Self-deception

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Self-deception is a process of denying or rationalizing away the relevance, significance, or importance of opposing evidence and logical argument. Self-deception involves convincing oneself of a truth (or lack of truth) so that one does not reveal any self-knowledge of the deception.

Contents

Brief history

While Freudian analysis of the conscious and the unconscious minds dominated the field, psychological scientists in the 1970s became curious about how those two seemingly separate worlds could work together. [1] The lack of mechanistic models available to this line of research, led to the debate being unresolved. Later, the focus has been shifted to vision-related research in social psychology. [2]

Theorization

Analysis

The traditional paradigm of self-deception is modeled after interpersonal deception, where A intentionally gets B to believe some proposition p, all the while knowing or believing truly ¬p (not p). [3] Such deception is intentional and requires the deceiver to know or believe ¬p and the deceived to believe p. On this traditional mode, self-deceivers must (1) hold contradictory beliefs and (2) intentionally get themselves to hold a belief they know or believe truly to be false. [3]

The process of rationalization, however, can obscure the intent of self-deception. Brian McLaughlin illustrates that such rationalizations in certain circumstances permit the phenomenon. When a person, who disbelieves p, intentionally tries to make himself believe or continue believing p by engaging in such activities, and, as a result unintentionally misleads himself into believing or continuing to believe p via biased thinking, he deceives himself in a way appropriate for self-deception. No deceitful intention is required for this. [4]

Psychology

Self-deception calls into question the nature of the individual, specifically in a psychological context and the nature of "self". Irrationality is the foundation from which the argued paradoxes of self-deception stem, and it is argued[ by whom? ] that not everyone has the "special talents" and capacities for self-deception. [5] However, rationalization is influenced by myriad factors, including socialization, personal biases, fear, and cognitive repression. Such rationalization can be manipulated in both positive and negative fashions; convincing one to perceive a negative situation optimistically and vice versa. In contrast, rationalization alone cannot effectively clarify the dynamics of self-deception, as reason is just one adaptive form mental processes can take. [6]

Paradoxes

The works of philosopher Alfred R. Mele have provided insight into some of the more prominent paradoxes regarding self-deception. Two of these paradoxes include the self-deceiver's state of mind and the dynamics of self-deception, coined the "static" paradox and the "dynamic/strategic" paradox, respectively.

Mele formulates an example of the "static" paradox as the following:

If ever a person A deceives a person B into believing that something, p, is true, A knows or truly believes that p is false while causing B to believe that p is true. So when A deceives A (i.e., himself) into believing that p is true, he knows or truly believes that p is false while causing himself to believe that p is true. Thus, A must simultaneously believe that p is false and believe that p is true. But how is this possible? [7]

Mele then describes the "dynamic/strategy" paradox:

In general, A cannot successfully employ a deceptive strategy against B if B knows A's intention and plan. This seems plausible as well when A and B are the same person. A potential self-deceiver's knowledge of his intention and strategy would seem typically to render them ineffective. On the other hand, the suggestion that self-deceivers typically successfully execute their self-deceptive strategies without knowing what they are up to may seem absurd; for an agent's effective execution of his plans seems generally to depend on his cognizance of them and their goals. So how, in general, can an agent deceive himself by employing a self-deceptive strategy? [7]

These models call into question how one can simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs ("static" paradox) and deceive oneself without rendering one's intentions ineffective ("dynamic/strategic" paradox). Attempts at a resolution to these have created two schools of thought: one that maintains that paradigmatic cases of self-deception are intentional and one that denies the notion—intentionalists and non-intentionalists, respectively. [3]

Intentionalists tend to agree that self-deception is intentional, but divide over whether it requires the holding of contradictory beliefs. [3] This school of thought incorporates elements of temporal partitioning (extended over time to benefit the self-deceiver, increasing the chance of forgetting the deception altogether) and psychological partitioning (incorporating various aspects of the "self").

