Belief

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Belief is the attitude that something is the case or true. [1] In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to personal attitudes associated with true or false ideas and concepts. However, "belief" does not require active introspection and circumspection. For example, few ponder whether the sun will rise, just assume it will. Since "belief" is an important aspect of mundane life, according to Eric Schwitzgebel in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a related question asks: "how a physical organism can have beliefs?" [2]

Contents

In the context of Ancient Greek thought, two related concepts were identified regarding the concept of belief: pistis and doxa . Simplified, pistis refers to "trust" and "confidence", while doxa refers to "opinion" and "acceptance". The English word "orthodoxy" derives from doxa.

Psychology

Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought. Philosophers have tended to be more abstract in their analysis, and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis.

The concept of belief presumes a subject (the believer) and an object of belief (the proposition). So, like other propositional attitudes, belief implies the existence of mental states and intentionality, both of which are hotly debated topics in the philosophy of mind, whose foundations and relation to brain states are still controversial.

Beliefs are sometimes divided into core beliefs (that are actively thought about) and dispositional beliefs (that may be ascribed to someone who has not thought about the issue). For example, if asked "do you believe tigers wear pink pajamas?" a person might answer that they do not, despite the fact they may never have thought about this situation before. [3]

This has important implications for understanding the neuropsychology and neuroscience of belief. If the concept of belief is incoherent, then any attempt to find the underlying neural processes that support it will fail.

Philosopher Lynne Rudder Baker has outlined four main contemporary approaches to belief in her controversial book Saving Belief: [4]

Strategic approaches make a distinction between rules, norms and beliefs as follows:

Emotion and beliefs

Research has indicated that emotion and cognition act in conjunction to produce beliefs, and more specifically emotion plays a vital role in the formation and maintenance of beliefs. [6] [7] [8]

Formation

We are influenced by many factors that ripple through our minds as our beliefs form, evolve, and may eventually change Ripples of influence.jpg
We are influenced by many factors that ripple through our minds as our beliefs form, evolve, and may eventually change

Psychologists study belief formation and the relationship between beliefs and actions. Three models of belief formation and change have been proposed:

Conditional inference process

When people are asked to estimate the likelihood that a statement is true, they search their memory for information that has implications for the validity of this statement. Once this information has been identified, they estimate the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were true, and the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were false. If their estimates for these two probabilities differ, people average them, weighting each by the likelihood that the information is true and false. Thus, information bears directly on beliefs of another, related statement. [9]

Linear models

Unlike the previous model, this one takes into consideration the possibility of multiple factors influencing belief formation. Using regression procedures, this model predicts belief formation on the basis of several different pieces of information, with weights assigned to each piece on the basis of their relative importance. [9]

Information processing models and change

These models address the fact that the responses people have to belief-relevant information is unlikely to be predicted from the objective basis of the information that they can recall at the time their beliefs are reported. Instead, these responses reflect the number and meaning of the thoughts that people have about the message at the time that they encounter it. [9]

Some influences on people's belief formation include:

However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In Anna Rowley's book, Leadership Therapy, she states "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This means that peoples' beliefs should evolve as they gain new experiences. [16]

Modification of beliefs

An extensive amount of scientific research and philosophical discussion exists around the modification of beliefs, which is commonly referred to as belief revision. Generally speaking, the process of belief revision entails the believer weighing the set of truths and/or evidence, and the dominance of a set of truths or evidence on an alternative to a held belief can lead to revision. One process of belief revision is Bayesian updating and is often referenced for its mathematical basis and conceptual simplicity. However, such a process may not be representative for individuals whose beliefs are not easily characterized as probabilistic.

There are several techniques for individuals or groups to change the beliefs of others; these methods generally fall under the umbrella of persuasion. Persuasion can take on more specific forms such as consciousness raising when considered in an activist or political context. Belief modification may also occur as a result of the experience of outcomes. Because goals are based, in part on beliefs, the success or failure at a particular goal may contribute to modification of beliefs that supported the original goal.

