Operation Valuable

Operation Valuable
Part of the Cold War
Top left: American Forces in Munich Germany, Recruiting Paramilitary Soldiers Top right: U.S. Colonel F. H. Dunn inspecting the anti-communist "Kompania 4000" during training at Hohenbrunn in Bavaria in November 1950. Bottom left: The Sigurimi with a captured CIA agent. Bottom right: Tito gives green light to U.S General John C. H. Lee to take down fellow communist ruler Enver Hoxha.
Date 1949–1956 Operation Valuable: 1949–1954 (5 years) Operation BG/Fiend: October 1950–May 1956 Location Albania Result Communist Albanian victory Western allied forces fail to overthrow Hoxha's regime [1] [2] [3]
Belligerents
Hoxha's regime:   Communist Albania	Western Bloc:   United States   United Kingdom NATO   Italy   West Germany [lower-alpha 1] Greece   Turkey [lower-alpha 2]   Yugoslavia Separatists: KEVA
Commanders and leaders
Enver Hoxha Mehmet Shehu Kadri Hazbiu	Harry S Truman [4] Dean Acheson Frank Wisner Franklin Lindsay James G. McCargar Roman Rudkowski (Ex-Colonel of the Polish Air Force) Clement Attlee [5] David Smiley Julian Amery Peter Kemp Alexandros Papagos [6] Panteleimon Kotokos Josip Broz Tito Vlado Popović Konrad Adenauer
Units involved
Albanian People's Army Sigurimi	United States Army CIA Kompania 4000 O.P.C British Army MI6 Italian Navy UDBA
Strength
unknown	Initial invasion: / 500 Agents [7] / 2,000 paramilitary soldiers [8] 5 submarines 180 C-47 aircraft 80 landing craft assault boats 6 landing craft utility 7,500 commandos [9]
Casualties and losses
unknown	1949–1954 / 300 Anglo-Americans killed [10] 961 Western Allied forces killed [11] 33 Yugoslav agents of the UDBA were captured or executed [12] 60 Western Agents were killed [lower-alpha 3] [13]
400 civilians executed

The Anglo-American intervention in Communist Albania, codenamed Operation Valuable, was a significant Cold War military conflict conducted by the United Kingdom and the United States, in collaboration with Western allies. This covert operation aimed to overthrow the government led by Enver Hoxha. The intervention sought to counter Communist influence and reinstate a leadership aligned with the Western powers. The operation involved strategic military actions, incorporating air, naval, and ground assets in pursuit of its objectives. ^[14]

MI6 and the CIA launched a joint subversive operation, using Albanian expatriates as agents. Other anti-communist Albanians and many nationalists worked as agents for Greek and Italian intelligence services, some supported by the Anglo-American secret services. Many of the agents were caught, put on trial, and either shot or condemned to long prison terms at penal labour. ^{[ citation needed ]}

Background

Albania was in an unenviable position after World War II. ^[15] Greece claimed Albanian lands. ^[15] The Western Allies recognized neither King Zog nor a republican government-in-exile, nor did they ever raise the question of Albania or its borders at major wartime conferences. ^[15] No reliable statistics on Albania's wartime losses exist, but the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration reported about 30,000 Albanian dead from the war, 200 destroyed villages, 18,000 destroyed houses, and about 100,000 people made homeless. ^[15] Albanian official statistics claim higher losses. ^[15]

British plans for the overthrow of Hoxha and the Communist regime in Albania had existed since 1946. ^[16] The Russia Committee, established in 1946 by the British Foreign Office, was created to oppose the extension of Soviet control by promoting civil strife in Russia's Western border nations. ^[17]

Operational plans

Participants of the conference, US Secretary Dean Acheson, proposes an intervention of communist Albania. Harry S. Truman and the NATO alliance agree

