Compatibilism

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Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent. [1] As Steven Weinberg puts it: "I would say that free will is nothing but our conscious experience of deciding what to do, which I know I am experiencing as I write this review, and this experience is not invalidated by the reflection that physical laws made it inevitable that I would want to make these decisions." [2] The opposing belief, that the thesis of determinism is logically incompatible with the classical thesis of free will, is known as "incompatibilism".

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Compatibilists believe that freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. [3] In other words, that causal determinism does not exclude the truth of possible future outcomes. [4] Because free will is seen as a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility, compatibilism is often used to support compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

Similarly, political liberty is a non-metaphysical concept. [5] Statements of political liberty, such as the United States Bill of Rights, assume moral liberty: the ability to choose to do otherwise than what one does. [6]

History

Compatibilism was mentioned and championed by the ancient Stoics [7] and some medieval scholastics. More specifically, scholastics like Thomas Aquinas and later Thomists (such as Domingo Báñez) are often interpreted as holding that human action can be free, even though an agent in some strong sense could not do otherwise than what they did. Whereas Aquinas is often interpreted to maintain rational compatibilism (i.e., an action can be determined by rational cognition and yet free), later Thomists, such as Báñez, develop a sophisticated theory of theological determinism, according to which actions of free agents, despite being free, are, on a higher level, determined by infallible divine decrees manifested in the form of "physical premotion" (praemotio physica), a deterministic intervention of God into the will of a free agent required to reduce the will from potency to act. A strong incompatibilist view of freedom was, on the other hand, developed in the Franciscan tradition, especially by Duns Scotus, and later upheld and further developed by Jesuits, especially Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez. In the early modern era, compatibilism was maintained by Enlightenment philosophers (such as David Hume and Thomas Hobbes). [8]

During the 20th century, compatibilists presented novel arguments that differed from the classical arguments of Hume, Hobbes, and John Stuart Mill. [9] Importantly, Harry Frankfurt popularized what are now known as Frankfurt counterexamples to argue against incompatibilism, [10] and developed a positive account of compatibilist free will based on higher-order volitions. [11] Other "new compatibilists" include Gary Watson, Susan R. Wolf, P. F. Strawson, and R. Jay Wallace. [12] Contemporary compatibilists range from the philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett, particularly in his works Elbow Room (1984) and Freedom Evolves (2003), to the existentialist philosopher Frithjof Bergmann. [13] Perhaps the most renowned contemporary defender of compatibilism is John Martin Fischer.

A 2020 survey found that 59% of philosophers accept or lean towards compatibilism. [14]

Defining free will

Arthur Schopenhauer Schopenhauer.jpg
Arthur Schopenhauer

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had the freedom to act according to their own motivation . That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." [15] In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. This definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of causal determinism. [3] This view also makes free will close to autonomy , the ability to live according to one's own rules, as opposed to being submitted to external domination.

Alternatives as imaginary

Saying "there may be a person behind that door" merely expresses ignorance about the one, determined reality. Gotland-Froejel-Kirche 03.jpg
Saying "there may be a person behind that door" merely expresses ignorance about the one, determined reality.

Some compatibilists hold both causal determinism (all effects have causes) and logical determinism (the future is already determined) to be true. Thus statements about the future (e.g., "it will rain tomorrow") are either true or false when spoken today. This compatibilist free will should not be understood as the ability to choose differently in an identical situation. A compatibilist may believe that a person can decide between several choices, but the choice is always determined by external factors. [16] If the compatibilist says "I may visit tomorrow, or I may not", he is saying that he does not know what he will choose—whether he will choose to follow the subconscious urge to go or not.

Non-naturalism

Alternatives to strictly naturalist physics, such as mind–body dualism positing a mind or soul existing apart from one's body while perceiving, thinking, choosing freely, and as a result acting independently on the body, include both traditional religious metaphysics and less common newer compatibilist concepts. [17] Also consistent with both autonomy and Darwinism, [18] they allow for free personal agency based on practical reasons within the laws of physics. [19] While less popular among 21st-century philosophers, non-naturalist compatibilism is present in most if not almost all religions. [20]

Criticism

Compatibilism has much in common with "hard determinism", including moral systems and a belief in determinism itself. Prim clockwork.jpg
Compatibilism has much in common with "hard determinism", including moral systems and a belief in determinism itself.

A prominent criticism of compatibilism is Peter van Inwagen's consequence argument.

Critics of compatibilism often focus on the definitions of free will: incompatibilists may agree that the compatibilists are showing something to be compatible with determinism, but they think that this something ought not to be called "free will". Incompatibilists might accept the "freedom to act" as a necessary criterion for free will, but doubt that it is sufficient. The incompatibilists believe that free will refers to genuine (i.e., absolute, ultimate, physical) alternate possibilities for beliefs, desires, or actions, [21] rather than merely counterfactual ones.

