Emergentism

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Emergentism is the belief in emergence, particularly as it involves consciousness and the philosophy of mind. A property of a system is said to be emergent if it is a new outcome of some other properties of the system and their interaction, while it is itself different from them. [1] Within the philosophy of science, emergentism is analyzed both as it contrasts with and parallels reductionism. [1] [2]

Contents

Forms

Emergentism can be compatible with physicalism, [3] the theory that the universe is composed exclusively of physical entities, and in particular with the evidence relating changes in the brain with changes in mental functioning.

Some varieties of emergentism are not specifically concerned with the mind–body problem but constitute a theory of the nature of the universe comparable to pantheism. [4] They suggest a hierarchical or layered view of the whole of nature, with the layers arranged in terms of increasing complexity with each requiring its own special science.

Relationship to vitalism

Emmeche et al. (1998) state that "there is a very important difference between the vitalists and the emergentists: the vitalist's creative forces were relevant only in organic substances, not in inorganic matter. Emergence hence is creation of new properties regardless of the substance involved." "The assumption of an extra-physical vitalis (vital force, entelechy, élan vital, etc.), as formulated in most forms (old or new) of vitalism, is usually without any genuine explanatory power. It has served altogether too often as an intellectual tranquilizer or verbal sedative—stifling scientific inquiry rather than encouraging it to proceed in new directions." [5]

History

Figure illustrating the interactions between mental states M1 and M2, and physical states P1 and P2 in non-reductive physicalism Figure1.gif
Figure illustrating the interactions between mental states M1 and M2, and physical states P1 and P2 in non-reductive physicalism

Addressing emergentism (under the guise of non-reductive physicalism) as a solution to the mind–body problem Jaegwon Kim has raised an objection based on causal closure and overdetermination.

Emergentism strives to be compatible with physicalism, and physicalism, according to Kim, has a principle of causal closure according to which every physical event is fully accountable in terms of physical causes. This seems to leave no "room" for mental causation to operate. If our bodily movements were not only caused by the preceding state of our bodies, but also by our decisions and intentions, they would be overdetermined. Mental causation in this sense is not the same as free will, but is only the claim that mental states are causally relevant. If emergentists respond by abandoning the idea of mental causation, their position becomes a form of epiphenomenalism.

In detail: he proposes using the chart above (which was originally drawn with the $ by Nancey Murphy [6] ). Here, P1 causes P2.M1 does not causally effect P1 (i.e., M1 is a consequent event of P1). P1 realises M1 and P2 realises M2. If P1 causes P2, and M1 is a result of P1, then M2 is a result of P2. But then M2 is not affected by M1 (no mental causation). According to him, the only alternatives compatible with mental causation are dualism (where the mental events are independent of the physical events) and eliminativism (where the mental events do not exist).

See also

Notes

  1. 1 2 O'Connor, Timothy and Wong, Hong Yu, "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/properties-emergent/>.
  2. Kistler, Max (2006). "New Perspectives on Reduction and Emergence in Physics, Biology and Psychology". Synthese. 151 (3): 311–312. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9014-3. ISSN   0039-7857. JSTOR   20118808. S2CID   36301964 . Retrieved 3 September 2021.
  3. Being Emergence vs. Pattern Emergence: Complexity, Control, and Goal-Directedness in Biological Systems, Jason Winning & William Bechtel In Sophie Gibb, Robin Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Emergence. London: pp. 134-144 (2019)
  4. Franklin, James (2019). "Emergentism as an option in the philosophy of religion: Between materialist atheism and pantheism" (PDF). Suri: Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines. 8 (2): 1–22. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
  5. Dictionary of the History of Ideas Archived 2011-05-11 at the Wayback Machine
  6. Murphy, Nancey; Brown, Warren S. (2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 65, n.40. ISBN   9780199215393.

Further reading

Related Research Articles

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