument. Another point Wittgenstein makes against the possibility of a private language involves the beetle-in-a-box thought experiment.[122] He asks the reader to imagine that each person has a box, inside which is something that everyone intends to refer to with the word beetle. Further, suppose that no one can look inside another's box. Under such a situation, Wittgenstein says the word beetle is meaningless.
The other trend of ordinary language philosophy was known as "Oxford philosophy", in contrast to the earlier analytic Cambridge philosophers. Influenced by Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's quietism, the Oxford philosophers claimed ordinary language already represents many subtle distinctions not recognized in traditional philosophy. The most prominent Oxford philosophers were Gilbert Ryle, Peter Strawson, and John L. Austin.[123]
Ryle
Gilbert Ryle
Ryle, in The Concept of Mind (1949), criticized Cartesiandualism, arguing in favor of disposing of "Descartes' myth" of the ghost in the machine by recognizing "category errors".[124] Ryle sees Descartes' error as similar to saying one sees the campus, buildings, faculty, students, and so on, but still goes on to ask "Where is the university?"[124]
Strawson
Strawson first became well known with his article "On Referring" (1950), a criticism of Russell's theory of descriptions.[125] On Strawson's account, the use of a description presupposes the existence of the object fitting the description.[125] In his book Individuals (1959), Strawson examines our conceptions of basic particulars.[126]
Analytic philosophy saw the demise of logical positivism and a revival of metaphysical theorizing during the second half of the twentieth century. Although many discussions are continuations of old ones from previous decades and centuries, the debates remain active.[135]
Sellars
Kant scholar Wilfrid Sellars "revolutionized both the content and the method of philosophy in the United States".[136] Sellers's criticism of the "Myth of the Given", in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), challenged logical positivism by arguing against sense-data theories and knowledge by acquaintance.[137] In his "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" (1962), Sellars's critical realism distinguishes between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of the world.[138] Sellars's goal of a synoptic philosophy uniting the everyday and scientific views of reality is the basis of what is sometimes called the Pittsburgh School, whose members include Robert Brandom, John McDowell, and John Haugeland.[139]
Quine
W. V. O. Quine helped to undermine logical positivism.
Harvard philosopher W. V. O. Quine shaped much of subsequent philosophy and is recognized as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century".[140] He is regularly cited as the greatest philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century,[141] or the next great philosopher after Wittgenstein.[142]
Quine was a student of Carnap.[106] He was an empiricist who sought to naturalize philosophy and saw philosophy as continuous with science, distinguished only by philosophy being the most general science.[143] However, Quine doubted usual theories of meaning, and, instead of logical positivism, advocated a kind of semantic holism and ontological relativity, which explained that every term in any statement has its meaning contingent on a vast network of knowledge and belief, the speaker's conception of the entire world.[144][145]
The gavagaithought experiment tells about a linguist, who tries to find out what the expression gavagai means when uttered by a speaker of a yet-unknown native language upon seeing a rabbit. At first glance, it seems that gavagai simply translates with rabbit. Quine points out there is no way to tell that the speaker did not mean, for instance, "undetached rabbit-part" (such as its ear) as well as several other scenarios.[147]
On What There Is
Quine's essay on ontology, "On What There Is" (1948) elucidates Russell's theory of descriptions.[41] Quine uses Pegasus instead of "the present King of France" and dubs the problem of nonexistence Plato's beard. The essay contains Quine's famous dictum of ontological commitment, "To be is to be the value of a variable". One is committed to the entities his theory posits by use of the existential quantifier, like 'There are some so-and-sos'.[41] Other parts of speech do not commit one to entities and so for Quine are syncategorematic.[148]
Two Dogmas of Empiricism
Also among the developments that resulted in the decline of logical positivism and the revival of metaphysics was Quine's attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), published in The Philosophical Review,[149][150] a paper "sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth-century philosophy".[151][aa] The paper made Quine the most dominant philosopher in America before Kripke.[153]
Kripke
Saul Kripke helped to revive interest in metaphysics among analytic philosophers.