On 6 September 1949, when NATO met for the first time in Washington, Bevin proposed that “a counter-revolution” be launched in Albania. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson was in agreement. NATO, established as a defensive military alliance for Western Europe and North America, was now committed to launching offensive covert operations against a sovereign nation in the Balkans. The US and UK, joining with their allies, Italy and Greece, agreed to support the overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania and to eliminate Soviet influence in the Mediterranean region. Bevin wanted to place King Zog on the throne as the leader of Albania once Hoxha was overthrown. ^[18] The plan called for parachute drops of royalists into the Mati region in Central Albania. The region was known as a bastion of Albanian traditionalism and moreover praised for their loyalty to King Zog, himself an offspring of one of the regional clans.^{[ citation needed ]} The original plan was to parachute in agents, in order to organize a massive popular revolt, which the allies would supply by air drops. In time, this revolt would spill out a civil war. The trouble that this would cause Soviet politics was considered by the British to be worth the risk, and if it did succeed, then it could be the starting point of a chain reaction of counter-revolutions throughout the Eastern Bloc.^{[ citation needed ]} The chief of SIS, Stewart Menzies, was not enthusiastic about the paramilitary operation but saw it as a way to appease the former SOE “stinks and bangs people.” ^{[ citation needed ]}

The British wanted the United States to finance the operation and to provide bases. Senior British intelligence officer William Hayter, who chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), came to Washington, D.C. in March with a group of Secret Intelligence Service members and Foreign Office staff that included Gladwyn Jebb, Earl Jellicoe, and Peter Dwyer of SIS and a Balkans specialist.^{[ citation needed ]} Joined by SIS Washington liaison Kim Philby, they met with Robert Joyce of the US State Department’s Policy and Planning Staff (PPS) and Frank Wisner, who was the head of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), and other U.S. intelligence officials such as James McCargar and Franklin Lindsay. McCargar was assigned to liaise with Philby on joint operational matters. Unbeknownst to the SIS and CIA, Philby was a communist and a spy for Soviet foreign intelligence, and has subsequently been blamed for the failure of the operation. ^[19]

Anti-communist Albanians were recruited in the Displaced Persons camps in Greece, Italy, and Turkey. The manpower for what the British codenamed VALUABLE Project and the Americans FIEND, consisted of 40% from the Balli Kombëtar (BK) National Front, a fascist collaborationist organization formed during World War II, 40% from the monarchist movement, known as Legaliteti and the rest from other Albanian factions. ^[20]

Valuable Project/Fiend

See also: "Free Albania" National Committee

A dozen Albanian émigrés were recruited and taken to Libya to train for a pilot project that would become known as Operation Valuable. The SIS, with U.S. Army Col. 'Ace' Miller as a liaison, trained these men in the use of weapons, codes and radio, the techniques of subversion and sabotage. They were dropped into the mountains of Mati throughout 1947, but failed to inspire the inhabitants of the region into a larger revolt. The operation continued into 1949. There were sabotage attempts on the Kuçova oilfields and the copper mines in Rubik but no real success in raising a revolt. Then, the US government weighing up the political situation, decided to lend a hand. In September 1949, British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin went to Washington, D.C. to discuss Operation Valuable with US government officials. The CIA released a report that concluded that “a purely internal Albanian uprising at this time is not indicated, and, if undertaken, would have little chance of success.” The CIA asserted that the Enver Hoxha regime had a 65,000 man regular army and a security force of 15,000. There were intelligence reports that there were 1,500 Soviet “advisers” and 4,000 “technicians” in Albania helping to train the Albanian Army.

British and U.S. naval officials were concerned that the USSR was building a submarine base at the Karaburun Peninsula near the port of Vlora. On 6 September 1949, when NATO met for the first time in Washington, Bevin proposed that “a counter-revolution” be launched in Albania. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson was in agreement. NATO, established as a defensive military alliance for Western Europe and North America, was now committed to launching offensive covert operations against a sovereign nation in the Balkans. The US and UK, joining with their allies, Italy and Greece, agreed to support the overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania and to eliminate Soviet influence in the Mediterranean region. Bevin wanted to place King Zog on the throne as the leader of Albania once Hoxha was overthrown.

