In metaphysics and ontology, nonexistent objects are a concept advanced by Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong in the 19th and 20th centuries within a "theory of objects". He was interested in intentional states which are directed at nonexistent objects. Starting with the "principle of intentionality", mental phenomena are intentionally directed towards an object. People may imagine, desire or fear something that does not exist. Other philosophers concluded that intentionality is not a real relation and therefore does not require the existence of an object, while Meinong concluded there is an object for every mental state whatsoever—if not an existent then at least a nonexistent one. [1]
The round square copula is a common example of the dual copula strategy used in reference to the "problem of nonexistent objects" as well as their relation to problems in modern philosophy of language. [2]
The issue arose, most notably, between the theories of contemporary philosophers Alexius Meinong (see Meinong's 1904 book Investigations in Theory of Objects and Psychology) [3] and Bertrand Russell (see Russell's 1905 article "On Denoting"). [4] Russell's critique of Meinong's theory of objects, also known as the Russellian view, became the established view on the problem of nonexistent objects. [5]
In late modern philosophy, the concept of the "square circle" (German : viereckiger Kreis) had also been discussed before in Gottlob Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884). [6]
The strategy employed is the dual copula strategy, [2] also known as the dual predication approach, [7] which is used to make a distinction between relations of properties and individuals. It entails creating a sentence that is not supposed to make sense by forcing the term "is" into ambiguous meaning.
The dual copula strategy was originally brought to prominence in contemporary philosophy by Ernst Mally. [8] [9] Other proponents of this approach include: Héctor-Neri Castañeda, William J. Rapaport, and Edward N. Zalta. [10]
By borrowing Zalta's notational method (Fb stands for b exemplifies the property of being F; bF stands for b encodes the property of being F), and using a revised version of Meinongian object theory which makes use of a dual copula distinction (MOTdc), we can say that the object called "the round square" encodes the property of being round, the property of being square, all properties implied by these, and no others. [2] But it is true that there are also infinitely many properties being exemplified by an object called the round square (and, really, any object)—e.g. the property of not being a computer, and the property of not being a pyramid. Note that this strategy has forced "is" to abandon its predicative use, and now functions abstractly.
When one now analyzes the round square copula using the MOTdc, one will find that it now avoids the three common paradoxes: (1) The violation of the law of noncontradiction, (2) The paradox of claiming the property of existence without actually existing, and (3) producing counterintuitive consequences. Firstly, the MOTdc shows that the round square does not exemplify the property of being round, but the property of being round and square. Thus, there is no subsequent contradiction. Secondly, it avoids the conflict of existence/non-existence by claiming non-physical existence: by the MOTdc, it can only be said that the round square simply does not exemplify the property of occupying a region in space. Finally, the MOTdc avoids counterintuitive consequences (like a 'thing' having the property of nonexistence) by stressing that the round square copula can be said merely to encode the property of being round and square, not actually exemplifying it. Thus, logically, it does not belong to any set or class.
In the end, what the MOTdc really does is create a kind of object: a nonexistent object that is very different from the objects we might normally think of. Occasionally, references to this notion, while obscure, may be called "Meinongian objects."
Making use of the notion of "non-physically existent" objects is controversial in philosophy, and created the buzz for many articles and books on the subject during the first half of the 20th century. There are other strategies for avoiding the problems of Meinong's theories, but they suffer from serious problems as well.
First is the dual property strategy, [2] also known as the nuclear–extranuclear strategy. [2]
Mally introduced the dual property strategy, [11] [12] but did not endorse it. The dual property strategy was eventually adopted by Meinong. [9] Other proponents of this approach include: Terence Parsons and Richard Routley. [10]
According to Meinong, it is possible to distinguish the natural (nuclear) properties of an object, from its external (extranuclear) properties. Parsons identifies four types of extranuclear properties: ontological, modal, intentional, technical—however, philosophers dispute Parson's claims in number and kind. Additionally, Meinong states that nuclear properties are either constitutive or consecutive, meaning properties that are either explicitly contained or implied/included in a description of the object. Essentially the strategy denies the possibility for objects to have only one property, and instead they may have only one nuclear property. Meinong himself, however, found this solution to be inadequate in several ways and its inclusion only served to muddle the definition of an object.
