Baker ran Bush's unsuccessful campaign for the 1980 Republican presidential nomination, but after Bush joined the Republican ticket under Ronald Reagan, Baker became an asset to the incoming president. Reagan appointed Baker as his White House chief of staff, and Baker remained in that position until 1985, when he became Secretary of the Treasury. As treasury secretary, he arranged the Plaza Accord and the Baker Plan. He resigned as treasury secretary with some trepidation to manage Bush's successful 1988 campaign for president. After the election, Bush appointed Baker to the position of secretary of state. As Secretary of State, he helped oversee U.S. foreign policy during the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as during the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Baker served another stint as White House chief of staff from 1992 to 1993 to help orchestrate Bush's re-election bid.
James Addison Baker III was born at 1216 Bissonnet Street in Houston.[3] Baker's mother, Bonner Means Baker, was a Houston socialite. His father, James A. Baker Jr, was a partner of Houston law firm Baker Botts, which was founded by Baker's great-grandfather in 1871.
Baker's father was a strict figure who used corporal punishment, becoming known as "The Warden" by Baker and his friends.[4] He offered Baker the aphorism which Baker knew as the Five Ps: "prior preparation prevents poor performance." Baker referred to this mantra as a gift he thought about "almost every day of [his] adult life."[5] The Warden also forbade Baker from getting involved in politics, believing that it was unseemly. Baker named his memoir Work Hard, Study...and Stay Out of Politics after this worldview, expressed by both his father and grandfather.
While Baker was growing up, his father vehemently opposed Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, believing Roosevelt a class traitor who unduly burned wealthy Americans. Despite the sentiment, Baker's father and grand-father were still Democrats in the one-party state of Texas.[4]
Baker was born eighteen months before his only sibling, his sister Bonner Baker Moffitt.[6] Moffitt struggled with schizophrenia and a tumultuous marriage with Houston Chronicle reporter Donald Moffitt. She predeceased Baker in 2015.[7]
Education and pre-political career
Baker attended the private preparatory academy the Kinkaid School in Houston, where his father was chairman of the board, until 1946.[8] For his final two years of school, Baker attended the Hill School, a boarding school in Pottstown, Pennsylvania attended by his father and late uncle.[8]
After boarding school, Baker attended Princeton University. Though his grades were middling, his father was a Princeton alumnus and wrote to the school more than a year before Baker applied to lobby for his admission. While at Princeton, Baker, by his own admission, "went wild" and joined multiple drinking societies, including the 21 Club and the "Right Wing Club" (named because members would use their right arms when drinking).[9] In 1952, Baker completed his history degree with a 188-page senior thesis, titled "Two Sides of the Conflict: Bevin vs. Bevan," under the supervision of Walter P. Hall.[10]
During the Korean War, Baker served for six months on the USS Monrovia (pictured) in the Mediterranean Sea.
Soon after the outset of the Korean War, while at Princeton, Baker joined a U.S. Marine officer training program to avoid being drafted before he finished college.[9] Baker went on active duty with the Marines from his graduation in 1952 to 1954. After months of basic training, he was originally assigned to lead an infantry platoon which may have taken him to the front in Korea. Baker instead requested to be assigned as a naval gunfire spotter.[11] Baker received the assignment and served for six months in the Mediterranean Sea aboard the USSMonrovia as first lieutenant. Baker remained in the Marine Corps Reserve until 1958, rising to the rank of captain.[11]
After his mandatory two years of active duty service, Baker began attending the University of Texas School of Law, his father's alma mater.[12] He considered attending law school in the northeast, but chose the University of Texas due to his family connection and greater compatibility with a Texas-based law career.[13] At the urging of his father, he joined the Phi Delta Theta fraternity and underwent severe hazing rituals:
"I went through hell. I had these young kids that were five and six years younger than I was telling me, ‘Sit on that ice block in burlap,’ and they would drop raw eggs down my throat. I did all that for my dad. He wanted me to do it.”[13]
In November 1953, while enlisted, Baker married his first wife and sired his first child soon after. While he received a dispensation from the army under the G.I. Bill, Baker also received a monthly allowance from his father to help him support his wife and child while in school.[13]
After law school, Baker intended to join the family firm Baker Botts, which was among the largest in the state. The firm had implemented a no-nepotism rule, which would have prevented Baker from working there while his father still did.[14] Baker and his father requested an exception, but the partners of the firm voted against admitting Baker. After his tenure as Secretary of State ended in 1993, Baker returned to Baker Botts, which had revised its rule to allow for Baker and his descendants to join.[14]
Baker was not able to join the family firm Baker Botts due to a policy against nepotism.
From 1957 to 1980, Baker practiced law at Andrews, Kurth, Campbell, & Bradley.[15] Baker's work at the firm largely involved helping clients draft by-laws, advising on mergers and acquisitions, and otherwise providing guidance as needed. The firm's business primarily lied in the prosperous oil and gas trade in Texas, with its most important client being the eccentric tycoon Howard Hughes, though Baker himself never worked with Hughes in any detail. Baker's clients included Petro-Tex Chemical Corporation, Con Edison, and the oil-rich heirs of Shanghai Pierce.[15]
While at Andrews, Kurth, Baker worked six to seven days a week and considered himself a "workaholic." He wrote in his memoir that his only significant breaks from work would be for tennis—he won back-to-back doubles tournaments at the Houston Country Club with future president George H.W. Bush—and occasional hunting trips.[16] Though he had a consistent, relatively high salary as a lawyer at a blue-chip firm, Baker's father continued to support him financially, providing money for his first house, for parts of his children's education, for Baker to buy a station wagon, and as assistance in the construction of a new house.[15]
When Baker wanted to buy a parcel of poorly developed South Texas land in 1968, his father refused to put up his money, feeling that the property offered little value.[15] Since Baker's father was, at that point, struggling with Parkinson's disease, his mother decided to grant Baker the money over his father's objections. Baker named the land "Rockpile Ranch" in deference to his father's doubts.
Early political career
In his twenties and thirties, while working at Andrews Kurth, Baker considered himself apolitical. He was a registered Democrat in one-party Texas, but he wrote in the memoir that he consistently voted for the Republican presidential candidate.[17] Baker attended the first inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower after receiving tickets while training at Quantico.[18]
Baker's first wife, the former Mary Stuart McHenry, was active in the Republican Party, coming from a family of Ohio Republicans. After their marriage, she continued to act as a Republican booster, supporting the Congressional campaigns of George H. W. Bush.[16] In addition, Baker's growing closeness with his tennis partner Bush and his conservative father—who supported Bush's father's political career and donated to Bush's first campaigns—influenced Baker's political preferences.[19]
In his first foray into electoral politics, Baker helped his friend George H.W. Bush (pictured) run for the Senate in Texas.
Baker supported Bush socially during his failed 1964 Senate campaign against Ralph Yarborough and in his successive successful House campaigns, but not actively. In the lead-up to the 1970 Senate campaign, Bush decided to forgo re-election for the House of Representatives—due to Texas's resign-to-run statute—to run again for the Senate against Yarborough. Bush encouraged Baker to run as his replacement in the House.[19] Baker strongly considered the opportunity for some weeks, since he had grown bored with routine and would have an almost certain safe seat.[20] He decided not to run to avoid campaigning as his wife's cancer grew worse. She died in February 1970, shortly after Baker decided not to run.[21]
In the aftermath of her death, Bush encouraged him to assist in the Senate campaign.[22] Baker chaired Bush's operation in Harris County, fundraising and coordinating support. Bush lost in 1970 to conservative Democrat Lloyd Bentsen—who had defeated the more liberal Yarborough in the Democratic primary—53 percent to Bush's 47 percent.[23]
During and after the campaign, Baker continued to work at Andrews Kurth as he reoriented his family life following his wife's passing. By the time of Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972, Baker returned to politics as Finance Chair for Texas.[24] After Nixon's victory, he considered multiple appointments. Bush lobbied Texas Senator John Tower to submit Baker for nomination to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.[24] Though that effort failed, Baker considered joining the executive branch with a scheduled interview for the same day as the sudden departures of John Dean, H.R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman in 1973.[25] He received and rejected an offer to be the assistant administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, due to the continuing Watergate Scandal.[26]
Ford administration (1975–1976)
Baker continued to work at Andrews Kurth before he received an appointment as Under Secretary of Commerce under Rogers Morton. Morton chose Baker after a trip to China where he spoke with Bush—then the U.S. Ambassador to China—who strongly recommended Baker for the role.[27] Baker was confirmed by the Senate in August 1975.[28]
Under Secretary of Commerce
In the role, Baker attended the White House as the department representative in discussions surrounding the economy. Baker was a key figure in pushing for protectionist policy toward Chinese textiles, over the objections of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.[29] In a campaign event in Oklahoma during Ford's primary campaign against Ronald Reagan, Baker also caused a mild controversy when he declared to anti-Kissinger conservatives that Ford would replace him should he win re-election.[29]White House Chief of StaffDick Cheney sternly reprimanded Baker, who apologized to Kissinger.
Baker was an occasional resource for political judgment in the campaign, including in the lead-up to Ford's loss to Reagan in the Texas primary. After the untimely death of political operative Jack Stiles, Morton—who was then running Ford's campaign—appointed Baker to be Ford's "delegate wrangler" during the 1976 Republican National Convention.[30]
In Kansas City, Baker and his team narrowly won the floor fight for Ford, with the count of 1,187 to 1,070.[31] According to his biographers, among Baker's strengths in the role were consistently accurate delegate estimates, especially compared to the fluctuating numbers offered by Reagan's representative, John Sears.[32] Baker was hailed in a profile from The New York Times as a "Miracle Man."[33] His floor team included future campaign manager Paul Manafort.[34]
Ford 1976 campaign chairman
Shortly after the convention, Baker replaced Morton as campaign chairman.[35] Morton departed after publicly criticizing Ford's prospects following the Reagan challenge. Cheney and political consultant Stuart Spencer chose Baker partly due to his success at convention and the belief, as Cheney put it to Newsweek, that he had the energy to "take a dead organization and turn it around."[36] Morton's wife had requested that Baker reject the promotion to reduce her husband's embarrassment, but Baker did not.[36] He told his biographers that taking over in those circumstances was one of the "toughest' moments in his political career.[36]
Among Baker's strategies in the campaign was the decision to agree to the first televised presidential debates since the 1960 election.[37] Ford and Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter met for three debates. Though polling indicated that Ford fared well in the first debate, he fared poorly in the second debate, partly due a gaffe where he claimed that there was "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford administration."[38] Televised debates have been held in each of the subsequent American presidential elections.[39]
Baker (left) participated in a 1976 campaign strategy session with President Gerald Ford (fourth from left) and others in Vail, CO.
In the days before the election, Baker controversially wrote to black clergymen to call attention to provocateur Clennon King's criticism of Carter, an integrationist, for the de facto segregation of his Plains, Georgia church.[40] Ford denounced the action internally as an apparent dirty trick he would disavow.[40] It also strengthened the connection Baker had tried to sever between Carter and black supporters, as prominent figures such as Jesse Jackson and Coretta Scott King rallied to support him.[40]
Ford lost the popular vote to Carter by two percentage points and fell in the electoral college by small margins in two states.[41] Despite the defeat, Baker received credit for improving Ford's chances and for closing the deficit, which was as large as 13 percent when Baker began. Other members of Ford's campaign team, including Stuart Spencer, strongly criticized Baker for failing to spend all of the campaign funds ($21.8 million) allotted to each of the candidates.[42] Baker had declined to spend the surplus money (about $1 million) for concerns about encroaching on post-Watergate propriety.
Candidacy for Texas Attorney General (1978)
Baker campaigned against Mark White, the Democratic nominee for Attorney General, but lost by an 11-point margin in November 1978. White later went on to be elected Texas governor.
After the 1976 election, Baker returned to Andrews Kurth, but he intended to re-enter politics. In a conversation with his friend George H.W. Bush, he asked for advice about running for state office in Texas. Bush recommended challenging Governor Dolph Briscoe, but Baker decided to run for Attorney General, expecting to face Price Daniel Jr., son of the former governor and descendant of Sam Houston.[27][40] Baker concluded that Daniel would be an easier candidate to defeat than Briscoe, as a pedigreed liberal in a state that was shifting toward conservative Republicans like Reagan.
