Fatalism

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Destiny, painting by T. C. Gotch (1885–1886), Adelaide, Art Gallery of South Australia

Fatalism is a belief [1] and philosophical doctrine [2] [3] which considers the entire universe as a deterministic system and stresses the subjugation of all events, actions, and behaviors to fate or destiny, which is commonly associated with the consequent attitude of resignation in the face of future events which are thought to be inevitable and outside of human control. [1] [2] [3] [4]

Contents

Definition

The term "fatalism" can refer to any of the following ideas:

Religion

Throughout history, the belief that the entire universe is a deterministic system subject to the will of fate or destiny has been articulated in both Eastern and Western religions, philosophy, music, and literature. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

The ancient Arabs that inhabited the Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam used to profess a widespread belief in fatalism (ḳadar) alongside a fearful consideration for the sky and the stars as divine beings, which they held to be ultimately responsible for every phenomena that occurs on Earth and for the destiny of humankind. [7] Accordingly, they shaped their entire lives in accordance with their interpretations of astral configurations and phenomena. [7]

In the I Ching and philosophical Taoism, the ebb and flow of favorable and unfavorable conditions suggests the path of least resistance is effortless (see: Wu wei). In the philosophical schools of the Indian Subcontinent, the concept of karma deals with similar philosophical issues to the Western concept of determinism. Karma is understood as a spiritual mechanism which causes the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra). [8] Karma, either positive or negative, accumulates according to an individual's actions throughout their life, and at their death determines the nature of their next life in the cycle of Saṃsāra. [8] Most major religions originating in India hold this belief to some degree, most notably Hinduism, [8] Jainism, Sikhism, and Buddhism.

The views on the interaction of karma and free will are numerous, and diverge from each other greatly. For example, in Sikhism, god's grace, gained through worship, can erase one's karmic debts, a belief which reconciles the principle of karma with a monotheistic god one must freely choose to worship. [9] Jainists believe in a sort of compatibilism, in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.

Ājīvika

In ancient India, the Ājīvika school of philosophy founded by Makkhali Gosāla (around 500 BCE), otherwise referred to as "Ājīvikism" in Western scholarship, [10] upheld the Niyati ("Fate") doctrine of absolute fatalism or determinism, [10] [11] [12] which negates the existence of free will and karma , and is therefore considered one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy. [10] [11] [12] The oldest descriptions of the Ājīvika fatalists and their founder Gosāla can be found both in the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures of ancient India. [10] [12] The predetermined fate of all sentient beings and the impossibility to achieve liberation (mokṣa) from the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra) was the major distinctive philosophical and metaphysical doctrine of this heterodox school of Indian philosophy, [10] [11] [12] annoverated among the other Śramaṇa movements that emerged in India during the Second urbanization (600–200 BCE). [10]

Buddhism

Buddhist philosophy contains several concepts which some scholars describe as deterministic to various levels. However, the direct analysis of Buddhist metaphysics through the lens of determinism is difficult, due to the differences between European and Buddhist traditions of thought. [13]

One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) in the early Buddhist texts, which states that all phenomena (dharma) are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be dependent on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they are fundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence and therefore are impermanent. [13] [14] In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra); all thoughts and actions exert a karmic force that attaches to the individual's consciousness, which will manifest through reincarnation and results in future lives. [13] In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another future life or more lives. [15] The early Buddhist texts and later Tibetan Buddhist scriptures associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-self (anattā). [13] [14]

Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the doctrine of non-self (anattā). [13] In Buddhism, attaining enlightenment involves one realizing that neither in humans nor any other sentient beings there is a fundamental core of permanent being, identity, or personality which can be called the "soul", and that all sentient beings (including humans) are instead made of several, constantly changing factors which bind them to the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra). [13] [14] Sentient beings are composed of the five aggregates of existence (skandha): matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. [13] In the Saṃyutta Nikāya of the Pāli Canon, the historical Buddha is recorded as saying that "just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available." [16] The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "monist" and "pluralist" ontologies or materialist and dualist views of mind-body relation). [17] In the Kaccānagotta Sutta of the Pāli Canon (SN 12.15, parallel at SA 301), the historical Buddha stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows: [18]

But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world. [19]

Some Western scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of free will and moral responsibility. [13] [20] If there is no autonomous self, in this view, and all events are necessarily and unchangeably caused by others, then no type of autonomy can be said to exist, moral or otherwise. [20] However, other scholars disagree, claiming that the Buddhist conception of the universe allows for a form of compatibilism. [13] Buddhism perceives reality occurring on two different levels: the ultimate reality, which can only be truly understood by the enlightened ones, and the illusory or false reality of the material world, which is considered to be "real" or "true" by those who are ignorant about the nature of metaphysical reality; i.e., those who still haven't achieved enlightenment. [13] [14] Therefore, Buddhism perceives free will as a notion belonging to the illusory belief in the unchanging self or personhood that pertains to the false reality of the material world, while concepts like non-self and dependent origination belong to the ultimate reality; the transition between the two can be truly understood, Buddhists claim, by one who has attained enlightenment. [13] [14] [20]

Determinism and predeterminism

While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, fatalism, determinism, and predeterminism are distinct, as each emphasizes a different aspect of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.

Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to causality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable but, for fatalists, not necessarily due to causality. [21]

Fatalism is a looser term than determinism. The presence of historical "indeterminisms" or chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, is an idea still compatible with fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance—both can be imagined as sovereign. [2] This idea has roots in Aristotle's work, "De interpretatione". [22]

Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free. [23] The early Islamic philosopher, Al Farabi, makes the case that if God does in fact know all human actions and choices, then Aristotle's original solution to this dilemma stands. [24]

Idle argument

One famous ancient argument regarding fatalism was the so-called Idle Argument. It argues that if something is fated, then it would be pointless or futile to make any effort to bring it about. The Idle Argument was described by Origen and Cicero and it went like this:

The Idle Argument was anticipated by Aristotle in his De Interpretatione chapter 9. The Stoics considered it to be a sophism and the Stoic Chrysippus attempted to refute it by pointing out that consulting the doctor would be as much fated as recovering. He seems to have introduced the idea that in cases like that at issue two events can be co-fated, so that one cannot occur without the other. [27]

Logical fatalism and the argument from bivalence

The main argument for logical fatalism goes back to antiquity. This is an argument that depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather is based on presumed logical truths. There are numerous versions of this argument, including those by Aristotle [28] and Richard Taylor. [5] These arguments have been objected to and elaborated on with some effect. [29]

The key idea of logical fatalism is that there is a body of true propositions (statements) about what is going to happen, and these are true regardless of when they are made. So, for example, if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then there cannot fail to be a sea battle tomorrow, since otherwise it would not be true today that such a battle will take place tomorrow.

The argument relies on applying principle of bivalence to future contingents, regarding that a statement about the future is either true or false. However, this does not apply if the future is considered to be undetermined meaning that the truth value of a statement can only be determined once the event occurs. [30]

Criticism

Semantic equivocation

One criticism comes from the novelist David Foster Wallace, who in a 1985 paper "Richard Taylor's Fatalism and the Semantics of Physical Modality" suggests that Taylor reached his conclusion of fatalism only because his argument involved two different and inconsistent notions of impossibility. [31] Wallace did not reject fatalism per se, as he wrote in his closing passage, "if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate." [31] Willem deVries and Jay Garfield, both of whom were advisers on Wallace's thesis, expressed regret that Wallace never published his argument. [31] In 2010, the thesis was, however, published posthumously as Time, Fate, and Language: An Essay on Free Will.

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ For further informations, see the article on predeterminism.

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Karma</span> Intent and actions of an individual influence the future of that individual

Karma is an ancient Indian concept that refers to an action, work, or deed, and its effect or consequences. In Indian religions, the term more specifically refers to a principle of cause and effect, often descriptively called the principle of karma, wherein individuals' intent and actions (cause) influence their future (effect): Good intent and good deeds contribute to good karma and happier rebirths, while bad intent and bad deeds contribute to bad karma and worse rebirths. In some scriptures, however, there is no link between rebirth and karma. Karma is often misunderstood as fate, destiny, or predetermination.

Free will is the capacity or ability to choose between different possible courses of action.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Determinism</span> Philosophical view that events are determined by prior events

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. Like eternalism, determinism focuses on particular events rather than the future as a concept. The opposite of determinism is indeterminism, or the view that events are not deterministically caused but rather occur due to chance. Determinism is often contrasted with free will, although some philosophers claim that the two are compatible.

Eastern philosophy includes the various philosophies that originated in East and South Asia, including Chinese philosophy, Japanese philosophy, Korean philosophy, and Vietnamese philosophy; which are dominant in East Asia, and Indian philosophy, which are dominant in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Tibet, and Mongolia.

<i>Saṃsāra</i> Cyclicality of all life, matter, existence

Saṃsāra is a Sanskrit word that means "wandering" as well as "world," wherein the term connotes "cyclic change" or, less formally, "running around in circles." Saṃsāra is referred to with terms or phrases such as transmigration/reincarnation, karmic cycle, or Punarjanman, and "cycle of aimless drifting, wandering or mundane existence". When related to the theory of karma it is the cycle of death and rebirth.