Non-intentionalists, in contrast, tend to believe that cases of self-deception are not necessarily accidental, but motivated by desire, anxiety, or some other emotion regarding p or related to p. [3] This notion distinguishes self-deception from misunderstanding. Furthermore, "wishful thinking" is distinguished from self-deception in that the self-deceivers recognize evidence against their self-deceptive belief or possess, without recognizing, greater counterevidence than wishful thinkers. [3]

Numerous questions and debates remain in play with respect to the paradoxes of self-deception, and a consensual paradigm has yet to appear.

Trivers' theory

It has been theorized that humans are susceptible to self-deception because most people have emotional attachments to beliefs, which in some cases may be irrational. Some evolutionary biologists, such as Robert Trivers, have suggested [8] [ page needed ] that deception plays a significant role in human behavior, and more generally speaking in animal behavior. One deceives oneself to trust something that is not true as to better convince others of that "truth". When a person convinces himself of this untrue thing, they better mask the signs of deception. [9] Trivers, along with two colleagues (Daniel Kriegman and Malcolm Slavin), applied his theory of "self-deception in the service of deception" in order to explain how in his view Donald Trump was able to employ the "big lie" with such great success. [10]

This notion is based on the following logic: deception is a fundamental aspect of communication in nature, both between and within species. It has evolved so that one can have an advantage over another. From alarm calls to mimicry, animals use deception to further their survival. Those who are better able to perceive deception are more likely to survive. As a result, self-deception behavior evolved to better mask deception from those who perceive it well or, as Trivers puts it "hiding the truth from yourself to hide it more deeply from others." In humans, awareness of the fact that one is acting deceptively often leads to tell-tale signs of deception, such as nostrils flaring, clammy skin, quality and tone of voice, eye movement, or excessive blinking. Therefore, if self-deception enables an individual to believe its own distortions, it will not present such signs of deception, and will therefore appear to be telling the truth.

Self-deception can be used both to act greater or lesser than one actually is. For example, one can act overconfident to attract a mate or act under-confident to avoid a threat such as a predator. If an individual is capable of concealing their true feelings and intentions well, then it is more likely to successfully deceive others.

It may also be argued that the ability to deceive, or self-deceive, is not the selected trait but rather a by-product of a more primary trait called abstract thinking. Abstract thinking allows many evolutionary advantages such as more flexible, adaptive behaviors, leading to innovation. Since a lie is an abstraction, the mental process of creating it can only occur in animals with enough brain complexity to permit abstract thinking. [11] Moreover, self-deception lowers cognitive cost; that is to say, if one has convinced oneself that that very thing is indeed true, it is less complicated for one to behave or think as that thing was untrue; the mind not thinking constantly of the true thing and then the false thing, but simply being convinced that the false thing is true.

Evolutionary implications

Because there is deceit, there exists a strong selection to recognize when deception occurs. As a result, self-deception behavior evolves so as to better hide the signs of deception from others. The presence of deception explains the existence of an innate ability to commit self-deception to hide the indications of deceptions. Humans deceive themselves in order to better deceive others and thus have an advantage over them. In the three decades since Trivers introduced his adaptive theory of self-deception, there has been an ongoing debate over the genetic basis of such a behavior.

The explanation of deception and self-deception as innate characteristics is perhaps true, but there are many other explanations for this pattern of behavior. It is possible that the ability to self-deceive is not innate, but a learned trait, acquired through experience. For example, a person could have been caught being deceitful by revealing their knowledge of information they were trying to hide. Their nostrils flared, indicating that they were lying to the other person, and thus did not get what they wanted. Next time, to better achieve success, the person will more actively deceive himself of having knowledge to better hide the signs of deception. Therefore, people could have the capacity to learn self-deception. However, simply because something is learned does not mean that it is not innate; what is learned and what is innate work in conjunction. [12] This is outlined in many introductory textbooks in evolutionary psychology. [12] For example, preparedness occurs in learning to explain why some behaviours are more easily learned than others. Evolutionary psychologists argue that there are learning mechanisms that allow learning to occur. [12]

Medicine

Self-deception has a prominent role in several medical conditions, such as borderline personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and histrionic personality disorder. [13]

Examples

Simple instances of self-deception include common occurrences such as: the alcoholic who is self-deceived in believing that his drinking is under control, the husband who is self-deceived in believing that his wife is not having an affair, the jealous colleague who is self-deceived in believing that her colleague's greater professional success is due to ruthless ambition.

