Responses to the argument against the existence of God
William L. Rowe's example of natural evil: "In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering."
The problem of evil is acute in monotheistic religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism whose religion is based on such a God.[7][8] However, the question of "why does evil exist?" has also been studied in religions that are non-theistic or polytheistic, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism.[9][10] In most theological discussions, evil is defined in a broad manner as any and all pain and suffering, but religion also uses a narrow definition that says evil involves horrific acts committed by an independent moral agent and does not include all wrongs or harm, including that from nature.[11][12]
The problem of evil is formulated as either a logical problem that highlights an inconsistency between some characteristic of God and evil or as an evidential problem that attempts to show that evidence of evil outweighs the evidence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God.[2][3][13]
The earliest formulation of the problem of evil dates back to the Greek philosopher Epicurus;[a]David Hume paraphrased it as follows: "Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?"[15]
The logical argument from evil is as follows:
If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient god exists, then evil does not.
There is evil in the world.
Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient god does not exist.[16]
Evidential problem of evil
The evidential problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version of the problem) seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.[17] Both absolute versions and relative versions of the evidential problems of evil are presented below.
There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being does not exist.[1]
The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings, they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[18]
The Bible "does not admit of a singular perspective on evil. ...Instead we encounter a variety of perspectives... Consequently [the Bible focuses on] moral and spiritual remedies, not rational or logical [justifications]."[19]:27 Suffering in the Bible is represented in at least twelve different ways:[19]:28[20]:160
Exodus 17:1–7 (and the Book of Job) characterize suffering as testing and speak of God's right to test human loyalty.
2 Corinthians 4:7–12 says human weakness during suffering reveals God's strength and that it is part of the believer's calling to embrace suffering in solidarity with Christ.
2 Corinthians 1:3–7 says God is the comforter and that people learn how to better comfort others when they have personal experience of suffering.
The hymn in Philippians 2 invites us to join Christ in suffering for the sake of others, so that we might also share in his glory.
Colossians 1:24 says our suffering participates in God's own suffering as it unfolds in the already and not yet of the kingdom of God.[20]:160,161
Suffering and misfortune are sometimes represented as evil in the Bible, yet Christianity is based on "the salvific value of suffering."[21]Saint Paul and Saint Barnabas in Acts 14:22 taught that Christians "must endure many hardships to enter the kingdom of God." Paul also taught that God permitted him to bear sufferings beyond his strength and endurance in order to teach Paul to trust more in God.[22][23][24]
According to Robert L. Plummer, because Christian identity is fundamentally determined by the self-diffusive gospel and the rejected Jesus, all followers should expect to face the same opposition that their Lord did. It is through this suffering, however, that God has chosen to magnify the glory of his word and demonstrate the nature of the crucified Christ.[25]
The Irenaean (or soul-making) theodicy is named after the 2nd-century Greek theologian Irenaeus, whose ideas were adopted in Eastern Christianity. Irenaean theodicy stands in sharp contrast to the Augustinian theodicy. For Augustine, humans were created perfect, but after the fall of man, their nature became corrupted. In Irenaeus' view, humans were not created perfect, but instead, must strive continuously to move closer to it.[26]
Irenaeus saw the purpose of the world in the development of the moral character of humans, and believed that a good world would be best suited to that purpose. Irenaeus believed that this world would include suffering and evil to help people draw closer to God. He perceived God's declaration in the Book of Genesis that his creation was good to mean that the world is fit for purpose, as opposed to free from suffering.[27] To illustrate the benefits of suffering, Irenaeus cited the Book of Jonah. He explained that Jonah's suffering, being swallowed by a whale, both enabled God's plan to be fulfilled and also brought Jonah closer to God: Jonah repented for his sin and the people of Nineveh turned to God.[28]
The soul-making theodicy has been modified and advocated in the twenty-first century by John Hick.[29] He describes it in the following way:
...one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptation, and thus by rightly making responsibly choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence or of virtue. In the former case, which is that of the actual moral achievements of mankind, the individual’s goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon an accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort.[29]
