Basmachi movement

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Basmachi movement
Part of World War I and the Russian Civil War
Fires in Bukhara 1920.jpg
Bukhara under siege by Red Army troops and burning during the Bukhara operation, 1 September 1920
Date1916–1934
Location
Result Soviet-Afghan victory
Territorial
changes
Turkestan incorporated into the Soviet Union
Belligerents

Flag of Russia.svg Russian Republic (1917)


In cooperation with:

Supported by:


Commanders and leaders
Strength
Flag RSFSR 1918.svg Turkestan Front:
120,000–160,000 [5] :35
Perhaps 30,000 at its height, over 20,000 (late 1919) [6]
Casualties and losses
  • 9,338 killed or died of disease
  • 29,617 wounded or sick (January 1921 – July 1922) [7]
  • 516 killed
  • 867 wounded or sick (October 1922 – June 1931) [8]

Total:

  • 40,000+ casualties
  • 9,854+ dead
  • 30,484+ wounded or sick
Unknown
  • Tens of thousands of civilians killed [9] [10] :355
  • Several hundred thousand Kazakh and Kyrgyz people killed or evicted with an unknown amount dying to famine according to Sokol [11]
  • Alternative soviet casualties: 327,000 (1920-1923) [12] [13]
  • Alternative estimate: 150,000 dead in 1916 [14]

The Basmachi movement [a] was an uprising against Imperial Russian and Soviet rule in Central Asia by rebel groups inspired by Islamic beliefs and Pan-Turkism. It has been called "probably the most important movement of opposition to Soviet rule in Central Asia". [16]

Contents

The movement's roots lay in the anti-conscription violence of 1916 which erupted when the Russian Empire began to draft Muslims for army service in World War I. [17] :101 In the months following the October 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks seized power in many parts of the Russian Empire and the Russian Civil War began. Turkestani Muslim political movements attempted to form an autonomous government in the city of Kokand, in the Fergana Valley. The Bolsheviks launched an assault on Kokand in February 1918 and carried out a general massacre of up to 25,000 people. [9] [10] :355 The massacre rallied support to the Basmachi who waged a guerrilla and conventional war that seized control of large parts of the Fergana Valley and much of Turkestan. The group's notable leaders were Enver Pasha and, later, Ibrahim Bek.

The fortunes of the movement fluctuated throughout the early 1920s, but by 1923 the Red Army's extensive campaigns had dealt the Basmachis many defeats. After major Red Army campaigns and concessions regarding economic and Islamic practices in the mid-1920s, the military fortunes and popular support of the Basmachi declined. [5] :41 Resistance to Soviet leadership did flare up again, to a lesser extent, in response to collectivization campaigns in the pre-WWII era. [10]

Etymology

The term "Basmachi" is of Uzbek origin and means "bandit" or "robber" [18] [19] which probably derived from "baskinji" meaning "attacker". [20] The Russians used the term for the Central Asian resistance fighters, and it was widely used throughout the region to denote them, in an attempt to persuade the public that the fighters were no more than criminals. [18] [21]

Background

Prior to World War I, Russian Turkestan was ruled from Tashkent as a Krai or Governor-Generalship. To the east of Tashkent, the Ferghana Valley was an ethnically diverse, densely populated region that was divided between settled farmers (often called Sarts) and nomads (mostly Kyrgyz). Under Russian rule, it was converted into a major cotton-growing region. [22] :280 The resulting economic development brought some small-scale industry to the region, but several scholars suggest that native shop workers were worse off than their Russian counterparts, and the new wealth from cotton was spread unevenly; many farmers became indebted. Many criminals organized into bands, forming the basis for the early Basmachi movement when it began in the Ferghana Valley. [22] :282

Cotton price-fixing during the First World War made matters worse, and a large, landless rural proletariat soon developed. Muslim clergy decried the gambling and alcoholism that became commonplace, and crime rose considerably. [22] :284

The Tashkent Soviet's building in 1917 Tashkent the building of town council 02.jpg
The Tashkent Soviet's building in 1917

Major violence in Russian Turkestan broke out in 1916, when the Tsarist government ended its exemption of Muslims from military service. This caused the Central Asian revolt of 1916, centered in modern-day Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which was put down by martial law. Tensions between Central Asians (especially Kazakhs) and Russian settlers led to large-scale massacres on both sides. Thousands died, and hundreds of thousands fled, most into the neighbouring Republic of China. [23] The Central Asian revolt of 1916 was the first anti-Russian incident on a mass scale in Central Asia, and it set the stage for native resistance after the fall of Tsar Nicholas II in the following year. [17] :101

The suppression of the rebellion was a deliberate campaign of annihilation against the Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes on the part of the Russian soldiers and settlers. Hundreds of thousands of Kazakh and Kyrgyz people were killed or expelled. The ethnic cleansing had its roots in the Tsarist government policy of ethnic homogenization. [24]

Conflict

Kokand autonomy and the start of hostilities

Flag of the Basmachi Movement Bandera del Turquestan.svg
Flag of the Basmachi Movement

In the aftermath of the February Revolution of 1917, Muslim political forces began to organize. Members of the All-Russian Muslim council formed the Shura-i Islam (Islamic Council), a Jadidist body that sought a federated, democratic state with autonomy for Muslims. [22] :186 More conservative religious scholars formed the Ulema Jemyeti (Board of Learned Men), more concerned with safeguarding Islamic institutions and Sharia law. Together, these Muslim nationalists formed a coalition, but it fell apart after the October Revolution, when the Jadids lent their support to the Bolsheviks who had seized power. The Tashkent Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, an organization dominated by Russian railway workers and colonial proletarians, rejected Muslim participation in government. Stung by this apparent reaffirmation of colonial rule, the Shura-i Islam reunited with Ulema Jemyeti to form the Kokand Autonomous Government. This was to be the nucleus of an autonomous [22] :290 state in Turkestan, governed by Sharia law. [10] :354