An example of self-deception is provided by Robert Trivers and Huey P. Newton published [14] in the form of an analysis of the role of flight crew self-deception in the crash of Air Florida Flight 90.

Criticisms

The claim that not being conscious about deception would decrease the body language signs of lying is criticized for being incompatible with the unconscious nature of body language as in body language giving away non-conscious processes, as well as for not being able to account for why evolutionary selection for lying would allow a body language that gives away lying to exist instead of simply selecting for lack of such signals. [15] [16]

The notion that non-conscious deception would be less costly than conscious deception is subject to criticism, citing that a non-conscious lie followed by a process of creating a conscious confabulation would amount to more, not fewer, brain processes than simply making up a conscious lie. [17]

The concept of self-deception is criticized for being able to classify any criticism of the notion of self-deception as being self-deception in itself, removing its falsifiability and therefore making it unscientific, and also for being an obstacle to science in general by being able to classify anything as self-deception in a way that confirms itself in a way that is not self-correcting. [18] [19]

The assumption that individuals who derive pleasure from hurting others would self-deceive into believing that their victims were not hurt is criticized for contradicting its own premise, since if the individual did enjoy knowing that the victim was hurt such self-deception would reduce and not increase the pleasure. [20]

See also

Related Research Articles

Deception is an act or statement that misleads, hides the truth, or promotes a belief, concept, or idea that is not true. This occurs when a deceiver uses information against a person to make them believe an idea is true. Deception can be used with both verbal and nonverbal messages. The person creating the deception knows it to be false while the receiver of the message has a tendency to believe it. It is often done for personal gain or advantage. Deception can involve dissimulation, propaganda and sleight of hand as well as distraction, camouflage or concealment. There is also self-deception, as in bad faith. It can also be called, with varying subjective implications, beguilement, deceit, bluff, mystification, ruse, or subterfuge.

Intentionality is the power of minds to be about something: to represent or to stand for things, properties and states of affairs. Intentionality is primarily ascribed to mental states, like perceptions, beliefs or desires, which is why it has been regarded as the characteristic mark of the mental by many philosophers. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of intentional inexistence: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.

Moore's paradox concerns the apparent absurdity involved in asserting a first-person present-tense sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" or "It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining." The first author to note this apparent absurdity was George E. Moore. These 'Moorean' sentences, as they have become known, are paradoxical in that while they appear absurd, they nevertheless

  1. Can be true;
  2. Are (logically) consistent; and
  3. Are not (obviously) contradictions.
<span class="mw-page-title-main">Lie</span> Intentionally false statement made to deceive

A lie is an assertion that is believed to be false, typically used with the purpose of deceiving or misleading someone. The practice of communicating lies is called lying. A person who communicates a lie may be termed a liar. Lies can be interpreted as deliberately false statements or misleading statements, though not all statements that are literally false are considered lies – metaphors, hyperboles, and other figurative rhetoric are not intended to mislead, while lies are explicitly meant for literal interpretation by their audience. Lies may also serve a variety of instrumental, interpersonal, or psychological functions for the individuals who use them.

The psychology of self is the study of either the cognitive, conative or affective representation of one's identity, or the subject of experience. The earliest form of the Self in modern psychology saw the emergence of two elements, I and me, with I referring to the Self as the subjective knower and me referring to the Self as a subject that is known.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Bad faith</span> Duplicity, fraud, or deception

Bad faith is a sustained form of deception which consists of entertaining or pretending to entertain one set of feelings while acting as if influenced by another. It is associated with hypocrisy, breach of contract, affectation, and lip service. It may involve intentional deceit of others, or self-deception.