Additionally, Hick argues that for suffering to have soul-making value, "human effort and development must be present at every stage of existence, including the afterlife."[30]:132,138
Saint Augustine of Hippo grappled with the problem of evil before he converted to Christianity and after it. After his conversion, Augustine came to view God as a spiritual, not corporeal, being who is sovereign over other lesser beings, based on God having created all material reality ex nihilo. Augustine's view of evil relies on the causal principle which states that every cause is superior to its effects.[31]:43 According to him, God is innately superior to his creation, and everything that God creates is good.[31]:40–42 Every creature is good, but "some are better than others"[31]:44 Created beings, however, are also subject to prejudices that come from a personal perspective: humans care about what affects themselves and fail to see how their privation might contribute to the common good. For Augustine, evil, when it refers to God's material creation, refers to a privation, an absence of goodness "where goodness might have been."[31]:44 This absence of good is an act of the will, "a culpable rejection of the infinite bounty God offers in favor of an infinitely inferior fare," freely chosen by the will of an individual.[31]:46
Saint Thomas Aquinas systematized the Augustinian conception of evil, supplementing it with his own musings. According to Saint Thomas, evil is a privation, or "the absence of some good which belongs properly to the nature of the creature."[32] Therefore, for Aquinas, there is no ontological source of evil that corresponds to the greater good, which is God. Saint Thomas believed that evil exists as a subjective conception, as opposed to an objective fact. Despise this he believed that things are evil not in themselves, but because of their relation to other items or persons. All realities, according to Aquinas, are themselves functional; they produce bad results incidentally. Consequently, he claimed that the final cause of evil is fundamental "goodness."[33]
In Christian theology, original sin is the term used to describe the sin of Adam and Eve, the progenitors of humanity. With the fall of man, they lost sanctifying grace and communion with God. Original sin hinges on the participation of humanity in the same human nature of Adam and Eve rather than in the participation in their actual sin.[34]
John Calvin explained evil as a consequence of the fall of man and the original sin. Calvin, however, held to the belief in predestination and believed that the fall was part of God's plan.[35]Martin Luther saw evil and original sin as an inheritance from Adam and Eve. He believed that it was passed on to all humans from their conception. According to Luther, God's just nature allowed sin as a consequence of human distrust, even though God planned humanity's redemption through Jesus Christ.[36]
In response to arguments concerning natural evil and the suffering of animals, Christopher Southgate developed a "compound evolutionary theodicy."[37]:711Robert John Russell summarizes it as beginning with an assertion of the goodness of creation and all sentient creatures.[38]:15 Next, Southgate argues that Darwinian evolution was the only way God could create such goodness. "A universe with the sort of beauty, diversity, sentience, and sophistication of creatures that the biosphere now contains" could only come about by the natural processes of evolution.[37]:716 According to Russell and Southgate, the goodness of creation is intrinsically linked to the evolutionary processes by which such goodness is achieved, and these processes, in turn, inevitably come with pain and suffering as intrinsic to them.[37]:716 In this scenario, natural evils are an inevitable consequence of developing life.[37]:716
In his evolutionary theodicy, Richard Kropf supposes that "what we take for evil in the natural course of events, exists primarily because creation as an evolutionary process necessarily begins with forms of existence that are totally unlike God."[39]Bethany N. Sollereder acknowledges that violence and suffering are inherent in the evolutionary process, yet asserts this is given context and redemption in light of the "creative suffering of God".[40]
Alvin Plantinga's response to the problem of evil is that it is not a problem that can be solved. Christians simply cannot claim to know the answer to the "Why?" of evil. Plantinga stresses that this is why he does not proffer a theodicy but only a defense of theistic belief.[41]:33 Philosopher Richard Swinburne also says that, in its classic form, the argument from evil is unanswerable, yet there may still be reasons for not reaching its conclusion that there is no God.[42] These reasons are of three kinds: other strong reasons for affirming that there is a God; general reasons for doubting the force of the argument itself; and specific reasons for doubting the criteria of any of the argument's premises.[43] The alleged contradictions of the problem of evil depend upon the meaning assigned to the terms involved, therefore "the most common way to resolve the problem of evil is by qualifying, redefining or supplementing one or more of the major terms."[44]