Daniel ran for the Democratic primary, but lost to former Texas Secretary of StateMark White by 4 percentage points.[40] Baker himself ran unopposed in his primary.[43]
In the general election, Baker ran as a moderate, telling advocacy group LULAC that he would support civil rights protections, even as Republican nominee for governor, Bill Clements, did not.[44] Baker did maintain the Republican orthodoxy on preventing taxpayer-funding of abortions, instituting harsher mandatory sentences for some criminals, and supporting the death penalty. National Republicans, including Reagan, Ford, 1976 Vice Presidential nominee Bob Dole campaigned on Baker's behalf in the race.[44]
Baker's ran on the slogan "Texas needs a lawyer, not a politician, for attorney general."[45]The Houston Chronicle political reporter Jim Barlow, who led the Chronicle's coverage of the race, told Baker's biographers that "he was the worst retail politician" that he had encountered over a 15-year career.[46] The Chronicle editorial page endorsed White over Baker, leading Baker to resent his hometown newspaper.
Baker lost the Attorney General race to White with an 11-point deficit. In the same year, Clements defeated Democratic governor nominee John Hill, becoming the first Republican to be elected Texas governor since the Reconstruction era. Republican Senator John Tower also defeated Democratic challenger, Bob Krueger.
1980 Presidential election
Bush, who was serving as chairman of the First International Bank following the end of the Ford presidency, requested Baker's help in running for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980. As early as December 1978, Baker had already checked former President Ford to confirm that Ford would not seek the nomination himself, to prevent any conflicts for Baker as Ford's previous campaign manager.[47] Baker and Bush also spoke with Reagan, a previous high performer in the Republican primaries, to inform him of their intention to run.
Bush 1980 presidential primary campaign
Baker and Bush chose a strategy for the primaries that then-incumbent Carter pioneered in his 1976 campaign.[48] To compete with party heavyweights like Reagan and former Texas governor John Connally, Baker's argued that the campaign would need a superior organizations, arguing that "primary elections are won by organization!—almost regardless of candidate."[47]
Reagan campaign operative Senator Paul Laxalt (left) speaks with Baker (center) and George Bush during Bush's 1980 campaign for the Republican nomination.
Baker and Bush's campaign strategy resulted in a Bush victory over Reagan in the Iowa race, 31.6 percent to 29.5 percent.[49] Bush lost significantly in the New Hampshire primary—Reagan's 50.2 percent to Bush's 23—following the victory in Iowa. In that primary contest, Bush and Baker engaged in a controversial debate performance hosted by the Nashua Telegraph that hurt his electoral prospects.[50]
Over the successive months, Baker led the Bush campaign to a handful of victories, including in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maine. Despite some success, Baker felt Bush was unlikely to defeat Reagan.[51] Without conferring with his candidate, Baker hinted to TheWashington Post in early June that Bush would soon wind down his campaign.[51][52] When they eventually met in Texas to discuss prospects going forward, Baker encouraged Bush to end his campaign, arguing that they lacked funds and that continuing would jeopardize the possibility of Reagan naming him Vice President nominee.[51] Bush didn't want to abandon his organization and expressed ambivalence toward the Vice Presidency, but he acceded to Baker's advice to end his campaign.[53]
Reagan campaign
In the months between Bush's withdrawal and the 1980 Republican National Convention, Baker lobbied the Reagan campaign to choose Bush as Vice Presidential nominee in the name of party unity.[54] Despite misgivings over his "Voodoo economics" criticism and moderately pro-choice views, Reagan eventually picked Bush for the nomination.[55] Baker was offered, but rejected, the chance to run Bush's Vice Presidential campaign, feeling it was below him.[56] Instead, he worked on the Reagan campaign in managing the debates.
As debate negotiator, Baker worked with Democrat Robert Strauss and the League of Women Voters to decide on how many debates to hold and when.[56] Though there were three debates scheduled, only the last featured Carter and Reagan on the same stage. In his memoir, Carter advisor Stuart Eizenstat credited Baker as "outfox[ing]" the Carter camp in scheduling the debate so soon before the election, leaving little potential for damage control.[57]
Debategate
In 1983, Baker faced controversy, known as "Debategate," upon the revelation that Baker's debate team had received a binder with Carter's debate preparation and strategy. In a letter Baker wrote to Congressman Donald Albosta, he claimed:
It is my recollection that I was given the book by [Reagan campaign chairman] William Casey with the suggestion that it might be of use to the debate briefing team. [...] It is correct that, after seeing the book, I did not undertake to find out how our campaign had obtained it."[58]
Casey denied Baker's recollection, but Congressional investigators found Baker's explanation to be more credible.[59]
Whether Baker's use of the Carter briefing books has itself been a matter of debate. Though the book was used by Reagan's opponent in the mock preparatory debate as a reference, Baker claimed to his biographers that they weren't "worth a damn."[59] Carter himself remained convinced that his material had been unethically used against him in the debate, but felt that Baker's upright reputation excused him from any of Carter's ill will.[59]
White House Chief of Staff (1981–1985)
On October 29, 1980, the night after Reagan's successful performance in the debate, Reagan campaign consultant Stuart Spencer proposed to Reagan that Baker should be his chief of staff, should he win.[60] Supported by Nancy Reagan and Reagan aide Michael Deaver, Spencer felt that Baker would be a less provocative choice than hardliner Edwin Meese, who had worked with Reagan throughout his campaigns and governorship. Reagan agreed, announcing Baker as his choice the morning after his election victory.[60]
Shortly after the election, Baker and Meese met to arrange their division of responsibilities. chief of staff in an informal agreement that has been referred to as the Troika: Baker would be chief of staff, in charge of day-to-day issues of access to the president and negotiations; Meese would be Counselor to the President, in charge of directing policy and long-term initiatives; With Deaver, who would be in charge of the administration's image, they made up "The Troika" of senior White House officials.
The Troika, under Baker's guidance, significantly restricted automatic access to Reagan to only family, Bush, and certain White House support staff.[61] Other callers would have to receive Troika approval. Among other influences, the Troika had effective veto power over hiring and firing. Though Reagan was the ultimate decider, he only acted on unanimous consent from the Troika, often preferring not to fire people if possible.[62]
Despite the power-sharing principle behind the Troika, Baker is considered to have had a high degree of influence over the first Reagan administration. Reagan biographer Max Boot argued that the arrangement let Baker "run circles around Meese," whom Baker privately derided as "Pillsbury Doughboy." Lou Cannon, who covered the administration for The Washington Post, referred to Baker as being the "key" to the proper functioning of the Troika.[63] Ford and Bush advisor Brent Scowcroft referred to Baker as "co-president, in a way," under Reagan.[64] In 1992, Washington Post columnist Marjorie Williams referred to Baker as "the most powerful [chief of staff] in political memory."[45]
Reagan assassination attempt
In March 1981, John Hinckleytried to shoot Reagan while he was leaving an AFL-CIO conference in Washington.[65] Baker wasn't in his entourage and learned of the shooting as Reagan was in the hospital. Baker and Meese joined Deaver at the hospital, where Reagan was in critical condition. Baker, Meese, and White House Political Director Lyn Nofziger decided amongst themselves whether to use the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to make Bush the Acting President while Reagan's status was in flux.[66] The group of advisors decided, without asking Bush, to avoid any temporary transition.[66] Baker himself worried that such an action would feed into conservatives' existing distrust toward both him and Bush. With Baker's authorization, his deputy Richard Darman actively stopped White House discussion—by White House CounselFred Fielding and Secretary of StateAlexander Haig, among others—of any transition by taking the transition documents they had drafted and putting it in his office safe.[66][67] According to his biographers, Baker consciously restricted access to Reagan during his recovery period, fearing that it would cast doubts on his overall competence if the country knew his poor health in the immediate aftermath.[68]
Conservative criticism
Members of the conservative movement publicly criticized Baker for his support of Sandra Day O'Connor and apparent inaction on conservative priorities. In Spring 1982, Baker confronted conservative writer Robert Novak for the negative coverage he felt he received over multiple Evans & Novak columns.[69] Shortly after Baker's outburst at Novak, long-time Reagan booster Clymer Wright of Houston wrote a letter to Republicans in an unsuccessful effort to convince Reagan to dismiss Baker.[70] Wright claimed that Baker, a former Democrat and a Bush political intimate, was a "usurper" who undermined conservative initiatives in the administration.
Reagan directly rejected Wright's request in a letter, at Baker's request. Reagan wrote that he himself was in charge and that Baker was following Reagan's own initiative. Despite the rebuttal, conservatives continued to distrust Baker. Former administration official Lyn Nofziger wrote a letter to conservative Republicans in late 1982 to express concern that the 1984 race would be a "Bush-Reagan," rather than a "Reagan-Bush," campaign.[69] Baker and Reagan both called Nofziger directly to ask him to retract the sentiment.[69] In January 1983, Interior SecretaryJames G. Watt pioneered the slogan "Let Reagan be Reagan," a barb about Baker and Bush, which became a common refrain among activists and columnists.[69]
Three years into the administration, Baker became heavily dispirited and tired due to the weight of his job; according to his wife, Baker was "so anxious to get out of [his job]" that he gave some consideration to the prospect of becoming Commissioner of Baseball.[71] Despite having no strong baseball fandom, Baker reached the last level of consideration to replace Bowie Kuhn before losing out to Peter Ueberroth.[72] Reagan offered to appoint Baker as Secretary of Transportation in 1983, but Baker believed that his rival Meese had pushed the plan.[72] At Bush's suggestion, he also strongly considered trying to become CIA Director.[69] In 1983, some Texas legislators attempted to draft Baker to run for the Senate seat that would open following John Tower's retirement, but Baker declined what he felt might be a demotion in power.[45][73]
National Security Advisor
In October 1983, Baker attempted to replace William Clark as National Security Advisor. Clark left for the Interior Department, partly out of feeling frustrated by what he perceived as Baker, Deaver, and Nancy Reagan's undue influence over the president.[61] Baker planned for Deaver to be his replacement as Chief of Staff.[74] Reagan initially agreed to the arrangement and had a drafted press release announcing the change. According to his biographers, Baker agreed that Reagan should inform the National Security Council before a press announcement, but did not attend the meeting himself.
After a long lunch with Baker ally George Shultz, Reagan was late to the NSC meeting, so Clark came up to the Oval Office to retrieve him.[75] Upon seeing the press release announcing the changes, Clark organized the NSC's conservative bloc— Clark, Meese, Casey, Weinberger—to reject the reshuffle.[74]
The conservative bloc wanted to appoint UN AmbassadorJeane Kirkpatrick, an anti-Soviet hardliner, as Clark's replacement instead. Baker, Deaver, and Shultz rallied to reject Kirkpatrick as unacceptably extreme. Reagan eventually chose Robert McFarlane, who was later convicted of crimes stemming from the Iran-Contra affair, as Clark's replacement.[74] In his memoir, Reagan referred to the decision not to appoint Baker as a "turning point" in his presidency.[76]
1984 campaign
Baker began to plan Reagan's expected re-election bid beginning in Autumn 1982.[77] Though Reagan did not officially announce his campaign until late January 1984—which the planning committee itself decided—Baker and his informal group—which included Deaver, Stuart Spencer, and Republican pollster Robert Teeter—believed his candidacy was a foregone conclusion.[77][78] The meetings ran weekly in the Madison Hotel until late 1983.[77]
As the Chief of Staff, Baker was not officially in charge of the campaign operations, but exerted extensive power over it. As such, Baker conflicted repeatedly with Senator Paul Laxalt, who was the official 1984 campaign chairman.[79] Baker informally chose Laxalt's deputy, campaign managerEd Rollins, and the question of who Rollins reported to spurred some minor internecine conflicts.[80][81] Early in the campaign, Laxalt directly complained to Reagan that Baker had assumed de facto control over the campaign. Reagan confirmed Laxalt's authority, leading to Baker accusing Rollins of "sandbagging" him in the campaign.[80] Laxalt also dismissed Baker as "the hired help" when they were at odds over campaign direction.[79]
Baker (third from right) and Reagan (third from left) on Air Force One, celebrating at the end of the president's successful re-election campaign.