Rationalization is a defense mechanism in which apparent logical reasons are given to justify behavior that is motivated by unconscious instinctual impulses. It is an attempt to find reasons for behaviors, especially one's own. Rationalizations are used to defend against feelings of guilt, maintain self-respect, and protect oneself from criticism.

Robert Ludlow "Bob" Trivers is an American evolutionary biologist and sociobiologist. Trivers proposed the theories of reciprocal altruism (1971), parental investment (1972), facultative sex ratio determination (1973), and parent–offspring conflict (1974). He has also contributed by explaining self-deception as an adaptive evolutionary strategy and discussing intragenomic conflict.

A half-truth is a deceptive statement that includes some element of truth. The statement might be partly true, the statement may be totally true, but only part of the whole truth, or it may use some deceptive element, such as improper punctuation, or double meaning, especially if the intent is to deceive, evade, blame or misrepresent the truth.

The evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) is a philosophical argument asserting a problem with believing both evolution and philosophical naturalism simultaneously. The argument was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga in 1993 and "raises issues of interest to epistemologists, philosophers of mind, evolutionary biologists, and philosophers of religion". The EAAN argues that the combined belief in both evolutionary theory and naturalism is epistemically self-defeating. The argument for this is that if both evolution and naturalism are true, then the probability of having reliable cognitive faculties is low. This argument comes as an expansion of the argument from reason, although the two are separate philosophical arguments.

Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) is one of a number of theories that attempts to explain how individuals handle actual deception at the conscious or subconscious level while engaged in face-to-face communication. The theory was put forth by David Buller and Judee Burgoon in 1996 to explore this idea that deception is an engaging process between receiver and deceiver. IDT assumes that communication is not static; it is influenced by personal goals and the meaning of the interaction as it unfolds. IDT is no different from other forms of communication since all forms of communication are adaptive in nature. The sender's overt communications are affected by the overt and covert communications of the receiver, and vice versa. IDT explores the interrelation between the sender's communicative meaning and the receiver's thoughts and behavior in deceptive exchanges.

Hypocrisy is the practice of feigning to be what one is not or to believe what one does not. The word "hypocrisy" entered the English language c. 1200 with the meaning "the sin of pretending to virtue or goodness". Today, "hypocrisy" often refers to advocating behaviors that one does not practice. However, the term can also refer to other forms of pretense, such as engaging in pious or moral behaviors out of a desire for praise rather than out of genuinely pious or moral motivations.

Doublethink is a process of indoctrination in which subjects are expected to simultaneously accept two conflicting beliefs as truth, often at odds with their own memory or sense of reality. Doublethink is related to, but differs from, hypocrisy.

Relational transgressions occur when people violate implicit or explicit relational rules. These transgressions include a wide variety of behaviors. The boundaries of relational transgressions are permeable. Betrayal for example, is often used as a synonym for a relational transgression. In some instances, betrayal can be defined as a rule violation that is traumatic to a relationship, and in other instances as destructive conflict or reference to infidelity.

Non-verbal leakage is a form of non-verbal behavior that occurs when a person verbalizes one thing, but their body language indicates another, common forms of which include facial movements and hand-to-face gestures. The term "non-verbal leakage" got its origin in literature in 1968, leading to many subsequent studies on the topic throughout the 1970s, with related studies continuing today.

Motivated reasoning is a cognitive and social response in which individuals, consciously or unconsciously, allow emotion-loaded motivational biases to affect how new information is perceived. Individuals tend to favor evidence that coincides with their current beliefs and reject new information that contradicts them, despite contrary evidence.

<i>The Folly of Fools</i> Book by Robert Trivers

The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life by Robert Trivers is a book that examines the evolutionary explanations for deceit and self-deception. Trivers focuses primarily on humans but he includes examples from many other organisms as well. Trivers' starting point is to illustrate that self-deception is something of an evolutionary puzzle. While the evolutionary benefits to deceiving other organisms are obvious at first glance it seems highly counter intuitive to think that it could ever be in the evolutionary interest of an organism to deceive itself.