Whether or not belief modification actually occurs is dependent not only on the extent of truths or evidence for the alternative belief, but also characteristics outside the specific truths or evidence. This includes, but is not limited to: the source characteristics of the message, such as credibility; social pressures; the anticipated consequences of a modification; or the ability of the individual or group to act on the modification. Therefore, individuals seeking to achieve belief modification in themselves or others need to consider all possible forms of resistance to belief revision.

Prediction

Different psychological models have tried to predict people's beliefs and some of them try to estimate the exact probabilities of beliefs. For example, Robert Wyer developed a model of subjective probabilities. [17] [18] When people rate the likelihood of a certain statement (e.g., "It will rain tomorrow"), this rating can be seen as a subjective probability value. The subjective probability model posits that these subjective probabilities follow the same rules as objective probabilities. For example, the law of total probability might be applied to predict a subjective probability value. Wyer found that this model produces relatively accurate predictions for probabilities of single events and for changes in these probabilities, but that the probabilities of several beliefs linked by "and" or "or" do not follow the model as well. [17] [18]

Knowledge and epistemology

A Venn/Euler diagram which grants that truth and well-justified belief may be distinguished and that their intersection is knowledge Classical definition of Kno.svg
A Venn/Euler diagram which grants that truth and well-justified belief may be distinguished and that their intersection is knowledge

Epistemology is concerned with delineating the boundary between justified belief and opinion, [19] and involved generally with a theoretical philosophical study of knowledge. The primary problem in epistemology is to understand exactly what is needed in order for us to have knowledge. In a notion derived from Plato's dialogue Theaetetus , where the epistemology of Socrates (Platon) most clearly departs from that of the sophists, who at the time of Plato seem to have defined knowledge as what is here expressed as "justified true belief". The tendency to translate from belief (here: doxa – common opinion) to knowledge (here: episteme), which Plato (e.g. Socrates of the dialogue) utterly dismisses, results from failing to distinguish a dispositive belief (gr. 'doxa', not 'pistis') from knowledge (episteme) when the opinion is regarded true (here: orthé), in terms of right, and juristically so (according to the premises of the dialogue), which was the task of the rhetors to prove. Plato dismisses this possibility of an affirmative relation between belief (i.e. opinion) and knowledge even when the one who opines grounds his belief on the rule, and is able to add justification (gr. logos: reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) to it. [20]

Plato has been credited for the "justified true belief" theory of knowledge, even though Plato in the Theaetetus (dialogue) elegantly dismisses it, and even posits this argument of Socrates as a cause for his death penalty. Among American epistemologists, Gettier (1963) [21] and Goldman (1967), [22] have questioned the "justified true belief" definition, and challenged the "sophists" of their time.

Justified true belief

Justified true belief is a definition of knowledge that gained approval during the Enlightenment, "justified" standing in contrast to "revealed". There have been attempts to trace it back to Plato and his dialogues.[ clarification needed ] [23] The concept of justified true belief states that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but also have justification for doing so. In more formal terms, an agent knows that a proposition is true if and only if:

This theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery of Gettier problems, situations in which the above conditions were seemingly met but where many philosophers disagree that anything is known. [24] Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false. [25] Bernecker and Dretske (2000) argue that "no epistemologist since Gettier has seriously and successfully defended the traditional view." [26] :3 On the other hand, Paul Boghossian argues that the justified true belief account is the "standard, widely accepted" definition of knowledge. [27]

Epistemology versus religion

Historically belief-in belonged in the realm of religious thought, belief-that instead belonged to epistemological considerations. [28]

Belief-in

To "believe in" someone or something is a distinct concept from "believing-that." There are at least these types of belief-in: [29]

  • Commendatory / faith – we may make an expression of 'faith' in respect of some performance by an agent X, when without prejudice to the truth value of the factual outcome or even confidence in X otherwise, we expect that specific performance. In particular self-confidence or faith in one's self is this kind of belief.
  • Existential claim – to claim belief in the existence of an entity or phenomenon in a general way with the implied need to justify its claim of existence. It is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. "He believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe in Santa Claus" or "I believe in a deity" are typical examples. [30] The linguistic form is distinct from the assertion of the truth of a proposition since verification is either considered impossible or irrelevant or a counterfactual situation is assumed.