During the campaign, Baker continued to work as a member of the cadre of senior advisors with his deputy Darman, Spencer, Deaver, Stockman, Rollins, and Laxalt.[80] Baker received credit for empowering conservative Republicans of the New Right—led by Representative Newt Gingrich—to decide much of the 1984 party platform, believing that Reagan would run on his actions as president more than specific policy proposals. Baker and Spencer did reject an attempt by platform-drafters to forswear any future tax hikes.[82] Instead, they had Reagan make his stance not that he would promise not to raise taxes, only that he had "no plans" to raise taxes.[80] The latter would allow Reagan to avoid upsetting anti-tax conservatives while allowing that taxes could be necessary to reaching a balanced budget without major cuts to Medicare or Social Security.
Reagan's won the election with a record 525 electoral votes total (of a possible 538), and received 58.8% of the popular vote to Walter Mondale's 40.6%.[83]
The campaign overall was optimistic about their chances throughout the process. A widely shared sentiment among Baker and senior aides was the one expressed by Stuart Spencer, that their goal was to not "screw up" their otherwise excellent chances.[84] Baker himself earned praise for minimizing campaign conflicts by directing conflicting aides toward Rollins, who would then adjudicate disputes before they boiled over.[81] Unlike in the 1976 and 1980 campaigns that Baker was involved in, there were no major staffing changes throughout the Republican campaign.
Baker managed Reagan's 1984 re-election campaign in which Reagan polled a record 525 electoral votes total (of a possible 538), and received 58.8% of the popular vote to Walter Mondale's 40.6%.[83]
In 1985, Reagan named Baker as United States Secretary of the Treasury, in a job-swap with then-Secretary Donald Regan, a former Merrill Lynch executive who became Chief of Staff. Regan suggested the change to Baker, feeling that the White House position would grant him greater power.[85] For his part, Baker relished the prestige of the Treasury Department and considered it a "stepping stone" to further prominence.[86] Reagan had little role in the plan, immediately approving it after his appointees suggested it.
Baker's departure from the White House came at the same time as others from Reagan's first term, including Meese, Deaver, Stockman, Rollins, and Baker's deputy Darman, who went with him to the Treasury Department. Baker's departure in particular marked a "turning point" in Reagan's presidency, according to Reagan biographer Lou Cannon.[87] After Regan replaced Baker, administration "blunders [became] more frequent and damage control [was] lacking."[87]
Baker was confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury on January 29, 1985 with a unanimous 95-0 vote in the Senate.[88]
Baker brought his long-time aide Darman to the Treasury Department as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. Darman was considered to be essential to Baker's agenda, as a detail-oriented and aggressive complement to Baker's more politic style. According to Wall Street Journal reporters Alan S. Murray and Jeffrey Birnbaum, stakeholders considered the Baker tenure to really be the Baker-Darman Treasury, with "Darmanesque" tactics representing anything particularly "sneaky and conniving."[89] Darman chafed at the outsized credit Baker received and resented being known as a "Baker aide" rather than his own entity.[86]
Baker's signature, which was featured on U.S. currency from his confirmation as Treasury Secretary in 1985 to his departure in 1988.
Besides Darman, Baker also brought Margaret Tutwiler and John F.W. Rogers from his White House staff to the Treasury department, as Assistant Secretary For Public Affairs and Assistant Secretary for Management respectively.
Tax Reform Act of 1986
The immediate priority of the Treasury under Baker was a plan to overhaul the tax code. Baker, as Chief of Staff, had placed a promise to "study" tax reform in the beginning of 1984, as a sop for the election year political climate.[90] Regan's plan (known as Treasury 1) was released toward the beginning of 1985. It would have removed many tax loopholes preferred by Reagan's business-friendly base. Though Democrats, including former presidential nominee George McGovern, spoke highly of the plan, Baker received questions during his confirmation hearings from Senators concerned for their local industries. Some Republican donors also returned pins they had received for large donations to the party, as a gesture of dissatisfaction with the reform.[89]
Donald Regan (right), who preceded Baker (center) as Treasury Secretary, and Baker addressed Reagan (left) shortly after their new appointments.
Over the course of four months, Baker and his staff drafted their own plan to present to Congress. Baker worked clandestinely on discussions between White House representatives and the offices of Senators Howard Baker (R-TN), Bob Dole (R-KS), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), and Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill (D-MA).[91] The goal was to develop a compromise that avoided controversy, which Baker consciously modeled off of the 1983 Social Security reforms.
The powerful House Ways and Mean Committee chairman Dan Rostenkowski did not participate in Baker's preliminary negotiations, feeling it would cede Congressional authority if he joined an executive branch proposal. When Reagan announced the proposal—which he referred to as a "second American Revolution"—in May 1985, Rostenkowski broadcast his own response to clarify areas of difference.[92][93]
Following the announcement in May, Baker continued to work with Rostenkowski and other members of Congress. In this process, one of Rostenkwoski's aides noted that he "really played Rostentowski like a cello," by treating him with excessive regard.[94]
The four "bedrock principles" Baker felt were necessary for reform were that it be revenue-neutral, would "reduce the top income tax rate for individuals to no higher than 35 percent, [would] remove millions of lower-income families from the tax rolls, and [would] retain the popular mortgage interest deduction."[94]
Baker (fourth from right) and other administration officials watching Congress vote on the 1986 tax bill.
When Rostenkowski introduced his bill in December 1985, it offered different provisions, including a 38 percent top rate and fewer deductions, but Baker supported it. When some House Republicans, including Dick Cheney (R-WY) and Trent Lott (R-MS) tried to organized to reject the plan, Baker successfully appealed to Reagan to stop the revolt.[94] Cheney credited Baker for having Reagan give a patriotic speech to House members in the immediate wake of the Arrow Air Flight 1285R crash in Canada that had resulted in the death of more than 200 U.S. Marines.[94]
The bill passed the House in mid-December 1985 and was reported to the Senate for further consideration.[95] In the Senate, Chairman Bob Packwood (R-OR) significantly revised the House plan, mainly by lowering the top tax rate to 25 percent for individuals, while increasing the corporate tax burden by closing loopholes and other initiatives.[96] Baker supported Packwood's change and worked to lobby Senators to the plan.[96] The bill eventually passed the Senate in July 1986 and after the reconciliation process, was signed into law by Reagan on October 22, 1986.[95]
Baker received credit for fostering the compromise that led to a major reform of the tax code. But Baker also earned notice for some carve-outs that he advocated for. Along with Senator John Danforth (R-MO), Baker strongly argued against a proposed tax on money gifted from grandparents to grandchildren.[97] Aides believed Danforth and Baker vigorously condemned the so-called "kiddie tax" due in part to their vast personal wealth. Baker also weighed in to break an impasse in favor of oil-state Senators who wanted exemptions for the petrochemical industry.[97] Baker's own extensive business with the industry and with his home state of oil-rich Texas was believed by some stakeholders to have informed his behavior.
Besides some of the broader issues, Baker also, in his words, used the bill to get "payback" against the Houston Chronicle for not endorsing him in his 1978 campaign for Texas Attorney General.[96] Due to a law passed in 1969, the newspaper's owners required periodic exemptions to maintain their stake.[96] In the 1986 bill, Baker intentionally removed their exemption, leading to their sale in 1987 for $400 million dollars to Hearst.[96][98] Decades later, Baker told his biographers that he was happy "getting even."[96]
In addition to the focus on tax reform, Baker expended attention to the issue of currency valuation. His feeling, according to his biographers, was that the increased strength of the US dollar had hampered domestic industries and exacerbated American trade deficits.
To resolve the perceived issue, Baker met with finance ministers from Japan, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom in September 1985 at the Plaza Hotel in New York City.[99] The parties agreed to sell their stores of American currency to decrease the supply, aiming for a 10-12 percent depreciation in the dollar. To avoid speculation, Baker kept much of the press and the Reagan administration—including Secretaries of State and Commerce—out of the loop on a major agreement over international finance.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and Japanese Vice Minister of Finance Toyoo Gyohten wrote that the Accord represented a "coup de grace" that sent a strong sign to guide the market.[100]
In early 1987, the parties to the Plaza Accord met again in Paris to adjust their approach to the value of the dollar. In the intervening year and a half, the dollar had depreciated by 40 percent. Under the Louvre Accord, the parties agreed to stabilize it where it ended
1987 Stock Market crash
On "Black Monday" in October 1987 American stock markets fell steeply. Baker's comments on monetary policy are considered one of multiple contributing factors to the crash.
In the middle of October 1987, Baker made multiple statements that threatened the US would not support the dollar vis a vis the Deutsche mark after West Germany raised its own interest rates. The October 18, 1987 New York Times carried an article detailing Baker's comments as an "abrupt shift" and noted that it might "erode markets."[101] The next day, October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average experienced its largest ever single-day drop in value (22.6 percent). The event, which was preceded by smaller drops in the prior week and similar drops in the Asian and European markets, became known as "Black Monday." Though the event had multiple factors, there were people who laid blame at American monetary policy and Baker's comments specifically. In a survey of monetary policy, economist Yōichi Funabashi summarized the role of Baker's comments in the panic:
"...wait a minute. If [Baker] is using it as a lever [to influence the Bundesbank] and we believe it won't work, there is no bottom. If he isn't using it as a lever, and he just actually wants the dollar to go down, then there is no stability. And if he isn't clear whether it is one or the other of those, then he doesn't understand his own system and his own business, and we'll have a problem of confidence."[102]
In the investigations after the crash conducted by the Brady Commission, Baker was accorded only a peripheral role in the crisis. The use of specific computer technology, group psychology and somewhat inflated valuation of some stocks, all contributed to the crash as much or more than Baker's comments.[103]
Other
During the Reagan administration, Baker also served on the Economic Policy Council, where he played an instrumental role in achieving the passage of the administration's tax and budget reform package in 1981. He also played a role in the development of the American Silver Eagle and American Gold Eagle coins, which both were released in 1986.
President George H. W. Bush announced Baker as his choice for Secretary of State the day after his election victory.[104] The Senate unanimously confirmed Baker on January 25, 1989.
Some perspective at the time framed Baker as equal to the president, which Bush wrote in his diary was "nonsense."[105] Even so, Baker's relationship and status made him a powerful figure in the political landscape. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft originally deferred to Baker as the public foreign policy voice of the administration, despite longstanding institutional competition between the two positions.[105] Columnist William Safire predicted that he would define the administration's foreign policy, for better or worse.[106] As Baker's biographers Susan Glasser and Peter Baker (no relation) summarized the view:
"[Baker] had an advantage that no secretary of state before him ever had. [...] No one could go around him or over his head. [Vice President Dan] Quayle and others had already tried and Baker invariably shut them down, often by directly intervening with Bush. If Baker declared a position on behalf of America, his interlocutors knew it would stick. And if he made a promise, they knew he could deliver. For nearly four years, it was almost as if the country had a second president to send overseas to negotiate and lay down the law."[107]
Nicaragua and Iran-Contra
One of Baker's immediate priorities after his appointment was to reduce American involvement in Latin America, which had resulted in the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan administration.[105] Baker appointed Bernard Aronson, a Contra-supporting Democrat, to be his Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.[108] Negotiating with House Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX) shortly after the election, Baker offered to stop requesting military funding for the Contra rebels, providing an off-ramp for American involvement in the conflict.[105]
Aronson and Baker reoriented their position toward humanitarian, rather than military, aid for Nicaragua. Baker took the position that the administration would not assist the Contras, at least until the results of the 1990 election, when Sandinista incumbent Daniel Ortega would seek re-election. Partly as an olive branch to his Democratic partners, Baker worked with the Carter Center to ensure the election was fairly run.
In March 1989, Bush signed the Bipartisan Accord on Central America, which stated that the "Executive and the Congress are united on a policy to achieve" democratization, an end to intra-American subversion, and reduction in Soviet influence.[109] It also earmarked $4.5 million a month in humanitarian aid to the Contras through to the February 1990 election.[110]
Baker ran afoul of some Republicans who supported the Contras' armed rebellion against Ortega's Sandinista government. Senator Jesse Helms (R-SC) in particular opposed Aronson as too dovish and inexperienced.[111] Quayle's office also strongly opposed Baker's stance on Nicaragua, criticizing Aronson's appointment and providing intelligence that cast doubt on Baker's strategy.[110][112]
In the 1990 Nicaraguan election, the Sandinista party was defeated by Violetta Chamorro.[113] Chamorro was a relatively inexperienced consensus candidate for the anti-Sandinista UNO coalition, who successfully ran on ending the Contra-Sandinista war and American sanctions.[114] Baker himself expected that Ortega would win out, but he and the Bush administration had strongly supported Chamorro's candidacy.[112]
The Soviet Union
Baker also played a significant role in the administration's approach to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Bush and Reagan had met together in December 1988 with Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev to continue warming relations between the countries, with Gorbachev announcing that he planned to withdraw hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.[115] Baker and Bush's immediate strategy was to "Pause" detente while the Americans could reassess.[115] Despite the Pause, events in the region throughout Baker's terms required greater involvement.
