Frank Cameron Jackson

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Frank Jackson
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Born
Frank Cameron Jackson

(1943-08-31) 31 August 1943 (age 80)
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Education University of Melbourne (BA)
La Trobe University (PhD)
Era Contemporary philosophy
Region Western philosophy
School Analytic
Doctoral advisor Brian Ellis [1]
Main interests
 Philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and meta-ethics
Notable ideas
 Mary's room

Frank Cameron Jackson AO FASSA FAHA FBA (born 31 August 1943) is an Australian analytic philosopher and Emeritus Professor in the School of Philosophy (Research School of Social Sciences) at Australian National University (ANU) where he had spent most of the latter part of his career. His primary research interests include epistemology, metaphysics, meta-ethics and the philosophy of mind. In the latter field he is best known for the "Mary's room" knowledge argument, a thought experiment that is one of the most discussed challenges to physicalism.

Contents

Biography

Frank Cameron Jackson was born on 31 August 1943 in Melbourne, Australia. [2] His parents were both philosophers. [3] His mother Ann E. Jackson, who rose to the rank of senior tutor, taught philosophy at the University of Melbourne from 1961 to 1984. [3] His atheistic father Allan Cameron Jackson (1911–1990) [4] had been a student of Ludwig Wittgenstein [5] (having gone to Cambridge in 1946 for Ph.D. studies). [3] F. C. Jackson, in interview with Graham Oppy, reports of his parents that; they were both "philosophers in the Old School, by which I mean the Wittgensteinian School. Philosophy was part of your life." [6]

Despite his self-reported enjoyment of the philosophical conversation of his household it was with view to becoming a mathematician that Jackson went to the University of Melbourne to study maths and science. [6] [7] And it was only in his final year of those studies that he chose to also take some philosophy which he found he better enjoyed and proved significantly more able. [6] [7] He passed his B.Sc. but went on to achieve Honours in a B.A. whose main subject was philosophy. [8] [6] [7] During his time at Melbourne he was a resident at Trinity College, a Clarke Scholar, and a member of the 2nd XVIII football team. [9]

Upon graduation from his second degree, Jackson taught at the University of Adelaide for a year in 1967 and then went to La Trobe University for a lectureship appointment. [10] Whilst there, Jackson published his first book (which was also his doctoral thesis) "Perception: A Representative Theory" (1977). The following year he succeeded his father to the chair of Philosophy at Monash University. [10]

In 1986, he joined ANU as Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Program, within the Research School of Social Sciences. At ANU, he served as Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies (1998–2001), Deputy Vice-Chancellor – Research (2001), and Director of the Research School of Social Sciences (2004–7). Jackson was appointed as Distinguished Professor at ANU in 2003; he became an Emeritus Professor upon his retirement in 2014. [11] Latterly (2007–14) he had also been a regular visiting professor of philosophy at Princeton University. [12]

Jackson was awarded the Order of Australia in 2006 for service to philosophy and social sciences as an academic, administrator, and researcher. Jackson delivered the John Locke Lectures at the University of Oxford in 1995. Notably, his father had also delivered the 1957–8 lectures, making them the first father–son pair to have done so. [13] [3]

Philosophical work

Jackson's philosophical research is broad, but focuses primarily on the areas of philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and meta-ethics.

In philosophy of mind, Jackson is known especially for the knowledge argument against physicalism—the view that the universe is entirely physical (i.e., the kinds of entities postulated in physics). Jackson motivates the knowledge argument by a famous thought experiment known as Mary's room. In a much cited passage [14] he phrases the thought experiment as follows:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'. (…) What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.

— Jackson, Frank, “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” (1982) [15]

Jackson's thought experiment features in the 1996 Channel 4 documentary "Brainspotting" [16] and David Lodge's novel Thinks... (2001). [17]

Jackson used the knowledge argument, as well as other arguments, to establish a sort of dualism, according to which certain mental states, especially qualitative ones, are non-physical. The view that Jackson urged was a modest version of epiphenomenalism—the view that certain mental states are non-physical and, although caused to come into existence by physical events, do not then cause any changes in the physical world.

However, Jackson later rejected the knowledge argument, [18] as well as other arguments against physicalism:

Most contemporary philosophers given a choice between going with science and going with intuitions, go with science. Although I once dissented from the majority, I have capitulated and now see the interesting issue as being where the arguments from the intuitions against physicalism—the arguments that seem so compelling—go wrong.

— Jackson, Frank, "Mind and Illusion" (2003) [19]

Jackson argues that the intuition-driven arguments against physicalism (such as the knowledge argument and the zombie argument) are ultimately misleading.

Jackson is also known for his defence of the centrality of conceptual analysis to philosophy; his approach, set out in his Locke Lectures and published as his 1998 book, is often referred to as the Canberra Plan.