Saul Kripke is widely regarded as having revived theories of essence and identity as respectable topics of philosophical discussion.[154] He was influential in arguing that flaws in common theories of descriptions and proper names are indicative of larger misunderstandings of the metaphysics of modality, or of necessity and possibility.[154]
Especially important was Kripke's book Naming and Necessity (1980). According to one author, Naming and Necessity "played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view—so popular among ordinary language philosophers—that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language."[159]
Kripke argued proper names are rigid designators, or designate the same thing in all possible worlds, unlike descriptions. For example, an election may have turned out differently, so the description "winner of the 1968 US presidential election" might have designated Hubert Humphrey instead of Richard Nixon. However, the name "Richard Nixon" designates the man Richard Nixon, regardless of the election results.[160]
Kant stated in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that necessity is the criterion for a priori knowledge.[161] Kripke argued that necessity is a metaphysical notion distinct from the epistemic notion of a priori, and that there are necessary truths that are known a posteriori, such as that water is H2O, or gold is atomic number 79.[158][154]
David Lewis defended a number of elaborate metaphysical theories. In works such as On the Plurality of Worlds (1986) and Counterfactuals (1973), Lewis argued for modal realism and counterpart theory–the belief in real, concrete possible worlds, and argued against any "ersatz" conception of possibility.[165][166]
According to Lewis, "actual" is merely an indexical label we give a world when we are in it. Lewis applied Quine's dictum of ontological commitment to the statement "There are other ways things could have been;" committing Lewis (by his lights) to the real existence of other ways things could have been.[167]
Frege questioned standard theories of truth, and sometimes advocated a deflationary, redundancy theory of truth, i. e. that the predicate "is true" does not express anything above and beyond the statement to which it is attributed.[50] Frank Ramsey also advocated a redundancy theory.[169]
Polish philosopher Stanisław Leśniewski, along with Nelson Goodman, established mereology, the formal study of parts and wholes. Mereology was originally a variant of nominalism arguing one should dispense with set theory, but the now broader subject of parts and wholes arguably goes back to the time of the pre-Socratics.[174]
Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (1984) defends a kind of bundle theory of personal identity.[182] Parfit issues the thought experiment of a case of fission, where one person splits into two, say surviving with half of their brain, while the other half is put into a new body.[183] David Lewis defends perdurantism, where people are four-dimensional, so a person at any one time is only a part or slice of the whole person.[165]
Eternalism holds that past, present, and future are equally real. In contrast, presentism holds that only entities in the present exist.[193] The moving spotlight theory is a kind of hybrid view where all moments exist, but only one moment is present.[194]Growing block holds that only the past and present exist, but the future does not (yet) exist (there is also the reverse, a shrinking block).[194] Charlie Broad advocated growing block.[195]
Edmund Gettier helped to revitalize analytic epistemology.
Owing largely to Edmund Gettier's paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" (1963),[198] and the so-called Gettier problem, epistemology has ever since enjoyed a resurgence as a topic of analytic philosophy. Using epistemic luck, Gettier provided counterexamples to the "justified true belief" (JTB) definition of knowledge, found as early as Plato's dialogue Theaetetus.[199] Philosophers give alternatives to the JTB account or develop theories of justification to deal with Gettier's examples. For example, Timothy Williamson argues in Knowledge and Its Limits (2000) that knowledge is sui generis and indefinable.[200]
Discussed since antiquity, Chisholm, in his Theory of Knowledge (1966), details the problem of the criterion with two sets of questions:
What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge?
How do we know? or What is the criterion for deciding whether we have knowledge in any particular case?[209]
Answering the former question first is called particularism, whereas answering the latter first is called methodism. A third solution is skepticism, or doubting there is such a thing as knowledge.[209][210]
Closure
"Here is one hand"
Epistemic closure is the claim that knowledge is closed under entailment; in other words epistemic closure is a property or the principle that if a subject knows , and knows that entails , then can thereby come to know .[211] Most epistemological theories involve a closure principle, and many skeptical arguments assume a closure principle. In Proof of An External World (1939), G. E. Moore uses closure in his famous anti-skeptical "here is one hand" argument.[212] Shortly before his death, Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty (1969) in response to Moore.[213][214]
In his book Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955), Nelson Goodman introduced the "new riddle of induction", so-called by analogy with Hume's classical problem of induction.[218] Goodman's famous example was to introduce the predicates grue and bleen. "Grue" applies to all things before a certain arbitrary time t, just in case they are green, but also just in case they are blue after time t; and "bleen" applies to all things before time t, just in the case they are blue, but also just in case they are green after time t. So the inductive inference "All emeralds are grue" will be true before time t but "All emeralds are bleen" will be true after t.[218]
Other topics
Other, related topics of research include debates over cases of knowledge, the value of knowledge, the nature of evidence, the role of intuitions in justification, and abduction.