Amidst the dissolution of the USSR, Baker participated extensively in the negotiations to reunify Germany following the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall. Baker was the first American official to enter East Berlin after the Wall's destruction in December 1989.[116] Vice President Quayle had intended to visit first, but Bush allowed Baker the honor over Quayle's objections.[116] On his trip, Baker became the first and only Secretary of State to go into East Germany beyond Berlin, where he met with the East German premier Modrow and visited St. Nicholas Church.[117] The US Ambassador to Germany in Bonn, Vernon Walters, strongly opposed the trip as aiding the Communist image, leading to Baker excluding him for the rest of German reunification negotiations.[112]
Baker, while primarily negotiating with the Soviets and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, spoke of the Two Plus Four plan for German reunification. The framework which, in September 1990, became the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany emphasized the self-determination of the two partitioned parts of the German whole, with the assent of the Four Powers countries. The notion was drafted by Baker's State Department advisors, though it is disputed whether Francis Fukuyama or Dennis Ross was the prime mover.[112] The plan was mildly distrusted by Bush and Scowcroft at the time, who worried about the speed of the change and whether West German ChancellorHelmut Kohl was completely on board.[118] Baker approached controversy when he negotiated with Gorbachev over the eastward expansion of NATO. In discussions with Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign MinisterEduard Shevardnadze, per a contemporaneous memo, Baker said that:
"There would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east"[119]
Given that a unified Germany would naturally result in either NATO's expulsion of West Germany (which had been a member since 1955) or an eastward expansion of NATO's jurisdiction, the promise taken literally would be untenable in the context of German reunification. Some in the Bush administration cautioned Baker, but Baker indicated that he had only meant that NATO would not add new members in Eastern Europe.[120] The record is conflicted on exactly what Baker meant and how what he said was understood at the time, but Russian PresidentVladimir Putin, among others, have labeled it as one of multiple instances where NATO and the US allegedly misled Russo-Soviet stakeholders into reducing their share of geopolitical power.[121]
After Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Gorbachev insisted that Baker's comments should not be taken as a broken promise.[122] He said that NATO expansion was not considered relevant during the discussions in 1989 and that "everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done."[122] Gorbachev instead dated NATO's expansion eastward to 1993 and said it did not connect to previous promises.
The final Two Plus Four agreement was signed in September 1990, paving the way for a unified Germany by March 1991.[123]
Soviet dissolution
Changes in internationally recognized boundaries of countries after the end of the Cold War. Orange in the "before" map represents the territories as of 1991 which were affected.
Over the course of Baker's term, Soviet member states individually staged revolutions and made declarations of independence. When his tenure ended in 1992, the Soviet Union had completely shifted from one large communist state into 15 different democratic republics, with satellite states (e.g. Poland, Romania) also departing Soviet orbit through the sunset of the Warsaw Pact.
Throughout Baker's tenure as Secretary of State, the Soviets repeatedly attempted to suppress secessionist movements. Bush and Baker supported some of the interventions as necessary for law and order. Baker had told Shevardnadze in July 1989 that the US appreciated that the military might be needed to suppress "irrational bloodletting and national hatreds."[125] The administration therefore "completely" supported Soviet suppression of Azeri Popular Front demonstrators in Baku, as Bush told Soviet diplomat Yuri Dubinin in January 1990.[125]
The US had a stronger response to Soviet crackdowns in Lithuania, which voted for independence in March 1990. Baker warned Shevardnadze that—while the administration had restrained its criticism—should the Soviets use force, the "nuances" in its public statement would end.[126] Against Bush and Baker's wishes, more than a third of the US Senate unsuccessfully supported recognizing an independent Lithuania.[127][128] Conservative figures like William Safire, Evans & Novak, and Senator Jesse Helms all publicly criticized Bush and Baker's conciliatory approach.[128]
Baker (left) speaks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (center) in the White House Cabinet Room on June 1, 1990
In April, Baker attempted to mediate the conflict, separately pressing both Shevardnadze—by threatening a proposed trade agreement and the START treaty—and Lithuanian independence leader Vytautas Landsbergis.[129] The other Baltic republics joined Lithuania in resisting Soviet occupation that summer, but Baker and Bush maintained focus on bilateral issues issues like arms reduction, German reunification, and economic revitalization.[130][131]
When the Soviet Armed Forces confronted democracy protestors in Lithuania's capital in the so-called "Vilnius Massacre," Baker warned his counterpart that the escalation could bring "consequences," but the focus on the Gulf War prevented those consequences from materializing.[132]
Baker was the first US representative to officially visit Albania in June 1991. Approximately 300,000 Albanians evinced pro-American enthusiasm as Baker spoke in Tirana's Skanderbeg Square.[133][134] In the speech, Baker spoke in favor of Albania's post-Soviet reintegration into the world system.
"With the recent reestablishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries and with my own trip here today, I say to the people of Albania: America is returning to you."[135]
On the same trip, Baker visited Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia, to meet with Serb nationalistSlobodan Milosevic.[136] Three days after he departed, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia, plunging the country into what would become a decade of intermittent war.[137] Baker felt that even should the Balkans enter a state of war, the region bore little importance to US foreign policy interests.[136] To that point, he was quoted as saying that the US does not have "a dog in that fight."[138][139] This disposition was received by Milosevic as a correct assumption that he had a free-hand for ethnic violence without intervention by the Bush administration.[136]
Beyond the Balkans, Baker also shaped the administration's approach to Ukrainian independence. Soviet stakeholder felt that Ukraine's departure would be especially harmful, given its size and cultural history. Despite popular nationalist sentiment among the vast majority of Ukrainians, Baker said that the administration was "nervous" about Ukrainian secession due to their productive relationship with Gorbachev.[140] Bush therefore spoke in Ukraine's capital city to denounce "those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred." The speech would be derided by columnist William Safire as the "Chicken Kiev" speech, reflecting Baker and Bush's skittish approach toward the newly fractured Soviet ecosystem.
As the Soviet Union completely dissolved, Baker was a voice for caution in the administration. Against anti-Soviet hardliners like Cheney and Quayle who wanted the US to expedite Soviet disintegration, Baker worried that independent states would become "another Yugoslavia."[136] Baker felt that rash action or proactive support would only help "radicals," that risk of "chaos & civil war" would increase.[136] Despite his reservations, Baker declared in December 1991—shortly after the Belovezha Accords— that "the Soviet Union as we've known it no longer exists."[141][142]
Throughout 1990, Iraqi PresidentSaddam Hussein repeatedly agitated against its eastern neighbor, Kuwait. Iraq stationed members of its Republican Guard on the border and Hussein frequently and publicly condemned Kuwait for what he considered economic aggression.[143] At the time, the American foreign policy apparatus was more concerned with German reunification and the changing shape of Europe, meaning that, as Baker admitted, the US was blindsided.[144]
Days before the invasion, Assistant Secretary of StateJohn Kelly told a subcommittee that the U.S. would have no obligation to Kuwait if Iraq invaded, potentially giving Hussein a signal of American ambivalence.[143][145] On July 25, when Hussein summoned American Ambassador to IraqApril Glaspie, she discouraged Iraq's adventurism on the border, but allegedly gave the impression that the US would not involve itself in "Arab-Arab" disputes beyond its national interest.[143] Though Glaspie did not receive specific instructions for the impromptu meeting, a previous July 24 cable from Baker laid out American policy:
"While we take no position on the border delineation issue raised by Iraq with respect to Kuwait, or on other bilateral disputes, Iraqi statements suggest an intention to resolve outstanding disagreements by the use of force, an approach which is contrary to U.N. charter principles. The implications of having oil production and pricing policy in the gulf determined and enforced by Iraqi guns are disturbing."[146]
Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.[147] Baker was with Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze at the time of the early reports.[148] Though the Soviets were long-time supporters of Iraq and Hussein in the proxy conflicts of the Cold War and though both men originally doubted the reports' severity, the two ministers released a joint statement condemning the invasion and calling for the involvement of the UN Security Council.[148][149]
In administration planning sessions, Baker was more dovish than the president and some advisors. Bush wrote at the time that Baker was most concerned with avoiding "another Vietnam."[144] When an Iraqi oil tanker apparently broke the American-enforced embargo, Cheney, Scowcroft and some allies—including Margaret Thatcher—strongly felt that the US should destroy or detain the ship.[144] Baker convinced Bush that they should not escalate beyond firing warning shots. Besides concerns about the potential chaos from a full-blown war, Baker and Bush also operated off the Soviet feeling, expressed by Shevardnadze, that overt American aggression could jeopardize a more collaborative response.[144]
Following the invasion, Baker spent much of the late summer and autumn traveling to countries to encourage both political and financial support for military intervention to stop Hussein. Travelling 100,000 miles over a ten-week period, Baker visited the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Bahrain, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.[150]
When in Cairo, Baker also covertly met with Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen. Baker promised that if China did not torpedo the coalition plan with their UN Security Council veto, he would arrange a meeting in Washington to end the American diplomatic ice-out in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.[150][151] Baker originally understood Qichen's response to be agreement to vote for it, and tried to renege on his deal when China abstained on the UNSC vote.[151]
In November 1990. the UN Security Council resolved that if Iraq did not revert to the internationally recognized boundaries by January 15, 1990, Kuwait's allies could use "all necessary means" to ensure compliance. [152] Baker personally occupied the American seat at the UN to communicate their commitment to a multilateral response.[150] Baker equated the opposition to the UN plan with Nazi appeasement, arguing that deciding not to intervene would result in the UN ending in ignominy as the League of Nations had.[153] China declined to either support or reject the plan while Cuba and Yemen voted no, but all of the other 12 Security Council members supported the coalition.[154] Yemen's no vote came amidst American threats that it was the "most expensive vote [the country] ever cast," resulting in the cut-off of $70 million dollars in American aid and the expulsion of Yemeni emigrants in Saudi Arabia.[154]
Despite the license to intervene, Bush asked Baker to negotiate with Iraq further to avoid the use of force. Baker eventually met with Iraqi Foreign MinisterTariq Aziz in Switzerland, less than a week before the January 15 deadline.[155] The meeting ruffled some feathers, with Saudi ambassador Bandar and NSC chief Scowcroft feeling that the UN resolution meant the end of negotiation.[150] In the six-hour discussion, Aziz refused to engage with Baker's entreaties.[155] Baker implied that, should Iraq refuse to withdraw, a coalition response could result in significant Iraqi losses and the end to the Hussein regime through popular uprising.[156] Baker also explicitly cautioned that any use of chemical or biological weapons would escalate the conflict to where Americans would insist on the total "elimination of the current regime." Baker later acknowledged that his intent was to threaten a retaliatory nuclear strike on Iraq,[156]
The Bush administration sought Congressional approval for the invasion, though some administration officials, including Cheney, Chief of Staff John Sununu, and White House Counsel Boyden Gray, argued that it offered little upside.[157][158] Baker himself supported seeking Congress's imprimatur, feeling that it would increase Iraq's willingness to withdraw without the use of force.
The coalition began bombing Iraq on January 17, one day after the deadline for withdrawal had passed.[159] Soon after British, French, American, Saudi, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti airplanes bombed the country, Iraq launched SCUD missiles at Israel, killing thirteen people.[160] Though Israel demanded that it be allowed to partake, Baker refused to allow them access, overruling the view of Cheney, Scowcroft, and others.[157] Baker felt that any focus on Israel would strain the coalition, especially Arab members that strongly supported Palestine. Israeli Defense MinisterMoshe Arens, who traveled to Washington in the midst of the offensive to seek inclusion, characterized Baker as entirely unsympathetic.