This time a better quality of commandos were sought and an approach was made to King Zog in exile in Cairo to recommend men for the job. However, British negotiator Neil 'Billy' McLean and American representatives Robert Miner and Robert Low were unable to bring Zog in because no one would name him head of a provisional government in exile. In August 1949, an announcement was made in Paris that Albanian political exiles had formed a multiparty committee to foment anti-communist rebellion in the homeland; actually the "Free Albania" National Committee was created by American diplomatic and intelligence officials for political cover to a covert paramilitary project, with British concurrence. The British made the first organizational move, hiring on as chief trainer Major David Smiley, deputy commander of a cavalry (tank) regiment stationed in Germany. The leaders of the Balli Kombetar, an exile political group whose key policy was to replace the Albanian Communist regime with a non-royalist government, had already agreed with McLean and his cohort, Julian Amery, to supply 30 Albanian émigrés, some veterans of World War II guerrilla and civil wars, as recruits for the operation to penetrate Albania

Fort Binġemma, where Albanian recruits were trained.

In July 1949, the first group of recruits, were transported by British special operations personnel to Fort Binġemma, on the British crown colony of Malta. Labeled as "The Pixies" by the SIS, they spent two months training as radio operators, intelligence gatherers, and more sophisticated guerrillas than they had been as members of cetas (guerrilla bands) during World War II. On 26 September 1949, nine Pixies boarded a Royal Navy trawler which sailed north; three days later, a Greek style fishing boat, known as a caïque and named "Stormie Seas', sailed from Malta.

With a stop at an Italian port, the two vessels sailed 3 October, rendezvoused at a point in the Adriatic Sea, and transferred the Albanians to the caïque. Hours later that same night, the Pixies landed on the Albanian coast, some distance south of Vlora, which was the former territory of the Balli Kombetar, others further north. Albanian government security forces soon interdicted one of the two groups on commandos. The Communists killed three members of the first group, and a fourth man with the second group. The first three deaths and disappearance of a fourth man to join his family wiped out one group, while the surviving four from the covert landing exfiltrated south to Greece.

For two years after this landing, small groups of British-trained Albanians left every so often from training camps in Malta, Britain and West Germany. Most of the operations failed, with Albanian security forces interdicting many of the insurgents. Occasionally, the Albanian authorities would report on “large but unsuccessful infiltrations of enemies of the people” in several regions of the country. Some American agents, originally trained by Italian or Greek officials, also infiltrated by air, sea, or on foot to gather intelligence rather than take part in political or paramilitary operations. The most successful of these operatives was Hamit Marjani, code name Tiger, who participated in 15 land incursions. ^[20]

The last infiltration took place a few weeks before Easter 1952. In an effort to discover what was going on Captain Shehu himself, with Captain Branica and radio operator Tahir Prenci, were guided by veteran gendarme and guerrilla fighter Matjani and three armed guards to the Mati region northeast of Tirana. Albanian security forces militia were waiting for them at their rendezvous point, a house owned by Shehu's cousin, a known supporter of Zog. The militia forced Shehu's operator to transmit an all clear signal to his base in Cyprus. The operator had been schooled to deal with such situations, using a fail-safe drill which involved broadcasting in a way that warned it was being sent under duress and therefore should be disregarded. But the militia seemed to know the drill. The all clear signal went out and, nearly a year later, four more top agents, including Matjani himself, parachuted into an ambush at Shen Gjergj (Saint George), near the town of Elbasan. Those not killed were tried in April 1954.

1950 Albanian coastline ambushes

The 1950 Albanian coastline ambushes or Raids on the Albanian coastline in 1950 involved a conflict between Albanian Hoxhaist secret forces (Sigurimi), and multiple British teams supported by MI6. ^{[21] [20]}

1950 Albanian coastline ambushes
Part of Operation Valuable
Date September and November, 1950 Location Albania, Albanian Coastline Result Communist Albanian victory
Belligerents
Communist Albania	United Kingdom Supported by: CIA United States Air Force
Commanders and leaders
Kadri Hazbiu	Peter Dwyer Air Support: Roman Rudkowski
Units involved
Sigurimi	MI6
Strength
Unknown	three British teams
Casualties and losses
none	All British troops were captured or killed