Ethics
Early analytic philosophers often thought ethics could not be made rigorous enough to merit any attention.[219] It was only with the emergence of ordinary-language philosophers that ethics started to become acceptable.[219] Analytic philosophers have gradually come to distinguish three major types of moral philosophy.
Meta-ethics, which investigates moral terms and concepts;
Normative ethics, which examines and produces ethical judgments;
Applied ethics, which applies normative principles to specific, practical issues.[220]
Meta-ethics
As well as Hume's famous is–ought problem,[221] twentieth-century meta-ethics has two original strains.
After Moore's work, not much was done in analytic philosophy with ethics until the 1950s and 1960s, when there was a renewed interest in traditional moral philosophy.[219]Philippa Foot defended naturalist moral realism and contributed several essays attacking other theories.[ac] Foot introduced the famous "trolley problem" into the ethical discourse.[226]
The second strain is founded on logical positivism and its attitude that unverifiable statements are meaningless. As a result, they avoided normative ethics and instead pursued meta-ethics. The logical positivists thought statements about value—including all ethical and aesthetic judgments—are non-cognitive. So they adopted an emotivist theory, that value judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker.[231] It is also known as the boo/hurrah theory. On this view, saying, "Murder is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval.
As the influence of logical positivism declined, analytic philosophers had a renewed interest in normative ethics. Contemporary normative ethics is dominated by three schools: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.
Current analytic political philosophy owes much to John Rawls, who in a series of papers (most notably "Two Concepts of Rules" (1955) and "Justice as Fairness" (1958) and his book A Theory of Justice (1971), produced a sophisticated defense of a generally liberal egalitarian account of distributive justice.[255][256][238] Rawls introduced the thought experiment of the veil of ignorance.
[W]hy isn't mixing what I own with what I don't own a way of losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don't? If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?[258]
Although a continental philosopher, Jürgen Habermas is another influential—if controversial—author in contemporary analytic political philosophy, whose social theory is a blend of social science, Marxism, neo-Kantianism, and pragmatism.[261]
Communitarianism
Communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Michael Sandel use analytic techniques to challenge liberal assumptions.[240] In particular, communitarians challenge whether the individual can be considered apart from the community in which he is brought up and lives. While in the analytic tradition, its major exponents often also engage at length with figures generally considered continental, notably Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Sibley, Weitz, and Goodman were anti-essentialists. In "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" (1956), Weitz famously argues necessary and sufficient conditions will never exist for the concept 'art' because it is an "open concept".[266] Goodman thought art is not so different from science, and is another branch of epistemology.[267]
George Dickie was an influential philosopher of art. Dickie states "a work of art in the classificatory sense is 1) an artifact 2) on which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation."[270] Dickie's student Noël Carroll is a leading philosopher of art contributing to the philosophy of film.
There is also the historical definition, best exemplified by Jerrold Levinson. For Levinson, "a work of art is a thing intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art: regard in any of the ways works of art existing prior to it have been correctly regarded."[271] In the opinion of historian of aesthetics Władysław Tatarkiewicz, there are six conditions for the presentation of art: beauty, form, representation, reproduction of reality, artistic expression, and innovation.[272]
Nicholas Wolterstorff emphasizes the social aspect of art, not as mere contemplation but as action.[273] Langer, Levinson and Wolterstorff have all contributed to the philosophy of music.
Beauty
Guy Sircello's work resulted in new analytic theories of love,[274] sublimity,[275] and beauty.[276] For Sircello, beauty is an objective, qualitative property. One author claims Sircello's theory is similar to Hume's.[277]Mary Mothersill sought to restore earlier conceptions of beauty in Beauty Restored (1984).[278]
Colin Radford and Michael Weston introduced the paradox of fiction in their paper "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" (1975)[280] The paper discusses emotional responses to fiction, such as Leo Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina.[280] Their question is how people can be moved by things that do not exist. The paper concluded people's emotional responses to fiction are irrational.[280] American philosopher Kendall Walton's paper "Fearing Fictions" (1978) addresses the paradox.[281][282] This paper served as the impetus for make-believe theory.