There is also the other worlds strategy. [2] Similar to the ideas explained with possible worlds theory, this strategy employs the view that logical principles and the law of contradiction have limits, but without assuming that everything is true. Enumerated and championed by Graham Priest, who was heavily influenced by Routley, this strategy forms the notion of "noneism". In short, assuming there exist infinite possible and impossible worlds, objects are freed from necessarily existing in all worlds, but instead may exist in impossible worlds (where the law of contradiction does not apply, for example) and not in the actual world. Unfortunately, accepting this strategy entails accepting the host of problems that come with it, such as the ontological status of impossible worlds.
Meinong's jungle is a term used to describe the repository of non-existent objects in the ontology of Alexius Meinong. [13] An example of such an object is a "round square", which cannot exist definitionally and yet can be the subject of logical inferences, such as that it is both "round" and "square".
Meinong, an Austrian philosopher active at the turn of the 20th century, believed that since non-existent things could apparently be referred to, they must have some sort of being, which he termed sosein ("being so"). A unicorn and a pegasus are both non-being; yet it is true that unicorns have horns and pegasi have wings. Thus non-existent things like unicorns, square circles, and golden mountains can have different properties, and must have a 'being such-and-such' even though they lack 'being' proper. [13] The strangeness of such entities led to this ontological realm being referred to as "Meinong's jungle". The jungle is described in Meinong's work Über Annahmen (1902). [14] The name is credited to William C. Kneale, whose Probability and Induction (1949) includes the passage "after wandering in Meinong's jungle of subsistence ... philosophers are now agreed that propositions cannot be regarded as ultimate entities". [14]
The Meinongian theory of objects (Gegenstandstheorie) was influential in the debate over sense and reference between Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell which led to the establishment of analytic philosophy and contemporary philosophy of language. Russell's theory of descriptions, in the words of P. M. S. Hacker, enables him to "thin out the luxuriant Meinongian jungle of entities (such as the round square), which, it had appeared, must in some sense subsist in order to be talked about". [15] According to the theory of descriptions, speakers are not committed to asserting the existence of referents for the names they use.
Meinong's jungle is cited as an objection to Meinong's semantics, as the latter commits one to ontically undesirable objects; [13] it is desirable to be able to speak meaningfully about unicorns, the objection goes, but not to have to believe in them. Nominalists (who believe that general or abstract terms and predicates exist but that either universals or abstract objects do not) find Meinong's jungle particularly unpalatable. [16] As Colin McGinn puts it, "[g]oing naively by the linguistic appearances leads not only to logical impasse but also to metaphysical extravagance—as with Meinong's jungle, infested with shadowy Being." [17] An uneasiness with the ontological commitments of Meinong's theory is commonly expressed in the bon mot "we should cut back Meinong's jungle with Occam's razor". [18] [19]
Meinong's jungle was defended by modal realists, whose possible world semantics offered a more palatable variation of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie, as Jaakko Hintikka explains:
If you ask "Where are the non-existent objects?" the answer is, "Each in its own possible world." The only trouble with that notorious thicket, Meinong's jungle, is that it has not been zoned, plotted and divided into manageable lots, better known as possible worlds.
However, modal realists retain the problem of explaining reference to impossible objects such as square circles. For Meinong, such objects simply have a 'being so' that precludes their having ordinary 'being'. But this entails that 'being so' in Meinong's sense is not equivalent to existing in a possible world.
Existence is the state of having being or reality in contrast to nonexistence and nonbeing. Existence is often contrasted with essence: the essence of an entity is its essential features or qualities, which can be understood even if one does not know whether the entity exists.
Intentionality is the mental ability to refer to or represent something. Sometimes regarded as the mark of the mental, it is found in mental states like perceptions, beliefs or desires. For example, the perception of a tree has intentionality because it represents a tree to the perceiver. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of intentional inexistence: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.
In metaphysics and the philosophy of language, an empty name is a proper name that has no referent.
Alexius Meinong Ritter von Handschuchsheim was an Austrian philosopher, a realist known for his unique ontology and theory of objects. He also made contributions to philosophy of mind and theory of value.
Richard Sylvan was a New Zealand–born philosopher, logician, and environmentalist.
