1991 Soviet coup attempt

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1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt
Part of the Cold War, the Revolutions of 1989,
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
August Coup montage.png
Clockwise from top left:
Date18–22 August 1991 (5 days)
Location
Result

Coup fails

Belligerents

Flag of the Soviet Union.svg State Committee on the State of Emergency

USSR, Flag commander 1964.svg Presidency of the Soviet Union

Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svgFlag of Russia (1991-1993).svg  Russian SFSR

Supporting republics : [1] [2]
Flag of the Abkhaz ASSR.svg  Abkhazia
Flag of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (1956-1991).svgFlag of Azerbaijan (1991-2013).svg  Azerbaijan
Flag of the Buryat ASSR.svg Buryatia
Flag of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (1951-1991).svg  Byelorussia
Flag of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.svg Checheno-Ingushetia
Flag of the Gagauz people.svg Gagauzia
Flag of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR.svg Kabardino-Balkaria
Flag of the North Ossetian ASSR.svg North Ossetia
Flag of Tajik SSR.svg  Tajikistan
Flag of Tatar ASSR.svg Tatarstan
Flag of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (1952-1990).svg Transnistria [3]
Flag of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.svg  Turkmenistan
Flag of the Uzbek SSR.svg  Uzbekistan
Supporting republics : [1]
Flag of Armenia.svg  Armenia
Flag of Estonia.svg  Estonia
Flag of Georgia (1990-2004).svg  Georgia
Flag of the Kazakh SSR.svg  Kazakhstan
Flag of Kyrgyz SSR.svg  Kyrgyzstan
Flag of Latvia.svg  Latvia
Flag of Lithuania (1988-2004).svg  Lithuania
Flag of Moldova.svg  Moldova
Flag of Azerbaijan 1918.svg  Nakhchivan
Flag of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1949-1991).svgFlag of Ukraine (1991-1992).svg Ukraine
Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svg Communist Party of the RSFSR
Flag of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.svg Communist Party of Estonia (CPSU)
Flag of Latvian SSR.svg Communist Party of Latvia
Flag of Lithuanian SSR.svg Communist Party of Lithuania
Flag of the LDPSU.svg Liberal Democratic Party [4]
Flag of the Russian Empire (black-yellow-white).svgFlag of Russia.svg Russian nationalists and monarchists
Flag of Azerbaijan 1918.svg Popular Front of Azerbaijan
Flag of Belarus (1918, 1991-1995).svg Belarusian Popular Front
Flag of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People.svg All-National Congress of the Chechen People [5]
Flag of Ukrainian People's Republic 1917.svg People's Movement of Ukraine
Flag of UNA-UNSO.svg UNA–UNSO
Flag of Lithuania (1988-2004).svg Sąjūdis
Diplomatic support:
[6] [7] [8]
  • Flag of Afghanistan (1987-1992).svg  Afghanistan
  • Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg  China
  • Flag of Cuba.svg  Cuba
  • Flag of Iraq (1991-2004).svg Iraq
  • Flag of Laos.svg  Laos
  • Flag of Libya (1977-2011).svg  Libya
  • Flag of North Korea (1948-1992).svg  North Korea
  • Flag of Sudan.svg  Sudan
  • Flag of Palestine.svg PLO [9]
  • Flag of Syria.svg  Syria
  • Flag of Vietnam.svg  Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Gennady Yanayev   White flag icon.svg
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Sergey Akhromeyev  
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Dmitry Yazov   White flag icon.svg
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Vladimir Kryuchkov   White flag icon.svg
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Valentin Pavlov   White flag icon.svg
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Boris Pugo  
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Oleg Baklanov   White flag icon.svg
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Vasily Starodubtsev   White flag icon.svg
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Alexander Tizyakov   White flag icon.svg
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Nikolay Kruchina  
USSR, Flag commander 1964.svg Mikhail Gorbachev [a]
Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svg Flag of Russia (1991-1993).svg Boris Yeltsin
Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svg Flag of Russia (1991-1993).svg Alexander Rutskoy
Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svg Flag of Russia (1991-1993).svg Ruslan Khasbulatov
Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svg Flag of Russia (1991-1993).svg Ivan Silayev
Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svg Flag of Russia (1991-1993).svg Konstantin Kobets
Flag of the Abkhaz ASSR.svg Vladislav Ardzinba
Flag of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (1956-1991).svg Flag of Azerbaijan (1991-2013).svg Hasan Hasanov
Flag of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (1951-1991).svg Anatoly Malofeyev
Flag of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (1951-1991).svg Nikolay Dementey
Flag of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.svg Doku Zavgayev
Flag of the Gagauz people.svg Stepan Topal
Flag of Tajik SSR.svg Qahhor Mahkamov
Flag of Tatar ASSR.svg Mintimer Shaimiev
Flag of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (1952-1990).svg Igor Smirnov
Flag of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.svg Saparmurat Niyazov
Flag of the Uzbek SSR.svg Islam Karimov
Flag of Armenia.svg Levon Ter-Petrosyan
Flag of Estonia.svg Edgar Savisaar
Flag of Georgia (1990-2004).svg Zviad Gamsakhurdia
Flag of the Kazakh SSR.svg Nursultan Nazarbayev
Flag of Kyrgyz SSR.svg Askar Akayev
Flag of Latvia.svg Ivars Godmanis
Flag of Lithuania (1988-2004).svg Vytautas Landsbergis
Flag of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.svg Valentin Kuptsov
Flag of Latvian SSR.svg Alfrēds Rubiks
Flag of Lithuanian SSR.svg Mykolas Burokevičius
Flag of Azerbaijan 1918.svg Abulfaz Elchibey
Flag of Belarus (1918, 1991-1995).svg Zianon Pazniak
Flag of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People.svg Dzhokhar Dudayev
Flag of Ukrainian People's Republic 1917.svg Viacheslav Chornovil
Flag of UNA-UNSO.svg Yuriy Shukhevych
Casualties and losses

3 died by suicide:

  • 3 civilians killed on 21 August

The 1991 Soviet coup attempt, also known as the August Coup, [b] was a failed attempt by hardliners of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to forcibly seize control of the country from Mikhail Gorbachev, who was Soviet President and General Secretary of the CPSU at the time. The coup leaders consisted of top military and civilian officials, including Vice President Gennady Yanayev, who together formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP). They opposed Gorbachev's reform program, were angry at the loss of control over Eastern European states and fearful of the New Union Treaty, which was on the verge of being signed by the Soviet Union (USSR). The treaty was to decentralize much of the central Soviet government's power and distribute it among its fifteen republics; Yeltsin's demand for more autonomy to the republics opened a window for the plotters to organize the coup.