Belief-that

Economic belief

Economic beliefs are beliefs which are reasonably and necessarily contrary to the tenet of rational choice or instrumental rationality. [31]

Studies of the Austrian tradition of the economic thought, in the context of analysis of the influence and subsequent degree of change resulting from existing economic knowledge and belief, has contributed the most to the subsequent holistic collective analysis. [32]

Delusion

Insofar as the truth of belief is expressed in sentential and propositional form we are using the sense of belief-that rather than belief-in. Delusion arises when the truth value of the form is clearly nil. [33] [34] [35]

Delusions are defined as beliefs in psychiatric diagnostic criteria [36] (for example in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ). Psychiatrist and historian G.E. Berrios has challenged the view that delusions are genuine beliefs and instead labels them as "empty speech acts," where affected persons are motivated to express false or bizarre belief statements due to an underlying psychological disturbance. However, the majority of mental health professionals and researchers treat delusions as if they were genuine beliefs.


Science

In scientific medical writing, the verb 'believe' can mean "actively accept as true" on the basis of external evidence (for example, a statement of the type, "we believe that x is a better treatment than y in this disease" can imply that "after examining the available evidence, we have concluded that x is..."). [37]

Religion

Religion collage updated.jpg

Religious belief refers to attitudes towards mythological, supernatural, or spiritual aspects of a religion. [38] Religious belief is distinct from religious practice and from religious behaviours – with some believers not practicing religion and some practitioners not believing religion. Religious beliefs, deriving from ideas that are exclusive to religion,[ citation needed ] often relate to the existence, characteristics and worship of a deity or deities, to the idea of divine intervention in the universe and in human life, or to the deontological explanations for the values and practices centered on the teachings of a spiritual leader or community. In contrast to other belief systems, religious beliefs are usually codified. [39]

Forms

A popular view holds that different religions each have identifiable and exclusive sets of beliefs or creeds, but surveys of religious belief have often found that the official doctrine and descriptions of the beliefs offered by religious authorities do not always agree with the privately held beliefs of those who identify as members of a particular religion. [40] For a broad classification of the kinds of religious belief, see below.

Fundamentalism

First self-applied as a term to the conservative doctrine outlined by anti-modernist Protestants in the United States, [41] "fundamentalism" in religious terms denotes strict adherence to an interpretation of scriptures that are generally associated with theologically conservative positions or traditional understandings of the text and are distrustful of innovative readings, new revelation, or alternative interpretations.[ citation needed ] Religious fundamentalism has been identified[ by whom? ] in the media as being associated with fanatical or zealous political movements around the world that have used a strict adherence to a particular religious doctrine as a means to establish political identity and to enforce societal norms.[ citation needed ]

Orthodoxy

First used in the context of Early Christianity, the term "orthodoxy" relates to religious belief that closely follows the edicts, apologies, and hermeneutics of a prevailing religious authority. In the case of Early Christianity, this authority was the communion of bishops, and is often referred to by the term "Magisterium". The term orthodox was applied[ when? ] almost as an epithet to a group of Jewish believers who held to pre-Enlightenment understanding of Judaism – now known as Orthodox Judaism. The Eastern Orthodox Church of Christianity and the Catholic Church each consider themselves to be the true heir to Early Christian belief and practice. The antonym of "orthodox" is "heterodox", and those adhering to orthodoxy often accuse the heterodox of apostasy, schism, or heresy.

Modernism/reform

The Renaissance and later the Enlightenment in Europe exhibited varying degrees of religious tolerance and intolerance towards new and old religious ideas. The philosophes took particular exception to many of the more fantastical claims of religions and directly challenged religious authority and the prevailing beliefs associated with the established churches. In response to the liberalizing political and social movements, some religious groups attempted to integrate Enlightenment ideals of rationality, equality, and individual liberty into their belief systems, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Reform Judaism and Liberal Christianity offer two examples of such religious associations.

Approaches to others

Adherents of particular religions deal with the differing doctrines and practices espoused by other religions or by other religious denominations in a variety of ways.