The Tashkent Soviet initially recognized the authority of Kokand, but restricted its jurisdiction to the Muslim old section of Tashkent, and demanded the final say in regional affairs. After violent riots in Tashkent, relations broke down, and despite the leftist leanings of many of its members, Kokand aligned itself with the Whites. [5] :22 Politically and militarily weak, the Muslim government began looking around for protection. To this end, a band of armed robbers led by Irgash Bey were amnestied and recruited to defend Kokand.[ when? ] [22] :290 This force, however, was unable to resist an attack on Kokand by the forces of the Tashkent Soviet. In February, 1918 the Red Army soldiers thoroughly pillaged Kokand, and carried out what was described as a "pogrom", [22] :291 in which as many as 25,000 people died. [9] [10] :355 This massacre, along with the execution of many Ferghana peasants who were suspected of hoarding cotton and food, incensed the Muslim population. Irgash Bey took up arms against the Soviets, declaring himself "Supreme Leader of the Islamic Army", and the Basmachi rebellion started in earnest. [22] :293

Sayeed Alim Khan of Bukhara (1880-1944), the last Uzbek monarch Prokudin-Gorskii-19.jpg
Sayeed Alim Khan of Bukhara (1880–1944), the last Uzbek monarch

Meanwhile, Soviet troops temporarily deposed Emir Sayeed Alim Khan of Bukhara in favor of the leftist Young Bukharans faction led by Fayzulla Xoʻjayev. Russian troops were repulsed by the Bukharan populace after a period of looting, and the Emir retained his throne for the time-being. [22] :32[ verification needed ] In the Khanate of Khiva, Basmachi leader Junaid Khan overthrew the Russian puppet and suppressed the modernizing movement of the leftist Young Khivans. [5] :24

First phase of the revolt in the Ferghana Valley

Irgash Bey's claims to leadership of an army of the faithful won recognition by the clergy of the Ferghana Valley, and he soon controlled a sizable fighting force. Widespread nationalization campaigns carried out from Tashkent had caused economic collapse, and the Ferghana Valley faced famine in absence of grain imports. All these factors drove people to join the Basmachi. The Tashkent Soviet was unable to contain the insurgency, and the end of 1918 decentralized bands of fighters, totaling roughly 20,000, controlled Ferghana and the countryside surrounding Tashkent. Irgash Bey faced rival commanders such as Madamin Bey, who was supported by more moderate Muslim factions, but he secured formal, nominal leadership of the movement at a council in March 1919. [10] :355

With the Tashkent Soviet in a vulnerable military position, the Bolsheviks left Russian settlers to organize their own defense by creating the Peasant Army of Fergana. This often involved brutal reprisals for Basmachi attacks by Soviet forces and Russian farmers both. [22] :293 The harsh policies of War Communism, however, caused the peasants' army to sour on the Tashkent Soviet. In May 1919, Madamin Bey formed an alliance with the settlers, entailing a non-aggression pact and a coalition army. The new allies made plans for establishing a joint Russian-Muslim state, with power sharing arrangements and cultural rights for both groups. [22] :295 [10] :356 Disputes over the Islamic orientation of the Basmachi led to the break-up of the alliance, however, and both Madamin and the settlers suffered defeats at the hands of the Muslim Volga Tatar Red Brigade. [5] :34 The inhabitants of the Ferghana Valley were exhausted after the punishing winter of 1919–20, and Madamin Bey defected to the Soviet side in March. [22] :296 Meanwhile, famine relief reached the region under the more moderate New Economic Policy, while land reform and amnesty placated Ferghana residents. As a result, the Basmachi movement lost control of most populated areas and shrank overall.

The pacification of Ferghana did not last long. During the summer of 1920 the Soviets felt secure enough to requisition food and mobilize Muslim conscripts. The result was a renewed uprising and new Basmachi groups proliferated, fueled by religious slogans. [5] :35 Renewed conflict would see the Basmachi movement spread across Turkestan.

Basmachi in Khiva and Bukhara

In January 1920, the Red Army captured Khiva and set up a Young Khivan provisional government. Junaid Khan fled into the desert with his followers, and the Basmachi movement in the Khorezm Region was born. [25] :160 Before the end of the year, the Soviets deposed the Young Khivans government, and the Muslim nationalists fled to join Junaid, strengthening his forces considerably. [5] :36

In August of that year, the Emir of Bukhara was finally deposed when the Red Army conquered Bukhara. From exile in Afghanistan, the Emir directed the Bokhara Basmachi movement, supported by the angry populace and clergy. Fighters operated on behalf of the Emir and were under the command of Ibrahim Bey, a tribal leader. [10] :358 Basmachi forces operated with success in both Khiva and Bokhara for an extended period. The insurgency also began spreading to Kazakhstan, as well as the Tajik and Turkmen lands. [5] :36

Enver Pasha's Bukhara campaign and the height of the Basmachi movement

Background

Negotiations with Basmachi, Fergana, 1921 Negotiations with basmachs Fergana, 1921.jpg
Negotiations with Basmachi, Fergana, 1921

In November 1921, Enver Pasha, former Ottoman war minister and one of the key architects of the Armenian genocide, arrived in Bukhara to assist the Soviet war effort. Enver Pasha had been an advocate of a Turkish-Soviet alliance against the British, and gained the trust of the Soviet authorities. Soon, however, he defected and became the single most important Basmachi leader, centralizing and revitalizing the movement. [10] :358 Enver Pasha intended to create a pan-Turkic confederation encompassing all of Central Asia, as well as Anatolia and Chinese lands. [10] :358 In May 1922, after receiving military aid from Afghanistan. Including 800 soldiers, 100 British rifles, and 80 camel-loads of ammunition. [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] His call for jihad attracted much support, and he managed to transform the Basmachi guerillas into an army of 16,000 men. [32]