Contents

The GKChP hardliners dispatched KGB agents who detained Gorbachev at his dacha but failed to detain the recently elected president of a newly reconstituted Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who had been both an ally and critic of Gorbachev. The GKChP was poorly organized and met with effective resistance by both Yeltsin and a civilian campaign of anti-authoritarian protesters, mainly in Moscow. [13] The coup collapsed in two days, and Gorbachev returned to office while the plotters all lost their posts. Yeltsin subsequently became the dominant leader and Gorbachev lost much of his influence. The failed coup led to both the immediate collapse of the CPSU and the dissolution of the USSR four months later.

Following the capitulation of the GKChP, popularly referred to as the "Gang of Eight", both the Supreme Court of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and President Gorbachev described its actions as a coup attempt.

Background

Since assuming power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev had embarked on an ambitious reform program embodied in the twin concepts of perestroika (economic and political restructuring) and glasnost (openness). [14] These moves prompted resistance and suspicion on the part of hard-line members of the nomenklatura . The reforms also caused nationalist agitation on the part of the Soviet Union's non-Russian minorities to grow, and there were fears that some or all of the union republics might secede. In 1991, the Soviet Union was in a severe economic and political crisis. Scarcity of food, medicine, and other consumables was widespread, [15] people had to stand in long lines to buy even essential goods, [16] fuel stocks were as much as 50% lower than the estimated amount needed for the approaching winter, and inflation exceeded 300% per year, with factories lacking the cash needed to pay salaries. [17]

In 1990, Estonia, [18] Latvia, [19] Lithuania [20] and Armenia [21] had already declared the restoration of their independence from the Soviet Union. In January 1991, a violent attempt to return Lithuania to the Soviet Union by force took place. About a week later, a similar attempt was engineered by local pro-Soviet forces to overthrow Latvian authorities.

Russia declared its sovereignty on 12 June 1990 and thereafter limited the application of Soviet laws, in particular those governing finance and the economy, on Russian territory. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR adopted laws that contradicted Soviet laws (the so-called War of Laws).

In the unionwide referendum on 17 March 1991, boycotted by the Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, a supermajority of residents in the other republics expressed the desire to retain the renewed Soviet Union, with 77.85% voting in favor. Following negotiations, eight of the remaining nine republics (Ukraine abstaining) approved the New Union Treaty with some conditions. The treaty was to make the Soviet Union a federation of independent republics called the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, with a common president, foreign policy, and military. Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were to sign the Treaty in Moscow on 20 August 1991. [22] [23]

British historian Dan Stone wrote the following about the plotters' motivation:

The coup was the last gasp of those who were astonished at and felt betrayed by the precipitous collapse of the Soviet Union's empire in Eastern Europe and the swift destruction of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon that followed. Many feared the consequences of Gorbachev's German policies above all, not just for leaving officers unemployed but for sacrificing gains achieved in the Great Patriotic War to German revanchism and irredentism – after all, this had been the Kremlin's greatest fear since the end of the war. [24]

Preparation

Planning

The KGB began considering a coup in September 1990. Soviet politician Alexander Yakovlev began warning Gorbachev about the possibility of one after the 28th Party Congress in June 1990. [2] On 11 December 1990, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov made a "call for order" over the Moscow Programme television station. [25] That day, he asked two KGB officers [26] to prepare measures to be taken in the event a state of emergency was declared in the USSR. Later, Kryuchkov brought Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, Central Control Commission Chairman Boris Pugo, Premier Valentin Pavlov, Vice President Gennady Yanayev, Soviet Defense Council deputy chief Oleg Baklanov, Gorbachev secretariat head Valery Boldin, and CPSU Central Committee Secretary Oleg Shenin into the conspiracy. [27] [28]

When Kryuchkov complained about the Soviet Union's growing instability to the Congress of People's Deputies, Gorbachev attempted to appease him by issuing a presidential decree enhancing the powers of the KGB and appointing Pugo to the Cabinet as Minister of Internal Affairs. Foreign Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze resigned in protest and rejected an offered appointment as vice president, warning that "a dictatorship is coming." Gorbachev was forced to appoint Yanayev in his place. [29]

Beginning with the January Events in Lithuania, members of Gorbachev's Cabinet hoped that he could be persuaded to declare a state of emergency and "restore order," and formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP). [30]

On 17 June 1991, Soviet Premier Pavlov requested extraordinary powers from the Supreme Soviet. Several days later, Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov informed U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock Jr. that a coup against Gorbachev was being planned. When Matlock tried to warn him, Gorbachev falsely assumed that his own Cabinet was not involved and underestimated the risk of a coup. [30] Gorbachev reversed Pavlov's request for more powers and jokingly told his Cabinet "The coup is over," remaining oblivious to their plans. [31]

On 23 July 1991, several party functionaries and literati published a piece in the hardline Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper, entitled "A Word to the People", that called for decisive action to prevent calamity. [32]

Six days later, on 29 July, Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed the possibility of replacing hardliners such as Pavlov, Yazov, Kryuchkov and Pugo with more liberal figures, [33] with Nazarbayev as Prime Minister (in Pavlov's place). Kryuchkov, who had placed Gorbachev under close surveillance as Subject 110 several months earlier, eventually got wind of the conversation from an electronic bug planted by Gorbachev's bodyguard, Vladimir Medvedev. [2] [34] [35] Yeltsin also prepared for a coup by establishing a secret defense committee, ordering military and KGB commands to side with RSFSR authorities and establishing a "reserve government" in Sverdlovsk under Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Lobov.

Commencement

On 4 August, Gorbachev went on holiday to his dacha in Foros, Crimea. [33] He planned to return to Moscow in time for the New Union Treaty signing on 20 August. On 15 August, the text of the draft treaty was published, which would have stripped the coup planners of much of their authority. [36] [37]

On 17 August, the members of the GKChP met at a KGB guesthouse in Moscow and studied the treaty document. Decisions were made to introduce a state of emergency from 19 August, to form a State Emergency Committee, and require Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or to resign and transfer powers to Vice President Yanayev. [33] They believed the pact would pave the way for the Soviet Union's breakup, and decided it was time to act. The next day, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin, and Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin Varennikov flew to Crimea for a meeting with Gorbachev. Yazov ordered General Pavel Grachev, commander of the Soviet Airborne Forces, to begin coordinating with KGB Deputy Chairmen Viktor Grushko and Genii Ageev to implement martial law. [2]

At 4:32 pm on 18 August, the GKChP cut communications to Gorbachev's dacha, including telephone landlines and the nuclear command and control system. [33] Eight minutes later Lieutenant General Yuri Plekhanov, Head of the Ninth Chief Directorate of the KGB, allowed the group into Gorbachev's dacha. Gorbachev realized what was happening after discovering the telephone outages. Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov demanded that Gorbachev either declare a state of emergency or resign and name Yanayev as acting president to allow the members of the GKChP "to restore order" to the country. [28] [38] [39] [30]