The direct predecessor to compatibilism was soft determinism (a term coined by William James, which he used pejoratively). [22] Soft determinism is the view that we (ordinary humans) have free will and determinism is true. (Compatibilists, by contrast, take no stand on the truth-value of determinism.) James accused the soft determinists of creating a "quagmire of evasion" by stealing the name of freedom to mask their underlying determinism. [22] Immanuel Kant called it a "wretched subterfuge" and "word jugglery". [23] Kant's argument turns on the view that, while all empirical phenomena must result from determining causes, human thought introduces something seemingly not found elsewhere in nature—the ability to conceive of the world in terms of how it ought to be, or how it might otherwise be. For Kant, subjective reasoning is necessarily distinct from how the world is empirically. Because of its capacity to distinguish is from ought, reasoning can "spontaneously" originate new events without being itself determined by what already exists. [24] It is on this basis that Kant argues against a version of compatibilism in which, for instance, the actions of the criminal are comprehended as a blend of determining forces and free choice, which Kant regards as misusing the word free. Kant proposes that taking the compatibilist view involves denying the distinctly subjective capacity to re-think an intended course of action in terms of what ought to happen. [23]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Free will</span> Ability to make choices without constraints

Free will is the capacity or ability to choose between different possible courses of action.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Determinism</span> Philosophical view that events are determined by prior events

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. Like eternalism, determinism focuses on particular events rather than the future as a concept. The opposite of determinism is indeterminism, or the view that events are not deterministically caused but rather occur due to chance. Determinism is often contrasted with free will, although some philosophers claim that the two are compatible.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Categorical imperative</span> Central concept in Kantian moral philosophy

The categorical imperative is the central philosophical concept in the deontological moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Introduced in Kant's 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it is a way of evaluating motivations for action. It is best known in its original formulation: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Incompatibilism</span> Contradiction of free will and determinism

Incompatibilism is the view that the thesis of determinism is logically incompatible with the classical thesis of free will. The term was coined in the 1960s, most likely by philosopher Keith Lehrer. The term compatibilism was coined to name the view that the classical free will thesis is logically compatible with determinism, i.e. it is possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will, even in a universe where determinism is true. These terms were originally coined for use within a research paradigm that was dominant among academics during the so-called "classical period" from the 1960s to 1980s, or what has been called the "classical analytic paradigm". Within the classical analytic paradigm, the problem of free will and determinism was understood as a compatibility question: "Is it possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will when determinism is true?" Those working in the classical analytic paradigm who answered "no" were incompatibilists in the original, classical-analytic sense of the term, now commonly called classical incompatibilists; they proposed that determinism precludes free will because it precludes the ability to do otherwise. Those who answered "yes" were compatibilists in the original sense of the term, now commonly called classical compatibilists. Given that classical free will theorists agreed that it is at least metaphysically possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will, all classical compatibilists accepted a compossibilist account of free will and all classical incompatibilists accepted a libertarian account of free will.

Fatalism is a family of related philosophical doctrines that stress the subjugation of all events or actions to fate or destiny, and is commonly associated with the consequent attitude of resignation in the face of future events which are thought to be inevitable.

Indeterminism is the idea that events are not caused, or are not caused deterministically.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Libertarianism (metaphysics)</span> Term in metaphysics

Libertarianism is one of the main philosophical positions related to the problems of free will and determinism which are part of the larger domain of metaphysics. In particular, libertarianism is an incompatibilist position which argues that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe. Libertarianism states that since agents have free will, determinism must be false and vice versa.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hard determinism</span> View that free will does not exist

Hard determinism is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism, it can also be a position taken with respect to other forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.

Predeterminism is the philosophy that all events of history, past, present and future, have been already decided or are already known, including human actions.

Peter van Inwagen is an American analytic philosopher and the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is also a research professor of philosophy at Duke University each spring. He previously taught at Syracuse University, earning his PhD from the University of Rochester in 1969 under the direction of Richard Taylor. Van Inwagen is one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of action. He was the president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from 2010 to 2013.

Robert Hilary Kane was an American philosopher. He was Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy and a professor of law at the University of Texas at Austin.

Theological determinism is a form of predeterminism which states that all events that happen are pre-ordained, and/or predestined to happen, by one or more divine beings, or that they are destined to occur given the divine beings' omniscience. Theological determinism exists in a number of religions, including Jainism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is also supported by proponents of Classical pantheism such as the Stoics and by philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kantian ethics</span> Ethical theory of Immanuel Kant

Kantian ethics refers to a deontological ethical theory developed by German philosopher Immanuel Kant that is based on the notion that "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” It is also associated with the idea that “[i]t is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will." The theory was developed in the context of Enlightenment rationalism. It states that an action can only be moral if it is motivated by a sense of duty, and its maxim may be rationally willed a universal, objective law.

Frankfurt cases were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.

Illusionism is a metaphysical theory about free will first propounded by professor Saul Smilansky of the University of Haifa. Although there exists a theory of consciousness bearing the same name (illusionism), it is important to note that the two theories are concerned with different subjects.