Exclusivism

People with exclusivist beliefs typically explain other beliefs either as in error, or as corruptions or counterfeits of the true faith. This approach is a fairly consistent feature among smaller new religious movements that often rely on doctrine that claims a unique revelation by the founders or leaders, and considers it a matter of faith that the "correct" religion has a monopoly on truth. All three major Abrahamic monotheistic religions have passages in their holy scriptures that attest to the primacy of the scriptural testimony, and indeed monotheism itself is often[ quantify ] vouched[ by whom? ] as an innovation characterized specifically by its explicit rejection of earlier polytheistic faiths.

Some exclusivist faiths incorporate a specific element of proselytization. This is a strongly-held belief in the Christian tradition which follows the doctrine of the Great Commission, and is less emphasized by the Islamic faith where the Quranic edict "There shall be no compulsion in religion" (2:256) is often quoted as a justification for toleration of alternative beliefs. The Jewish tradition does not actively seek out converts.

Exclusivism correlates with conservative, fundamentalist, and orthodox approaches of many religions, while pluralistic and syncretist approaches either explicitly downplay or reject the exclusivist tendencies within a religion.[ citation needed ]

Inclusivism

People with inclusivist beliefs recognize some truth in all faith systems, highlighting agreements and minimizing differences. This attitude is sometimes associated[ by whom? ] with Interfaith dialogue or with the Christian Ecumenical movement, though in principle such attempts at pluralism are not necessarily inclusivist and many actors in such interactions (for example, the Roman Catholic Church) still hold to exclusivist dogma while participating in inter-religious organizations.

Explicitly inclusivist religions include many that are associated with the New Age movement, as well as modern reinterpretations of Hinduism and Buddhism. The Bahá'í Faith considers it doctrine that there is truth in all faith-systems.

Pluralism

People with pluralist beliefs make no distinction between faith systems, viewing each one as valid within a particular culture.

Syncretism

People with syncretic views blend the views of a variety of different religions or traditional beliefs into a unique fusion which suits their particular experiences and contexts (see eclecticism). Unitarian Universalism exemplifies a syncretic faith.

Adherence

Typical reasons for adherence to religion include the following:

Psychologist James Alcock also summarizes a number of apparent benefits which reinforce religious belief. These include prayer appearing to account for successful resolution of problems, "a bulwark against existential anxiety and fear of annihilation," an increased sense of control, companionship with one's deity, a source of self-significance, and group identity. [47]

Apostasy

Typical reasons for rejection of religion include:

Collective belief

A world view comprises a set of mutually supportive beliefs. The beliefs of any such system can be religious, philosophical, political, ideological, or a combination of these. Philosopher Jonathan Glover says that beliefs are always part of a belief system, and that tenanted belief systems are difficult for the tenants to completely revise or reject. [52] [53] [ need quotation to verify ] This insight has relevance for inquisitors, missionaries, agitprop groups and thought-police.

Perspectives

A collective belief is referred to when people speak of what "we" believe when this is not simply elliptical for what "we all" believe. [54]

Sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote of collective beliefs and proposed that they, like all "social facts", "inhered in" social groups as opposed to individual persons. Jonathan Dancy states that "Durkheim's discussion of collective belief, though suggestive, is relatively obscure". [55]

Philosopher Margaret Gilbert (1942- ) has offered a related account in terms of the joint commitment of a number of persons as a body to accept a certain belief. According to this account, individuals who together collectively believe something need not personally believe it individually. Gilbert's work on the topic has stimulated a developing literature among philosophers.[ citation needed ] One question that has arisen is whether and how philosophical accounts of belief in general need to be sensitive to the possibility of collective belief.

Philosopher Jonathan Glover warns that belief systems are like whole boats in the water; it is extremely difficult to alter them all at once (for example, it may be too stressful, or people may maintain their biases without realizing it). Snipa.JPG
Philosopher Jonathan Glover warns that belief systems are like whole boats in the water; it is extremely difficult to alter them all at once (for example, it may be too stressful, or people may maintain their biases without realizing it).

Jonathan Glover (1941- ) believes that he and other philosophers ought to play some role in starting dialogues between people with deeply-held, opposing beliefs, especially if there is risk of violence. Glover also believes that philosophy can offer insights about beliefs that would be relevant to such dialogue.