Gorbachev has always claimed that he refused point-blank to accept the ultimatum. [38] [40] Varennikov has insisted that Gorbachev said: "Damn you. Do what you want. But report my opinion!" [41] However, those present at the dacha at the time testified that Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov had been clearly disappointed and nervous after the meeting with Gorbachev. [38] Gorbachev is said to have insulted Varennikov by pretending to forget his name, and to have told his former trusted advisor Boldin "Shut up, you prick! How dare you give me lectures about the situation in the country!" [30] With Gorbachev's refusal, the conspirators ordered that he remain confined to the dacha. Additional KGB security guards were placed at the dacha gates with orders to stop anybody from leaving. [38]

At 7:30 pm, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov flew to Moscow, accompanied by Plekhanov. His deputy, Vyacheslav Generalov, remained "on the farm" in Foros. [33]

At 8:00 pm, Yanayev, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo and Soviet Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoly Lukyanov gathered in the Kremlin cabinet of the Prime Minister, discussing and editing the documents of the State Emergency Committee. [33] At 10:15 pm, they were joined by Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, Varennikov and Plekhanov. It was decided to publicly declare Gorbachev ill. Yanayev hesitated, but the others convinced him that leadership and responsibility would be collective. [33]

At 11:25 pm, Yanayev signed a decree entrusting himself with presidential powers. [33]

GKChP members ordered that 250,000 pairs of handcuffs from a factory in Pskov be sent to Moscow, [42] also ordering 300,000 arrest forms. Kryuchkov doubled the pay of all KGB personnel, called them back from holiday, and placed them on alert. Lefortovo Prison was emptied to receive prisoners. [34]

The coup chronology

The members of the GKChP met in the Kremlin after Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov returned from Crimea. Yanayev (who had only just been persuaded to join the plot), Pavlov and Baklanov signed the so-called "Declaration of the Soviet Leadership", which declared a state of emergency in the entirety of the USSR and announced that the State Committee on the State of Emergency (Государственный Комитет по Чрезвычайному Положению, ГКЧП, or Gosudarstvenniy Komitet po Chrezvichaynomu Polozheniyu, GKChP) had been created "to manage the country and effectively maintain the regime of the state of emergency". The GKChP included the following members:

Yanayev signed the decree naming himself acting Soviet President, using the pretense of Gorbachev's inability to perform presidential duties due to "illness". [44] However, Russian investigators later identified Kryuchkov as the key planner of the coup. [2] Yanayev later claimed that he had been forced to participate in the coup under the threat of arrest. [45] The eight aforementioned GKChP members became known as the "Gang of Eight".

The GKChP banned all Moscow newspapers except for nine party-controlled newspapers. [43] [46] It also issued a populist declaration which stated that "the honour and dignity of the Soviet man must be restored." [43]

Monday 19 August

Early hours

At 1:00 am, Yanayev signed documents on the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), consisting of himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev. Included in the documents was the "Appeal to the Soviet people". [33] [47]

The GKChP members present signed GKChP Resolution No. 1, which introduced the following: a state of emergency "in certain areas of the USSR" lasting six months from 4:00 am Moscow time on 19 August; the prohibition of rallies, demonstrations and strikes; suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that impede the normalization of the situation; and the allocation of up to 1,500 square metres (0.4 acres) of land to all interested city residents for personal use. [33] [43]

At 4:00 am, the Sevastopol regiment of KGB border troops surrounded Gorbachev's presidential dacha in Foros. By order of Soviet Air Defense Chief of Staff Colonel-General Igor Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's aircraft were located: a Tu-134 jet and Mi-8 helicopter. [48]

Morning

Starting at 6:00 am, all of the GKChP documents were broadcast over state radio and television. [33] The KGB immediately issued an arrest list that included newly elected Russian SFSR President Boris Yeltsin, his allies, and the leaders of the umbrella activist group Democratic Russia. [2] The Russian SFSR-controlled Radio Rossii and Televidenie Rossii, plus Ekho Moskvy, the only independent political radio station, were taken off the air. However, the latter station later resumed its broadcasts and became a source of reliable information during the coup. The BBC World Service and Voice of America were also able to provide continuous coverage. Gorbachev and his family heard the news from a BBC bulletin on a small Sony transistor radio that had not been seized. For the next several days, he refused to take food from outside the dacha to avoid being poisoned, and took long outdoor strolls to dispute reports of his ill health. [49] [30]

Under Yanayev's orders,[ verification needed ] units of the Tamanskaya mechanized infantry and Kantemirovskaya armored division rolled into Moscow, along with airborne troops. Around 4,000 soldiers, 350 tanks, 300 armoured personnel carriers and 420 trucks were sent to Moscow. Four Russian SFSR people's deputies were detained by the KGB at a Soviet Army base near the capital. [27] However, almost no other arrests were made by the KGB during the coup. Ulysse Gosset and Vladimir Federovski later alleged that the KGB was planning to carry out a much larger wave of arrests two weeks after the coup, after which it would have abolished almost all legislative and local administrative structures under a highly centralized Council of Ministers. [2] Yanayev instructed Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh to make a statement requesting formal diplomatic recognition from foreign governments and the United Nations. [2]

The GKChP conspirators considered detaining Yeltsin upon his return from a visit to Kazakhstan on 17 August but failed when Yeltsin redirected his flight from Chkalovsky Air Base northeast of Moscow to Vnukovo Airport southwest of the city. Afterwards, they considered capturing him at his dacha near Moscow. The KGB Alpha Group surrounded his dacha with Spetsnaz, but for undisclosed reasons did not apprehend him. The commanding officer, Viktor Karpukhin, later alleged that he had received an order from Kryuchkov to arrest Yeltsin but disobeyed it, although his account has been questioned. [2] The failure to arrest Yeltsin proved fatal to the plotters' plans. [27] [50] [51] After the announcement of the coup at 6:30 am, Yeltsin began inviting prominent Russian officials to his dacha, including Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, Moscow Deputy Mayor Yury Luzhkov, Colonel-General Konstantin Kobets, RSFSR Prime Minister Ivan Silayev, RSFSR Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov. [2] [33]

U.S. map of Moscow with 1980s street names Moscow White House area 1980 Central Moscow (30849056096) (cropped).jpg
U.S. map of Moscow with 1980s street names