Enver's campaign and reforms

On 13 May 1922 Enver launched a broad offensive, clearing Soviet forces from Hisar, Kulab, Darvaz, Karategin, Saraykemer, Kurgantepe, Kabaduyan, and most of the city of Boysun. [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] (The detailed report submitted to Galip Pasha, who had been appointed as the representative to Bukhara, confirms more than half of the territory of the Emirate of Bukhara was under the military control of Enver Pasha's forces, not the Soviets.) [42] In the brief period of military actions initiated by Enver Pasha, sown areas in Bukhara were reduced by 72%, and livestock numbers fell by two-thirds. [43] [44] By early 1922, Enver Pasha had already seized much of the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic and attracted several disillusioned Jadid former collaborators of the Soviet regime to his cause. [45] Following these victories, Enver Pasha stated: [46]

The assembly of these beks will form, initially, the new government of Bukhara. Everyone is ready to carry out whatever I want… I have engaged in battle with the Russians five times over the past ten days. In the most recent battle, many Russians were killed, while we lost only one fighter…"

By early 1922 until June, majority of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] Fergana valley [59] [60] [61] and Khorezm People's Soviet Republic was under Basmachi control. [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] Meanwhile, Dungan Muslim Magaza Masanchi formed the Dungan Cavalry Regiment to fight for the Soviets against the Basmachi. [67] Enver Pasha has also decided to unify his forces under one uniform. He informed Hacı Sami in Afghanistan, and through Amanullah Khan’s foster brother Ahmet Khan, he received khaki uniforms and hats made from Karagöl lambskin. Since boots were hard to obtain, locals produced light, upturned shoes similar to those in Anatolia, based on a model. [68] [69] During this period, the movement also became more centralized; regular meetings were held among the leaders of Khiva, Bukhara, and Fergana. [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] Enver Pasha's successful gains in Bukhara were on the verge of spreading to Dagestan, where signs of unrest had already begun to emerge. [75] [76] He established a unified army in Bukhara, implemented a Western-style chain of command, [77] [78] and incorporated Turkish officers into the ranks. [79]

Creation of The Turkestan Provisional Government

In accordance with the decisions made at the 15 April 1922 congress, [80] [81] [82] [83] Enver Pasha established local and civil administrations in these areas and stationed a portion of his troops in the mentioned locations to maintain control and security. [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] They have also declared the Independent Islamic Republic of Turkestan (also called Turkestan Provisional Government ) [89] with its own constitution [90] [91] [92] [93] in Samarkand with Osman hoca as the President of Bukhara, electing Shir Muhammad, commander-in-chief of the Basmachi armies, as its president. [94] [95] Abdul hamid as war minister And Ali Riza as Deputy War Minister. [89] The state was based on the principles of private ownership and rule by Shari'a law. [96] The government established by Shir Muhammad Bek

enver's hand-drawn map of turkestan published in "sarki buhara vekazi'i" liva-el-islam 2 no 11-12 1 august 1922 49 Map of turkestan 1 august 1922.webp
enver’s hand-drawn map of turkestan published in “şarkı buhara vekazı’i” liva-el-islam 2 no 11-12 1 august 1922 49

relocated its center five times within three months, moving to Samarkand, Namangan, Osh, Margilan, and Naryn. [97] [98] The congress, attended by representatives including Cora Hoca from Kabul, decided to organize regular military units in liberated areas of Eastern Bukhara, prepare local populations for combat, assign commanders to lead revolutionary actions in each region, and levy taxes if resources were insufficient. The congress consisted of 16 measures, with the final one granting Enver Pasha unanimous authority over all military and political actions. He was formally given a seal reading: "Damad-ı Halifet’ül Müslimin, Emir-i Leşker-i İslâm Seyyid Enver" (Son-in-law of the Caliph of the Muslims, Commander of the Islamic Army, Seyyid Enver), securing the support of the national movement leadership. [99] [100]

Defeat of the movement

Turkestan front, 1922 Turk front1922.jpg
Turkestan front, 1922
Soviet Central Asia in 1922 SovietCentralAsia1922.svg
Soviet Central Asia in 1922

Now fearing the total loss of Turkestan, the Soviet authorities once again adopted a double strategy to crush the rebellion: political reconciliation and cultural concessions along with overwhelming military power. Religious concessions reinstated Sharia law, while Koran schools and waqf lands were restored. [10] :357 Moscow sought to indigenize the fight with the creation of a volunteer militia composed of Muslim peasants, called the Red Sticks, and it is estimated that 15-25 percent of Soviet troops in this region were Muslim. [5] :35 The Soviets primarily relied on thousands of regular Red Army troops, veterans of the Civil War, now bolstered by air support. The strategy of concessions with airstrikes was successful. As a last resort, the Russians called the highly trusted Head of the Bukhara Government, Fayzulla Xoʻjayev, to Moscow, and through him, they offered truce to Enver Pasha. [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] The Russians, through an eleven-member delegation from Kazan that they sent, were granting Enver Pasha wide concessions in everything he would do and were calling him to reach an agreement. In response, Enver Pasha convened the National Pact Congress. [108] But Enver's reply was uncompromising: [107]

"Peace is only acceptable after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Turkestan soil."

As a result of the negotiations, the Russians offer was rejected, even though Togan urged Enver to accept the peace as he had news from Moscow that the Soviet government intented to send 100,000 additional men to Turkestan if they refused. [107] And the congress issued a decision for full independence. [109] Enver himself sketched. Hoping for better days, the headquarters was later moved from Pulluhakiyan to Kafirun.