Demolished vehicles line Highway 80, also known as the "Highway of Death", the route fleeing Iraqi forces took as they retreated from Kuwait
The air offensive continued for multiple weeks. Bush's senior advisors set a new deadline (February 24) for withdrawal on February 21 before the coalition would launch a ground offensive.[161] Though Cheney, Quayle, Colin Powell and others strongly supported the ultimatum, Baker offered lukewarm support, worrying about how allies would respond.[157]
The ground offensive officially began on February 24 and ended on February 28, when the Iraqi troops fled from Kuwait via the "highway of death."[162]
Concerned about mission creep and the prospects for a larger-scale conflict, Baker and most of Bush's advisors agreed that there was no value in continuing the offensive following Iraq's withdrawal.[110]
Given the Second Gulf War, which began 12 years later and focused on the capture of Saddam Hussein, there has been some conflicting perspective on the role regime change played in the approach to the First Gulf War.[163] The coalition did not proceed to the capital or attack Hussein's forces further following the withdrawal, but over the course of the offensive, Baker, Cheney, and Bush all indicated that they would welcome a movement by the Iraqi people to depose Hussein.[110] Despite the encouragement, in the ceasefire talks, the Americans allowed Hussein to continue using military equipment that he then used to suppress popular uprisings in the Shiite South and Kurdish North.[110]
Baker's personal approval rating rose shortly after the successful ground offensive to 84 percent.[110] Baker's insistence on international burden-sharing was considered a key element of the war's quick end and 41 percent of people polled by Gallup said that Baker should replace Quayle on the 1992 presidential ticket.[110] Beyond the political support for the war, Baker also managed to coordinate financial support from the various involved countries so that their funds of $53.7 billion to offset the $61.1 billion that the US had allocated to the effort.[144]
Criticism of conduct during the Gulf War
Though Baker and Bush earned praise for the coalition forces' triumph, Baker also made missteps criticized by allies and the press throughout the process .
Immediately following the invasion, Baker was castigated for seeming to blame Ambassador Glaspie for insufficiently discouraging Hussein. Though Glaspie was operating on advice from a cable signed by Baker from a day before she spoke with Hussein, Baker refused responsibility for Glaspie's approach and claimed on Meet the Press that there were "312,000" such cables under his name.[164] As interviewer Johnny Apple put it to Baker, "nobody's trying to criticize April Glaspie. They're trying to criticize you."[164]
In the lead-up to the invasion, Baker also caused a minor fracas when he commented about the importance of the offensive for maintain US economic growth. He spoke about the intent behind the war at a news conference in Bermuda, saying:
"To bring [the war] down to the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs. If you want to sum it up in one word, it’s jobs. Because an economic recession worldwide, caused by the control of one nation, one dictator, if you will, of the West’s economic lifeline will result in the loss of jobs on the part of American citizens."[166]
The comments tarnished the diplomatic effort as a matter of mere commerce, causing some tension between Baker and the White House.[150]
At the beginning of February, shortly into the air offensive, Baker also made the mistake of signing onto a bilateral statement with the Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh that implied Iraq could end the war without a formal withdrawal.[167] Bush was furious at what he felt was a mistake that undermined administration policy.[157] White House Chief of Staff John Sununu reportedly summarized his feeling, saying that "Baker bends over backward to please the Soviets and now the Soviets are bending over backward to help Saddam."[168] Former President Richard Nixon, then out of public life, privately said that he thought Bush should fire Baker for the misstep.[157]
Arab-Israeli Conflict
In the midst of extensive conflict in the region following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the First Intifada, Baker's predecessor George Shultz worked to shift the focus of American negotiation from Israel's Arab neighbors to the Palestinian Liberation Organization.[169] Though Shultz did not succeed in resolving the conflict, he became the first US representative to officially recognize the PLO.
Baker himself approached the conflict with trepidation. In the beginning of his tenure, he told his advisor Dennis Ross that he did not want to be "fly[ing] around the Middle East like George Shultz had done."[170] Baker also felt that his foreign policy focus belonged in Europe with the Soviet Union.
Despite the sense of caution, Baker did speak on issues involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In May 1989, he gave a speech at the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee where he called for Israel to "lay aside once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel,"cease the construction of Israeli settlements in West Bank and Gaza, forswear annexation of more territory, and to treat Palestinians "as neighbors who deserve political rights." According to Ross, who drafted the speech with Harvey Sicherman, Baker took out multiple positive remarks about Israel and its relationship with the U.S., feeling that they were too pandering.[171]
After the American-Israeli deference of the Schultz era, political figures responded to the apparent change in tone.[172] Israeli premier Yitzhak Shamir took personal offense at the "useless" comments and said that it reflected a poor understanding of the dynamics at play.[173]Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli Defense Minister, argued that Baker should have directed his critique to the Palestinians, rather than the Israelis.[174] Bush privately encouraged Baker for having the courage of his convictions and former American president Richard Nixon congratulated Baker on his "outstanding" speech.[175]
Shortly after Shamir convened a new, more right-leaning government in June 1990, Baker again criticized Israeli leadership for insufficient interest in peace. Speaking before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Baker said that he sought "good faith affirmative efforts" for peace.[176] He also, to some infamy, provided the public telephone number for the administration and claimed that the Israelis should call only "when [they] are serious about peace."[177]
In the wake of those comments, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly claimed that the American policy was based on "distortion and lies," angering Baker.[178] In response, Baker barred Netanyahu from the State Department building, over the objections of some of Baker's subordinates. Though he eventually allowed Netanyahu to enter the building, he refused to meet with him again during his tenure.[178]
Zalman Shoval incident
The friction between Baker and Israeli officials grew in the midst of the Gulf War, when the Bush administration ultimately opposed allowing Israel to retaliate against Iraqi missile attacks.
In a Reuters interview the following month, Israel's US Ambassador Zalman Shoval publicly complained about the administration giving his country "the runaround" on funding for Soviet Jewish resettlement.[179] Baker personally confronted Shoval, extracted a public apology for the remarks, and privately wrote to Israeli Prime MinisterYitzhak Shamir warning that future public rebukes would result in Shoval's expulsion.[180] At the time, Shoval maintained that the comments were meant to be on the record, though his supporters later claimed the reporter misrepresented him.[181]
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens—who had personally traveled to Washington to unsuccessfully request Baker's permission for retaliatory strikes against Iraq—recounted his colleagues' surprise at Baker's approach toward Israeli officials. In comments to Baker's biographers, Arens claimed that
"This Bush-Baker move against Israel’s ambassador had, to the best of my knowledge, no precedent in modern diplomatic history. Never had an ambassador of a friendly country been publicly castigated in such manner in Washington, and this during a war in which we were supposed to be allies.”[175]
Madrid Conference
At a September 1990 meeting between the US and the Soviet Union meant to coordinate a response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush told Gorbachev that he would look into a Middle East peace conference to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict.[175] Baker, who had rejected a similar entreaty from Shevardnadze, and his advisors strongly discouraged linking Hussein's aggression with the Palestinian cause.
President Bush addresses the Middle East Peace Conference at the Royal Palace in Madrid, Spain
In further discussions with Gorbachev, Baker successfully removed the issue from the negotiating table.[175] Instead, he privately promised the Soviet premier that they would have a peace conference after Iraq had been subdued.
Following the coalition victory in the Gulf War, Baker became the first American Secretary of State to negotiate directly and officially with Palestinians in the multilateral Madrid Conference of 1991, which was the first comprehensive peace conference that involved every party involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the conference was designed to address all outstanding issues.[172]
The Soviet and Arab delegations wanted Madrid to be a large international conference, but Israel wanted only a direct bipartisan negotiation to avoid being outnumbered by countries that preferred Palestine.[175] Baker arranged a smaller multi-party negotiation between Israel, Palestine, and its three neighbors.
Israel conditioned its participation on multiple mitigations to Palestinian unity. Shamir required that Palestine engage as a joint delegation with Jordan, that no Palestinians from disputed East Jerusalem participate, and that no members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization be allowed to represent Palestine. Shamir also tried to require that all Palestinian participants explicitly condemn the PLO, but Baker denied the request.
The Palestinian delegation tried to exert its own conditions, that they be allowed to include an East Jerusalem resident and that Israel halt settlement construction during the negotiations.[178] Baker threatened to exclude the Palestinians if they didn't drop their requests.[178]
In a decades-later recollection, American Ambassador to IsraelWilliam Andreas Brown said that the Americans viewed the Palestinian delegation as "crybabies," overly reliant on the excluded PLO head, Yasser Arafat.[182] Baker and his team thus focused on only minor improvements in relations between the parties.[182]
When Shevardnadze spoke to Baker and his aides months before Madrid, they had unfavorable things to say about the PLO's negotiating position.[183] Baker commented that Arafat had "severely" hurt the odds for a two-state solution, Ross said that Arafat was on the "losing side" where "people don't get rewarded," and an unnamed aide cursed out Arafat and the PLO.[183]
NYPost quote
In March 1992, New York City Mayor Ed Koch claimed in his weekly column that Baker had dismissed Jewish voters, quoting him as saying "F—’em. They [the Jews] don't vote for us."[184] Baker denied this quote, which Koch heard second-hand from HUD SecretaryJack Kemp, as misrepresentative. He claimed that he was specifically referring to AIPAC—an agenda-based advocacy group that had criticized Baker—not individual constituents.[185] Kemp's version of the quote, relayed to Baker's biographers, omitted any expletive, but said it came after Kemp mentioned campaigning for Bush to Jewish voters.[185]
Baker and Kemp had had previous heated disputes, stemming in part from Kemp's assumption of a foreign policy role. After Kemp—as the Housing and Urban Development Secretary—told Baker he was wrong on an overly cautious approach to Lithuania, Baker cursed him out in the Oval Office in front of Bush and other advisors.[186] Kemp followed Baker out and continued a loud argument until NSC Chair Brent Scowcroft intervened. According to Robert Gates, the two men were on the verge of a "fistfight" at the time, though Kemp later apologized to Baker.[186]
White House Chief of Staff (1992–1993)
The 1992 election was complicated by the on-again-off-again candidacy of Ross Perot, who would end up taking 19% of the popular vote.[187] In August, following the Democratic Convention, with Bush trailing Clinton in the polls by 24 points,[188] Bush announced that Baker would return to the White House as chief of staff and as head of the re-election campaign.[189] However, despite playing a large role in Republican victories in 1980, 1984, and 1988, Baker didn't succeed in leading the 1992 campaign. Bush lost to Clinton by 370 electoral votes to 168.[190]
Baker briefly worked for the company Enron as a consultant from 1993 to 1995.
The Enron Corporation hired Baker as a consultant within a month of his departure from the White House, and Enron said that Baker would have an opportunity to invest in any projects he developed.[194] Baker said he joined the company largely due to fellow Houstonian Robert Mosbacher, who also went to the company after serving in Bush's cabinet.[195]
During a 1993 trip in which he and Bush received medals from the Kuwaiti government for their work during the Gulf War, Baker worked on a deal with the Kuwaiti government that would allow Enron to restore a massive energy plant that had been destroyed during the Iraqi invasion.[196] According to his biographers, Baker did not speak to officials about the details of the project itself and only spoke about his own time in government service.[196] A September 1993 report by Seymour Hersh catalogued questionable ethical ties from Bush administration officials relating to the post-war rebuilding of Kuwait, including the work Baker (and Lt. General Thomas Kelly) did for Enron.[197][198] Per Hersh,
"The argument can be made, and has, that Baker and the others were pursuing contracts that, were it not for their special connections, would be awarded to Japanese or European concerns. Understood this way, the issue, to put it as Baker once did in justifying American involvement in the Gulf War, is jobs, jobs, jobs. And Bush’s sons and his former aides have, of course, broken no laws in attempting to do business in Kuwait."[198]
Though Hersh and other reporters did not claim Baker did anything illegal, he questioned whether it was a disrespect to American servicemembers to so quickly "us[e] their sacrifice as a kind of calling card."[198] Baker confronted Hersh and claimed that the article "screwed" him and that his intention was only to "help an American company."[196]
Baker stayed with the company briefly, leaving in 1995.[196] After Enron's collapse, Baker said that part of his issue with the company was its "success fee" incentive structure.[195] Unless a consultant like Baker recommended projects that bore out and earned the success fee, they received little to no compensation. This policy, in his view, incentivized analysts to falsify numbers and "to put contracts on the books, whether they were good contracts or not.”[195]
After Baker's departure from the company, he still maintained relations amidst its scandals. As late as November 2001, after Enron had publicly admitted to falsifying years of reporting financial reporting, Baker arranged for Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan to accept the Enron Award for Distinguished Public Service at a public ceremony.[199] The award was a partnership between the Baker Institute and Enron.[199]
Carlyle Group
Baker worked as a senior consultant for The Carlyle Group from the end of his government tenure in 1993 to a 2005 controversy over influence peddling.