Yeltsin initially wanted to remain at the dacha and organize a rival government, but Kobets advised his group to travel to the White House, Russia's parliament building, to maintain communications with coup opponents. They arrived and occupied the building at 9:00 am. Together with Silayev and Khasbulatov, Yeltsin issued a declaration "To the Citizens of Russia" that condemned the GKChP's actions as a reactionary anti-constitutional coup. The military was urged not to take part in the coup, and local authorities were asked to follow laws from the RSFSR President rather than the GKChP. Although he initially avoided the measure to avoid sparking a civil war, Yeltsin also subsequently took command of all Soviet military and security forces in the RSFSR. [2] The joint declaration called for a general strike, with the demand to let Gorbachev address the people. [52] This declaration was distributed around Moscow in the form of flyers, and disseminated nationwide through medium-wave radio and Usenet newsgroups via the RELCOM computer network. [53] Izvestia newspaper workers threatened to go on strike unless Yeltsin's proclamation was printed in the paper. [54]

The GKChP relied on regional and local soviets, mostly still dominated by the Communist Party, to support the coup by forming emergency committees to repress dissidence. The CPSU Secretariat under Boldin sent coded telegrams to local party committees to assist the coup. Yeltsin's authorities later discovered that nearly 70 percent of the committees either backed it or attempted to remain neutral. Within the RSFSR, the oblasts of Samara, Lipetsk, Tambov, Saratov, Orenburg, Irkutsk, and Tomsk and the krai of Altai and Krasnodar all supported the coup and pressured raikom to do so as well, while only three oblasts aside from Moscow and Leningrad opposed it. However, some of the soviets faced internal resistance against emergency rule. The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics of Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Checheno-Ingushetia, Buryatia, and North Ossetia all sided with the GKChP. [2] Soviet Armed Forces officers seized control of city halls and government buildings around the country claiming to be in control, as well as television stations in the Baltic states. [55]

The Soviet public was divided on the coup. A poll in the RSFSR by Mnenie on the morning of 19 August showed that 23.6 percent of Russians believed the GKChP could improve living standards, while 41.9 percent had no opinion. However, separate polls by Interfax showed that many Russians, including 71 percent of Leningrad residents, feared the return of mass repression. The GKChP enjoyed strong support in the Russian-majority regions of Estonia and Transnistria, while Yeltsin enjoyed strong support in Sverdlovsk and Nizhny Novgorod. [2]

At 10:00 am, Rutskoy, Silayev, and Khasbulatov delivered a letter to Lukyanov demanding a medical exam of Gorbachev by the World Health Organization and a meeting between themselves, Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and Yanayev within 24 hours. Rutskoy later visited Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow, spiritual leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, and convinced him to declare support for Yeltsin. Meanwhile, in Leningrad, Military District Commander Viktor Samsonov ordered the formation of an emergency committee for the city, chaired by Leningrad First Secretary Boris Gidaspov, to circumvent Sobchak's democratically elected municipal government. Samsonov's troops were ultimately blocked by hundreds of thousands of demonstrators supported by the police, which forced Leningrad Television to broadcast a statement by Sobchak. Workers at the Kirov Plant went on strike in support of Yeltsin. Moscow First Secretary Yuri Prokofev attempted a similar maneuver in the capital but was rebuffed when Boris Nikolskii refused to accept the office of Mayor of Moscow. [2] At 11:00 am, RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev held a press conference for foreign journalists and diplomats, and gained the support of most of the West for Yeltsin. [2]

Afternoon and evening

That afternoon, Moscow citizens began gathering around the White House, erecting barricades around it. [52] In response, Yanayev declared a state of emergency in Moscow at 4:00 pm. [39] [43] He declared at a 5:00 pm press conference that Gorbachev was "resting". He said: "Over these years he has got very tired and needs some time to get his health back." Yanayev's shaking hands led some people to think he was drunk, and his trembling voice and weak posture made his words unconvincing. Victoria E. Bonnell and Gregory Frieden noted that the press conference allowed spontaneous questioning from journalists who openly accused the GKChP of carrying out a coup, as well as the lack of censorship by news crews, who did not hide Yanayev's erratic motions the way they had with past leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev, making the coup leaders appear more incompetent to Soviet audiences. [56] Gorbachev's security detail managed to construct a makeshift television antenna so he and his family could watch the press conference. [39] After viewing the conference, Gorbachev expressed confidence that Yeltsin would be able to stop the coup. That night, his family smuggled out a videotape of Gorbachev condemning the coup.

Yanayev and the rest of the State Committee ordered the Cabinet of Ministers to alter the five-year plan of the time to relieve the housing shortage. All city dwellers were each given 1,000 square metres (13 acre) to combat winter shortages by growing fruits and vegetables. Due to the illness of Valentin Pavlov, the duties of the Soviet head of the government were entrusted to First Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Doguzhiyev. [57] [33]

Meanwhile, the Soviet forces carrying out the coup began to suffer from mass defections to the RSFSR as well as soldiers refusing to obey orders to shoot civilians. Yeltsin asked his followers not to harass the soldiers and offered amnesty for any military servicemen who defected to oppose the coup. [58] Major Evdokimov, chief of staff of a tank battalion of the Tamanskaya Division guarding the White House, declared his loyalty to the leadership of the Russian SFSR. [52] [59] Yeltsin climbed one of the tanks and addressed the crowd. Unexpectedly, this episode was included in the state media's evening news. [60] Soviet Armed Forces officers loyal to the GKChP tried to prevent defections by confining soldiers to their barracks, but this only limited the availability of forces to carry out the coup. [61]

Tuesday 20 August

Tanks in Red Square 1991 coup attempt4.jpg
Tanks in Red Square

At 8:00 am, the Soviet General Staff ordered that the Cheget briefcase controlling Soviet nuclear weapons be returned to Moscow. Although Gorbachev discovered that the GKChP's actions had cut off communications with the nuclear duty officers, the Cheget was returned to the capital by 2:00 pm. However, Soviet Air Force Commander-in-Chief Yevgeny Shaposhnikov opposed the coup and claimed in his memoirs that he and the commanders of the Soviet Navy and the Strategic Rocket Forces told Yazov that they would not follow orders for a nuclear launch. After the coup, Gorbachev refused to admit that he had lost control of the country's nuclear weapons. [30]

At noon, Moscow military district commander General Nikolai Kalinin, whom Yanayev appointed military commandant of Moscow, declared a curfew in Moscow from 11:00 pm to 5:00 am, effective 20 August. [28] [62] [52] This was understood as a sign that an attack on the White House was imminent.