Glover suggests that beliefs have to be considered holistically, and that no belief exists in isolation in the mind of the believer. Each belief always implicates and relates to other beliefs. [52] Glover provides the example of a patient with an illness who returns to a doctor, but the doctor says that the prescribed medicine is not working. At that point, the patient has a great deal of flexibility in choosing what beliefs to keep or reject: the patient could believe that the doctor is incompetent, that the doctor's assistants made a mistake, that the patient's own body is unique in some unexpected way, that Western medicine is ineffective, or even that Western science is entirely unable to discover truths about ailments. [52]

Glover maintains that any person can continue to hold any belief if they would really like to [52] (for example, with help from ad hoc hypotheses). One belief can be held fixed, and other beliefs will be altered around it. Glover warns that some beliefs may not be entirely explicitly believed (for example, some people may not realize they have racist belief-systems adopted from their environment as a child). Glover believes that people tend to first realize that beliefs can change, and may be contingent on their upbringing, around age 12 or 15. [52]

Glover emphasizes that beliefs are difficult to change. He says that one may try to rebuild one's beliefs on more secure foundations (axioms), like building a new house, but warns that this may not be possible. Glover offers the example of René Descartes, saying: "[Descartes] starts off with the characteristic beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman; he then junks the lot, he rebuilds the system, and somehow it looks a lot like the beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman." To Glover, belief systems are not like houses but are instead like boats. As Glover puts it: "Maybe the whole thing needs rebuilding, but inevitably at any point you have to keep enough of it intact to keep floating." [52]

Glover's final message is that if people talk about their beliefs, they may find more deep, relevant, philosophical ways in which they disagree (e.g., less obvious beliefs, or more-deeply-held beliefs). Glover thinks that people often manage to find agreements and consensus through philosophy. He says that at the very least, if people do not convert each other, they will hold their own beliefs more openmindedly and will be less likely to go to war over conflicting beliefs. [52] [56]

The British philosopher Stephen Law (1960-) has described some belief systems (including belief in homeopathy, psychic powers, and alien abduction) as "claptrap" and says that such belief-systems can "draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap [...] if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again". [57]