In response to Enver's victories, the Bukhara Group of Troops was formed from units from the Moscow Military District and Belarus, totaling 4,500 rifles, 3,030 sabers, and 20 artillery pieces. [110] The Bolshevik leadership, allocated 1.5 million rubles and sent military trains to Bukhara. [111] For the direct command of military operations in Bukhara, RKKA commander S.S. Kamenev and Chekist Ya.Kh. Peters were sent to purge the Bukhara party, military, and militia of Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist elements. [112] Responding to Enver Pasha, the Soviet administration under the Turkestan Front, commanded by N. Kakurin and P. Pavlov, organized 2 cavalry brigades, 2 cavalry squadrons, and 1 rifle division, with roughly 7,500–8,000 soldiers and 20 machine guns. [112] J. Peters, a Russian revolutionary and one of the first commanders of the Communist Party, along with S. Kamenev, commander of the RSFSR, were sent to Buhara to conduct operations against Enver. [112] [113] A squadron of four aircraft, two Nieuport fighters and two 1½-Strutters was sent to southern Bukhara to provide support against Basmachis. [114] Soviets have also bought about 24 LVG VI reconnaissance planes from Germany, and the majority were sent to fight against Basmachis. [114]

In June 1922 Soviet units led by General Kakurin (ru) defeated the Basmachi forces in the Battle of Kafrun. The Red Army began to drive the rebels eastwards, retaking considerable territory. Enver himself was killed in a failed last-ditch cavalry charge on August 4, 1922, near Baldzhuan (in present-day Tajikistan). His successor, Selim Pasha, continued the struggle but finally fled to Afghanistan in 1923.

In July to August 1923, a large Soviet offensive succeeded at forcing the Basmachi out of Garm. [115] A Basmachi presence remained in the Ferghana Valley until 1924, and fighters there were led by Korşirmat (or Kurshirmat), who had renewed the revolt in 1920. British intelligence reported [116] :47–30 that Kurshirmat possessed forces of 5,000-6,000 men. After years of war, however, popular support for the Basmachi cause was drying up. Peasants wanted to return to work, especially now that Soviet policies had made Turkestan livable again. Kurshirmat's forces shrank to around 2,000, many resorting to banditry, [116] :47–30 and he soon fled to Afghanistan. [5] :42 Turkestan was at this point exhausted by war. 200,000 people had fled Tajik lands, leaving two-thirds of arable land abandoned. Lesser devastation could be observed in Ferghana. [5] :42

Cross-border operations in northern Afghanistan

Habibullah Kalakani pictured with his followers in Afghanistan, gave a safe haven for Basmachi fighters Habibullah Kalakani (Bacha-i-Saqao) with his followers.jpg
Habibullah Kalakani pictured with his followers in Afghanistan, gave a safe haven for Basmachi fighters

1929

In January 1929, after coming to power in Afghanistan during the Afghan Civil War (1928–1929), Habibullāh Kalakāni allowed Basmachi insurgents to operate in northern Afghanistan, who then had established themselves in Imanseiide, Khan Abad, Rostaq, Taloqan, Fayzabad by the end of March 1929. [115] In mid-March 1929, two raids were undertaken by the Afghan Basmachi into the Soviet Union, the first into Amu Darya, south-west of Kulyab, and the second was undertaken by Kurbashi Kerim Berdoi with 100 Basmachi troops. Both incursions were defeated. [115] Further incursions were repelled on 17 March and 7 April. [115] On 12 April, Basmachi insurgents successfully crossed the Panj River and captured the town of Togmai. Soon after, this force then reached Dzafr and Kevron. On 13 April, the Basmachi captured Qal'ai Khumb. [115] and a few days later, occupied Gashion, and on the 15th, they captured Vanch, which the Soviets recaptured the next day. [115]

Because of the Basmachi attacks, the Soviet Union dispatched a small force into Afghanistan from Termez on April 15, commanded by Vitaly Primakov, to support ousted Afghan King Amanullah Khan. This Red Army force of 700 to 1,000 eventually took control of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif and Tashqurghan. [21] During the Soviet operation the Basmachi continued raiding across the border, capturing Kalai-Liabob on 20 April, and on 21 April capturing Nimichi, 35 kilometres east of Garm, after an intense battle. [115] Between 20 and 22 April, further Basmachi units crossed into the Soviet Union, one of which made it as far as Tavildara before being turned back by the guards there on 30 April. On 22 April, the Basmachi captured Garm, which the Soviets recaptured either the same day or the next day. On 24 April, the Soviets began a large counteroffensive, and recaptured Kalai-Liabob that same day. On 3 May, the last Basmachi units retreated into Afghanistan. [115]

The Red Army had planned to head for Kabul to take it back from the Saqqawists to Amanullah Khan. [117] However the operation was halted after Moscow heard that Amanullah Khan had fled to the British Raj in exile on 23 May. [118] In addition, international resentment (at a time the Soviet Union attempted to gain international recognition) was also cited as a reason for canceling the operation. [117] The last Soviet unit crossed back from Afghanistan in June 1929. [117]