The defenders of the White House prepared themselves, most being unarmed. Evdokimov's tanks were moved from the White House in the evening. [39] [63] The makeshift White House defense headquarters was headed by General Konstantin Kobets, a Russian SFSR people's deputy. [63] [64] [65] Outside, Eduard Shevardnadze, Mstislav Rostropovich, and Yelena Bonner delivered speeches in support of Yeltsin. [2]

In the afternoon, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Pugo finally decided to attack the White House. This decision was supported by other GKChP members (with the exception of Pavlov, who had been sent to his dacha due to drunkenness). Kryuchkov's and Yazov's deputies, KGB general Gennady Ageyev and Army general Vladislav Achalov, planned the assault, codenamed "Operation Grom" (Thunder), which would gather elements of the Alpha Group and Vympel elite special forces units, supported by paratroopers, Moscow OMON, Internal Troops of the ODON, three tank companies and a helicopter squadron. Alpha Group commander General Viktor Karpukhin and other senior unit officers, together with Airborne deputy commander Gen. Alexander Lebed mingled with the crowds near the White House and assessed the possibility of such an operation. Afterwards, Karpukhin and Vympel commander Colonel Boris Beskov tried to convince Ageyev that the operation would result in bloodshed and should be cancelled. [27] [28] [33] [66] Lebed, with the consent of his superior Pavel Grachev, returned to the White House and secretly informed the defense headquarters that the attack would begin at 2:00 am the following morning. [33] [66]

While the events were unfolding in the capital, Estonia's Supreme Council declared at 11:03 pm the full reinstatement of the independent status of the Republic of Estonia after 51 years.

State-controlled TASS dispatches from 20 August emphasize a hardline approach against crime, especially economic crimes and the Russian mafia, which the GKChP blamed on increasing trade with the West. Draft decrees were later discovered which would have allowed military and police patrols to shoot "hooligans," including pro-democracy demonstrators. [2]

Wednesday 21 August

At about 1:00 am, not far from the White House, trolleybuses and street cleaning machines were used to barricade a tunnel against arriving Taman Guards infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), commanded by Captain Sergey Surovikin, [67] who years later rose to army general and commander of Russian forces in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. [68] Three men were killed in the ensuing clash: Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov, and Ilya Krichevsky; several others were wounded. Komar, a 22-year-old Soviet-Afghan War veteran, was shot and crushed trying to cover a moving IFV's observation slit. Usov, a 37-year-old economist, was killed by a stray bullet while coming to Komar's aid. The crowd set fire to an IFV and Krichevsky, a 28-year-old architect, was shot dead as the troops pulled back. The three men were posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. [39] [64] [69] [70] According to journalist and democracy campaigner Sergey Parkhomenko, who was in the crowd defending the White House, "those deaths played a crucial role: both sides were so horrified that it brought a halt to everything." [71] Alpha Group and Vympel did not move to the White House as planned, and Yazov ordered the troops to pull out of Moscow. Reports also surfaced that Gorbachev had been placed under house arrest in Crimea. [72] [73] During the final day of her family's exile, Raisa Gorbacheva suffered a minor stroke. [30]

At 8:00 am, the troops began to leave Moscow. [33]

Between 8:00 and 9:00 am, the GKChP members met in the Defence Ministry and, not knowing what to do, decided to send Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov, Anatoly Lukyanov, and Deputy CPSU General Secretary Vladimir Ivashko to Crimea to meet Gorbachev, [33] who refused to meet them when they arrived.

At 10:00 am, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR opened in the White House, at which President Yeltsin spoke. [33]

At 1:00 pm, the Soviet Cabinet of Ministers circulated a statement about its non-involvement in the putsch. [33] At 1:20 pm, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov, Lukyanov and CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary Vladimir Ivashko left for the airport, getting stuck in a traffic jam created by the Taman Division armored vehicles returning to their base. [33]

At 2:00 pm, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat issued a statement demanding that the GKChP clarify the fate of the head of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev. [33]

At 2:30 pm, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo signed the last GKChP order a cypher telegram to the regional departments of internal affairs with a demand to strengthen the security of television and radio organizations and report on all violations of the GKChP Resolution on information control. [33]

At 4:08 pm, the plane with the GKChP delegation landed in Crimea. [33] Around 4:00 pm, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, chaired by the heads of the chambers of the union parliament, [74] adopted a resolution in which it declared illegal the removal of the Soviet President from his duties and their transfer to the Vice President, [75] and in this vein demanded that Yanayev cancel the decrees and emergency orders based on them [76] as legally invalid from the moment they were signed. [77]

At 4:52 pm, a group of Russian deputies and public figures led by RSFSR Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, as well as Soviet Security Council members Yevgeny Primakov and Vadim Bakatin, flew to Gorbachev's dacha in Foros. They were accompanied by 36 officers of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs armed with machine guns, under the command of RSFSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Andrei Dunaev. [33]

Eight minutes later, at 5:00 pm, the GKChP delegation arrived at the presidential dacha. President Gorbachev refused to receive it and demanded that communication to the outside world be restored. [33] At the same time, Yanayev signed a decree dissolving the State Emergency Committee [78] [79] and declaring all of its decisions invalid. [80] [76]

At 7:16 pm, the plane of the Russian delegation led by Rutskoy landed in Crimea. [33]

At 8:00 pm, the Soviet General Prosecutor's Office initiated a criminal case into the attempted coup. [33] [52]

At 8:10 pm, Rutskoy and his delegation went to see Gorbachev. According to eyewitnesses, the meeting was cordial and joyful, allowing them to momentarily forget divisions between Soviet and Russian authorities. [33]

From 9:40 to 10:10 pm, Gorbachev received Lukyanov and Ivashko in the presence of Rutskoy and Primakov, accusing the USSR Supreme Soviet Speaker of treason, and the party deputy of inaction during the putsch. [33]

Around 10:00 pm, RSFSR Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov signed an arrest warrant for the Emergency Committee members. [33]

That day, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia declared its sovereignty officially completed with a law passed by its deputies, confirming the independence restoration act of 4 May as an official act. [81] In Estonia, just a day after the restitution of the country's full independence, the Tallinn TV Tower was taken over by Soviet Russian airborne troops. But while television broadcasts were cut for a time, the radio signal was kept on the air after a handful of Estonian Defence League (the unified paramilitary forces of Estonia) members barricaded themselves in the tower's broadcasting studio. [82] That evening, as news from Moscow about the coup's failure reached Tallinn, the Russian paratroopers left the TV tower and the Estonian capital.

Thursday 22 August

22 August 1991 1991-Barrikad-BelyDom.jpg
22 August 1991

At one minute past midnight, Gorbachev, his family and assistants flew to Moscow on Rutskoy's plane. The GKChP members were sent back on a different plane; only Kryuchkov flew in the presidential plane, under police custody (according to Rutskoy, "they [would] definitely not be shot down with him on board"). Upon arrival, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Tizyakov were arrested on the airfield, which was illegal under Soviet law as officials representing the central government could only be arrested and tried under Soviet law, which prevailed over the laws of the constituent republics. [83] [33]

At 2:00 am, when Gorbachev arrived at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport, television showed live footage of him walking down the airstairs wearing a knitted sweater. Later, he would be criticized for not going to the White House, but to rest at his dacha. [33]

At 6:00 am, Soviet Vice President Yanayev was arrested in his office. [33] [84]

Boris Pugo and his wife died by suicide after being contacted by the RSFSR for a meeting over his role in the coup attempt. [85]

Friday 23 August

Pavlov, Starodubtsev, Baklanov, Boldin, and Shenin would all be taken into custody within the next 48 hours. [33]

Aftermath

Victims' place of death 1991-August-Moscow.jpg
Victims' place of death

Since several heads of the regional executive committees supported the GKChP, on 21 August 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR adopted Decision No. 1626-1, which authorized Russian President Boris Yeltsin to appoint heads of regional administrations, [86] although the Constitution of the Russian SFSR did not empower the president with such authority. The Russian Supreme Soviet passed another decision the following day declaring the old imperial colors Russia's national flag; [87] it replaced the Russian SFSR flag two months later.