Plantinga offers a free will defense instead of a theodicy.[41] Plantinga begins with the Leibnizian supposition that there were innumerable possible worlds, some with moral good but no moral evil, available to God before creation.[41]:38 We live in the actual world (the world God actualized), but God could have chosen to create (actualize) any of the possibilities. The catch, Plantinga says, is that it is possible that factors within the possible worlds themselves prevented God from actualizing any of those worlds with moral goodness and no moral evil. Plantinga refers to these factors as the nature of "human essences" and "transworld depravity."[45]:51–53
Across the various possible worlds (transworld) are all the variations of possible humans, each with their own "human essence" (identity): core properties essential to each person that makes them who they are and distinguishes them from others. Every person is the instantiation of such an essence. This "transworld identity" varies in detail but not in essence from world to world.[45]:50–51 This might include variations of a person (X) who always chooses right in some worlds. If somewhere, in some world, (X) ever freely chooses wrong, then the other possible worlds of only goodness could not be actualized and still leave (X) fully free.[46]:184 There might be numerous possible worlds that contained (X) doing only morally good things, but these would not be worlds that God could bring into being because (X) effectively eliminated those options through free action in other possible worlds. (X)'s free choice determined the world available for God to create.[46]:187–188
An all-knowing God would know "in advance" that there are times when "no matter what circumstances" God places (X) in, as long as God leaves (X) free, (X) will make at least one bad choice. Plantinga terms this "transworld depravity."[46]:186 Therefore, if God wants (X) to be a part of creation and free, then it could mean that the only option such a God would have would be to have an (X) who goes wrong at least once in a world where such wrong is possible. "What is important about transworld depravity is that if a person suffers from it, then it wasn't within God's power to actualize any world in which that person is significantly free but does no wrong."[45]:48 Plantinga extends this to all human agents, noting, "clearly it is possible that everybody suffers from transworld depravity."[46]:186 This means creating a world with moral good, no moral evil, and truly free persons was not an option available to God. The only way to have a world free of moral evil would be "by creating one without significantly free persons."[46]:189
Contemporary post-Holocaust theodicy
Contemporary theodicy takes one, or some combination, of four general approaches to addressing the problem of evil (five if one counts the anti-theodicy position as a theodicy).[30]:i The first can be called the protological approach. It asserts God's decisions and actions at creation are reconcilable with omnibenevolence despite the many and often horrendous evils that have come as a result.[30]:42–44 Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, and Eleonore Stump have markedly different theodicies but all have their primary focus on "God as maker of Heaven and earth" doing the best, most loving thing by creating humans and the world as it exists. David Ray Griffin and John Hick also have substantial protological elements in their theodicies.[30]:44
Jürgen Moltmann, René Girard, Pope John Paul II, Marilyn McCord Adams, and James Cone all have versions of the traditional Christological (aka cruciform) approach to the problem of evil.[30]:79 John Paul and Adams speak of the "horrors" of existence becoming "secure points of identification with the crucified God."[47] Moltmann says Jesus' suffering was so profound it changed God, just as profound suffering changes the humans who endure it.[48]:77–78 René Girard's "unique claim is that Christ's death has once-and-for-all unmasked the cycle of violence and victimization that has existed 'since the foundation of the world.'"[49] Black theologian James Cone says that, through Jesus' immersion in human suffering, God's identity is found among those who suffer.[50]
The enestological solution, based on process theology, stresses the ongoing presence of God as a benevolent providence who constantly works to persuade human beings to choose good but does not unilaterally intervene to force them as a despot would.[51] It has become a particularly influential view in the contemporary period through the work of a number of feminist and womanist theologians, such as Wendy Farley and Cheryl Kirk-Duggan, as well as to the majority of those who hold to the "anti-theodicy" position, such as Sarah Pinnock.[52][30]:107Marjorie Suchocki and John Hick use process theology to emphasize the "here and now" of God while also having strong protological and eschatological elements in their approaches, but it was David Griffin's book God, Power, and Evil in 2004 that was the first "full-scale treatment of the problem of evil written from the perspective of 'process' philosophical and theological thought."[30]:87 Griffin builds on Whitehead's view that God is not alone in having "power, creativity, and self-determination," asserting that "God has no hands but our hands."[53][51]:93