1930

After the Saqqawists lost the civil war and Kalakani was executed, the Afghan prime minister Mohammad Hashim Khan on behalf of the new king, Mohammed Nader Shah, demanded Ibrahim Bek to lay down arms against the Soviet Union, but he refused. [119] [ full citation needed ] Afghanistan and Soviet Union agreed for another intervention, launched by the Red Army in June 1930 and commanded by Colonel Yakov Melkumov. [117] The cavalry brigade advanced 50–70 km inland in northern Afghanistan and was carefully controlled as to not "touch" the farms and property of locals as to not affect their nationalistic or religious feelings. This was relatively successful, as the Afghan locals were friendly and guided them. Ibrahim Bek initially wanted to fight but after hearing of the cavalry's strength and lack of local Afghan sympathy, he halted plans. As a result the Soviets did not face organized resistance and managed to eliminate the Basmachis and their accomplices. The yurts in the river valley including the villages of Aq Tepe and 'Aliabad where Basmachis were based, and the Basmachi's properties, were burned down, although the local Afghan population remained untouched. The Basmachis and accomplices lost 839 people, whereas the Soviet army had one loss (from drowning) and two injuries. [120] [ full citation needed ] [121]

Intermittent Basmachi operations after the Soviet victory

After the Basmachi movement was destroyed as a political and military force, the fighters who remained hidden in mountainous areas conducted a guerrilla war. The Basmachi uprising had died out in most parts of Central Asia by 1926. However, skirmishes and occasional fighting along the border with Afghanistan continued until the early 1930s. Junaid Khan threatened Khiva in 1926, but was finally exiled in 1928. [5] :42 Two prominent commanders, Faizal Maksum and Ibrahim Bey, continued to operate out of Afghanistan and conducted a number of raids into the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic in 1929. Ibrahim Bek led a brief resurgence of the movement when collectivization fuelled resistance and succeeded in delaying the policy until 1931 in Turkmenistan, but he was soon caught and executed. The movement then largely died out. [115] [122] The last major Basmachi combat operation occurred In October 1933, when Junaid Khan's forces were defeated in the Karakum desert. The Basmachi movement had ended by 1934. [123]

Aftermath

Indigenous leaders began to cooperate with Soviet authorities and large numbers of Central Asians joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin's indigenization policy. Many gained high positions in the governments of the Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics, formed out of the Turkestani Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. During the Sovietization of Central Asia, Islam became the focus of antireligious campaigns. The government closed most mosques, repressing Islamic clerics and targeting symbols of Islamic identity such as the veil. [124] Uzbeks who remained practicing Muslims were deemed nationalist and often targeted for imprisonment or execution. Stalinist collectivization and industrialization proceeded as elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

Character of the movement

The Basmachi movement has been characterized as a national liberation movement [5] :43 that sought to end foreign rule over the Central Asian territories then known as Turkestan, and also the protectorates of Khiva and Bokhara. It is suggested[ by whom? ] that "basmacı" is a Turkic word which refers to a bandit or marauder, such as the bands of thieves that preyed on caravans in the region, derived from the word basmak – to raid, to press.[ citation needed ] The term 'basmachi' was pejorative and used by the Soviets; the people it referred to did not use it to refer to themselves. [125]

The Soviets portrayed the movement as being composed of brigands motivated by Islamic fundamentalism, waging a counterrevolutionary war with the support of British agents. [22] :277 In reality, the Basmachi were a diverse and multi-faceted group that received negligible foreign aid.[ citation needed ] The Basmachi were not viewed favorably by Western Powers, who saw the Basmachi as potential enemies[ citation needed ] due to the Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist ideologies that some of their leaders ascribed to. However, some Basmachi groups received support from British and Turkish intelligence services and in order to cut off this outside help, special military detachments of the Red Army masqueraded as Basmachi forces and successfully intercepted supplies.[ citation needed ]

Although many fighters were motivated by calls for jihad, [22] :293 the Basmachi drew support from many ideological camps and major sectors of the population. At some point or another[ vague ][ when? ] the Basmachi attracted the support of Jadid reformers, pan-Turkic ideologues and leftist Turkestani nationalists. [10] :252 Peasants and nomads, long opposed to Russian colonial rule, reacted with hostility to anti-Islamic policies and Soviet requisitioning of food and livestock. The fact that Bolshevism in Turkestan was dominated by Russian colonists in Tashkent [22] :289 made Tsarist and Soviet rule appear identical. The ranks of the Basmachi were filled with those left jobless by poor economic conditions, and those who felt that they were opposing an attack on their way of life. [25] :151 The first Basmachi fighters were bandits, as their name suggests, and they reverted to brigandage as the movement fizzled later on. [5] :42 Although the Basmachi were relatively united at certain points, the movement suffered from atomization overall.[ citation needed ] Rivalry between various leaders and more serious ethnic disputes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks or Turkmen posed major problems to the movement.[ citation needed ]

The rebellion is featured in several "Osterns", such as White Sun of the Desert , The Seventh Bullet , and The Bodyguard , and in the television series State Border .