Baker joined the private equity firm The Carlyle Group shortly after his government service ended. Carlyle co-founder David Rubinstein said he originally offered the role to Baker while he was still Chief of Staff, but Baker demurred.[200] After Baker's former deputy Richard Darman joined the company in late February, Baker himself joined in early March 1993.[201]
Writer Michael Lewis identified Baker, along with former Cabinet-level officials Frank Carlucci and Darman, as part of Carlyle's cadre of "access capitalists."[202]
"The access capitalist enjoys a number of advantages over his progenitor, the Washington lobbyist [...] The access capitalist effectively sells the present value of all his influence, in perpetuity, each time he makes a phone call. What’s more, the access capitalist can plausibly represent himself as a higher social type—a businessperson rather than an influence-peddler—which gives him an edge if he decides to return to politics. But perhaps best of all for those who have spent their lives in politics, the access capitalist doesn’t really need to know much about business."[202]
As the Carlyle group's strategy revolved around acquiring companies through private exchanges rather than through public auctions, Rubinstein felt that high-profile associates like Baker would allow the Carlyle Group to reach stakeholders otherwise unavailable to the public.[202]
"Let’s suppose you’re the CEO of G.M. and you get a call from Baker. You think, `Hey the former secretary of state wants to come out and have lunch with me. I’ll get the photographer out ... have my picture taken.’"[202]
Baker's work with the Carlyle Group, as one of its most prominent members during its rise in the 1990s, remained controversial into the 2000s. An investigation by The Nation in 2004—when Baker was a presidential envoy for Iraqi debt relief—implicated Baker in Carlyle's efforts to acquire a billion dollars in investment from the Kuwaiti government, effectively leveraging Baker's government service during the First Gulf War in pursuit of private profit.[203]
In 2003, Baker commented that though people "like to bitch about" his work with the Carlyle group, he felt that he should not be punished for wanting to make money in the private sector.[195] He claimed he never directly asked for money from investors, and only gave speeches about his government experience. Rubinstein cosigned the claim, telling Baker's biographers that Baker "never brought a deal in, he never worked on a deal, and I never asked him to ask for money."[192]
In 2005, due to the unpopularity of the Bush administration and controversies over conflicts of interest, Rubinstein asked Baker to leave the organization in 2005, after more than a decade of work at the firm.[204] Baker himself had been identified, including in Michael Moore's film Fahrenheit 9/11, as part of a link between the Bush family, the Carlyle Group, the bin Laden family and an alleged Saudi influence scheme, though multiple sources questioned such claims.[205][206][207] To mitigate Baker's embarrassment, Rubinstein offered that his departure could be timed for his 75th birthday.[208]
Shortly after his departure from Carlyle, Baker joined a different private-equity firm based in Dallas—Ewing Management—which was itself formed under the Carlyle Group banner by former Carlyle executive Edward Ewing.[209]
Diplomatic work
In March 1997, Baker became the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara.[210] In June 2004, he resigned from this position, frustrated over the lack of progress in reaching a complete settlement acceptable to both the government of Morocco and the pro-independence Polisario Front.[211] He left behind the Baker II plan, accepted as a suitable basis of negotiations by the Polisario and unanimously endorsed by the Security Council, but rejected by Morocco.[212]
Rice University sought out a way to bolster its public policy school as early as the 1980s. In the beginning of Bush's term, the university offered him Rice as a location for his presidential library, but Bush declined.[213] After Baker gave a commencement address at Rice in 1991, political science professor Richard Stoll suggested that Baker would be a good alternative candidate should Bush lose re-election.[213]
Former Secretary Baker introduces Secretary Kerry before he delivers a speech at the Baker Institute in 2016.
On January 14, 1993—a week before the end of Bush's presidency—Rice announced that the school would appoint Baker to the board and create a public policy institute in his name.[193][214] Baker's grandfather was the personal lawyer for Rice namesake William Marsh Rice.[215] He chaired the Board of Trustees from its 1891 charter until his death in 1941 and was also himself the namesake for Rice's first residential college, Baker College.[215][216]
Baker occasionally participates in high profile conversations at the Institute, as with Obama in 2018 for the organization's 25th anniversary and with Hillary Clinton and Henry Kissinger in 2023 for the 30th anniversary. [217][221]
The Baker Institute also irregularly grants the James A. Baker III Prize for Excellence in Leadership to prominent figures, including Colin Powell (2007), Marguerite Barankitse (2017), Brian Mulroney (2019), Austin Tice (2022), and Condoleezza Rice (2024). Prior to its collapse, Enron sponsored the James Baker Prize's predecessor, the Enron Prize (also administered by the Baker Institute), which recognized Colin Powell (1995), Mikhail Gorbachev (1997), Nelson Mandela (1999), and Alan Greenspan (2001).[222][223]
Baker himself has been very involved in the Institute since its founding, especially in fundraising and networking, but is not the day-to-day director.[195] The Institute was led by former ambassador (and his personal friend) Edward Djerejian from 1994 to 2021 and has been led by David Satterfield since 2022.[218] Baker originally offered the directorship to Dennis Ross, but he declined in order to work in the Clinton administration.[192]
2000 recount
Though Baker had assisted Bush's father throughout his political career and presidency, he did not play an official role during George W. Bush's 2000 campaign. Early in the Bush campaign, in 1999, conservative columnist Robert Novak reported that Bush officials were emphatic about avoiding old hands like Baker and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.[224] Bush and his father apologized to Baker for the bluntness of the sentiment, but Baker himself declaimed about his disinterest, saying that Bush's campaign was best run by younger men than him.[224]
The morning after Baker watched the election returns in Austin with vice presidential nominee Dick Cheney and other former colleagues, Bush's campaign chairman Donald Evans asked him to go to Florida for the fight over the recount. Given the ties between the Bush family and Baker, as well as his recognition as a top-tier campaign talent who was "skilled at PR, the law, politics," Cheney suggested him to lead the team in Florida.[225]
Pro-Bush activist displays "Sore Loserman" nickname in Tallahassee in 2000.
Baker approached the dispute in Florida as a zero-sum political fight, frustrating his interlocutor Warren Christopher, who wanted to negotiate terms for a bilateral investigation into the results.[226] Baker argued that such a plan would unfairly help the Gore campaign, but admitted that his side was "getting killed on ‘count all the votes,’ who the hell could be against that?"[227]
In response, Baker's team brought in provocateur Roger Stone as well as prominent Republican figures like Bob Dole and Arlen Specter to make the case for the campaign.[227] The team also printed signs dismissing the Gore Lieberman ticket as "Sore Loserman" and distributed them to affiliated protestors.[227] According to Baker's biographers, a poll during the recount effort found that Baker's arguments were convincing to 51 percent of respondents, while Christopher convinced only 42 percent.[227]
Baker's biographers wrote that in the recount fight, he was "the field marshal mobilizing the troops, the chief strategist calling the shots."[227]Jake Tapper wrote that Baker was the "general manager," to Benjamin Ginsberg's "coach."[225] In interpreting the saga through the frame of William Shakespeare's Twelfth Night,Harold Bloom compared Baker to the "incessant fortune-hunter" Sir Andrew Aguecheek.[228] Shortly after the recount fight, Washington Monthly editor Paul Glastris wrote that Baker was "widely feared for his cold-blooded effectiveness."[229]
Baker's own team totaled around 30 people, many from his firm Baker Botts, and lawyers who would later be appointed to government positions by the Bush administration, including John Bolton, John Roberts, and Brett Kavanaugh.[230] Future Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett also worked in Florida on Bush's legal team.[230]
Though Baker was himself a lawyer and led a team of lawyers, much of the litigation in the case was not under his per view. While the original first choice for lead advocate was former Senator John Danforth (R-MO), he wondered whether it would be improper for the federal courts to intervene in state election procedures.[226] Baker felt that his "heart [was] not in it" and so chose Theodore Olsen—who later served as Bush's first-term Solicitor General—as lead advocate instead.[226]
After the Florida Supreme Court ruled against the Bush team, Baker said at a news conference that he felt the court had rewritten election rules and would welcome the Florida state legislature to nullify the ruling.[231] Legal journalist Anthony Lewis condemned Baker's news conference in an opinion column, writing that it was a "despicable" choice by Baker to "encourag[e] defiance of a court."[232]
Baker did not go to the U.S. Supreme Court himself, but kept apprised of the arguments from headquarters in Tallahassee. When the court's opinion were faxed over—and campaign aide (a former clerk for Chief JusticeWilliam Rehnquist) Ted Cruz confirmed their meaning—Baker became the first to congratulate Bush as president-elect.
The 2008 HBO film Recount covers the month following the controversial election. Baker was interviewed during the making of the film, and British actor Tom Wilkinson portrayed him in it.[233] The Baker Institute hosted a preview screening of the movie with a question-and-answer featuring Baker and former president Jimmy Carter.[234] Baker praised the film as "solidly entertaining," but both he and Carter said they thought that the depiction of Warren Christopher was unfair.[234]
George W. Bush administration
Baker did not immediately join the Bush administration after prevailing in the Florida recount fight. He was considered for leadership at the World Bank, but Baker instead returned to work at Baker Botts, Carylyle and the Baker Institute.[235] Baker informally weighed in on the administration, both in private and in public. He strongly discouraged Bush against appointing Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary due to his perceived treachery against Bush's father in 1976, saying that Bush should remember "what he did to your daddy."[236] In an August 2002 essay, he encouraged Bush to seek a United Nations Security Council resolution to support regime change in Iraq. Baker declined to weigh in on the prudence of regime change in general, but he advised that it couldn't be achieved without significant investment.[237]
"The only realistic way to effect regime change in Iraq is through the application of military force, including sufficient ground troops to occupy the country (including Baghdad), depose the current leadership and install a successor government"[237]
The day after Baker's essay, Vice President Dick Cheney rejected a multilateral path to military intervention in Iraq in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, saying that a international inspections would "provide no assurance whatsoever of [Saddam Hussein's] compliance with UN resolutions."[238]
President George W. Bush poses for a photo Thursday, Jan. 5, 2006 in the Oval Office with former Secretaries of State and Secretaries of Defense, following a meeting on the strategy for victory in Iraq. Baker stands third-from-left
Baker served occasionally as an informal advisor to Bush during his first term. In July 2003, Bush enlisted Baker to meet with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to ensure that the 2003 Georgian Parliamentary Elections would be run democratically.[239][240] Shevardnadze agreed to administer the election along the principles Baker laid out, but the November elections were widely recognized as questionable.[239] After three weeks of protests during the Rose Revolution, Shevardnadze resigned as president.[241]
In December 2003, President George W. Bush appointed Baker as his special envoy to ask various foreign creditor nations to forgive or restructure $100 billion in international debts owed by the Iraq government which had been incurred during the tenure of Saddam Hussein.[243] Before taking the post, Baker required that he be allowed to report only to the president, circumventing both Cheney and the State Department.[239]
Baker's work as envoy resulted in France, Germany, Japan, Russia, China, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia agreeing to erase large portions of the Iraqi debt.[239] Multiple countries asked that Baker guarantee that they would have commercial access to a post-Hussein Iraq, especially in question after deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that some countries would be barred from bidding on reconstruction projects in Iraq.[239][244]
While he was envoy, The Nation published a document that the Carlyle Group shared with the Kuwaiti government on the same day that Baker was in Kuwait negotiating with the government on Iraqi debt relief. The documents offer the services of Carlyle—where Baker worked as a prominent consultant—as part of a consortium that would help Kuwait receive billions of dollars in war reparations from the 1990 Iraqi invasion.[245] The document, as quoted by the magazine, explicitly references Baker's role as envoy:
"The extent to which these individuals can play an instrumental role in fashioning strategies is now more limited…due to the recent appointment of Secretary Baker as the President’s envoy on international debt, and the need to avoid an apparent conflict of interest. ... We believe that with Secretary Baker’s retirement from his temporary position [as debt envoy], that Carlyle and those leading individuals associated with Carlyle will then once again be free to play a more decisive role…”[245]
According to his biographers, Baker called Carlyle head David Rubinstein demanding that the Kuwait proposal be rescinded and said that it was clearly a "direct conflict" with his work for the Bush administration.[239] Rubinstein later withdrew Carlyle from the consortium that had proposed the deal.[239]
U.S. President George W. Bush with Lee Hamilton, left, and former Secretary of State James Baker in the Cabinet Room, Dec. 6. 2006
Iraq Study Group
A 2005 bill sponsored by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) established a bipartisan group of prominent national figures to recommend a path forward for the country in Iraq.[246] Coming after the revelations of the Abu Ghraib prison torture and with Wolf's own doubts about prospects for success in the country, the Group was meant to provide an alternate to the party-line narrative from the White House.[247] Baker became the co-chairman of the committee due to his relationship with the Bush family and his dignified reputation. As Condoleezza Rice put it, the administration wanted a "brand name that people would trust and we needed someone that we could trust not just to make it a polemic."