On the night of 24 August, the Felix Dzerzhinsky statue in front of the KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy Square (Lubianka) was dismantled, while thousands of Moscow citizens took part in the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krichevsky, the three citizens who had died in the tunnel incident. Gorbachev posthumously awarded them with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin asked their relatives to forgive him for not being able to prevent their deaths. [33]

End of the CPSU

Gorbachev initially tried to defend the CPSU, proclaiming at a 22 August press conference that it still represented a "progressive force" despite its leaders' participation in the coup. [30] Gorbachev resigned as CPSU General Secretary on 24 August. [88] [33] Vladimir Ivashko replaced him as acting General Secretary, but resigned on 29 August[ citation needed ] when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR suspended the activities of the party throughout the Soviet Union. [89]

In a decree, Yeltsin ordered the transfer of the CPSU archives to the state archive authorities, [90] and nationalized all CPSU assets in the Russian SFSR [91] (these included not only party committee headquarters but also assets such as educational institutions and hotels).[ citation needed ] The party's Central Committee headquarters were handed over to the Government of Moscow. [30] On 6 November, Yeltsin issued a decree banning the party in Russia. [92]

The Dissolution of the Soviet Union

On 24 August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev created the so-called "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" (Комитет по оперативному управлению народным хозяйством СССР), to replace the USSR Cabinet of Ministers [93] headed by Valentin Pavlov, a GKChP member. Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev headed the committee.

That same day, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Independence of Ukraine and called for a referendum on support of the Act of Independence.

On 25 August, the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian SSR announced its Declaration of Sovereignty as a constitutional law. [94] [95]

On 28 August, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dismissed Prime Minister Pavlov [96] and entrusted the functions of the Soviet government to the Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy. [97] The next day, Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoly Lukyanov was arrested. [33]

On 5 September, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union adopted Soviet Law No. 2392-1 "On the Authorities of the Soviet Union in the Transitional Period", replacing itself with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Two new legislative chambers the Soviet of the Union (Совет Союза) and the Soviet of Republics (Совет Республик) replaced the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities (both elected by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies). The Soviet of the Union was to be formed by the popularly elected USSR people's deputies and would only consider issues concerning civil rights and freedoms and other issues which did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Soviet of Republics. Its decisions would have to be reviewed by the Soviet of Republics. The Soviet of Republics was to include 20 deputies from each union republic and one deputy to represent each autonomous region of each union republic (both Soviet people's deputies and republics' people's deputies) delegated by the legislatures of the union republic. Russia, with 52 delegates, was an exception. However, the delegation of each union republic was to have only one vote in the Soviet of Republics. The laws were to be first adopted by the Soviet of the Union and then by the Soviet of Republics, which would set procedures for the central government, approve the appointment of central ministers and consider inter-republic agreements. [98]

Also created was the Soviet State Council (Государственный совет СССР), which included the Soviet President and the presidents of union republics. The "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" was replaced by the USSR Inter-republic Economic Committee (Межреспубликанский экономический комитет СССР), [98] also headed by Ivan Silayev.

On 27 August, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova declared the independence of Moldova from the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan did the same on 30 and 31 August, respectively. On 6 September, the newly created Soviet State Council recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. [99] Estonia had declared re-independence on 20 August, Latvia the following day, while Lithuania had already done so on 11 March the previous year. On 9 September, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan declared the independence of Tajikistan from the Soviet Union. Also in September, over 99% percent of voters in Armenia voted for independence of the republic in a referendum. The immediate aftermath of the vote was the Armenian Supreme Soviet's declaration of independence on 21 September. On 27 October, the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan declared the independence of Turkmenistan from the Soviet Union. On 1 December, Ukraine held a referendum, in which more than 90% of residents supported the Act of Independence of Ukraine.

By November, the only Soviet Republics that had not declared independence were Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. That same month, seven republics (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) agreed to a new union treaty that would form a confederation called the Union of Sovereign States. However, this confederation never materialized.

On 8 December, Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich  the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (which had adopted the name in August 1991) as well as the prime ministers of the three republics, met in Minsk, Belarus to sign the Belovezha Accords. The Accords declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist "as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality." It repudiated the 1922 union treaty that established the Soviet Union and established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the Union's place. On 12 December, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR ratified the accords and recalled the Russian deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Although this has been interpreted as the moment that Russia seceded from the Union, Russia took the position that it was not possible to secede from a state that no longer existed. The lower chamber of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of the Union, was forced to halt its operations, as the departure of the Russian deputies left it without a quorum.

Doubts remained about the legitimacy of the 8 December accords, since only three republics took part. Thus, on 21 December in Alma-Ata, the Alma-Ata Protocol expanded the CIS to include Armenia, Azerbaijan and the five republics of Central Asia. They also pre-emptively accepted Gorbachev's resignation. With 11 of the 12 remaining republics (all except Georgia) having agreed that the Union no longer existed, Gorbachev bowed to the inevitable and said he would resign as soon as the CIS became a reality (Georgia joined the CIS in 1993, only to withdraw in 2008 after its war with Russia; the three Baltic states were never a part of the commonwealth, instead joining both the European Union and NATO in 2004.)

On 24 December 1991, the Russian SFSR now renamed the Russian Federation with the concurrence of the other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, informed the United Nations that it would inherit the Soviet Union's membership in the UN  including the Soviet Union's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. [100] No member state of the UN formally objected to this step. The legitimacy of this act has been questioned by some legal scholars as the Soviet Union itself was not constitutionally succeeded by the Russian Federation, but merely dissolved. Others argued that the international community had already established the precedent of recognizing the Soviet Union as the legal successor of the Russian Empire, and so recognizing the Russian Federation as the Soviet Union's successor state was valid.

On 25 December, Gorbachev announced his resignation as President of the Soviet Union. The red hammer and sickle flag of the Soviet Union was lowered from the Senate building in the Kremlin and replaced with the tricolour flag of Russia. The next day, 26 December, the Soviet of Republics, the upper chamber of the Supreme Soviet, formally voted the Soviet Union out of existence (the lower chamber, the Council of the Union, had been left without a quorum after the Russian deputies withdrew), thus ending the life of the world's first and oldest socialist state. All former Soviet embassies became Russian embassies, and Russia received all nuclear weapons located in other former republics by 1996. A constitutional crisis in late 1993 escalated into violence, and the new Russian constitution that came into force at the end of the year abolished the last vestiges of the Soviet political system.