Marjorie Suchocki asserts the need for an eschatological aspect to create a complete Christian theodicy.[30]:103,104 Yet, the willingness to include an eschatology at all is a minority view among the writers of contemporary theodicy mentioned here. Most agree that "eschatology should be clearly de-emphasized, if not bypassed altogether," as an afterlife cannot be used to justify or explain suffering in this life.[48]:251–253 Yet, the eschatological approach has been the particular focus and emphasis of John Hick's writings.[54]
Hick asserts that "the question of immortality ... is an essential basis for any view which could count towards a solution of the theological problem of human suffering."[55] Hick holds that moral goodness is only gradually achieved and that, because it is obtained through suffering and struggle, it is of greater value than a preprogrammed virtue God might have enacted at creation.[30]:90,121 For Hick, this soul-making must continue after death, and he adamantly holds to the doctrine of universal salvation.[30]:132,138 Universal salvation/reconciliation has long been a heavily debated minority view in the West, but it was the common soteriology until Augustine's competing theory of eternal damnation of the fourth century. Hick references the earlier view found in the writings of Irenaeus,[56]:2 and in other Eastern writers, including Origen[57] and Gregory of Nyssa,[58] arguing that "eternal pain [and] unending torment" would render any "Christian theodicy impossible" as it would instantiate an evil that was able to thwart God's benevolence and power.[54][55]:201,243
A. K. Anderson advocates a maximal Christian theodicy that integrates the strengths of all four approaches since he sees them all as, separately, inadequate.[30]:ii,144–145
"With Plantinga we have a Creator God, but not much else, while Hick adds to this God’s relation to the end time, but leaves the Divine distant, both epistemically and otherwise, from what takes place between the beginning and the eschaton. Cone and Soelle correct this tendency of Hick's, but have their own reverse omissions, as they both find the Divine first and foremost in the person of Jesus, and secondarily in the ongoing struggle against injustice he inspires, yet they bypass serious consideration of creation and an afterlife. Griffin meanwhile has an enestological theodicy with a protological component, but in his work Christology and eschatology are unable to find any significant place at the table."[30]:145
Finally, James Wetzel writes that Kenneth Surin is representative of an increasing anti-theodicy backlash.[59] For those writing theodicy in the twenty-first century, there is no seamless theory that provides all answers, nor do these contemporary theologians think there should be. "When one considers human lives that have been shattered to the core, and, in the face of these tragedies [addresses] the question "Where is God?" ... we would do well to stand with [poet and Holocaust survivor] Nelly Sachs as she says, 'We really don't know.'"[60] Contemporary theodiceans, such as Alvin Plantinga, describe having doubts about the enterprise of theodicy "in the sense of providing an explanation of precise reasons why there is evil in the world." Instead, they attempt to articulate a defense of theistic belief as logical in the face of remaining questions.[30]:29 For example, Sarah Pinnock asserts that: "Direct contact with God does not answer Job's questions, but it makes meaning, and the acceptance of suffering, possible."[48]:74
Wetzel says that Surin distinguishes theoretical theodicy from a practical theodicy that needs to be more concerned with eliminating evil than explaining it and replaces "philosophy's abstract and impassable God [a God who cannot change and therefore doesn't suffer] with a God who suffers."[61]Dorothy Soelle, Jürgen Moltmann, and P. T. Forsyth are in this group.[62]
Islamic scholars in the medieval and modern eras have tried to reconcile the problem of evil with the afterlife theodicy.[63][64] According to Nursi, the temporal world has many evils, such as the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and its substitution with secularism, and such evils are impossible to understand unless there is an afterlife.[63] The omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God in Islamic thought creates everything, including human suffering and its causes (evil).[65] Evil was neither bad nor needed moral justification from God, but rewards awaited believers in the afterlife. The faithful suffered in this short life so as to be judged by God and enjoy Jannah in the never-ending afterlife.[63]
Meanwhile, the Islamic rationalist school, Mu'tazilite, tried to resolve theological questions in dealing with the problems of evil, disaster, and cruelty in the world. This dialectical effort led to the formation of Mu'tazilah theodicy, which states that because Allah (God) is all-just and wise, it is impossible for Allah to do or carry out things that are contrary to reason. Proponents of the theodicy claim that God cannot possibly act without considering the welfare of his creatures.[66] For that reason, according to Mu'tazilah theodicy, all crimes, cruelties, disasters, and misery that exist and occur in the world must be considered as something that occurs solely because of human free will or due to natural phenomena.[67] For the Mu'tazilites, humans will undergo ḥisāb (the process of calculating their deeds in the afterlife) based on their actions and behavior in the world. Proponents of the theodicy claim that humans consciously shape their actions and behavior through free will.[68][69]