Honours

Jackson was elected Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities (FAHA) in 1981 [20] and of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (FASSA) in 1998. [21]

He was awarded the Centenary Medal in 2001 [22] and appointed an Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) in 2006. [23]

In 2003 he was appointed as Distinguished Professor at the Australian National University and Emeritus Professor in 2014. In November 2018 Jackson received the Peter Baume Award, which recognises substantial and significant achievement and merit. [24]

Publications

Books

Edited books

Selected articles

Related Research Articles

Epiphenomenalism is a position on the mind–body problem which holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, yet themselves have no influence over physical events. According to epiphenomenalism, the appearance that subjective mental states influence physical events is an illusion, consciousness being a by-product of physical states of the world. For instance, fear seems to make the heart beat faster, but according to epiphenomenalism the biochemical secretions of the brain and nervous system —not the experience of fear—is what raises the heartbeat. Because mental events are a kind of overflow that cannot cause anything physical, yet have non-physical properties, epiphenomenalism is viewed as a form of property dualism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mind–body dualism</span> Philosophical theory

In the philosophy of mind, mind–body dualism denotes either the view that mental phenomena are non-physical, or that the mind and body are distinct and separable. Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, as well as between subject and object, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism and enactivism, in the mind–body problem.

Eliminative materialism is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. It is the idea that the majority of mental states in folk psychology do not exist. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. The argument is that psychological concepts of behavior and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. Other versions entail the nonexistence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">J. J. C. Smart</span> Australian philosopher and academic

John Jamieson Carswell Smart was a British-Australian philosopher who was appointed as an Emeritus Professor by the Australian National University. He worked in the fields of metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and political philosophy. He wrote several entries for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

The knowledge argument is a philosophical thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson in his article "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982) and extended in "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hard problem of consciousness</span> Philosophical concept, first stated by David Chalmers in 1995

In philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiences. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give a (healthy) human being the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioral functions such as watching, listening, speaking, and so forth. The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation—that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioral—since each physical system can be explained purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon.

A philosophical zombie is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal human being but does not have conscious experience.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Property dualism</span> Category of positions in the philosophy of mind

Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that at least some non-physical, mental properties exist in, or naturally supervene upon, certain physical substances.

Jaegwon Kim was a Korean-American philosopher. At the time of his death, Kim was an emeritus professor of philosophy at Brown University. He also taught at several other leading American universities during his lifetime, including the University of Michigan, Cornell University, the University of Notre Dame, Johns Hopkins University, and Swarthmore College. He is best known for his work on mental causation, the mind-body problem and the metaphysics of supervenience and events. Key themes in his work include: a rejection of Cartesian metaphysics, the limitations of strict psychophysical identity, supervenience, and the individuation of events. Kim's work on these and other contemporary metaphysical and epistemological issues is well represented by the papers collected in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (1993).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Freya Mathews</span> Australian philosopher

Freya Mathews is an Australian environmental philosopher whose main work has been in the areas of ecological metaphysics and panpsychism. Her current special interests are in ecological civilization; indigenous perspectives on "sustainability" and how these perspectives may be adapted to the context of contemporary global society; panpsychism and critique of the metaphysics of modernity; and wildlife ethics and rewilding in the context of the Anthropocene.

Sydney Sharpless Shoemaker was an American philosopher. He was the Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University and is well known for his contributions to philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

Type physicalism is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain. For example, one type of mental event, such as "mental pains" will, presumably, turn out to be describing one type of physical event.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Quietism (philosophy)</span> View on the purpose of philosophy

Quietism in philosophy sees the role of philosophy as broadly therapeutic or remedial. Quietist philosophers believe that philosophy has no positive thesis to contribute; rather, it defuses confusions in the linguistic and conceptual frameworks of other subjects, including non-quietist philosophy. For quietists, advancing knowledge or settling debates is not the job of philosophy, rather philosophy should liberate the mind by diagnosing confusing concepts.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Qualia</span> Instances of subjective experience

In philosophy of mind, qualia are defined as instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in relation to a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple — this particular apple now".

<i>The Conscious Mind</i> 1996 philosophy book by David Chalmers

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory was published in 1996, and is the first book written by David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher specialising in philosophy of mind. Although the book has been greatly influential, Chalmers maintains that it is "far from perfect", as most of it was written as part of his PhD dissertation after "studying philosophy for only four years".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Philosophy of color</span> Dispute between color realism and fictionalism

The philosophy of color is a subset of the philosophy of perception that is concerned with the nature of the perceptual experience of color. Any explicit account of color perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views, distinguishing namely between externalism/internalism, which relate respectively to color realism, the view that colors are physical properties that objects possess, and color fictionalism, the view that colors possess no such physical properties.