Free will in antiquity is a philosophical and theological concept. Free will in antiquity was not discussed in the same terms as used in the modern free will debates, but historians of the problem have speculated who exactly was first to take positions as determinist, libertarian, and compatibilist in antiquity. There is wide agreement that these views were essentially fully formed over 2000 years ago. Candidates for the first thinkers to form these views, as well as the idea of a non-physical "agent-causal" libertarianism, include Democritus, Aristotle, Epicurus, Chrysippus, and Carneades.

Dickinson Sargeant Miller was an American philosopher best known for his work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. He worked with other philosophers including William James, George Santayana, John Dewey, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Agent causation</span> Idea in philosophy

Agent causation, or Agent causality, is an idea in philosophy which states that a being who is not an event—namely an agent—can cause events. Agent causation contrasts with event causation, which occurs when an event causes another event. Whether agent causation as a concept is logically sound is itself a topic of philosophical debate.

Abilities are powers an agent has to perform various actions. They include common abilities, like walking, and rare abilities, like performing a double backflip. Abilities are intelligent powers: they are guided by the person's intention and executing them successfully results in an action, which is not true for all types of powers. They are closely related to but not identical with various other concepts, such as disposition, know-how, aptitude, talent, potential, and skill.

References

  1. ↑ Coates, D. Justin; McKenna, Michael (February 25, 2015). "Compatibilism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on June 3, 2024. Retrieved May 10, 2016.
  2. ↑ Weinberg, Steven (2011-02-10). "The Universes We Still Don't Know". The New York Review of Books. Vol. 58, no. 2. ISSN   0028-7504 . Retrieved 2024-06-10.
  3. 1 2 Podgorski, Daniel (October 16, 2015). "Free Will Twice Defined: On the Linguistic Conflict of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism". The Gemsbok. Archived from the original on March 8, 2016. Retrieved March 7, 2016.
  4. ↑ McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin, "Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
  5. ↑ Locke, John (1690). The Second Treatise of Civil Government.
  6. ↑ "Reid on moral liberty" Archived 2021-06-03 at the Wayback Machine . The Monist, Vol. 70, No. 4, "Thomas Reid and His Contemporaries" (October 1987), pp. 442–452. Published by Oxford University Press Stable. Accessed: 06-12-2019.
  7. ↑ Ricardo Salles, "Compatibilism: Stoic and modern." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83.1 (2001): 1–23.
  8. ↑ Michael McKenna: "Compatibilism". //The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy//. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 2009.
  9. ↑ Kane, Robert (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will . Oxford University Press. p.  93. ISBN   978-0-19-514970-8.
  10. ↑ Kane 2005, p. 83.
  11. ↑ Kane 2005, p. 94.
  12. ↑ Kane 2005, pp. 98, 101, 107, 109.
  13. ↑ Frithjof Bergmann (1977). On Being Free. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctvpj760s. ISBN   978-0-268-15889-7. JSTOR   j.ctvpj760s.
  14. ↑ Bourget, David; Chalmers, David J. (2023). "Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey" (PDF). Philosophers' Imprint. 23 (1). University of Michigan Library. doi: 10.3998/phimp.2109 . Archived (PDF) from the original on 2024-02-08. Retrieved 2024-02-08.
  15. ↑ Schopenhauer, Arthur (1945). "On the Freedom of the Will". The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory. Translated by Morris Zucker. p. 531.
  16. ↑ Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility", Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829–839.
  17. ↑ Ridge, Michael (3 February 2014). "Moral Non-Naturalism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 24 February 2024. Retrieved 3 June 2019.
  18. ↑ Lemos, John (2002). "Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non–naturalism". Metaphilosophy. 33 (4): 468–482. doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00240. ISSN   1467-9973.
  19. ↑ Nida-Rümelin, Julian (1 January 2019). "The Reasons Account of Free Will: A Libertarian-Compatibilist Hybrid". Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. 105 (1): 3–10. doi:10.25162/arsp-2019-0001. S2CID   155641763.
  20. ↑ Stump, Eleonore (1996). "Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities". In Howard-Snyder, Daniel; Jordan, Jeff (eds.). Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 73–88.
  21. ↑ Danko D. Georgiev (2021). "Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will". Biosystems. 208: 104474. arXiv: 2107.06572 . Bibcode:2021BiSys.20804474G. doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2021.104474. PMID   34242745. S2CID   235785726. Free will is the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives.
  22. 1 2 James, William. 1884 "The Dilemma of Determinism", Unitarian Review, September 1884. Reprinted in The Will to Believe, Dover, 1956, p. 149.
  23. 1 2 Kant, Immanuel 1788 (1952).The Critique of Practical Reason, in Great Books of the Western World, vol. 42, Kant, University of Chicago, p. 332.
  24. ↑ Kant, Immanuel 1781 (1949). The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Max Mueller, p. 448.
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