Baker's Democratic counterpart was retired Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), who had previously participated in the drafting of the 9/11 Commission Report.[248] Hamilton appointed the Democratic-aligned members and Baker appointed the Republican-align members, including his former aide Robert Gates, Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY), Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and New York City MayorRudy Giuliani.[248] After Giuliani missed multiple meetings and started angling to run for the Republican nomination for president in 2008, Baker replaced him with his former troika colleague Edwin Meese. After Gates became Secretary of Defense, Baker replaced him with Larry Eagleburger, his successor as Secretary of State in 1992.[248]
The Iraq Study Group examined a number of ideas, including one that would create a new power-sharing arrangement in Iraq that would give more autonomy to regional factions.[249] On October 9, 2006, The New York Times quoted co-chairman Baker as saying "our commission believes that there are alternatives between the stated alternatives, the ones that are out there in the political debate, of 'stay the course' and 'cut and run.'"[250]
Baker worked extensively through the Study Group in meeting the White House and conservatives where they were. After Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten informed Baker that Bush was planning to "double down" on the war, Baker included a sentence in the report endorsing group-member Chuck Robb's preference for a "short-term" surge in troops to secure Baghdad.[251] Though Baker specifically highlighted the sentence to Bush in an effort to sell the report to him, the administration did not heed the Iraq Study Group's broader argument about the failures of the war and its recommended reversal of administration policy.[251] Bush only conceded that the report was "worthy of serious study."[251][252]
Though the Iraq Study Group was generally collegial, shortly after it completed its report, Baker and Hamilton publicly disagreed on its policy implications.[253] Hamilton argued in a March 2007 Washington Post editorial that a House plan requiring a withdrawal of US troops in Iraq by mid-2008 had laudably followed the Iraq Study Group's recommendations.[254] A week later, Baker wrote in his own Washington Post editorial that while he agreed with much of Hamilton's perspective, they did "not set timetables or deadlines for the removal of troops, as contemplated by the supplemental spending bills the House and Senate passed."[255] For the Brookings Institution, writer Michael E. O'Hanlon leaned toward Hamilton's interpretation, citing a portion of the report that said "by the first quarter of 2008 [...] all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.”[253]
Other advisory positions
Bob Woodward claimed, in his 2006 book State of Denial, that White House Chief of StaffAndrew Card urged President Bush to replace Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld with Baker following the 2004 presidential election. Bush later confirmed that he made such an offer to Baker but that he declined.[256] Bush again offered the role to Baker in November 2005.[257] Baker worried that his age was too great and that the position he would be placed in was too fraught to find success, though he considered the prestige of completing the trifecta of prominent cabinet roles after his tenure at Treasury and State.[257]
The Bush administration asked Baker to replaced George Tenet as CIA Director in 2004, but he declined.[257] Baker also helped the administration after the 2004 election by back-channelling with the Kerry campaign after it argued for recounts due to the close margins in Ohio. Baker spoke to campaign operative Vernon Jordan who encouraged Kerry to concede.[257]
Baker endorsed moderate senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson in her 2010 primary challenge to Texas governor Rick Perry, based on her "record and vision."[263] In the primary, Hutchinson received 30.3 percent of the vote to Perry's 51.1. Baker immediately endorsed Perry after his primary victory.[264]
Baker provisionally endorsed Jeb Bush in 2014 for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination.[265] Baker later served as a foreign policy advisor for the former governor. Baker drew controversy in the Jeb Bush campaign after he gave a speech to the liberal Jewish advocacy group J Street where he criticized Benjamin Netanyahu for foreswearing a two-state solution.[266][267] Republican boosters, including Sheldon Adelson and the Zionist Organization of America, publicly expressed doubts about the Bush campaign itself due to Baker's comments.[268] In response, Bush said that he disagreed with aspects of Baker's speech and that his foreign policy would not be defined by older advisors like Baker and George Shultz.[269]
Baker voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 election and did so again in the 2020 election.[272] During a 2016 memorial service for Nancy Reagan, he commented to former Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney that he believed there were parallels between the rise of Trump and the rise of Reagan.[272] Baker informally advised Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign and suggested the appointment of Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State.[272] During the 2016 campaign, Baker publicly criticized Trump's stated foreign policy goals—especially his protectionist and hawkish tendencies, but said he wouldn't get his "panties in a wedge."[273][274]
Baker told his biographers that his preference for Trump was firm, basing it on his commitment to the Republican party and his feeling that, as they paraphrased, "it was worth it to get conservative judges, tax cuts, and deregulation."[275][276] Despite his consistent intentions, he did briefly question his approach in 2019, after considering the Democratic primary candidate Joe Biden to be a possible choice. He denied his wavering, telling his biographers: "Don't say I will vote for Joe Biden," because he didn't want to abandon or hurt the Republican party.[275] After the U.S. Capitol attack on January 6, 2021, Baker told his biographers, during a forum at the Hamilton Lugar School at Indiana University, that he did not "buy into" Trump's attacks on the results, despite his own past litigating the 2000 election on behalf of George W. Bush.[277][278]
Personal life
Baker met his first wife, the former Mary Stuart McHenry, of Dayton, Ohio, while on spring break in Bermuda with the Princeton University rugby team. They married in 1953. Together they had four sons, including James Addison Baker IV (1954), a partner at Baker Botts[279] as well as Stuart McHenry Baker (1956), John Coalter Baker (1960), and Douglas Bland Baker (1961) of Baker Global Advisory.
Mary Stuart Baker died of breast cancer on February 18, 1970.[280]
Though he goes by James A. Baker III, Baker is technically the fourth such name in his family line. Baker's grandfather removed his own "Jr." sometime in the 1870s before the birth of Baker's father.[281] His firstborn son retained the ordering as James A. Baker IV.[282]
In 1973, Baker and Susan Garrett Winston, a divorcée and a close friend of Mary Stuart, were married.[26] Baker is an ardent hunter, and after marrying her went with her on a "hunting-moon" to the Victoria Falls Hotel in Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) for a 23-day safari trip.[283] He imported $3,000 worth of hunting trophies, including a rug made from a wildebeest, following his safari.[283] Winston had two sons and a daughter with her former husband. In September 1977, she and Baker had a daughter, Mary Bonner Baker.[citation needed] In 1985, Susan Garrett Baker was one of four "Washington Wives" who founded the Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC), a bipartisan United States government committee with the stated goal of increasing parental control over children's access to music deemed to have violent, drug-related, or sexual themes.
When Saddam Hussein's forces took Kuwait City in August 1990, Baker was in Mongolia on a planned hunting trip for Ibexes, but he had to cut it short due to the crisis.[107] He postponed a pheasant-hunting trip in 2000 with Bush in Scotland to assist George W. Bush in the 2000 recount effort.[284] Baker's said that his experience turkey-hunting with Florida Senator Lawton Chiles influenced his strategy during the recount process.[284]
Baker and his wife own a substantial property in remote Wyoming near Boulder where Baker would retreat from public life.[285] They bought the 1,555-acre (629ha) property, known as Silver Creek Ranch, for $625,000 shortly after Baker's success in the 1988 presidential election.
Baker (left) unveiling a bust of himself with Secretary of State Antony Blinken on April 4, 2022
In January 1989, Washington Post writer Marjorie Williams, who called him then "perhaps the most powerful unelected man in America," described his public image:
"Jim Baker, man of the sterling reputation, has come to represent a Washington ideal. A competitor, in a city whose weightiest transactions are commonly described as a game; a gentleman, in an establishment whose highest value is that antagonists be able to drink together after 6 p.m.; a corporate lawyer, in a culture that reserves its harshest punishments for the incautious, he has much to tell us about Washington's values."[291]
Baker was known for having a watchful eye on his image and the image of his professional agenda. His biographers assigned a major role in his rise to prominence during the Reagan administration to "his assiduous courtship of journalists."[292] They also quoted one of Baker's ghostwriters who said Baker admitted to the negative side of that reputation:
“I got the reputation in the Reagan administration for being an extraordinarily prolific leaker. I was. In that milieu, it was rat fuck. If you didn’t leak, you didn’t live.”[292]
Others in the administrations he worked resented this self-aggrandizing behavior. Nancy Reagan, noting his "constant" leaks, privately reflected that Baker's "main interest was Jim Baker."[293] After Baker resisted the pressure to run George H.W. Bush's 1988 and 1992 presidential campaigns, Barbara Bush called him "The Invisible Man."[294] When Bush lost, Barbara and George W. felt, at the time, that his reticence had buried the campaign.[295] Both later said that they did not blame or resent Baker for the failing.[295]
Baker's colleagues and interlocutors also resented his self-interested tendencies and press cultivation. At various points in his political career, William Casey, Mikhail Gorbachev, Dan Quayle, and Ken Langone accused him of using leaks to get an edge in their respective dealings.[296] The conservative columnist Robert Novak claimed that Baker used his leaking to "trash" Novak with other journalists and arranged a sort of "non-aggression pact" between himself and the Reagan administration to end the practice.[297]
A statue of Baker by artist Chas Fagan, which was unveiled in 2012 in Sesquicentennial Park in Houston, Texas.
In fall 1983, Baker personally intervened with Ronald Reagan to prevent a polygraph-based leaks investigation after a leak of a secret order Reagan gave to American troops in Lebanon.[298] Baker had spoken to one of the reporters who reported the leaks, though he told his biographers that he had only shared "non-secret" information.[298]
In late 2024, political reporter Jess Bidgood favorably contrasted Baker's "steady, behind-the scenes" expertise with the "bomb-throwing, hyper-macho and preternaturally online energy" energy of Trump appointees Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy.[299] Also in 2024, conservative lobbyist Michael McKenna wrote critically for The Washington Times that Baker was a "Rockefeller Republican with a Texas accent who did whatever he could to frustrate the Reagan agenda."[300]
Former State Department analyst and scholar Aaron David Miller wrote that Baker was one of only three American leaders (with Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter) that belonged in the metaphorical "hall of fame" for Israel-Palestine peace negotiations.[301] Miller credited Baker and the Madrid Conference as making the 1990s the only decade since Israel's founding without a major war.
Chris Whipple, who directed a documentary series on White House Chiefs of Staff and later wrote a book on the same subject, referred to Baker in 2013 as the undisputed "tops" among Chiefs of Staff.[302] In Whipple's estimation, Baker was "the closest confidant, the most powerful adviser, the consigliere and the guy who keeps everybody on the same page."[302]
Baker was the subject of the PBS documentary "James Baker: The Man Who Made Washington Work," which aired in March 2015. The documentary featured many of Baker's colleagues, including Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, and Henry Kissinger, and featured narration by Tom Brokaw.