See also

Notes

  1. Primmer, Justin (2018), "Belief", in Primmer, Justin (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, retrieved 19 September 2008
  2. Compare: – "The 'mind-body problem', for example, so central to philosophy of mind, is in part the question of whether and how a purely physical organism can have beliefs." Retrieved 01 July 2016.
  3. Bell, V.; Halligan, P.W.; Ellis, H.D. (2006). "A Cognitive Neuroscience of Belief". In Halligan, Peter W.; Aylward, Mansel (eds.). The Power of Belief: Psychological Influence on Illness, Disability, and Medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-853010-7.
  4. Baker, Lynne Rudder (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-0-691-07320-0.
  5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army (2012). Information Operations. Joint Publication 3–13. Joint Doctrine Support Division, Suffolk, VA. p. 22.
  6. Frijda, Nico H (2010). Emotions and Beliefs. Cambridge University Press. ISBN   9780511659904.
  7. Mercer, Jonathan (January 2010). "Emotional Beliefs". International Organization. 65: 1–31 via Cambridge University Press.
  8. Harlé, Katia M.; Shenoy, Pradeep; Paulus, Martin P. (19 September 2013). "The influence of emotions on cognitive control: feelings and beliefs—where do they meet?". Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. 7. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00508. ISSN   1662-5161. PMC   3776943 . PMID   24065901.
  9. 1 2 3 Wyer, R.S., & Albarracin, D. (2005). Belief formation, organization, and change: Cognitive and motivational influences. In D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, & M.P. Zanna, The Handbook of Attitudes (273–322). New York: Psychology Press.
  10. Gelman, Andrew; Park, David; Shor, Boris; Bafumi, Joseph; Cortina, Jeronimo (2008). Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do. Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-0-691-13927-2.
  11. Argyle, Michael (1997). The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience. London: Routledge. p. 25. ISBN   978-0-415-12330-3. Religion, in most cultures, is ascribed, not chosen.
  12. Hoffer, Eric (2002). The True Believer. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. ISBN   978-0-06-050591-2.
  13. Kilbourne, Jane; Pipher, Mary (2000). Can't Buy My Love: How Advertising Changes the Way We Think and Feel. Free Press. ISBN   978-0-684-86600-0.
  14. see Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004
  15. Rothschild, Babette (2000). The Body Remembers: The Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN   978-0-393-70327-6.
  16. Rowley, Anna (2007). Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p.  69. ISBN   978-1-4039-8403-6.
  17. 1 2 Wyer, R.S. (1970). "Quantitative prediction of belief and opinion change: A further test of a subjective probability model". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 16 (4): 559–570. doi:10.1037/h0030064.
  18. 1 2 Wyer, R.S.; Goldberg, L. (1970). "A probabilistic analysis of the relationships among beliefs and attitudes". Psychological Review. 77 (2): 100–120. doi:10.1037/h0028769.
  19. Oxford Dictionaries – definition published by OUP [Retrieved 2015-08-09]
  20. http://www.friesian.com/knowledg.htm – 2007, 2008 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D.
  21. Gettier, E.L. (1963). "Is justified true belief knowledge?" (PDF). Analysis . 23 (6): 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121. JSTOR   3326922.
  22. Goldman, A.I. (1967). "A causal theory of knowing". The Journal of Philosophy . 64 (12): 357–372. doi:10.2307/2024268. JSTOR   2024268.
  23. The received view holds it that Plato's theory presents knowledge as remembering eternal truths and justification reawakens memory, see Fine, G. (2003). "Introduction". Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 5–7. ISBN   978-0-19-924558-1.
  24. Chisholm, Roderick (1982). "Knowledge as Justified True Belief". The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN   978-0-8166-1103-4.
  25. Nozick, Robert. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN   0674664485. OCLC   7283862.
  26. Bernecker, Sven; Dretske, Fred (2000). Knowledge. Readings in contemporary epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 3. ISBN   978-0-19-875261-5.
  27. Paul Boghossian (2007), Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, ISBN   978-0-19-923041-9 , Chapter 2, p. 15.
  28. Price, H.H. (1965). "Belief 'In' and Belief 'That'". Religious Studies. 1 (1): 5–27. doi:10.1017/S0034412500002304.
  29. MacIntosh, J.J. (1994). "Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams". Religious Studies. 30 (4): 487–503. doi:10.1017/S0034412500023131.
  30. Macintosh, Jack. "Belief-in". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. p. 86. ISBN   978-0-19-926479-7.
  31. Peter Taylor-Gooby – Economic Beliefs and Social Policy Behaviour Economic and Social Research Council (Economic Beliefs and behaviour research programme) [Retrieved 2015-08-09]