Alternate theodicies in Islamic thought include the 11th-century Ibn Sina's denial of evil in a form similar to the "privation theory" theodicy. However, this theodicy attempt by Ibn Sina is considered by Shams C. Inati to be unsuccessful because it implicitly denies the omnipotence of God.[70]
According to Jon Levenson, the writers of the Hebrew Bible were well aware of evil as a theological problem, but there is no evidence of awareness of the problem of evil.[71] In contrast, according to Yair Hoffman, the ancient books of the Hebrew Bible do not show an awareness of the theological problem of evil, and even most later biblical scholars did not touch the question of the problem of evil.[72]
In the Bible, all characterizations of evil and suffering assert the view of "a God who is greater than suffering [who] is powerful, creative and committed to His creation [who] always has the last word"; God's commitment to the greater good is assumed in all cases.[20]:162,168 In the Hebrew Bible, Genesis says God's creation is "good," with evil depicted as entering creation as a result of human choice.[73]:Chapter 4 The Book of Job "seeks to expand the understanding of divine justice ...beyond mere retribution, to include a system of divine sovereignty [showing] the King has the right to test His subject's loyalty... [Job] corrects the rigid and overly simplistic doctrine of retribution in attributing suffering to sin and punishment."[74]:Chapter 3:Job
Hebrew Bible scholar Marvin A. Sweeney says, "...a unified reading of [Isaiah] places the question of theodicy at the forefront... [with] three major dimensions of the question: Yahweh's identification with the conqueror, Yahweh's decree of judgment against Israel without possibility of repentance, and the failure of Yahweh's program to be realized by the end of the book."[75]:209Ezekiel and Jeremiah confront the concept of personal moral responsibility and understanding divine justice in a world under divine governance.[76]:82 "Theodicy in the Minor Prophets differs little from that in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel."[77] In the Psalms, more personal aspects of theodicy are discussed, such as Psalm 73, which confronts the internal struggle created by suffering.[74] Theodicy in the Hebrew Bible almost universally looks "beyond the concerns of the historical present to posit an eschatological salvation" at that future time when God restores all things.[77]:137
10th-century Rabbi Saadia Gaon presented a theodicy along the lines of "soul-making, greater good and afterlife."[78] Saadia suggested that suffering, in a manner similar to Babylonian TalmudBerakhot 5, should be considered as a gift from God because it leads to an eternity of heaven in the afterlife. In contrast, the 12th-century Moses Maimonides offered a different theodicy, asserting that the all-loving God neither produces evil nor gifts suffering because everything God does is absolutely good, then presenting the "privation theory" explanation. Both these answers, states Daniel Rynhold, merely rationalize and suppress the problem of evil rather than solve it.[78] Attempts by theologians to reconcile the problem of evil, with claims that the Holocaust evil was a necessary, intentional, and purposeful act of God, have been declared obscene by Jewish thinkers such as Richard Rubenstein.[78]
The problem of evil gained renewed interest among after the Holocaust; according to beliefs of the Jews, the all-powerful, all-compassionate, all-knowing monotheistic God presumably had the power to prevent the Holocaust, but he did not.[78] The persecution of Jewish people was not a new phenomenon, and medieval Jewish thinkers such as Judah Halevi and Saadia Gaon had, in abstract, attempted to resolve the problem of evil.[79][80] The Holocaust experience and other episodes of mass extermination, such as the Gulag and the Killing Fields, where millions of people experienced torture and died, however, brought into focus the visceral nature of the evidential version of the problem of evil.[81]
Jewish theodicy continues to experience extensive revision while continuing to assert the difference between the human and divine perspective of evil; it remains rooted in the nature of creation itself and the limitation inherent in matter's capacity to be perfected, and the action of free will includes the potential for perfection from individual effort and leaves evil in human hands.[82]:70
The gods in the Ancient Greek religion were seen as superior, but they shared similar traits with humans and often interacted with them.[83][84] Although the Greeks did not believe in any "evil" gods, the Greeks still acknowledged the fact that evil was present in the world.[85] Gods often meddled in the affairs of men, and sometimes their actions consisted of bringing misery to people; for example, gods would sometimes be a direct cause of death for people.[83][84] However, the Greeks did not consider the gods to be evil as a result of their actions. Instead, the answer to most situations in Greek mythology was the power of fate. Fate is considered to be more powerful than the gods themselves, and for this reason, no one can escape it. For this reason, the Greeks recognized that unfortunate events were justifiable because of fate.[86]