In logic and philosophy, a property is a characteristic of an object; for example, a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties. A property, however, differs from individual objects in that it may be instantiated, and often in more than one object. It differs from the logical and mathematical concept of class by not having any concept of extensionality, and from the philosophical concept of class in that a property is considered to be distinct from the objects which possess it. Understanding how different individual entities can in some sense have some of the same properties is the basis of the problem of universals.
In philosophy and the arts, a fundamental distinction is between things that are abstract and things that are concrete. While there is no general consensus as to how to precisely define the two, examples include that things like numbers, sets, and ideas are abstract objects, while plants, dogs, and planets are concrete objects. Popular suggestions for a definition include that the distinction between concreteness versus abstractness is, respectively: between (1) existence inside versus outside space-time; (2) having causes and effects versus not; 3) being related, in metaphysics, to particulars versus universals; and (4) belonging to either the physical versus the mental realm. Another view is that it is the distinction between contingent existence versus necessary existence; however, philosophers differ on which type of existence here defines abstractness, as opposed to concreteness. Despite this diversity of views, there is broad agreement concerning most objects as to whether they are abstract or concrete, such that most interpretations agree, for example, that rocks are concrete objects while numbers are abstract objects.
The Graz School, also Meinong's School, of experimental psychology and object theory was headed by Alexius Meinong, who was professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of Graz where he founded the Graz Psychological Institute in 1894. The Graz School's phenomenological psychology and philosophical semantics achieved important advances in philosophy and psychological science.
In analytic philosophy, actualism is the view that everything there is is actual. Another phrasing of the thesis is that the domain of unrestricted quantification ranges over all and only actual existents.
Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters— is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding. This can apply to items such as the physical world, the past and future, other minds, and the self, though may also apply less directly to things such as universals, mathematical truths, moral truths, and thought itself. However, realism may also include various positions which instead reject metaphysical treatments of reality altogether.
A free logic is a logic with fewer existential presuppositions than classical logic. Free logics may allow for terms that do not denote any object. Free logics may also allow models that have an empty domain. A free logic with the latter property is an inclusive logic.
Ernst Mally was an Austrian analytic philosopher, initially affiliated with Alexius Meinong's Graz School of object theory. Mally was one of the founders of deontic logic and is mainly known for his contributions in that field of research. In metaphysics, he is known for introducing a distinction between two kinds of predication, better known as the dual predication approach.
Edward Nouri Zalta is an American philosopher who is a senior research scholar at the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University. He received his BA from Rice University in 1975 and his PhD from the University of Massachusetts Amherst in 1981, both in philosophy. Zalta has taught courses at Stanford University, Rice University, the University of Salzburg, and the University of Auckland. Zalta is also the Principal Editor of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Terence Dwight Parsons (1939–2022) was an American philosopher, specializing in philosophy of language and metaphysics. He was emeritus professor of philosophy at UCLA.
Noneism, also known as modal Meinongianism, is both a philosophical and theological theory. In a philosophical and metaphysical context, the theory suggests that some things do not exist. That definition was first conceptualized by Richard Sylvan in 1980 and then later expanded on by Graham Priest in 2005. In a theological context, noneism is the practice of spirituality without an affiliation to organized religion.
Héctor-Neri Castañeda was a Guatemalan-American philosopher and founder of the journal Noûs.
William Joseph Rapaport is a North American philosopher who is an associate professor emeritus of the University at Buffalo.
In metaphysics, Plato's beard is a paradoxical argument dubbed by Willard Van Orman Quine in his 1948 paper "On What There Is". The phrase came to be identified as the philosophy of understanding something based on what does not exist.
Abstract object theory (AOT) is a branch of metaphysics regarding abstract objects. Originally devised by metaphysician Edward Zalta in 1981, the theory was an expansion of mathematical Platonism.
The Meinongian argument is a type of ontological argument or an "a priori argument" that seeks to prove the existence of God. This is through an assertion that there is "a distinction between different categories of existence." The premise of the ontological argument is based on Alexius Meinong's works. Some scholars also associate it with St. Anselm's ontological argument.
Gilbert Ryle once referred to Meinong as 'the supreme entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy', and Keith Donnellan alludes to 'the Meinongian population explosion', both thereby expressing a common view that lies behind the bon mot that we should cut back Meinong's jungle with Occam's razor.