  32. R. Arena & A. Festré (1 January 2006). Knowledge, Beliefs and Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing 2006, 288 pages. ISBN   978-1-84720-153-9 . Retrieved 9 August 2015.
  33. L. Bortolotti (2010). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. OUP Oxford 2010, 299 pages, International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry. ISBN   978-0-19-920616-2.
  34. Tarski's Truth Definitions, LOTH Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  35. Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences" Alfred Tarski Dover 1995/41, Ch. I, § 2 Expressions containing variables—sentential and designatory functions and Ch. II On the Sentential Calculus in its entirety
  36. Delusions in the DSM 5 A blog by Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett
  37. Huth, Edward J (1987). Medical Style & Format: An International Manual for Authors, Editors, and Publishers. ISI Press. p.  264. ISBN   978-0-89495-063-6.
  38. Unknown. "What does religious belief mean?". www.definitions.net. Retrieved 24 February 2019.
  39. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2007). Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. University of California Press. p. 53. ISBN   978-0-520-25181-6.
  40. Braithwaite, R.B. (1975). An empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief. Norwood Editions (Norwood, Pa.). ISBN   978-0-88305-955-5.
  41. "The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth". 27 November 2012. Archived from the original on 3 December 2012. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
  42. Compare: "Roy Moore: 'We Have No Morality Without an Acknowledgment of God'". Christianity Today . 7 March 2005. Retrieved 19 May 2006.
  43. Miller, David Ian (15 February 2005). "Finding My Religion: Steve Georgiou on his faith and mentor, minimalist poet Robert Lax". SFGate. Retrieved 19 May 2006.
  44. Repa, J. Theodore (18 October 1998). "Building Community: The Marriage of Religion and Education". Archived from the original on 7 September 2006. Retrieved 19 May 2006.
  45. Note for example the concept of a cultural Christian.
  46. Larson, David B.; Susan S. Larson; Harold G. Koenig (October 2000). "Research Findings on Religious Commitment and Mental Health". Psychiatric Times. 17 (10). Retrieved 19 May 2006.
  47. Alcock, James (2018). "The God Engine". Skeptical Inquirer . 42 (5): 32–38.
  48. For example: Russell, Bertrand (1927). "Why I am Not a Christian". Archived from the original on 19 November 2006. Retrieved 19 May 2006.
  49. For example, some Muslims believe that women are inferior to men. Some Christians share this belief. At the time of the American Civil War of 1861–1865, many Southerners used passages from the Bible to justify race-based slavery. Certain campaigners have used the Christian religion as a reason to persecute and to deny the rights of homosexuals, on the basis that the Christian biblical God disapproves of homosexuality, and by implication of homosexuals. Compare http://www.godhatesfags.com
  50. Beauchamp, Philip (pseudonym of Jeremy Bentham) Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind, 1822, R. Carlile, London, at page 76: "Of all human antipathies, that which the believer in a God bears to the unbeliever is the fullest, the most unqualified, and the most universal"
  51. Waldau, Paul (2001). The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (American Academy of Religion Books). Oxford University Press, US. ISBN   978-0-19-514571-7.
  52. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 "Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011
  53. Elizabeth A. Minton, Lynn R. Khale (2014). Belief Systems, Religion, and Behavioral Economics. New York: Business Expert Press LLC. ISBN   978-1-60649-704-3.
  54. Dancy, Jonathan (2014). A Companion to Epistemology. Just the Facts101 (2 ed.). Content Technologies Inc. (published 2016). ISBN   9781478400028 . Retrieved 30 April 2019. A collective belief is referred to when people speak of what 'we' believe when this is not simply elliptical for what 'we all' believe.
  55. Dancy, Jonathan (2014). A Companion to Epistemology. Just the Facts101 (2 ed.). Content Technologies Inc. (published 2016). ISBN   9781478400028 . Retrieved 30 April 2019. Sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote of collective beliefs and proposed that they, like all 'social facts', 'inhered in' social groups as opposed to individual persons. Durkheim's discussion of collective belief, though suggestive, is relatively obscure.
  56. 'Philosophy, Beliefs, and Conflict' , JonathanGlover.co.uk
  57. New Scientist (magazine), 11 June 2011 A field guide to bullshit | New Scientist - "Intellectual black holes are belief systems that draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap. Belief in homeopathy, psychic powers, alien abductions – these are examples of intellectual black holes. As you approach them, you need to be on your guard because if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again."

