The most prominent form of the Kalam cosmological argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, is expressed in two parts, as an initial syllogism followed by further philosophical analysis.[5]
Timeless (therefore changeless), spaceless, immaterial and enormously powerful, in creating spacetime and its contents ex nihilo.
Personal, possessing non-deterministicagency, in creating the universe from a timeless state (without prior determining conditions).
Singular, per Occam's razor, in the absence of good reasons to believe in the existence of more than one uncaused cause.
Based upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion:[6]
If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans (without) the universe[7] is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.
Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.
Craig notes the theological implications that follow from the final conclusion of this argument.[8]
Like other early Christian commentators, Philoponus disputed the Greek doctrine of the eternity of matter, noting that this was inconsistent with the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Furthermore, he examined the contradiction between Greek conceptions of past eternity and Aristotle's repudiation of the existence of actual infinities.[10] In 529, he presented his critique, On the Eternity of the World Against Proclus, categorising arguments for the finitude of the past, which underpinned his arguments for the existence of God.[9]
Philoponus's ideas would be developed substantially within the proceedings of medievalIslamicscholasticism—or kalam—through the 9th and 12th centuries,[10] refined in the 11th century by Al-Ghazali and in the 12th by Ibn Rushd.[11] In his landmark thesis, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Persian Muslim theologian Al-Ghazali characterised the absurdity of a beginningless universe and of the existence of actual infinities, articulating a prototypical formulation of the modern Kalam cosmological argument:[12]
"Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins;
therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning."
In the 13th century, the cosmological argument was introduced to medieval Christian theology, wherein it would be examined by St. Bonaventure as well as Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica (I, q.2, a.3) and Summa Contra Gentiles (I, 13).[13][14][15] Conceptions of temporal finitism that had been substantiated in Philoponus's—and later, Al-Ghazali's—writings inspired energetic debate between Aquinas and Bonaventure, as well as further generations of scholars up until the 18th century. Craig writes:[16]
"It finally sputtered to something of an inconclusive end in the thought of the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. Kant held, ironically, that there are rationally compelling arguments for both [the finitude and infinitude of the past], so that the problem is insoluble and exposes the bankruptcy of reason itself."
"A count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defense of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence."
Modern discourse encompasses the fields of both philosophy and science (e.g. the fields of quantum physics and cosmology), which Bruce Reichenbach summarises as:[18]
"... whether there needs to be a cause of the first natural existent, whether something like the universe can be finite and yet not have a beginning, and the nature of infinities and their connection with reality".
Since the temporal ordering of events is central, the Kalam argument also brings issues of the nature of time into the discussion.[19]
Premise one: "Everything that begins to exist has a cause."
Craig and James Sinclair propose that the first premise is obviously true, at least more plausibly true than its negation.[20]
Craig offers three reasons to support the premise:[21]
Reductio ad absurdum: If false, it would be inexplicable why anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause. To come into being without any cause is to come into being from nothing, which he says is surely absurd.
Inductive reasoning from both common experience and scientific evidence, which constantly verifies and never falsifies its truth.
According to Reichenbach, "the Causal Principle has been the subject of extended criticism", which can be divided into philosophical and scientific criticisms.[22]
"Mackie, [Adolf] Grunbaum, [Quentin] Smith and I—among many others—have taken issue with the first premise: why should it be supposed that absolutely everything which begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist?"
Mackie affirms that there is no good reason to assume a priori that an uncaused beginning of all things is impossible. Moreover, that the Causal Principle cannot be extrapolated to the universe from inductive experience. He appeals to David Hume's thesis (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) that effects without causes can be conceived in the mind, and that what is conceivable in the mind is possible in the real world.[26] This argument has been criticised by Bruce Reichenbach and G.E.M. Anscombe, who point out the phenomenological and logical problems in inferring factual possibility from conceivability.[27][28] Craig notes:[29][30]
"Hume himself clearly believed in the causal principle. He presupposes throughout the Enquiry that events have causes, and in 1754 he wrote to John Stewart, 'But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause'."
Morriston asserts that causal laws are physical processes for which we have intuitive knowledge in the context of events within time and space, but that such intuitions do not hold true for the beginning of time itself. He states:[31]
"We have no experience of the origin of worlds to tell us that worlds don't come into existence like that. We don't even have experience of the coming into being of anything remotely analogous to the 'initial singularity' that figures in the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe."
Craig responds that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist", remarking:[32]
"The history of twentieth century astrophysical cosmology belies Morriston's claim that people have no strong intuitions about the need of a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe."