See also

Notes

  1. Russian: басмачество (basmachestvo) – derived from Uzbek bosmachi, meaning 'bandits' [15]

References

  1. In union with him and Bey Madamin counter-revolutionary robber bands from July 10, 1919, to January 1920.
  2. Muḥammad, Fayz̤; Hazārah, Fayz̤ Muḥammad Kātib (1999). Kabul Under Siege: Fayz Muhammad's Account of the 1929 Uprising. Markus Wiener. p. 12. ISBN   9781558761551.
  3. Saqqawists had fought only in northern Afghanistan.
  4. Until late spring or June
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Rywkin, Michael (1990). Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
  6. Nahaylo, Bohdan; Swoboda, Victor (1990). Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR. p. 40.
  7. Krivosheev, Grigori, ed. (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill. p. 43. 12,827 killed or dead
  8. Andronikov, V. M.; Burkikov, P. D.; Gurkin, V. V.; Kruglov, A. A.; Rodinov, Ye. I.; Filimoshin, M. V.; et al. (3 January 1996) [first Russian publication 1993]. Krivosheyev, G. F. (ed.). "Soviet Armed Forces Losses in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts" (PDF). Translated by US Department of the Army. Moscow Military Publishing House. p. 56. Retrieved 2015-06-21 via The Black Vault.
  9. 1 2 3 McCray, Thomas R.; Gritzner, Charles F. (2004). Uzbekistan. Infobase. p. 30. ISBN   1438105517.
  10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Olcott, Martha B. (July 1981). "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan, 1918–24". Soviet Studies. 33 (3): 361. doi:10.1080/09668138108411365.
  11. Baberowski & Doering-Manteuffel 2009, p. 202.
  12. Glenda Fraser, Basmachi Vol 1 p.59
  13. Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan in XX Jahrhunder p.202
  14. Morrison, Alexander (2017). "The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia. By Edward Dennis Sokol. Foreword by S. Frederick Starr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016 (original edition 1954). x, 187 pp. Bibliography. Index. Figures" . Slavic Review (book review). 76 (3): 772–778. doi:10.1017/slr.2017.185. ISSN   0037-6779. S2CID   166171560.
  15. Parenti, Christian (28 June 2011). Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence. PublicAffairs. ISBN   978-1-56858-662-5. These traditionalist, protomujahideen—called Basmachi, meaning 'bandits', by the Soviets—described themselves as standing for Islam, Turkic nationalism, and anticommunism. One of these bands of Muslim rebels was led by Enver Pasha, ...
  16. Lewis, Bernard (1993). Islam and the West. Oxford University Press. p. 142.
  17. 1 2 Spolnikov, Victor (1994). "Impact of Afghanistan's War on the Former Soviet Republics of Central Asia". In Malik, Hafeez (ed.). Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects. New York: St. Martin's Press.
  18. 1 2 Abdullaev, Kamoludin (10 August 2018). Historical Dictionary of Tajikistan. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN   978-1-5381-0252-7. The uprising spread, and as it gained strength, the Bolsheviks began to refer to its fighters as Basmachi, meaning 'bandit' in the local tongues.
  19. Hiro, Dilip (November 2011). Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran. Abrams. ISBN   978-1-59020-378-1. The Communists' major problem now was how to counter the continuing nationalist Basmachi (meaning 'bandit' in Uzbek) movement.
  20. Paksoy, H. B. (June 1995). "Basmachi Movement From Within: Account of Zeki Velidi Togan" . Nationalities Papers . 23 (2): 373–399. doi:10.1080/00905999508408381 via Richard Hacken at Brigham Young University.
  21. 1 2 Goodson, Larry P. (28 October 2011). Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press. ISBN   978-0-295-80158-2.
  22. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Lorenz, Richard (1994). "Economic Bases of the Basmachi Movement in the Ferghana Valley". In Kappeler, Andreas; Simon, Gerhard; Brunner, Gerog (eds.). Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Central Asia Book Series. Duke University Press. ISBN   978-0-8223-1490-5.
  23. Catherin Evtuhov, Richard Stites, A History of Russia: Peoples, Legends, Events, Forces (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 265
  24. Baberowski & Doering-Manteuffel 2009, pp. 201–202.
  25. 1 2 Marwat, Fazal-Ur-Rahim Khan (1985). The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia (A Study in Political Development). Peshawar: Emjay Books International.
  26. Bardakçı, Murat (8 April 2016). Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim (in Turkish). Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları. p. 546. ISBN   9786053327271. Sevgili Naciye! Dün akşam Ortayüz'e kadar gelen Afganlılar'ı sabah istikbale gittim. Geceki yağmur yağıyor ve etrafı fenalaştırıyor. Bereket versin ki, Afganlılar deve yerine bu defa at almışlar. Efendiciğim, gelen eşyada yüz adet mükemmel İngiliz tüfeği ve çok cephane ve tüfekçi edevâtı, çadır vesâire vardır. Bunları Afganlılar'ın yanına gönderdim. Ben de yine mâlâyani işlerle meşgulüm.
  27. KC MDA, Fund No. 2225, Record No. 2, File No. 45, pp. 115–120.
  28. Özdemir, Hikmet (2007). Üç Jöntürk'ün Ölümü: Enver, Cemal, Talat (in Turkish). Remzi Kitabevi. p. 278. ISBN   9789751412232.
  29. Kocaoğlu, Timur (2001). Kocaoğlu, Timur (ed.). Türkistan'da Yenilik Hareketleri ve İnkılâplar (in Turkish). p. 42.
  30. Baysun, Abdullah Recep (1943). Türkistan Millî Hareketleri (in Turkish). Alaeddin Matbaası. p. 65.
  31. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), f. 62, op. 2, d. 5, l. 231