Philosophy of language
Philosophy of language is still strongly influenced by earlier authors.
Hilary Putnam used the Twin Earth and brain in a vat thought experiments to argue for semantic externalism, or the view that the meanings of words are not psychological.[162][163][285] Donald Davidson uses the thought experiment of Swampman to advocate for semantic externalism.[286]Tyler Burge uses the thought experiment of arthritis in one's thigh.[287]
Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) provides a skeptical, rule-following paradox, undermining the possibility of our ever following rules, and so calls into question the idea of meaning. Kripke writes this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date".[288] The portmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a term for a fictional person who holds the views expressed by Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein.
Analytic philosophy's interest in philosophy of language has arguably been superseded by an interest in the philosophy of mind.[13] Two common notions in analytic philosophy of mind are intentionality, as above, and qualia, a term introduced by C. I. Lewis.[294]
Physicalism
Emergent materialism holds that mental properties emerge as novel properties of complex material systems.[295] It can be divided into emergence which denies mental causation and emergence which allows for causal effect. A version of the latter type was advocated by John Searle, called biological naturalism.[ae]
The other main group of materialist views in the philosophy of mind can be labeled non-emergent (or non-emergentist) materialism, and includes philosophical behaviorism, typeidentity theory (reductive materialism), functionalism, and pure physicalism (eliminative materialism).
Motivated by the logical positivists, behaviorism was the most prominent theory of mind in analytic philosophy for the first half of the twentieth century.[297] Behaviorists believed either that statements about the mind were equivalent to statements about behavior and dispositions to behave in particular ways; or that mental states were directly equivalent to behavior and dispositions to behave. Hilary Putnam criticized behaviorism by arguing that it confuses the symptoms of mental states with the mental states themselves, positing "super Spartans" who never display signs of pain.[298]
Hilary Putnam
Type identity
Behaviorism later became much less popular, in favor of either type identity theory or functionalism.[299] Type identity theory or type physicalism identified mental states with brain states. Former students of Ryle at the University of AdelaideJack Smart and Ullin Place argued for type physicalism.[300][301] Type identity was criticized by Putnam and others using multiple realizability.[302] The criticism spawned anomalous monism.[303]
Functionalism
Functionalism remains the dominant theory.[af]Computationalism is a kind of functionalism. The view was first associated with Sellars.[305] Putnam was also a functionalist.[302] Another functionalist was Jerry Fodor, who is known for proposing the modularity of mind, a theory of innateness.[306] He also introduced the language of thought hypothesis, which describes thought as possessing "language-like" or compositional structure (sometimes known as mentalese).[307]
Searle's Chinese room argument criticized functionalism and holds that while a computer can understand syntax, it could never understand semantics.[308] A similar idea is Ned Block's China brain.[309]
Finally, analytic philosophy has featured a certain number of philosophers who were dualists, and recently forms of property dualism have had a resurgence; the most prominent representative is David Chalmers.[318] Chalmers introduced the notion of the hard problem of consciousness. He has criticized interactionism and shown sympathy with neutral monism. Kripke also makes a notable argument for dualism.[158][319]
Epiphenomenalism is sometimes classed as a kind of property dualism. It's the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but they do not cause anything else in return.[316][320]
Panpsychism
Yet another view is panpsychism, or the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world.[321] Panpsychism can be contrasted with idealism by still believing in matter.[ag]
Perception and consciousness
In recent years, a central focus of research in the philosophy of mind has been consciousness and the philosophy of perception. While there is a general consensus for the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness,[323] there are many opinions as to the specifics.