Quantum physics
For scientific evidence against the first premise, Paul Davies refers to the phenomenon of quantum indeterminacy wherein subatomic processes appear to contradict a deterministic model of cause and effect.[33] Craig argues that, though quantum indeterminism contradicts the proposition that every event has a cause, it is nonetheless consistent with the causal premise that "everything that begins to exist has a cause", encompassing the more modest view that objects cannot come into existence entirely devoid of causal conditions.[34]
He also notes that the phenomenon of indeterminism is specific to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, pointing out that this is only one of a number of different interpretations, some of which he states are fully deterministic (mentioning David Bohm) and none of which are as yet known to be true. He concludes that subatomic physics is not a proven exception to the first premise.[35]
"Even if the universe has a beginning in time, in the light of recently proposed cosmological theories this beginning may be uncaused. Despite Craig's claim that theories postulating that the universe 'could pop into existence uncaused' are incapable of 'sincere affirmation,' such similar theories are in fact being taken seriously by scientists."
David Albert has criticised use of the term 'nothing' in describing the quantum vacuum. In a review of Krauss's book, he states:[38]
"Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states—no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems—are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn't this or that particular arrangement of the fields—what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields."
Craig argues that the quantum vacuum state, in containing measurable energy, cannot be characterised as nothing, therefore, that phenomena originating from the quantum vacuum cannot be described as uncaused. On the topic of virtual particles, he writes:[39]
"For virtual particles do not literally come into existence spontaneously out of nothing. Rather the energy locked up in a vacuum fluctuates spontaneously in such a way as to convert into evanescent particles that return almost immediately to the vacuum."
Cosmologist Alexander Vilenkin has stated that even "the absence of space, time and matter" cannot truly be defined as 'nothing' given that the laws of physics are still present, though it would be "as close to nothing as you can get". He continues:[40]
"That makes you wonder, where are these laws? If the laws describe the creation of the universe, that suggests they existed prior to the universe. The question that nobody has any idea how to address is where these laws come from and why these laws in particular?"
Premise two: "The universe began to exist."
Craig defends the second premise using both scientific and philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past.
The second law of thermodynamics, which stipulates that the universe must, in a finite duration, reach a state of equilibrium known as heat death. If the universe has an infinite past, he argues, heat death would have already transpired.[42]
The Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem, according to which any universe that has, on average, been expanding throughout its history cannot have been expanding indefinitely but must have had a past boundary at which inflation began.[43]
Boundary cosmology
Professor Alexander Vilenkin, one of the authors of the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem, writes:[44]
"A remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality. We made no assumptions about the material content of the universe. We did not even assume that gravity is described by Einstein's equations. So, if Einstein's gravity requires some modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we made was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero value, no matter how small."
According to Vilenkin and co-author Alan Guth, the past boundary described by the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem does not necessarily represent a cosmic beginning, instead the beginning of cosmic inflation.[45] Though it "opens the door" for theories other than an absolute beginning, in a 2012 lecture, Vilenkin would discuss problems with alternative theories that would claim to avoid a cosmological beginning (including eternal inflation, cyclic and emergent models) concluding: "All the evidence we have says that the universe had a beginning".[46] In publications, he would propose that the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem is sufficient evidence for a beginning of the universe.[47][48][49]
Craig maintains that, if anything existed before the past boundary described by the theorem, it would be a non-classical region described by an as-yet-undetermined theory of quantum gravity. In that case, he argues that the quantum region—given its inherent instability—would then be the beginning of the universe instead of the boundary of classical spacetime. He elaborates:[50]
"Certainly, it would be impossible for such a metastable condition to endure for infinite time doing nothing and then suddenly begin to expand about 13.8 billion years ago. So even though we do not yet have a description of this earliest phase of the universe, we can be confident that if such a quantum regime does exist, then it was the beginning of the universe."
"It is very difficult to devise a system, especially a quantum one, that does nothing 'forever', then evolves. A truly stationary or periodic quantum state, which would last forever, would never evolve, whereas one with any instability will not endure for an indefinite time."