  32. Estimates of Basmachi strength vary widely and are therefore disputed. Marie Broxup gives 16,000 (Marie Broxup, "The Basmachi," Central Asian Survey 2, no. 1 [1983]: 57–81). A Soviet archival source gives 26,000 (Central State Archive of the Soviet Army [CSASA], file 7, catalogue 2, dossier 466, p. 58). Salahi R. Sonyel, “Enver Paşa ve Orta Asya'da Başgösteren ‘Basmacı’ Akımı,” Belleten 54, no. 211 [1990]: 1179–1208, and Okan Yeşilot & Burcu Özdemir, “Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Basmacı Hareketi,” Belleten 85, no. 302 [2021]: 279–310, both suggest around 20,000. Ali Bademci gives 60,000 (Basmacı Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Türkistan’da Enver Paşa, Istanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 2019, p. 306)—likely including non-combatants, as he uses the term "mujahid" rather than "fighter." Şevket Süreyya Aydemir estimates 12,400–7,465 (Enver Paşa: Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya, Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970, p. 664). Glenda Fraser, Central Asian Survey 6:1 [1987]: 58, suggests up to 7,000 in May 1922. H. B. Paksoy, “The Basmachi Movement From Within,” Nationalities Papers 23, no. 2 [1995]: 373–399, reports about 7,000. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), p. 112, gives as few as 3,000.
  33. "Bulletin périodique de la presse russe". Bulletin périodique de la presse russe (in French). France. Ministère de la guerre: 1. 1922.
  34. Cebesoy, Ali Fuat (1955). Moskova Hatıraları (in Turkish). Vatan Neşriyatı. p. 335.
  35. Erer, Tekin (1971). Enver Paşa'nın Türkistan Kurtuluş Savaşı (in Turkish). Mayataş Yayınları. pp. 122–123.
  36. İdil, Aydın (2013). Enver Paşa'nın son savaşı: Basmacı hareketinin önderi Seyyid Enver Emir-i Leşker-i İslam (in Turkish). Kitabevi. p. 227. ISBN   978-6055397678.
  37. Snowden, Jack (2021). "Enver Paşa's Last Stand, in Turkistan (1921-1922)". pp. 12–14.
  38. "TURKEY REINTERPRETED". Current History. 16 (6): 952. September 1922.
  39. Nabiyev, Muhammadali (2022). "The Role of Anwar Pasha in History of Turkestan". Science and Innovation International Scientific Journal. 1 (2): 605.
  40. Shahingoz, Mehmed; Akhantaeva, Amina (2020). "Some aspects of the «Basmachi» movement and the role of Enver pasha in Turkestan". Journal of History. 97 (2): 24–33. doi:10.26577/JH.2020.v97.i2.03.
  41. Dixon, Jeffrey S.; Sarkees, Meredith Reid (2015). A Guide to Intra-state Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014. CQ Press. p. 473. ISBN   9780872897755.
  42. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), 23/8/1922, File: 43111, Background File: 30.10.0.0, Location number: 247.671.11
  43. Поляков, Ю.А.; Чугунов, А.И. (1976). Конец басмачества [The End of the Basmachi Movement](PDF). Москва: Наука. pp. 90–101.
  44. Rumyantsev, Vyaçeslav (2000-01-20). "Enver Pasha". Chronos.
  45. Smele, Jonathan D. The "Russian" Civil Wars, 1916–1926: Ten Years That Shook the World. Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 271 <https://www.scribd.com/document/337450283/Jonathan-Smele-The-Russian-Civil-Wars-1916-1926-Ten-Years-That-Shook-the-World-Oxford-University-Press-2016>.
  46. Zakharov, A. (2015-02-05). "Турецкий басмач из Кёнигсберга. Как Энвер-паша большевика Троцкого в Индию не пустил" [The Turkish Basmachi from Königsberg: How Enver Pasha Prevented Bolshevik Trotsky from Going to India]. Новые колёса. Retrieved 2025-09-13.
  47. Castagné, Joseph (1925). "Les Basmatchis: le mouvement national des indigènes d'Asie Centrale depuis la Révolution d'octobre 1917 jusqu'en octobre 1924". L'Asie française (in French): 51.
  48. Baumann, Robert F. (1993). Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan (PDF). Leavenworth Papers #20. Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College. p. 112.
  49. Tannenbaum, Ben (2023). Fate Saw the Jewel: Enver Pasha's Post-War Intrigues, 1918–1922. United States Military Academy. p. 63.
  50. Sonyel, Salahi R. (1990). "Enver Pasha and the Basmaji movement in Central Asia". Middle Eastern Studies. 26 (1): 52–64. doi:10.1080/00263209008700804.
  51. O'Kearney, Donna (2008). "Enver Pasha and the Basmachi Rebellion". Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics. 3 (1): 98–105.
  52. Zakharov, A. (2015-02-05). "Турецкий басмач из Кёнигсберга. Как Энвер-паша большевика Троцкого в Индию не пустил" [The Turkish Basmachi from Königsberg: How Enver Pasha Prevented Bolshevik Trotsky from Going to India]. Новые колёса. Retrieved 2025-09-13.
  53. Krist, Gustav (1939). Alone Through The Forbidden Land. Reader’s Union. p. 78.
  54. "Bulletin périodique de la presse russe". Bulletin périodique de la presse russe (in French). France. Ministère de la guerre: 1. 1922.
  55. Adle, Chahryar; Palat, Madhavan K.; Tabyshalieva, Anara (2005). History of Civilizations of Central Asia: Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century (PDF). Vol. VI. UNESCO. p. 177.
  56. Shahingoz, Mehmed; Akhantaeva, Amina (2020). "Some aspects of the «Basmachi» movement and the role of Enver pasha in Turkestan". Journal of History. 97 (2): 24–33. doi:10.26577/JH.2020.v97.i2.03.
  57. Aymen de Lageard, Helene (1987). "The revolt of the basmachi according to Red Army journals (1920–1922)". Central Asian Survey. 6 (3): 1–35. doi:10.1080/02634938708400590.
  58. Johnson, David Ray (June 1990). Soviet Counterinsurgency (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. p. 33. PDF
  59. Baymirza Hayit, Basmacılar / Ruslara Karşı Basmacılar Hareketi [The Basmachi: The National Liberation Movement in Turkestan Against the Russians]. Istanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2006, p. 277.
  60. Entsiklopedik Luğat, vol. 2 (Tashkent: Özbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi, 1988), p. 117: "In the spring of 1922, the Basmachi occupied much of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic; similar movements also occurred in Ferghana and Khorezm at that time."
  61. "Basmachi | Encyclopedia.com". www.encyclopedia.com. Retrieved 2025-10-17. At their height in 1920 through 1922, some sources claim that the rebels had twenty to thirty thousand men under arms, controlled the Ferghana valley and most of Tajikistan, and enjoyed widespread popularity among the indigenous non-Russian population.