Later, Greek and Roman theologians and philosophers discussed the problem of evil in depth. Starting at least with Plato, philosophers tended to reject or de-emphasize literal interpretations of mythology in favor of a more pantheistic, natural theology based on reasoned arguments. In this framework, stories that seemed to impute dishonorable conduct to the gods were often simply dismissed as false and as being nothing more than the "imagination of poets." Greek and Roman thinkers continued to wrestle, however, with the problems of natural evil and of evil that we observe in our day-to-day experience. Influential Roman writers, such as Cicero (De Natura Deorum) and Seneca (De Providentia), drawing on earlier work by the Greek philosophers such as the Stoics, developed many arguments in defense of the righteousness of the gods.[86][87]
On the other hand, the philosopher Lucretius, in De rerum natura, rejected the divinity in nature as a cause of many evils for humanity.[88]
According to Buddhist teachings there is evil in the world, as well as Dukkha (suffering), which is caused by evil or natural causes (aging, disease, rebirth). Buddhists believe that evil is expressed in actions and states of mind, such as cruelty, murder, theft, and avarice, which are a result of the three poisons: greed, hatred, and delusion. The precepts and practices of Buddhism, such as the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, aim to empower a follower in gaining insights and liberation (nirvana) from the cycle of such suffering as well as rebirth.[89][90]
Some strands of Mahayana Buddhism developed a theory of Buddha-nature in texts such as the Tathagata-garbha Sutras composed in 3rd-century south India, which is very similar to the "soul, self" theory found in classical Hinduism.[91][92] The Tathagata-garbha theory leads to a Buddhist version of the problem of evil, states Peter Harvey,[9] because the theory claims that every human being has an intrinsically pure inner Buddha, which is good. This premise leads to the question as to why anyone does any evil and why does not the "intrinsically pure inner Buddha" attempt or prevail in preventing the evil actor before they commit the evil.[9] One response has been that the Buddha-nature is omnibenevolent but not omnipotent. Further, the Tathagata-garbha Sutras are atypical texts of Buddhism because they contradict the Anatta doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that the Tathagatagarbha Sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists and that they do not represent mainstream Buddhism.[93][91]
Mainstream Buddhism, since its early development, did not need to address a theological problem of evil as it saw no need for a creator of the universe and asserted instead, like many Indian traditions, that the universe never had a beginning and all existence is an endless cycle of rebirths (samsara).[9]
Hinduism is a multifaceted religion with many different currents and religious beliefs.[94] Its non-theist traditions, such as Samkhya, early Nyaya, Mimamsa, and many within Vedanta, do not posit the existence of an almighty, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God (monotheistic God), and the classical formulations of the problem of evil and theodicy do not apply to most Hindu traditions. Further, deities in Hinduism are not eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent. Devas are mortal and subject to samsara. Evil as well as good, along with suffering, is considered real and caused by human free will.[95] Its source and consequences are explained through the karma doctrine of Hinduism, as in other Indian religions.[96][97][98]
Karma as action and reaction: if we show goodness, we will reap goodness
A version of the problem of evil appears in the ancient Brahma Sutras, probably composed between 200 BCE and 200 CE,[99] a foundational text of the Vedanta tradition of Hinduism.[100] Its verses 2.1.34 through 2.1.36 aphoristically mention a version of the problem of suffering and evil in the context of the abstract metaphysical Hindu concept of Brahman.[101][102] Verse 2.1.34 of Brahma Sutras asserts that inequality and cruelty in the world cannot be attributed to the concept of Brahman, and this is in the Vedas and the Upanishads. In his interpretation and commentary on the Brahma Sutras, the 8th-century scholar Adi Shankara states that because some people are happier than others and because there is so much malice, cruelty, and pain in the world, Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.[101]
For that would lead to the possibility of partiality and cruelty. For it can be reasonably concluded that God has passion and hatred like some ignoble persons... Hence there will be a nullification of God's nature of extreme purity, (unchangeability), etc., [...] And owing to infliction of misery and destruction on all creatures, God will be open to the charge of pitilessness and extreme cruelty, abhorred even by a villain. Thus on account of the possibility of partiality and cruelty, God is not an agent.