In preparation for the landing of British SIS troops, several C-47 aircraft and boats were used, the planes were piloted by CIA and ex-Polish Air Force colonels. The British Chief Peter Dwyer was in charge of the British SIS during the raids. ^{[22] [19]}

It was one of the most disastrous parts of the covert operation as all of the British agents were killed or captured. ^[21]

Aftermath

See also: Company 4000

Operation Valuable was a failure, with 300 MI6 and CIA agents killed during its duration. ^[23]

See also

• Banda Mustafaj
• Bay of Pigs invasion – similar operation in Cuba

Notes

1. Formation of the unit Company 4000
2. Agency support and recruiting soldiers
3. Mainly the agents were Yugoslav, Greek, Italian, British and American

References

1. Oller, Jan P. (2009). Gods, Guns, & Fear. AuthorHouse. ISBN   978-1-4389-4163-9. The operations failed, primarily
2. Xhudo, Gazmen (27 July 2016). Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans: A US Foreign Policy Perspective. Springer. ISBN   978-1-349-24947-3. The attempts by both the US and British failed
3. Walton, Calder (6 June 2023). Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West. Simon and Schuster. ISBN   978-1-6680-0069-4. The MI6-CIA attempt to liberate Albania was, however, a dramatic failure.
4. Peters, Stephen (13 October 1985). "KIM PHILBY AND THE ALBANIAN MISSION". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved 28 March 2023.
5. "Attlee's secret war with Stalin". HistoryExtra. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
6. "Disaster in Albania: The CIA's First Covert Mission". coldwarhistoryblog. Retrieved 22 February 2020.
7. "Country Plan Albania" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. 97 (39). 1949. Present OPC plans for operations in Albania envisage the recruiting and training of an additional guard company, making a total of two (500 agents), and the infiltration of 50 agents by 30 June 1952. Given the widespread although at present uncoordinated opposition to the regime, it should be possible to recruit initially at least 2,000 guerrillas from opposition elements now awaiting outside assistance.
8. "Country Plan Albania" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. 97 (39). 1949.
9. "Η άγνωστη αποτυχημένη προσπάθεια ανατροπής του Ενβέρ Χότζα από Βρετανούς και Αμερικανούς (1949 – 1958) και ο ρόλος της Ελλάδας". www.protothema.gr. Retrieved 8 July 2023.
10. "BBC World Service - World Update, The CIA's Secret Failure in Albania". BBC. 18 August 2016. Retrieved 27 March 2023.
11. "Η άγνωστη αποτυχημένη προσπάθεια ανατροπής του Ενβέρ Χότζα από Βρετανούς και Αμερικανούς (1949 – 1958) και ο ρόλος της Ελλάδας". www.protothema.gr. Retrieved 8 July 2023.
12. GazetaSot. "Dokumenti i CIA zbardh të vërtetën e operacionit BGFIEND kundër regjimit të Enver Hoxhës, si hidheshin agjentët amerikanë dhe britanikë në Shqipëri dhe roli i agjentëve shqiptarë të stërvitur në Gjermani". sot.com.al. Retrieved 11 July 2023. Radio Tirana raportoi më 27 tetor se 33 spiunë jugosllavë u kapën ose u vranë nga forcat shtetërore të sigurisë. Asnjë prej tyre nuk ishte agjent i OPC. Këto tre lajmërime tregojnë për suksesin e forcave qeveritare në ndalimin e infiltrimeve nga jashtë. Aktualisht, vetëm dy grupe të OPC janë operativë në Shqipëri, por meqënëse ende nuk është vendosur kontakti radio, statusi i operacioneve nuk njihet. (Albanian) Radio Tirana reported on October 27 that 33 Yugoslav spies were captured or killed by state security forces. None of them were OPC agents. These three announcements show the success of government forces in stopping infiltrations from abroad. Currently, only two OPC groups are operational in Albania, but since radio contact has not yet been established, the status of operations is unknown.
13. The Journal of Intelligence History. LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN   978-3-8258-0650-7. The next OPC team was parachuted in October 1951, just when in Tirana British, American, Greek, Italian and Yugoslav agents captured at different times were on trial. In general, during 1951, 60 Western agents were parachuted into Albania. None of them survived.
14. Gloyer, Gillian (2008). Albania: The Bradt Travel Guide. Bradt Travel Guides. ISBN   978-1-84162-246-0.
15. Sudetic, Charles (1994). "World War II and the Rise of Communism, 1941-44". In Raymond E. Zickel; Walter R. Iwaskiw (eds.). Albania: A Country Study (2nd ed.). Federal Research Division. ISBN   0-8444-0792-5. LCCN   93042885. OCLC   165149425. OL   1431418M. Wikidata   Q100997825. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain .
16. "Οι προσπάθειες ανατροπής του Ενβέρ Χότζα από Βρετανούς και Αμερικανούς και ο ρόλος της Ελλάδας". www.himara.gr. Retrieved 28 March 2023.
17. Lulushi, Albert (3 June 2014). Operation Valuable Fiend: The CIA's First Paramilitary Strike Against the Iron Curtain. Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. ISBN   9781628723946 . Retrieved 28 March 2023.
18. "Albanian Dossier: CIA and British MI6 in Albania" (PDF). Albanian Canadian League Information Service. 8 (6). 2007.
19. Trahair, R. C. S. (2004). Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN   9780313319556 . Retrieved 28 March 2023.
20. Prados 2006, p. 63.
21. The Journal of Intelligence History. LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN   978-3-8258-0650-7. Despite the above development, in September and November 1950 three more British teams landed on the Albanian beach. The results were disastrous. The Albanian Security Service, Sigurimi, ambushed the SIS agents and almost all of them were killed or captured.
22. Trahair, Richard C. S.; Trahair, R. C. S. (2004). Encyclopedia of Cold War espionage, spies, and secret operations (1. publ ed.). Westport, CT London: Greenwood Press. ISBN   978-0-313-31955-6.
23. "BBC World Service - World Update, The CIA's Secret Failure in Albania". BBC. 18 August 2016. Retrieved 28 March 2023.