The argument from free will, also called the paradox of free will or theological fatalism, contends that omniscience and free will are incompatible and that any conception of God that incorporates both properties is therefore inconceivable. See the various controversies over claims of God's omniscience, in particular the critical notion of foreknowledge. These arguments are deeply concerned with the implications of predestination.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Indian philosophy</span>

Indian philosophy consists of philosophical traditions of the Indian subcontinent. The philosophies are often called darśana meaning, "to see" or "looking at." Ānvīkṣikī means “critical inquiry” or “investigation." Unlike darśana, ānvīkṣikī was used to refer to Indian philosophies by classical Indian philosophers, such as Chanakya in the Arthaśāstra.

Destiny, sometimes also called fate, is a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual.

Predeterminism is the philosophy that all events of history, past, present and future, have been already decided or are already known, including human actions.

<i>Ājīvika</i> One of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy

Ajivika is one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy. Believed to have been founded in the 5th century BCE by Makkhali Gosāla, it was a Śramaṇa movement and a major rival of Vedic religion, early Buddhism, and Jainism. Ājīvikas were organized renunciates who formed discrete communities. The precise identity of the Ājīvikas is not well known, and it is even unclear if they were a divergent sect of the Buddhists or the Jains.

The lazy argument or idle argument is an attempt to undermine the philosophical doctrine of fatalism by demonstrating that, if everything that happens is determined by fate, it is futile to take any kind of action. Its basic form is that of a complex constructive dilemma.

<i>Śramaṇa</i> Monastic orders

A śramaṇa is a person "who labours, toils, or exerts themselves for some higher or religious purpose" or "seeker, one who performs acts of austerity, ascetic". The śramaṇa tradition includes primarily Jainism, Buddhism, and others such as the Ājīvika.

Theological determinism is a form of predeterminism which states that all events that happen are pre-ordained, and/or predestined to happen, by one or more divine beings, or that they are destined to occur given the divine beings' omniscience. Theological determinism exists in a number of religions, including Jainism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is also supported by proponents of Classical pantheism such as the Stoics and by philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Saṃsāra (Buddhism)</span> Cycle of repeated birth, mundane existence and dying again

Saṃsāra in Buddhism and Hinduism is the beginningless cycle of repeated birth, mundane existence and dying again. Samsara is considered to be dukkha, suffering, and in general unsatisfactory and painful, perpetuated by desire and avidya (ignorance), and the resulting karma and sensuousness.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Problem of future contingents</span> Statements involving superpositions of truth

Future contingent propositions are statements about states of affairs in the future that are contingent: neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Makkhali Gosala</span> Ascetic teacher of ancient India

Makkhali Gosala or Manthaliputra Goshalak was an ascetic ajivika teacher of ancient India. He was a contemporary of Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, and of Mahavira, the last and 24th Tirthankara of Jainism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Religion in ancient Tamilakam</span> Religious beliefs in ancient Tamilakam

Hinduism, in particular Vaishnavism and Shaivism, was the predominant religion in ancient Tamilakam. The Sangam period in Tamilakam was characterized by the coexistence of many denominations and religions: Vaishnavism, Shaivism, Ajivika and later joined by Buddhism and Jainism alongside the folk religion of the Tamil people. The monarchs of the time practiced religious tolerance and openly encouraged religious discussions and invited teachers of every sect to the public halls to preach their doctrines. Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism were the three major religions that prevailed in the Tamil region predating the Common Era, as early as the Sangam period.

Free will in antiquity is a philosophical and theological concept. Free will in antiquity was not discussed in the same terms as used in the modern free will debates, but historians of the problem have speculated who exactly was first to take positions as determinist, libertarian, and compatibilist in antiquity. There is wide agreement that these views were essentially fully formed over 2000 years ago. Candidates for the first thinkers to form these views, as well as the idea of a non-physical "agent-causal" libertarianism, include Democritus, Aristotle, Epicurus, Chrysippus, and Carneades.

Jainism has been engaged in debates with the other philosophical and religious traditions, in which its theories and its followers' practices have been questioned and challenged.

<i>Das Problem der Willensfreiheit in der neuesten deutschen Philosophie</i> 1902 book by Leopold Müffelmann

Das Problem der Willensfreiheit in der neuesten deutschen Philosophie is a book written by Dr. Leopold Müffelmann and published in Leipzig in 1902. It is the dissertation of Dr. Leopold Müffelmann who was a jurist and chief executive of the lodge of the Freemason, and summarizes historical viewpoints on the topic of free will with a focus on the common opinion within German philosophy in the early 20th century. The book considers the general ideas towards the problem, namely indeterminism, fatalism and determinism. Müffelmann treats the subject of free will rather objectively, however, it becomes apparent that his view towards the problem of free will is deterministic. In the dissertation Müffelmann argues, that the problem of free will is actually not as important as often claimed by philosophers and that ethical life and thought should not be made dependent upon it.

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