Deception in animals is the transmission of misinformation by one animal to another, of the same or different species, in a way that propagates beliefs that are not true.

Truth-default theory (TDT) is a communication theory which predicts and explains the use of veracity and deception detection in humans. It was developed upon the discovery of the veracity effect - whereby the proportion of truths versus lies presented in a judgement study on deception will drive accuracy rates. This theory gets its name from its central idea which is the truth-default state. This idea suggests that people presume others to be honest because they either don't think of deception as a possibility during communicating or because there is insufficient evidence that they are being deceived. Emotions, arousal, strategic self-presentation, and cognitive effort are nonverbal behaviors that one might find in deception detection. Ultimately this theory predicts that speakers and listeners will default to use the truth to achieve their communicative goals. However, if the truth presents a problem, then deception will surface as a viable option for goal attainment.

Motivation impairment effect (MIE) is a hypothesised behavioral effect relating to the communication of deception. The MIE posits that people who are highly motivated to deceive are less successful in their goal when their speech and mannerisms are observed by the intended audience. This is because their nonverbal cues, such as adaptor gestures, sweating, kinesic behaviors, verbal disfluencies, etc, tend to be more pronounced due to increased stress, cognitive load, and heightened emotional state. There is some disagreement regarding the MIE hypothesis, with a few nonverbal communication scholars arguing that deception should not be examined as separate for senders and receivers, but rather as an integral part of the overall process.

References

  1. Gur, Ruben C.; Sackeim, Harold A. (1979). "Self-deception: A concept in search of a phenomenon". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 37 (2): 147–169. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.2.147. ISSN   0022-3514.
  2. Balcetis, Emily (January 2008). "Where the Motivation Resides and Self-Deception Hides: How Motivated Cognition Accomplishes Self-Deception". Social and Personality Psychology Compass. 2 (1): 361–381. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00042.x. ISSN   1751-9004.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Deweese-Boyd, Ian. "Self-Deception". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  4. "Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief" by Brian P. McLaughlin. PhilPapers: MCLETP
  5. "The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs" by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. PhilPapers: RORTDS-2
  6. Johnston, Mark (1995). "Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind". Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 63–91. PhilPapers: JOHSAT
  7. 1 2 Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception by Alfred R. Mele. PhilPapers: MELTPO-5
  8. Trivers, Robert (2002). Natural Selection and Social Theory: Selected Papers of Robert Trivers. Oxford University Press US. ISBN   978-0-19-513062-1.
  9. Trivers, Robert (1976). "Foreword". In Dawkins, Richard (ed.). The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press. ISBN   9780191093067. OCLC   2681149.
  10. Kriegman, D., Trivers, R, and Slavin, M. "Leading psychologists explain how Trump's self-delusions make him stunningly effective at predatory deception", The Raw Story, April 6, 2020.
  11. Abe, Nobuhito; Okuda, Jiro; Suzuki, Maki; Sasaki, Hiroshi; Matsuda, Tetsuya; Mori, Etsuro; Tsukada, Minoru; Fujii, Toshikatsu (December 1, 2008). "Neural Correlates of True Memory, False Memory, and Deception". Cerebral Cortex. 18 (12): 2811–2819. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn037. ISSN   1047-3211. PMC   2583150 . PMID   18372290.
  12. 1 2 3 Barkow, Tooby, & Cosmides. (1995). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.
  13. Ford, Charles (1999). Lies!, lies!!, lies!!! : The psychology of deceit. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press. pp. 103–125. ISBN   978-0-88048-997-3.
  14. Trivers, R. L.; Newton, H. P. (November 1982). "The crash of Flight 90: Doomed by self-deception?" (PDF). Science Digest . Vol. 90, no. 11. pp. 66–67, 111.
  15. Paul Ekman - 2006 - Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review
  16. Dylan Evans, Pierre Cruse - 2004 - Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality
  17. David E. Over - 2004 - Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate
  18. Tom Flynn - 2007 - The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief
  19. 2005 - The Skeptical Inquirer
  20. David Buller - 2005 - Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature

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