Sources

• Prados, John (2006). Safe for democracy : the secret wars of the CIA . Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. ISBN   978-1-61578-011-2. OCLC   812925034.
• Nicholas Bethell (1985). Betrayed. New York: Times Books. ISBN   0-8129-1188-1. OCLC   2215298.
• Colonel David Smiley LVO, OBE, MC, "Irregular Regular", Michael Russell, Norwich, 1994 ( ISBN   0-85955-202-0). The Mémoirs of a Royal Horse Guards officer, SOE agent in Albania and Thailand, and later MI6 agent in Poland, Malta, Oman and Yemen. He trained the Pixies in Malta in 1949. Translated in French by Thierry Le Breton, Au cœur de l’action clandestine. Des Commandos au MI6, L’Esprit du Livre Editions, France, 2008 ( ISBN   978-2-915960-27-3). With numerous photographs.
• Dorril, Stephen. MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, Fourth Estate, University of Michigan: 2000 ( ISBN   978-1-857020-93-9)
• Bruce Page; David Leitch; Phillip Knightley (1968). The Philby Conspiracy . New York: Doubleday. OCLC   165938.
• Paul Hockenos (2003). Homeland calling: exile patriotism and the Balkan wars. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. ISBN   0-8014-4158-7. OCLC   52165767.
• Noble, Andrew. “Bullets and Broadcasting: Methods of Subversion and Subterfuge in the CIA War against the Iron Curtain.” MA dissert. University of Nevada, 2009
• Stavrou, Nikolaos A. “Searching for a Brother Lost in Albania’s Gulag”. Mediterranean Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2008): 47-81

Media

• "CIA and British MI6 in Albania"
• Irish television programme "Who Do You Think You Are? Episode: Rosanna Davison" Broadcast on RTÉ One, 28 September 2009. Contains the revelation that Rosanna Davison's grandfather Charles Davison took up a secret posting in Malta in 1952, training agents to infiltrate Albania.