Beginning of radical economic reforms in Russia

On 1 November 1991, the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies issued Decision No. 1831-1 "On the Legal Support of the Economic Reform" whereby the Russian president (Boris Yeltsin) was granted the right to issue decrees required for economic reform even if they contravened existing laws. Such decrees entered into force if they were not repealed within 7 days by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR or its Presidium. [101] Five days later, Boris Yeltsin, in addition to his duties as president, assumed those of the prime minister. Yegor Gaidar became deputy prime minister and simultaneously economic and finance minister. On 15 November 1991, Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 213 "On the Liberalization of Foreign Economic Activity on the Territory of the RSFSR", whereby all Russian companies were allowed to import and export goods and acquire foreign currency (all foreign trade had previously been tightly controlled by the state). [101] Following the issuance of Decree No. 213, on 3 December 1991 Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 297 "On the Measures to Liberalize Prices", whereby from 2 January 1992, most previously existing price controls were abolished. [101]

Trial of GKChP members

The GKChP members and their accomplices were charged with treason in the form of a conspiracy aimed at capturing power. However, by January 1993, they had all been released from custody pending trial. [102] [103] The trial in the Military Chamber of the Russian Supreme Court began on 14 April 1993. [104] On 23 February 1994, the State Duma declared amnesty for all GKChP members and their accomplices, along with the participants of the October 1993 crisis. [105] They all accepted the amnesty, except for General Varennikov, who demanded the continuation of the trial and who was finally acquitted on 11 August 1994. [33] The Russian Procuracy also wanted to charge former Deputy Defense Minister Vladislav Achalov, but the Russian Supreme Soviet refused to lift his immunity. [2] Additionally, the Procuracy refrained from charging numerous other individuals accused of complicity in the coup, including the Army Chief of Staff.

Commemoration of the civilians killed

Soviet stamps commemorating (from left to right) Ilya Krichevsky, Dmitry Komar and Vladimir Usov Vladimir Usov, Ilya Krichevsky, Dmitri Komar Stamps.png
Soviet stamps commemorating (from left to right) Ilya Krichevsky, Dmitry Komar and Vladimir Usov

Thousands of people attended the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky, and Vladimir Usov on 24 August 1991. Gorbachev posthumously made the three Heroes of the Soviet Union for their bravery in "blocking the way to those who wanted to strangle democracy.". [106]

Parliamentary commission

In 1991, a parliamentary commission tasked with investigating causes for the attempted coup was established under Lev Ponomaryov, but was dissolved in 1992 at Ruslan Khasbulatov's insistence.

Mysterious deaths of the participants of the coup

On the 24th of August 1991, Sergey Akhromeyev was found dead in his office, serving as the Advisor to the President of USSR.

On the 26th of August, Nikolay Kruchina was found dead near his residence in the morning, having jumped from the window of his apartment a few hours prior. He served as the Managing Director of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His predecessor Georgiy Pavlov followed the same fate on the 6th of October of the same year.

On the 17th of October, former Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU Dmitriy Lisovolik was found dead, having also jumped from the window of his apartment. [107]

Said deaths have faced extensive scrutiny by historians and contemporaries, who noted the similarities with which the figurants ended their lives.

International reactions

Western Bloc and NATO countries

George H. W. Bush, left, is seen with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Bush condemned the coup and the actions of the "Gang of Eight". Bush Gorba P15623-25A.jpg
George H. W. Bush, left, is seen with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Bush condemned the coup and the actions of the "Gang of Eight".

"I can't believe that the Soviet people will allow a reversal in the progress that they have recently made toward economic and political freedom. Based on my extensive meetings and conversations with him, I am convinced that President Gorbachev had the best interest of the Soviet people in mind. I have always felt that his opposition came from the communist bureaucracy, and I can only hope that enough progress was made that a movement toward democracy will be unstoppable." [8]

Communist states

A Soviet Stamp promoting Perestroika. For some Communist States, Gorbachev's reforms resulted in a drastic cutting of Soviet Aid. The coup's failure led to the abrupt end of any remaining Russian support for its former Communist allies. The Soviet Union 1988 CPA 5942 stamp (Perestroika (reformation). Worker. Industries and agriculture).jpg
A Soviet Stamp promoting Perestroika. For some Communist States, Gorbachev's reforms resulted in a drastic cutting of Soviet Aid. The coup's failure led to the abrupt end of any remaining Russian support for its former Communist allies.

Many but not all of states still officially Marxist–Leninist (not former Warsaw Pact members that had begun transitioning to a multi-party system) had supported the coup, while others left ambivalent or unofficial support and reversed their position when the coup failed.

Former Warsaw Pact members

The Warsaw Pact had dissolved in July, and its members had rapidly changed, with Marxist–Leninist pro-Soviet governments deposed or elected out of office. As a result, all criticized or expressed weary sentiments about events in Moscow. Some former Warsaw Pact members deployed armed forces to strategically important areas.