Interactionism or interactionist dualism is the theory in the philosophy of mind which holds that matter and mind are two distinct and independent substances that exert causal effects on one another. An example of your mind influencing your body would be if you are depressed, you can observe the effects on your body, such as a slouched posture, a lackluster smile, etc. Another example, this time of your body affecting your mind would be: If you struck your toe very forcefully on a door, you would experience terrible pain. Interactionism is one type of dualism, traditionally a type of substance dualism though more recently also sometimes a form of property dualism. Many philosophers and scientists have responded to this theory with arguments both supporting and opposing its relevance to life and whether the theory corresponds to reality.

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Yujin Nagasawa is a Japanese-born philosopher specialising in the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of mind and applied philosophy.

References

  1. ↑ "Tree – David Chalmers" . Retrieved 19 April 2022.
  2. ↑ The International Who's Who, 1997-98 . The International Who's Who. London: Europa Publications. 1997. p. 730. ISBN   978-1-85743-022-6 – via Internet Archive. JACKSON, Frank Cameron, PH.D., F.A.H.A .; Australian professor of philosophy; b. 31 Aug. 1943, Melbourne; s. of Allan C. Jackson and Ann E. Jackson; m. Morag E. Fraser 1966
  3. 1 2 3 4 Oppy, Graham (22 February 2011). The Antipodean Philosopher: Public Lectures on Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Lexington Books. pp. 43, 46, 70, 254. ISBN   978-0-7391-6793-9.
  4. ↑ Smith, Warren Allen (2000). Who's who in hell : a handbook and international directory for humanists, freethinkers, naturalists, rationalists, and non-theists . New York : Barricade Books. p. 581. ISBN   978-1-56980-158-1 – via Internet Archive.
  5. ↑ Borst, Clive (1996). "Jackson, Frank Cameron". Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Philosophers. (eds.) Brown, Stuart; Collinson, Diane; Wilkinson, Robert. London; New York: Routledge. pp. 370–371. ISBN   978-1-134-92796-8.
  6. 1 2 3 4 Oppy, Graham; Trakakis, Nick; Burns, Lynda (2011). The Antipodean Philosopher: Interviews with Australian and New Zealand philosophers. Lexington Books. p. 69. ISBN   978-0-7391-6655-0.
  7. 1 2 3 Jackson, Frank. "Mary's Room and stuff". 3:16. Interviewed by Richard Marshall. Retrieved 22 April 2022.
  8. ↑ "Professor 1961-2000". Monash University Records Archives. Retrieved 21 April 2022. 1978-1986, 1991, Frank Cameron JACKSON BA BSc Melb PhD LaT
  9. ↑ "Minor Scholars", The Fleur-de-Lys , Nov. 1963, p. 43. See also pp. 21–22, 40.
  10. 1 2 O'Dea, John (2014). "Jackson, Frank Cameron". A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand (PDF). (eds.) Graham Oppy, Nick Trakakis (2nd ed.). Clayton, Victoria. p. 243. ISBN   978-1-925495-26-3. OCLC   904689134.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  11. ↑ Director (Research Services Division). "Professor Frank Jackson". researchers.anu.edu.au. Retrieved 23 June 2020.
  12. ↑ Biographical information from Jackson's academic profile at ANU: http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/profile/frank-jackson Archived 2 March 2015 at the Wayback Machine
  13. ↑ Supervenience, Metaphysics, and Analysis (John Locke Lectures), Oxford University, 1994–95
  14. ↑ Nida-Rümelin, Martine; O Conaill, Donnchadh (2021), "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 19 April 2022.
  15. ↑ Jackson, Frank (1982). "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (PDF). The Philosophical Quarterly . 32 (127): 130. doi:10.2307/2960077. ISSN   0031-8094. JSTOR   2960077.
  16. ↑ Alter, Torin. "Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Retrieved 19 April 2022.
  17. ↑ Byrne, Alex (20 January 2006). "There's Something About Mary". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Retrieved 19 April 2022.
  18. ↑ Torin Alter. "Jackson's Retraction". APA. Archived from the original on 16 May 2008.
  19. ↑ In: A. O'Hear (Ed.), Minds and Persons (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, pp. 251-272). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003) doi:10.1017/CBO9780511550294.014.
  20. ↑ "Frank Jackson". Australian Academy of the Humanities. Retrieved 1 December 2018.
  21. ↑ "Emeritus Professor Frank Jackson AO". Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. Retrieved 1 December 2018.
  22. ↑ It's an Honour: Centenary Medal. Retrieved 22 November 2014
  23. ↑ It's an Honour: AO. Retrieved 22 November 2014
  24. ↑ "Peter Baume Award: Emeritus Professor Frank Jackson AO". ANU. 15 November 2018. Retrieved 1 December 2018.
  25. ↑ Lowe, E. J. (2001). "Review of Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays". Mind. 110 (437): 211–215. ISSN   0026-4423. JSTOR   2659847.
  26. ↑ Schroeder, Timothy (5 November 2004). "Review of Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. ISSN   1538-1617.
  27. ↑
    • a significantly revised version of this paper appears (under the same title) as Chapter 6 of Conditionals (1987)

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