Kurt Gödel, a student of Hans Hahn of the Vienna Circle, produced his incompleteness theorems showing that Principia Mathematica also failed to reduce arithmetic to logic, and that Hilbert's program was unattainable.[327]
Akin to the medieval debate on universals, between realists, idealists, and nominalists; the philosophy of mathematics has the debate between logicists or platonists, conceptualists or intuitionists, and formalists.[41]
StructuralistPaul Benacerraf has two well-known objections to mathematical platonism. One is about identification[335] and the other epistemological.[336] Benacerraf argues that while platonism explains mathematical semantics, it does not simultaneously explain mathematical knowledge. It is hard to know anything about a far-removed, platonic object.[336]Predicativism is another alternative to platonism, utilizing Henri Poincaré's response to Russell's paradox.[64] There are also Aristotelians in mathematics, such as Dale Jacquette.[337]
...analytic philosophy has been a very heterogeneous 'movement'.... some forms of analytic philosophy have proven very sympathetic to the philosophy of religion and have provided a philosophical mechanism for responding to other more radical and hostile forms of analytic philosophy.[340]
Analytic philosophy tended to avoid the study of religion, largely dismissing (as per the logical positivists) the subject as a part of metaphysics and therefore meaningless.[ai] The demise of logical positivism led to a renewed interest in the philosophy of religion, prompting philosophers not only to introduce new problems, but to re-study perennial topics such as the existence of God, the rationality of belief, the nature of miracles, the problem of evil, and several others.[344] The Society of Christian Philosophers was established in 1978.
Plantinga was once described by Time magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God".[345] His seminal work God and Other Minds (1967) argues belief in God is a properly basic belief akin to the belief in other minds.[346] Plantinga also developed a modal ontological argument in The Nature of Necessity (1974).[347]
Orthodox convert Richard Swinburne wrote a trilogy of books arguing for God, The Coherence of Theism (1977), The Existence of God (1979), and Faith and Reason (1981).[358][359][360] Swinburne is notable for his belief that God's existence is contingent rather than necessary (it is possible God does not exist), but that nonetheless He does exist as a brute fact.[361]
Wittgenstein and religion
The analytic philosophy of religion has been preoccupied with Wittgenstein, as well as his interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard.[362] Wittgenstein fought for the Austrian army in the First World War and came upon a copy of Leo Tolstoy's The Gospel in Brief (1896). He subsequently underwent some kind of religious conversion.[363][364]
"Swansea school" philosophers such as Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, and D. Z. Phillips, among others, founded a school of religious thought based on Wittgenstein. The name "contemplative philosophy" was coined by Phillips in Philosophy's Cool Place (1999), after a passage quoted in Wittgenstein's Culture and Value (1980).[365][aj][ak]
Philosophers like Tim Maudlin focus on the philosophy of physics. Maudlin argues in The Metaphysics Within Physics (2007) that philosophy must reflect on physics.[377] Recently there has been work in the philosophy of chemistry.[378]Eric Scerri is the founder and editor of the journal Foundations of Chemistry.
The philosophy of social science has also received increased interest. Peter Winch takes a Wittgensteinian perspective in The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (1958).[383]
Notes
↑"Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers.[2]
↑Quote on the definition: "'Analytic' philosophy today names a style of doing philosophy, not a philosophical program or a set of substantive views. Analytic philosophers, crudely speaking, aim for argumentative clarity and precision; draw freely on the tools of logic; and often identify, professionally and intellectually, more closely with the sciences and mathematics, than with the humanities."[1]
↑"This tradition emphasizes clarity, rigor, argument, theory, truth. It is not a tradition that aims primarily for inspiration or consolation or ideology. Nor is it particularly concerned with 'philosophy of life', though parts of it are. This kind of philosophy is more like science than religion, more like mathematics than poetry—though it is neither science nor mathematics."[6]
↑According to Scott Soames, "an implicit commitment—albeit faltering and imperfect—to the ideals of clarity, rigor and argumentation" and it "aims at truth and knowledge, as opposed to moral or spiritual improvement [...] the goal in analytic philosophy is to discover what is true, not to provide a useful recipe for living one's life".[7]
↑One author states "[I]t is difficult to give a precise definition of 'analytic philosophy' since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems."[8] [...] "I think Sluga is right in saying 'it may be hopeless to try to determine the essence of analytic philosophy.' Nearly every proposed definition has been challenged by some scholar. [...] [W]e are dealing with a family resemblance concept."[9] Another author states, "Analytic philosophy is a tradition held together both by ties of mutual influence and by family resemblances."[10]
↑"The distinction (between analytic and continental philosophy) rests upon a confusion of geographical and methodological terms";[14] "it is like classifying cars into front-wheel drive and Japanese."[15]
↑"Practitioners of types of philosophizing that are not in the analytic tradition—such as phenomenology, classical pragmatism, existentialism, or Marxism—feel it necessary to define their position in relation to analytic philosophy."[2]
↑"Analytic philosophy is mainly associated with the contemporary English-speaking world, but it is by no means the only important philosophical tradition. In this volume two other immensely rich and important such traditions are introduced: Indian philosophy, and philosophical thought in Europe from the time of Hegel."[16]
↑"So, despite a few overlaps, analytical philosophy is not difficult to distinguish broadly [...] from other modern movements, like phenomenology, say, or existentialism, or from the large amount of philosophizing that has also gone on in the present century within frameworks deriving from other influential thinkers like Aquinas, Hegel, or Marx."[17]
↑Steven D. Hales describes the philosophical methods practiced in the West: "[i]n roughly reverse order by number of proponents, they are phenomenology, ideological philosophy, and analytic philosophy".[18]
↑"The distinction...has had many incarnations, from Plato's 'ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy'..."[20][21]
↑The analytic tradition has also been criticized for excessive formalism, ahistoricism,[22][23] and aloofness towards alternative disciplines and outsiders.[24][25] Some philosophers have tried to develop a postanalytic philosophy.