Shankara attributes evil and cruelty in the world to the karma of oneself, of others, and to ignorance, delusion, and wrong knowledge,[102] but not to the abstract Brahman.[101] Brahman itself is beyond good and evil. There is evil and suffering because of karma. Those who struggle with this explanation, states Shankara, do so because of presumed duality between Brahman and Jiva or because of a linear view of existence, when in reality, "samsara and karma are anadi" (existence is cyclic, rebirth and deeds are eternal with no beginning).[102] In other words, in the Brahma Sutras, the formulation of the problem of evil is considered a metaphysical construct, but not a moral issue. Ramanuja of the theistic Sri Vaishnavism school—a major tradition within Vaishnavism—interprets the same verse in the context of Vishnu and asserts that Vishnu only creates potentialities.[101]
According to Swami Gambhirananda of Ramakrishna Mission, Sankara's commentary explains that God cannot be charged with partiality or cruelty (i.e., injustice) on account of his taking the factors of virtuous and vicious actions (karma) performed by an individual in previous lives. If an individual experiences pleasure or pain in this life, it is due to a virtuous or vicious action (karma) done by that individual in a past life.[103]
A sub-tradition within the Vaishnavism school of Hinduism that is an exception is dualistic Dvaita, founded by Madhvacharya in the 13th century. This tradition posits a concept of God so similar to Christianity that Christian missionaries in colonial India suggested that Madhvacharya was likely influenced by early Christians who migrated to India,[104] a theory that has been discredited by scholars.[105]:266[106]:19–21 Madhvacharya was challenged by Hindu scholars on the problem of evil, given his dualistic Tattvavada theory that proposed God and living beings along with the universe as separate realities. Madhvacharya asserted Yathecchasi tatha kuru, which Sharma translates and explains as "one has the right to choose between right and wrong, a choice each individual makes out of his own responsibility and his own risk."[107]:361 Madhva's reply does not address the problem of evil, state Dasti and Bryant, as to how evil can exist with that of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.[108][107]
According to Sharma, "Madhva's tripartite classification of souls makes it unnecessary to answer the problem of evil."[109] According to David Buchta, this does not address the problem of evil because the omnipotent God "could change the system, but chooses not to" and thus sustains the evil in the world.[108] This view of self's agency of Madhvacharya was, states Buchta, an outlier in Vedanta school and Indian philosophies in general.[108]
The theory of karma refers to the spiritual principle of cause and effect, where the intent and actions of an individual influence the future of that individual.[110] The problem of evil, in the context of karma, has been long discussed in Indian religions including Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism, both in its theistic and nontheistic schools; for example, in Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sutras Book 2 Chapter 1;[111][112] the 8th-century arguments by Adi Sankara in Brahmasutrabhasya where he posits that God cannot reasonably be the cause of the world because there exists moral evil, inequality, cruelty and suffering in the world;[113][114] and the 11th-century theodicy discussion by Ramanuja in Sribhasya.[115]
Karma theory of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism is not static but dynamic, wherein living beings with intent or without intent, but with words and actions continuously create new karma, and it is this that they believe to be in part the source of good or evil in the world.[116] These religions also believe that past lives or past actions in current life create current circumstances, which also contributes to either. Other scholars[117] suggest that nontheistic Indian religious traditions do not assume an omnibenevolent creator; the Indian deities are personal and cosmic facilitators and, in some schools, conceptualized like Plato's Demiurge.[115] Therefore, the problem of theodicy in many schools of major Indian religions is not significant, or at least is of a different nature than in Western religions.[118]
Notes
↑ According to Mark Joseph Larrimore, the formulation may have been wrongly attributed to Epicurus by Lactantius, who, from his Christian perspective, regarded Epicurus as an atheist.[14]
↑ Meister, Chad (2009), "The problem of evil", The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology, Cambridge Companions to Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.152–169, ISBN978-0-521-51433-0, retrieved 2025-03-07
↑ Draper, Paul (1989). "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists". Noûs. 23 (3): 331–50. doi:10.2307/2215486. JSTOR2215486.
1 2 Scott, Mark. S. M. (2015). Pathways in Theodicy: An Introduction to the Problem of Evil (illustrated, reprinted.). Augsburg Fortress Publishers. ISBN9781451464702.
1 2 3 Gregg, Brian Han (2016). What Does the Bible Say About Suffering?. Downer's Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic. ISBN978-0-8308-5145-4.