Further reading

Related Research Articles

Epistemology Branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge.

Faith and rationality are two ideologies that exist in varying degrees of conflict or compatibility. Rationality is based on reason or facts. Faith is belief in inspiration, revelation, or authority. The word faith sometimes refers to a belief that is held with lack of reason or evidence, a belief that is held in spite of or against reason or evidence, or it can refer to belief based upon a degree of evidential warrant.

Faith, derived from Latin fides and Old French feid, is confidence or trust in a person, thing, or concept. In the context of religion, one can define faith as confidence or trust in a particular system of religious belief. Religious people often think of faith as confidence based on a perceived degree of warrant, while others who are more skeptical of religion tend to think of faith as simply belief without evidence.

Foundationalism concerns philosophical theories of knowledge resting upon justified belief, or some secure foundation of certainty such as a conclusion inferred from a basis of sound premises. The main rival of the foundationalist theory of justification is the coherence theory of justification, whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be established by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that each small region was solved correctly.

Philosophy of religion is "the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions". Philosophical discussions on such topics date from ancient times, and appear in the earliest known texts concerning philosophy. The field is related to many other branches of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

Skepticism or scepticism is generally a questioning attitude or doubt towards one or more items of putative knowledge or belief or dogma. It is often directed at domains, such as the supernatural, morality, theism, or knowledge. Formally, skepticism as a topic occurs in the context of philosophy, particularly epistemology, although it can be applied to any topic such as politics, religion, and pseudoscience.

The theory of justification is a part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of propositions and beliefs. Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of justification, warrant, rationality, and probability. Loosely speaking, justification is the reason that someone (properly) holds a belief.

The regress argument is the argument that any proposition requires a justification; However, any justification itself requires support; This means that any proposition whatsoever can be endlessly (infinitely) questioned. It is a problem in epistemology and in any general situation where a statement has to be justified.

Reason Capacity for consciously making sense of things

Reason is the capacity of consciously making sense of things, applying logic, and adapting or justifying practices, institutions, and beliefs based on new or existing information. It is closely associated with such characteristically human activities as philosophy, science, language, mathematics, and art, and is normally considered to be a distinguishing ability possessed by humans. Reason, or an aspect of it, is sometimes referred to as rationality.

Alvin Plantinga American Christian philosopher

Alvin Carl Plantinga is an American analytic philosopher who works primarily in the fields of philosophy of religion, epistemology, and logic.

Edmund L. Gettier III is an American philosopher and Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He is best known for his short 1963 article "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", which has generated an extensive philosophical literature trying to respond to what became known as the Gettier problem.

The Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning our understanding of descriptive knowledge. Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier, Gettier-type counterexamples challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge. The JTB account holds that knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief; if all three conditions are met of a given claim, then we have knowledge of that claim. In his 1963 three-page paper titled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Gettier attempts to illustrate by means of two counterexamples that there are cases where individuals can have a justified, true belief regarding a claim but still fail to know it because the reasons for the belief, while justified, turn out to be false. Thus, Gettier claims to have shown that the JTB account is inadequate; that it does not account for all of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.

Fideism is an epistemological theory which maintains that faith is independent of reason, or that reason and faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular truths. The word fideism comes from fides, the Latin word for faith, and literally means "faith-ism". Philosophers have identified a number of different forms of fideism.

Evidentialism is a thesis in epistemology which states that one is justified to believe something if and only if that person has evidence which supports his or her belief. Evidentialism is therefore a thesis about which beliefs are justified and which are not.

The existence of God is a subject of debate in the philosophy of religion and popular culture.

Reformed epistemology

In the philosophy of religion, Reformed epistemology is a school of philosophical thought concerning the nature of knowledge (epistemology) as it applies to religious beliefs. The central proposition of Reformed epistemology is that beliefs can be justified by more than evidence alone, contrary to the positions of evidentialism, which argues that while belief other than through evidence may be beneficial, it violates some epistemic duty. Central to Reformed epistemology is the proposition that belief in God may be "properly basic" and not need to be inferred from other truths to be rationally warranted. William Lane Craig describes Reformed epistemology as "One of the most significant developments in contemporary Religious Epistemology ... which directly assaults the evidentialist construal of rationality."

Agnostic theism, agnostotheism or agnostitheism is the philosophical view that encompasses both theism and agnosticism. An agnostic theist believes in the existence of a god or gods, but regards the basis of this proposition as unknown or inherently unknowable. The agnostic theist may also or alternatively be agnostic regarding the properties of the god or gods that they believe in.

Intersubjective verifiability is the capacity of a concept to be readily and accurately communicated between different individuals ("intersubjectively"), and to be reproduced under varying circumstances for the purposes of verification. It is a core principle of empirical, scientific investigation.

Russells teapot Analogy coined by Bertrand Russell

Russell's teapot is an analogy, formulated by the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), to illustrate that the philosophic burden of proof lies upon a person making unfalsifiable claims, rather than shifting the burden of disproof to others.

The argument from religious experience is an argument for the existence of God. It holds that the best explanation for religious experiences is that they constitute genuine experience or perception of a divine reality. Various reasons have been offered for and against accepting this contention.