Exceptions to the theorem
Craig and James Sinclair identify 4 exception conditions to the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem:[52]
According to the emergent universe model, the universe existed in a static phase for an infinite duration, then transitioned spontaneously via quantum tunneling to a dynamic expansion phase. The static phase is metastable, and because it endures over infinite time, the universe overall has an average expansion rate of zero (Havg = 0) thereby avoiding the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem.[52]
Metastability in this context refers to a false vacuum state, which is stable according to classical physics, but unstable at the quantum mechanical level, in that it can transition spontaneously via quantum tunneling to a more stable true vacuum state. This transition may trigger cosmic inflation or even collapse of the universe to a hyperdense state.[53] Vilenkin and Audrey Mithani maintain that the metastable state cannot endure indefinitely. Though an event such as cosmic collapse is highly improbable, they argue that over an infinite duration it becomes a mathematical certainty. If the emergent universe cannot exist indefinitely, then it must have had a beginning.[54]
Responding to Vilenkin and Mithani, Rube Goldberg cosmology postulates an emergent model of spacetime that is fully classical, avoiding a quantum gravity era as well as the problems associated with quantum instability. However, the author notes that its composition comes at the cost of a "long chain of highly ad hoc assumptions, akin to a Rube Goldberg machine".[55]
Cyclic universe models, which are infinitely cyclic (Havg = 0) - which, to avoid expansion (and thus applicability of the BGV theorem) due to the accumulation of entropy, would have to have some entropy "reset" mechanism.
De Sitter Cosmology, wherein the universe contracts for infinite time prior to the singularity, followed by expansion (Havg < 0) - which, as Vilenkin ponts out, is classically unstable in the contraction phase and cannot survive until the bounce except if the arrow of time is reversed.
The Aguirre–Gratton model, which proposes a reversal of time at the singularity.[56]
Victor J. Stenger has referred to the Aguirre–Gratton model as an exemplar by which to avoid a cosmic beginning.[57] In correspondence with Stenger, Vilenkin has remarked how the model attempts to evade a beginning by reversing the "arrow of time" at t=0, but that: "This makes the moment t=0 rather special. I would say no less special than a true beginning of the universe."[58]
Philosophical arguments
For philosophical evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig cites:
An infinite series of past events is metaphysically impossible, given that it would represent an actual infinite existing in reality.[1]
Past events cannot be extended to an infinite past, given that they consist of a series formed by successive addition.[1][62]
Variations of these arguments have been presented by philosopher Andrew Loke, who refers to a modified version of Hilbert's Hotel,[63] and Ben Waters, who has published the story of Methuselah's Diary as a refinement of the diary of Tristram Shandy.[64]
Craig maintains that, though it is metaphysically impossible for actual infinities to exist in the real world, they (and the absurdities that attend their existence in the real world) are describable via mathematics, therefore logically possible.[65] He also distinguishes between actual infinities and potential infinities, stating that it is fully possible for potential infinites to exist in the real world, in contrast to the former:[66]
"A potential infinite is a series which has a beginning and is growing indefinitely; infinity serves merely as an ideal limit of the series which it never reaches ... That’s impossible, since for any natural numbern, n+1 is always a finite number."
Actuality of the past
Edward Feser observes that the Kalam cosmological argument is based upon a presentist theory of time in which past and future events do not exist, remarking that this would be incompatible with objections against an eternal past based upon Hilbert's Hotel:[67]
"If the present alone is real, then how can an infinite series of events in time count as an actual infinite? Past moments of time are not actual; they no longer exist ... In the Hilbert’s hotel scenario [the rooms and guests] exist together all at once, at the same time."
Craig affirms that the simultaneous existence of the enumerated objects is irrelevant, so long as past events have been real, thus instantiated in reality, they can be counted.[68][69] He refers to a narrative by Aquinas of a blacksmith who, from an eternal past, has used and broken successive hammers. He notes that the discarded hammers need no longer exist to be counted as an actual infinite.[70] Furthermore, that the absurdities attending the existence of actual infinites in reality still apply if the enumerated objects no longer exist:[71]
"... in an infinite series of past events, the number of odd-numbered events is the same as the number of all the events, even though the latter collection includes all the odd-numbered events plus an infinite number of even-numbered events as well."
Feser contends that past events are more analogous to abstract objects than concrete objects, such as rooms and guests relevant to Hilbert's Hotel, noting that it is fully tenable for mathematicians to deal with infinite sets of abstract objects, such as natural numbers. For this, he refers to Aristotle's postulate that denies the existence of time independent of objects that change:[72]
"To speak of time apart from change is a bit like speaking of a universal like redness apart from actual red things—it is to engage in abstraction from the concrete conditions under which the thing in question (redness, or time) can actually exist."