↑The notion of "analytic philosophy" has been expanded from the specific programs that dominated anglophone philosophy before 1960 to a much more general notion of an "analytic" style,[1][29] characterized by mathematical precision, thoroughness about a specific topic, and resistance to "imprecise or cavalier discussions of broad topics".[29]
↑Soames also states that analytic philosophy is characterized by "a more piecemeal approach. There is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance".[7]
↑"Analytic philosophy opposed right from its beginning English neo-Hegelianism of Bradley's sort and similar ones. It did not only criticize the latter's denial of the existence of an external world (anyway an unjust criticism), but also the bombastic, obscure style of Hegel's writings."[57]
↑Russell once explained, "Hegel had maintained that all separateness is illusory and that the universe is more like a pot of treacle than a heap of shot. I therefore said, "The universe is exactly like a heap of shot."'[63]
↑The Waverley novels were not acknowledged by Scott and penned anonymously saying only "by the author of Waverley" on the title page.[68]
↑Carnap famously criticized the continental philosopher Heidegger for saying "the nothing noths".[104]
↑The first recorded use of the term "analytic philosophers" occurred in Wisdom's 1931 work, "Interpretation and Analysis in Relation to Bentham's Theory of Definition", which expounded on Bentham's concept of "paraphrasis": "that sort of exposition which may be afforded by transmuting into a proposition, having for its subject some real entity, a proposition which has not for its subject any other than a fictitious entity".[25] At first Wisdom referred to "logic-analytic philosophers", then to "analytic philosophers". According to Michael Beaney, "the explicit articulation of the idea of paraphrasis in the work of both Wisdom in Cambridge and Ryle in Oxford represents a definite stage in the construction of analytic philosophy as a tradition".[25]
↑John's elder brother was William Anderson, Professor of Philosophy at Auckland University College from 1921 to his death in 1955, who was described as "the most dominant figure in New Zealand philosophy."[130]
↑On What There Is and Two Dogmas of Empiricism were republished in Quine's book From A Logical Point of View (1953).[152]
↑Problems of personal identity are analogous to the Ship of Theseus and talks of identity going back even further.[178]
↑In a 2020 PhilPapers survey, 33% of respondents were accepting or leaning towards it.[304]
↑While analytic idealism remains a minority position, one notable example is the work of Bernardo Kastrup.[322] It seeks to resolve the so-called hard problem of consciousness by taking experience as ontologically fundamental.[322]
↑An alternative higher-order theory, the higher-order global states (HOGS) model, is offered by Robert van Gulick.[326]
↑A notable exception is the series of Michael B. Foster's 1934–36 Mind articles involving the Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern science.[341][342][343]
↑"My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them."[366]
↑This interpretation was first labeled "Wittgensteinian Fideism" by Kai Nielsen, but those who consider themselves members of the Swansea school rejected this construal as a caricature of Wittgenstein's position; this is especially true of Phillips.[367] Responding to this interpretation, Nielsen and Phillips became two of the most prominent interpreters of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.[368]
↑Longworth, Guy (2017), "John Langshaw Austin", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 21 July 2020
↑Bird, Alexander; Tobin, Emma (2024), "Natural Kinds", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 22 April 2024
↑Carter, Ian (18 November 2022). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Positive and Negative Liberty. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
↑Korta, Kepa; Perry, John (2024), "Pragmatics", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 7 June 2025
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