Other sovereign states

Supranational bodies and organizations

Subsequent fate of GKChP Gang of Eight

See also

Notes and references

  1. under house arrest
  2. Russian:Августовский путч, romanized:Avgustovskiy Putch, "August Putsch".
  1. 1 2 Ольга Васильева, «Республики во время путча» в сб.статей: «Путч. Хроника тревожных дней». // Издательство «Прогресс», 1991. (in Russian). Accessed 14 June 2009. Archived 17 June 2009.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Dunlop, John B. (1995). The rise of Russia and the fall of the Soviet empire (1st pbk. printing, with new postscript ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-1-4008-2100-6. OCLC   761105926. Archived from the original on 4 December 2021. Retrieved 23 May 2021.
  3. "Solving Transnistria: Any Optimists Left? by Cristian Urse. p. 58" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 September 2020.
  4. A party led by the politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky – Accessed 13 September 2009. Archived 16 September 2009
  5. Hayward, Alker; Rupesinghe, Kumar; Gurr, Ted Robert (1999). Journeys Through Conflict. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 119. ISBN   9780742510289.
  6. 1 2 "Би-би-си – Россия – Хроника путча. Часть II". news.bbc.co.uk. 18 August 2006. Archived from the original on 28 August 2007. Retrieved 14 August 2013.
  7. Р. Г. Апресян. Народное сопротивление августовскому путчу (recuperato il 27 novembre 2010 tramite Internet Archive)
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Ishërwood, Julian M. (19 August 1991). "World reacts with shock to Gorbachev ouster". United Press International. Archived from the original on 26 May 2019. Retrieved 31 May 2017.
  9. "Апресян Р.Г. Народное сопротивление августовскому путчу". Archived from the original on 11 September 2007. Retrieved 4 December 2021.
  10. 1 2 3 R.C. Gupta. (1997) Collapse of the Soviet Union. p. 57. ISBN   9788185842813,
  11. "Third Soviet official commits suicide". United Press International. 26 August 1991. Archived from the original on 8 March 2019. Retrieved 7 March 2019.
  12. "The Central Committee Chief of Administration Kills Himself". Deseret News. Archived from the original on 8 March 2019. Retrieved 7 March 2019.
  13. Mark Kramer, "The Dialectics of Empire: Soviet Leaders and the Challenge of Civil Resistance in East-Central Europe, 1968–91", in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, Oxford University Press, 2009 pp. 108–109 Archived 20 March 2017 at the Wayback Machine .
  14. 1 2 "Gorbachev and Perestroika. Professor Gerhard Rempel, Department of History, Western New England College, 1996-02-02, accessed 2008-07-12". Mars.wnec.edu. Archived from the original on 28 August 2008. Retrieved 31 March 2010.
  15. Sarker, Sunil Kumar (1994). The rise and fall of communism. New Delhi: Atlantic publishers and distributors. p. 94. ISBN   978-8171565153. Archived from the original on 9 July 2021. Retrieved 4 January 2017.
  16. "USSR: The food supply situation" (PDF). CIA.gov. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 March 2018. Retrieved 26 July 2019.
  17. Gupta, R.C. (1997). Collapse of the Soviet Union. India: Krishna Prakashan Media. p. 62. ISBN   978-8185842813. Archived from the original on 9 July 2021. Retrieved 4 January 2017.
  18. Ziemele (2005). p. 30.
  19. Ziemele (2005). p. 35.
  20. Ziemele (2005). pp. 38–40.
  21. Маркедонов Сергей Самоопределение по ленинским принципам Archived 16 November 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  22. "Многоступенчатый запуск нового Союза намечен на 20 августа". Archived from the original on 2 June 2021. Retrieved 24 March 2021.
  23. Союз можно было сохранить. Белая книга: Документы и факты о политике М. С. Горбачёва по реформированию и сохранению многонационального государства Archived 10 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine . – 2-е изд., перераб. и доп. – М.: АСТ, 2007. – С. 316 – 567 с.
  24. Dan Stone, Goodbye to all that? The story of Europe since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 23.
  25. Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN   0-374-52738-5, pp. 276–293.
  26. KGB Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Zhizhin and KGB Col. Alexei Yegorov, The State Within a State, pp. 276–277.
  27. 1 2 3 4 "Заключение по материалам расследования роли и участии должностных лиц КГБ СССР в событиях 19–21 августа 1991 года". flb.ru. Archived from the original on 26 March 2021. Retrieved 10 April 2020.
  28. 1 2 3 4 (in Russian) "Novaya Gazeta" No. 51 of 23 July 2001 Archived 15 February 2012 at the Wayback Machine (extracts from the indictment of the conspirators)
  29. Kyriakodis, Harry G. (1991). "The 1991 Soviet and 1917 Bolshewk Coups Compared: Causes, Consequences and Legality". Russian History. 18 (1–4): 323–328. doi:10.1163/187633191X00137. ISSN   0094-288X. Archived from the original on 3 August 2022. Retrieved 30 June 2022.
  30. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Hoffman, David E. (2009). The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Deadly Legacy (1 ed.). New York: Doubleday. ISBN   978-0-385-52437-7. OCLC   320432478. Archived from the original on 4 December 2021. Retrieved 19 May 2021.
  31. Kyriakodis 1991, p. 328.
  32. A Word to the People, full text Archived 4 August 2021 at the Wayback Machine scan from the Pravda newspaper at the KPRF website (in Russian)
  33. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 (in Russian) Timeline of the events Archived 27 November 2007 at the Wayback Machine by Artem Krechnikov, Moscow BBC correspondent
  34. 1 2 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin (2000). The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West. Gardners Books. ISBN   0-14-028487-7, pp. 513–514.
  35. The KGB surveillance logbook included every move of Gorbachev and his wife Raisa Gorbacheva, Subject 111, such as "18:30. 111 is in the bathtub."The State Within a State, pp. 276–277
  36. "Договор о Союзе суверенных государств". Archived from the original on 4 December 2021. Retrieved 15 August 2021.
  37. Kyriakodis 1991, p. 280.
  38. 1 2 3 4 (in Russian) Novaya Gazeta No. 59 of 20 August 2001 Archived 29 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine (extracts from the indictment of the conspirators)
  39. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Kommersant Archived 7 January 2008 at the Wayback Machine , 18 August 2006 (in Russian)
  40. "Горбачев: "Я за союз, но не союзное государство"" [Gorbachev: "I am for the union, but not the union state"]. BBC News (in Russian). 16 August 2001. Archived from the original on 10 March 2007. Retrieved 26 June 2007.
  41. "Варенников Валентин Иванович/Неповторимое/Книга 6/Часть 9/Глава 2 – Таинственная Страна". mysteriouscountry.ru. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 6 July 2011.
  42. Revolutionary Passage by Marc Garcelon p. 159 Archived 16 May 2016 at the Wayback Machine
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  44. "УКАЗ вице-президента СССР". Archived from the original on 26 August 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2021.
  45. Kyriakodis 1991, p. 338.
  46. The newspapers that were allowed were Trud, Rabochaya Tribuna , Izvestia , Pravda , Krasnaya Zvezda , Sovetskaya Rossiya , Moskovskaya Pravda , Leninskoye Znamya, and Sel'skaya zhizn′.
  47. Янаев Г. И. Последний бой за СССР Archived 17 September 2018 at the Wayback Machine . – М.: Эксмо, 2010. – 443 с.
  48. "Путч: день первый. 19 августа 1991 года". Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 13 August 2021.
  49. (in Russian) another "Kommersant" article Archived 7 January 2008 at the Wayback Machine , 18 August 2006
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Bibliography

See also: Bibliography of the Post Stalinist Soviet Union § The Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Bloc

Primary sources

  • Gorbačev, Michail (1991). The August coup: the truth and the lessons (1. ed.). New York, NY: HarperCollins Publisher. ISBN   978-0-06-016890-2. Includes transcript of the videotaped statement made 19/20 August 1991 as his Foros dacha.
  • Bonnell, Victoria E.; Cooper, Ann; Freidin, Gregory, eds. (1994). Russia at the barricades: eyewitness accounts of the August 1991 Coup. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. ISBN   978-1-56324-272-4. Includes the chronology of the coup, photos, and accounts from a broad cross-section of participants and eyewitnesses, including the editors.

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