The Symmetry Objection
Craig proposes that, though a beginningless past would qualify as an actually infinite series of past events, an endless future would qualify only as a potential infinite, given that future events, unlike past events, are yet to be actualised and merely potential.[69]
Wes Morriston and Alex Malpass argue that this asymmetry is arbitrary. They pronounce that future events that will be actual satisfy the same reality condition as past events that are deemed actual in that they have been. Furthermore, they stipulate that natural numbers can be representative of moments in time. Since the set of natural numbers greater than any given value, x, is always an actual infinite, so too, they argue, must future events beyond any given moment in time be actually infinite. They conclude that, if the Hilbert's Hotel paradox disproves an eternal past, so too does it negate an endless future, contradicting the Judeo-Christian doctrine of eternal life.[73]
Commenting in agreement that future events cannot be actually infinite, Craig responds that this objection begs the question and fails to address the ontological distinction between past and future qualified by the objectivity of temporal becoming under presentism.[74][75] He writes:
"The series of future events can be finite but endless. In such a case the series is potentially infinite. This is a view that is so widespread and commonly accepted in the history of philosophy and science that the objector has a considerable burden of proof to bear if he is to show that this view is untenable."
"It should be obvious that Craig's conclusion that a single personal agent created the universe is a non sequitur. At most, this Kalam argument shows that some personal agent or agents created the universe. Craig cannot validly conclude that a single agent is the creator. On the contrary, for all he shows, there may have been trillions of personal agents involved in the creation."
Martin adds that Craig has not justified his claim of creation ex nihilo, remarking that the universe may have been created from pre-existing material in a timeless or eternal state. Moreover, that Craig takes his argument too far beyond what his premises allow in stating that the creator is greater than the universe. For this, he cites the example of a parent "creating" a child who eventually becomes greater than he or she.[77]
Conceptual analysis of the conclusion
In the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, published in 2009, Craig and James Sinclair present a philosophical analysis of the properties of the cause of the universe, denoting that they follow by entailment from the initial syllogism of the Kalam cosmological argument:[6]
The universe must originate ex nihilo in being without natural cause, because no natural explanation can be causally prior to the very existence of the natural world. The cause of the universe is therefore outside of space and time (timeless, therefore changeless, and spaceless) as well as immaterial and enormously powerful, in bringing spacetime and its contents into existence.
Even if positing a plurality of causes prior to the origin of the universe, the causal chain must terminate in a cause which is absolutely first and uncaused, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which Craig and Sinclair argue is impossible.
Occam's Razor maintains that unicity of the First Cause should be assumed in the absence of specific reasons to believe that there is more than one causeless cause.
Agent causation, or volitional action, is the only ontological condition in which an effect can arise in the absence of prior determining conditions. Therefore, only personal, free agency can account for the origin of a first temporal effect from a changeless cause.
There are two conceivable categories of objects with the potential to be uncaused, spaceless, timeless and immaterial:
Minds (in some conceptions of mind-body dualism) may be characterised as immaterial and spatially unextended, with the potential to be unembodied, timeless, changeless and beginningless.[78]
Abstract objects, such as the set of natural numbers, may be described as non-spatial and non-temporal, but do not sit in causal relationships and are therefore causally ineffective.[79]
Based upon their conceptual analysis, Craig concludes:[6]
"... an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe[7] is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful."
He notes the theological implications of this union of properties:[8]
"... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."
Theories of time
The Kalam cosmological argument is based on the A-theory of time, also known as the "tensed theory of time" or presentism, in which past and future events do not exist in reality (they have existed, or will exist, but do not exist now) and only the present exists.[80] This is opposed to the B-theory of time, also known as the "tenseless theory of time" or eternalism, in which past, present and future events co-exist and there is no privilege to the present other than as a frame of reference.[81]
Under the A-theory, the passage of time and temporal becoming are objective and real features of the universe, with objects coming into being and going out of being. In the B-theory, temporal passage and becoming are illusions of consciousness. Craig explains:[34]
"On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived."