1 2 3 4 5 Mann, William E. (2001). "Augustine on evil and original sin". The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (2nded.). Cambridge University Press. pp.40–48. ISBN978-1107025332.
↑ Adams, Marilyn McCord (2000). Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (reprinted.). Cornell University Press. pp.164–168. ISBN9780801486869.
1 2 3 Pinnock, Sarah K. (2012). Beyond Theodicy Jewish and Christian Continental Thinkers Respond to the Holocaust. State University of New York Press. pp.251–253. ISBN9780791487808.
↑ Girard, René (1989). The Scapegoat. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN9780801839177.
↑ Cone, James (1994). "An African-American Perspective on the Cross and Suffering". The Scandal of a Crucified World Perspectives on the Cross and Suffering. Orbis Books. pp.48–61. ISBN9780883449769.
1 2 Whitehead, Alfred North (1967). Adventures of Ideas. Free Press. p.169. ISBN0-02-935170-7.
↑ Cone, James (1997). God of the Oppressed (Rev Subed.). Orbis. p.xv. ISBN978-1570751585.
↑ Griffin, David Ray (1991). Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations. SUNY Press. pp.25–27. ISBN9780791406120.
1 2 Hick, John (2001). "An Irenaean Theodicy". Encountering Evil Live Options in Theodicy (2nded.). Westminster John Knox Press. p.38. ISBN9780664222512.
1 2 Hick, John (1994). Death and Eternal Life (illustrated, reprinted.). Westminster John Knox Press. p.157. ISBN9780664255091.
↑ Adamson, Jennifer L. (2015). "Saint Irenaeus and Conflicting Doctrines of Damnation". Diffusion- the UCLan Journal of Undergraduate Research. S2CID170293548.
↑ al-Asadābādī, ʻAbd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad (1965). Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsah (in Arabic). Maktabat wahbah. Archived from the original on 2024-12-20. Retrieved 2024-12-20.
↑ Friesenhahn, Jacob H. (2016). The Trinity and Theodicy: The Trinitarian Theology of von Balthasar and the Problem of Evil. New York: Routledge. ISBN978-1-409-40801-7.
1 2 Ko, Grace (2014). Theodicy in Habakkuk. United Kingdom: Paternoster.
↑ Linafelt, Tod, ed. (2000). "Isaiah and Theodicy after the Shoah". Strange Fire: Reading the Bible After the Holocaust. New York University Press. ISBN978-0-8147-5165-7.
↑ Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Rackham, H. (2005). De Natura Deorum; Academica. W. Heinemann G.P. Putnam's Sons. Archived from the original on 2025-02-28. Retrieved 2025-02-28.
↑ Williams, Paul; Tribe, Anthony; Wynne, Alexander (2012). "Chapter 2". Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. Routledge. pp.30–52. ISBN978-1-136-52087-7.
↑ Sharma 1962, pp.270, 370–71, Quote: The problem of evil and suffering in the world is the most difficult one in Theism. We have explained Madhva's attitude to the allied problem of freedom and freewill, on the basis of the doctrine of natural selection of good or bad and of the tripartite classification of souls. It is not therefore necessary for Madhva to answer the question of the consistency of evil with Divine goodness..
↑ Clooney, Francis (2005), in The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism (Editor: Gavin Flood), Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN0631215352, pp. 454–55
↑ Clooney, Francis (1989), ‘‘Evil, Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom: Vedanta’s theology of Karma, Journal of Religion, Vol. 69, pp 530–48
↑ Bilimoria, Purushottama (2007), Karma’s suffering: A Mimamsa solution to the problem of evil, in Indian Ethics (Editors: Bilimoria et al.), Volume 1, Ashgate Publishing, ISBN978-0754633013, pp. 171–89
1 2 Bilimoria, Purushottama (2013), Toward an Indian Theodicy, in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Editors: McBrayer and Howard-Snyder), 1st Edition, John Wiley & Sons, ISBN978-0470671849, Chapter 19
↑ Sharma, Ursula (1973), Theodicy and the doctrine of karma, ‘‘Man’’, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 347–64
↑ Obeyesekere, Gananath (1968), Theodicy, sin and salvation in a sociology of Buddhism, in Practical religion (Ed. Edmund Leach), Cambridge University Press, ISBN978-0521055253
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