Memoirs
In 1995, Baker published his memoirs of service as Secretary of State in a book entitled The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 ( ISBN0-399-14087-5). He mostly dictated the book through Newsweek writer Thomas DeFrank, with research from aide Derek Chollet, consultation from Margaret Tutwiler, and supervision from his State Department speechwriter Andrew Carpendale.[303]
The book-drafting process was fraught, according to Baker's biographers. Baker was keen on avoiding controversy and removed multiple passages admitting mistakes, including the admission that immediate withdrawing coalition forces from Iraq may have preserved Hussein's regime.[303] Carpendale resigned after reading one revised draft and wrote a letter chastising Baker, saying that:
"You alone will have to bear the burden when the lead review in The New York Times Book Review begins something like this: ‘In a colorful and readable memoir, James A. Baker, III manages to do as an author what he did so well in over twelve years in power in Washington: glorify his own successes, avoid any hint of failure, and skirt the truth.'"[303]
Chief New York Times book critic Michiko Kakutani did conclude in her review that "the man famous for spinning the message of the week is now spinning his own image for history."[303][304]
In 2006, Baker published a second memoir—written with ghostwriter Steve Fiffer—more focused on his entire political and personal life. Though it was "livelier" than the first effort, it also avoided controversy.[208] His editor Neil Nyren wrote that his references to the ongoing Iraq War were "so cautious and nondescript that you might as well not be saying anything at all" and that "when even Brent [Scowcroft] can no longer contain himself (among others), readers are simply going to expect something more from you.”[208] Baker declined.[208]
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.16–17. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.20–23. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, James (2006). 'Work Hard, Study... and Keep Out of Politics!': Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life. Steve Fiffer. East Rutherford: Penguin Publishing Group. pp.9–13. ISBN978-1-4406-8455-5.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.33–34. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Emmis Communications (October 24, 1991). "The Alcalde". Emmis Communications – via Google Books.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.35–37. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.39–42. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.37–39. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, James (2006). 'Work Hard, Study... and Keep Out of Politics!': Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life. Steve Fiffer. East Rutherford: Penguin Publishing Group. pp.24–26. ISBN978-1-4406-8455-5.
12Meacham, Jon (2015). Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush. Westminster: Random House Publishing Group. pp.150–160. ISBN978-1-4000-6765-7.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.48–49. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.50–51. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.53–54. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. p.56. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.57–59. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.62–63. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Meacham, Jon (2015). Destiny and power: the American odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (Firsted.). New York: Random House. pp.213–214. ISBN978-1-4000-6765-7.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.72–73. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.69–71. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.75–76. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.78–80. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.80–81. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.84–86. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12345Smith, Richard Norton (2023). An Ordinary Man: The Surprising Life and Historic Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (1sted.). HarperCollins Publishers. pp.605–625. ISBN978-0-06-268416-5.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.88–90. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.97–100. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.102–103. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.104–105. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.105–107. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.117–120. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Meacham, Jon (2015). Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush. Westminster: Random House Publishing Group. pp.235–237. ISBN978-1-4000-6765-7.
↑Meacham, Jon (2015). Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush. Westminster: Random House Publishing Group. pp.237–239. ISBN978-1-4000-6765-7.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.120–123. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Boot, Max (2024). Reagan: His Life and Legend (1sted.). New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation. pp.405–410. ISBN978-0-87140-944-7.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.123–125. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Eizenstat, Stuart (2018). President Carter: The White House Years. Madeleine Albright (1sted.). New York: St. Martin's Press. pp.900–910. ISBN978-1-250-10455-7.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.204–206. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Cannon, Lou (2000). President Reagan: the role of a lifetime (1st Public Affairsed.). New York: Public Affairs. pp.45–55. ISBN978-1-891620-91-1.
12Boot, Max (2024). Reagan: His Life and Legend (1sted.). New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation. pp.450–465. ISBN978-0-87140-944-7.
↑Cannon, Lou (2000). President Reagan: the role of a lifetime (1st Public Affairsed.). New York: Public Affairs. pp.235–250. ISBN978-1-891620-91-1.
↑Cannon, Lou (2000). President Reagan: the role of a lifetime (1st Public Affairsed.). New York: Public Affairs. pp.100–115. ISBN978-1-891620-91-1.
↑Whipple, Chris (2017). The gatekeepers: how the White House Chiefs of Staff define every presidency (Firsted.). New York: Crown. pp.110–115. ISBN978-0-8041-3824-6.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.151–156. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Boot, Max (2024). Reagan: His Life and Legend (1sted.). New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation. pp.460–470. ISBN978-0-87140-944-7.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.156–159. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12345Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.200–210. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.220–235. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.145–155. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑FitzGerald, Frances (2001). Way out there in the blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the end of the Cold War (1. Touchstoneed.). New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. pp.210–220. ISBN978-0-7432-0023-3.
123Goldman, Peter Louis; Fuller, Tony; DeFrank, Thomas M. (1985). The quest for the presidency 1984. A Newsweek book. Toronto; New York: Bantam Books. p.15. ISBN978-0-553-05100-1.
12Goldman, Peter; Fuller, Tony; DeFrank, Thomas M. (1985). The quest for the presidency 1984. A Newsweek book. Toronto New York: Bantam Books. p.40. ISBN978-0-553-05100-1.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.235–250. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Goldman, Peter; Fuller, Tony; DeFrank, Thomas M. (1985). The quest for the presidency 1984. A Newsweek book. Toronto New York: Bantam Books. pp.261–265. ISBN978-0-553-05100-1.
↑Goldman, Peter; Fuller, Tony; DeFrank, Thomas M. (1985). The quest for the presidency 1984. A Newsweek book. Toronto New York: Bantam Books. ISBN978-0-553-05100-1.
↑Boot, Max (2024). Reagan: His Life and Legend (1sted.). New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation. pp.600–620. ISBN978-0-87140-944-7.
↑Boot, Max (2024). Reagan: His Life and Legend (1sted.). New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation. pp.610–630. ISBN978-0-87140-944-7.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.250–265. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Cannon, Lou (2000). President Reagan: the role of a lifetime (1st Public Affairsed.). New York: Public Affairs. pp.520–540. ISBN978-1-891620-91-1.
12Murray, Alan (2010). Showdown at Gucci Gulch. Jeffrey Birnbaum, Peter Osnos. Westminster: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. pp.85–95. ISBN978-0-394-75811-4.
↑Murray, Alan (2010). Showdown at Gucci Gulch. Jeffrey Birnbaum, Peter Osnos. Westminster: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. pp.55–65. ISBN978-0-394-75811-4.
↑Birnbaum, Jeffrey H.; Murray, Alan S. (1988). Showdown at Gucci Gulch: lawmakers, lobbyists, and the unlikely triumph of tax reform (1st Vintage Booksed.). New York: Vintage Books. pp.95–105. ISBN978-0-394-75811-4.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.270–280. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
123456Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.280–290. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Murray, Alan (2010). Showdown at Gucci Gulch. Jeffrey Birnbaum, Peter Osnos. Westminster: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. pp.260–270. ISBN978-0-394-75811-4.
↑Volcker, Paul; Gyohten, Toyoo (May 3, 1993). Changing Fortunes: The World's Money and the Threat to American Leadership. Three Rivers Press. pp.280–290. ISBN978-0812922189.
↑Funabashi, Yōichi (1988). Managing the dollar: from the Plaza to the Louvre. Institute for International Economics (U.S.). Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. p.235. ISBN978-0-88132-071-8.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.330–340. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.410–420. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
1234567Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.350–360. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.390–400. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.340–350. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.380–390. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.370–380. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.397–404. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Beschloss, Michael R.; Talbott, Strobe (1993). At the highest levels: the inside story of the end of the cold war (1sted.). Boston: Little, Brown. pp.162–167. ISBN978-0-316-09281-4.
↑Beschloss, Michael R.; Talbott, Strobe (1993). At the highest levels: the inside story of the end of the cold war (1sted.). Boston: Little, Brown. pp.182–187. ISBN978-0-316-09281-4.
12Beschloss, Michael; Talbott, Strobe (2016). At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War = The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War. Newburyport: Open Road Media. pp.187–192. ISBN978-0-316-09281-4.
↑Beschloss, Michael; Talbott, Strobe (2016). At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War = The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War. Newburyport: Open Road Media. pp.197–202. ISBN978-0-316-09281-4.
↑Beschloss, Michael; Talbott, Strobe (2016). At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War = The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War. Newburyport: Open Road Media. pp.281–286. ISBN978-0-316-09281-4.
12345Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.475–485. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.485–495. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
123Cockburn, Andrew; Cockburn, Patrick (1999). Out of the ashes: the resurrection of Saddam Hussein (1.ed.). New York, NY: HarperCollins. pp.80–85. ISBN978-0-06-092983-1.
12345Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.420–430. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.404–410. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12345Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.430–440. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12345Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.440–450. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Beschloss, Michael R.; Talbott, Strobe (1993). At the highest levels: the inside story of the end of the Cold War. Boston: Little, Brown. pp.332–337. ISBN978-0-316-09282-1.
↑Ross, Dennis (2016). Doomed to succeed: the U.S.-Israel relationship from Truman to Obama. New York/N.Y: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp.230–235. ISBN978-0-374-53644-2.
↑Ross, Dennis (2016). Doomed to succeed: the U.S.-Israel relationship from Truman to Obama. New York/N.Y: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp.240–245. ISBN978-0-374-53644-2.
12345Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.450–460. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.460–470. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Beschloss, Michael R.; Talbott, Strobe (1993). At the highest levels: the inside story of the end of the Cold War. Boston: Little, Brown. pp.290–295. ISBN978-0-316-09282-1.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.486–489. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.458–461. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter, and Glasser, Susan, The Man Who Ran Washington Doubleday, 2020, at pp. 492, 505.
↑Vise, David A.. "Former Secretary of State Baker Joins Carlyle Group", The Washington Post, March 11, 1993.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.515–517. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.518–520. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.565–566. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12"The Thought Factory". Rice Magazine | Office of Public Affairs | Rice University. Archived from the original on April 15, 2024. Retrieved November 17, 2025.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.529–531. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Tapper, Jake (2001). Down and dirty: the plot to steal the presidency. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown. pp.55–65. ISBN978-0-316-83264-9.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.533–536. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12345Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.540–543. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑"U.N. ENVOY: Asking Baker to resolve dispute is good choice". Houston Chronicle. March 20, 1997. p.38.(subscription required)
1234567Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.557–561. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Chandrasekaran, Rajiv (2007). Imperial life in the emerald city: inside Iraq's green zone. Internet Archive. New York: Vintage Books. ISBN978-0-307-27883-8.
123Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.569–573. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.561–564. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.192–196. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑John Schwartz (February 7, 2017). "'A Conservative Climate Solution': Republican Group Calls for Carbon Tax". The New York Times. Retrieved April 17, 2017. The group, led by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, with former Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Henry M. Paulson Jr., a former secretary of the Treasury, says that taxing carbon pollution produced by burning fossil fuels is "a conservative climate solution" based on free-market principles.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2020). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (Firsted.). New York: Doubleday. p.579. ISBN978-0-385-54055-1.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. p.581. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker and Glasser, Peter and Susan (September 29, 2020). The Man Who Ran Washington, The Life and Times of James A. Baker III. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (published 2020). ISBN9781101912164.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2020). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (Firsted.). New York: Doubleday. pp.8–9. ISBN978-0-385-54055-1.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.61–62. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Sweany, Brian D. (January 20, 2013). "The Republic of Chad". Texas Monthly. Archived from the original on March 29, 2023. Retrieved July 26, 2025.
↑Gwynne, S. C. (January 21, 2013). "James Baker Forever". Texas Monthly. Retrieved April 15, 2025.
↑Dumas, Bob (October 2003). "Troubled Waters". Pool & Spa News. Archived from the original on December 21, 2012. The victim in this case was Graeme Baker, the granddaughter of James Baker III, former secretary of state under President George Bush.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.159–164. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.192–196. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.499–501. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.505–508. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.214, 300, 383, 503. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
12Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.207–210. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑Bidgood, Jess (November 15, 2024). "Government by Bro". Archived from the original on September 3, 2025. Retrieved December 30, 2025.
↑McKenna, Michael (May 15, 2024). "The problem with Jim Baker". The Washington Times. Retrieved 2025-12-15.
1234Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan (2021). The man who ran Washington: the life and times of James A. Baker III (First Anchor Booksed.). New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. pp.525–528. ISBN978-1-101-91216-4.
↑"Gen. Colin L. Powell Biography and Interview". Awards Council member and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA presents the Golden Plate Award to former Secretary of State James A. Baker III at the 1998 Summit in Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Further reading
Works by
1995: The Politics of Diplomacy. with Thomas M. DeFrank. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. ISBN9780399140877.
2006: "Work Hard, Study... And Keep Out of Politics!": Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life. with Steve Fiffer. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. ISBN9780399153778.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