Neo-Lorentzian relativity
Craig has defended the A-theory against objections from J. M. E. McTaggart and hybrid A–B theorists.[82][83] He refers to the neo‐Lorentzian interpretation of the Special Theory of Relativity, which he contends has become tenable in light of recent findings in quantum mechanics concerning Bell's theorem.[84] Similar to Einstein's original interpretation, the Lorentzian view describes a 3-dimensional universe existing through time, with objects in motion demonstrating time dilation and length contraction. However, these relativistic distortions occur relative to a privileged rest frame (an absolute frame of reference for the universe) rather than relative to each observer.[85]
He writes that the Lorentzian interpretation, in postulating an absolute space and absolute time, resolves the fragmentation of reality that characterises Einsteinian relativity, in which observers in relative motion occupy different spaces and times. Importantly, Lorentz's view of time as dynamic, and distinct from space, renders it compatible with the A-theory conception of a tensed universe.[86]
Philosopher Yuri Balashov asserts that both consensus and evidence support Minkowski's interpretation of relativity, which posits a 4D geometric universe inhabited by objects extended in time as well as space.[87] In spurning the notion of a 3D universe existing in time, Minkowskian relativity rejects the A-theory, correlating instead with the B-theory conception of a tenseless spacetime. Balashov remarks:[88]
"Despite the fact that presentism has the firm backing of common sense and eternalism revolts against it, eternalism is widely regarded as almost the default view in contemporary debates, and presentism as a highly problematic view."
Craig suggests that Balashov underestimates the challenge to Minkowskian relativity posed by recent findings.[85] He criticises Balashov for adopting a verificationist methodology that ignores important metaphysical and theological arguments underpinning the A-theory, affirming that correct interpretation of Special Relativity is not merely a physical, but also a metaphysical question.[86][89]
Compatibility with the B-theory
In a 2020 interview, Craig proposed that the Kalam cosmological argument could be adapted to the B-theory of time by:[90]
Abandoning the metaphysical argument against forming an actual infinity by successive addition.
Modifying the causal premise (replacing its appeal to the concept of 'coming into being' with the concept of 'beginning to exist').
Under the B-theory, scientific evidence for the finitude of the past would still be valid and the argument as a whole would still be tenable, though requiring reformulation to correct for the absence of objective temporal becoming. Craig articulates a B-theory version of its syllogism:[91]
If something exists at a time t but it does not exist at any earlier point in time then it has a cause.
The universe does exist at time t at which there is no earlier time where the universe existed.
Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Philosopher Ben Waters has also argued that the Kalam cosmological argument does not require a commitment to the A-theory.[92]
1 2 Craig, 2001 Craig establishes this caveat on theological grounds distinct from the argument, postulating that God enters into a temporal state at the moment of creation, therefore, no longer embodying the properties of timelessness and changelessness.
↑ Kovach, FJ (1974). "The Question of the Eternity of the World in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas – A Critical Analysis". Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. 5: 141–172. doi:10.5840/swjphil19745233.
↑ Grieg, JT (1932). The Letters of David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.187.
↑ Morriston, W (2000). "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument". Faith and Philosophy. 17: 149. doi:10.5840/faithphil200017215.
↑ Moreland, JP; Craig, WL (2017). Philosophical foundations for a Christian worldview. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity P. p.469.
↑ Smith, Q (1988). "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe". Philosophy of Science. 55: 39–57. doi:10.1086/289415.
↑ Martin, 1990: 106. Martin lists the following sources as examples: Edward P. Tryon, "Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?" Nature, 246, 14 December 1973, pp. 396–397; Edward P. Tryon, "What Made the World? New Scientist, 8, March 1984, pp. 14–16; Alexander Vilenkin, "Creation of Universes from Nothing," Physics Letters, 117B, 1982, pp. 25–28; Alexander Vilenkin, "Birth of Inflationary Universes," Physical Review, 27, 1983, pp. 2848–2855; L. P. Grishchuck and Y. B. Zledovich, "Complete Cosmological Theories," The Quantum Structure of Space and Time, ed. M. J. Duff and C. J. Isham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 409–422; Quentin Smith, "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe," Philosophy of Science, 55, 1988, pp. 39–57.
↑ Craig, WL (1993). "The Caused Beginning of the Universe: a Response to Quentin Smith". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 44 (4): 623–639. doi:10.1093/bjps/44.4.623.
↑ Craig, William Lane (2002). "The Kalām Cosmological Argument". In Jerry L. Walls; Trent Dougherty (eds.). Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.389–405. ISBN978-0-190-84222-2.
↑ Falguera, José L; Martínez-Vidal, Concha; Rosen, Gideon (2021). "Abstract Objects". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 23 September 2024.
Copan, Paul; Craig, William Lane (2004). Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration. Baker Academic.
Vaas, Rüdiger (2004). "Time before Time – Classifications of universes in contemporary cosmology, and how to avoid the antinomy of the beginning and eternity of the world". Bilder aus der Wissenschaft. 10: 32–41. arXiv:physics/0408111. Bibcode:2004physics...8111V.
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