  62. Hayit, Baymirza (1997). Basmacılar: Türkistan millî mücadele tarihi (1917–1934) (in Turkish). Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. p. 205. ISBN   9789753893053.
  63. Olcott, Martha Brill (1981). "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24". Soviet Studies. 33 (3): 352–369. doi:10.1080/09668138108411365.
  64. Bademci, Ali (2008). Korbaşılar ve Enver Paşa-II (in Turkish). Istanbul, Turkey: Ötüken Neşriyat. p. 122.
  65. Beckett, Ian, ed. (15 May 2017). Modern Counter-Insurgency. Taylor & Francis. ISBN   9781351917025 . Retrieved 14 October 2025. in 1920, stimulated by some positive measures by Soviet authorities, the rebellion flared up again and in 1921 spread to the eastern part of the Emirate of Bukhara (the southern regions of today's Uzbekistan and western Tadzhikistan) and later to the Turkmen area of Khorezm
  66. Entsiklopedik Luğat, vol. 2 (Tashkent: Özbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi, 1988), p. 117: "In the spring of 1922, the Basmachi occupied much of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic; similar movements also occurred in Ferghana and Khorezm at that time."
  67. Joseph L. Wieczynski (1994). The Modern encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet history, Volume 21. Academic International Press. p. 125. ISBN   0-87569-064-5 . Retrieved 2011-01-01.
  68. Kutay, Cemal (1960). Enver Paşa Lenin'e karşı [Enver Pasha against Lenin] (in Turkish). Istanbul: Ekicigil Yayınevi. p. 60.
  69. Kara, İlyas (2011-02-01). Enver Paşa Basmacılar İsyanı[Enver Pasha and the basmachi revolt] (in Turkish). Yediveren Yayınevi. p. 131. ISBN   9786058820364.
  70. Yalvar, Cihan (2017). "1918-1922 Yılları Arasında Emir Timur'un Mirası: "Buhara Emirliği"". Türk & İslam Dünyası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi (in Turkish). 4 (10): 213–233.
  71. Hatunoğlu, Nurettin (2011). Türkistan'da Son Türk Devleti Buhara Emirliği ve Alim Han (in Turkish). Ötüken Neşriyat. pp. 322–323.
  72. Gümüş, Musa (2015). "Türkistan'da "Vatan Müdafaacıları": Korbaşılar Hareketi ve Enver Paşa". Tarih Okulu Dergisi (in Turkish) (24): 649–682.
  73. Olcott, Martha Brill (1981). "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24". Soviet Studies. 33 (3): 352–369. doi:10.1080/09668138108411365.
  74. Yeşilot, Okan; Özdemir, Burcu (2021). "Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Basmacı Hareketi". Belleten (in Turkish). 85 (302): 279–310. doi:10.37879/belleten.2021.279.
  75. Kara, İlyas. Enver Paşa Basmacılar İsyanı (in Turkish). p. 132.
  76. Kutay, Cemal (1955). Enver Paşa Lenin'e Karşı (in Turkish). Erkicigil Yayınları. p. 61.
  77. Kydyralieva, Saltanat (2015). Türk ve Rus Kaynaklarına Göre Türkistan’da Basmacı Hareketi (1916–1924) / Basmachi Movement in Turkestan According to Turkish and Russian Sources (1916–1924) (PhD thesis) (in Turkish). İstanbul, Turkey: İstanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Ana Bilim Dalı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Bilim Dalı. p. 242.
  78. Johnson, David Ray (June 1990). Soviet Counterinsurgency (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. p. 33. PDF
  79. Olcott, Martha Brill (1981). "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24". Soviet Studies. 33 (3): 352–369. doi:10.1080/09668138108411365.
  80. Baysun, Abdullah Recep. Türkistan'da İstiklal Hareketleri ve Enver Paşa. Turan Yayıncılık, 15 Ekim 2001, ISBN 9789757893325, ss. 92-93. (English: Independence Movements in Turkestan and Enver Pasha. Turan Yayıncılık, 15 October 2001, ISBN 9789757893325, pp. 92-93.)
  81. Doğan, Cabir. Enver Paşa'nın Yurt Dışındaki Hayatı ve Mücadelesi. Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Anabilim Dalı, Isparta, 1998, s. 108. Available at: PDF. (English: Enver Pasha's Life Abroad and Struggle. Master's Thesis, Süleyman Demirel University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of History, Isparta, 1998, p. 108.)
  82. Snowden, Jack (2021). "Enver Paşa's Last Stand, in Turkistan (1921-1922)". pp. 12–14.
  83. In areas of Eastern Bukhara cleared of the enemy, regular and organized military forces will be established and combat procedures will be implemented. Mobile forces will be sent to regions where uprisings have not yet occurred to encourage the local population to mobilize. In each province, a commander (leshkerbashi) will be appointed to manage revolutionary movements. If zakat and tribute are insufficient for the supply of military forces, a tax will be levied on the population according to their wealth. A collector will be appointed to manage these financial matters. In each province, in areas cleared of the enemy, a local government will be established and its administration organized. In places where commanders and local leaders have not yet been appointed, we will assign commanders, governors, and zakat collectors. In areas capable of self-administration, the sergerdars will inform us in due time about these appointments. Commanders will be responsible for all military affairs. Beys and other military personnel will handle provisioning and logistics and assist commanders in supplying troops and other necessities. Zakat collectors, appointed to protect the population from oppression while administering local affairs, will be responsible for collecting zakat. Each provincial commander and Bey will send a daily report to the central command. If security conditions are stable, reports may be sent twice a week. Representatives sent from the center to the provinces will sign official documents on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief. In the event of an emergency or if one of the nearby commanders is pressed by the enemy, the closest commanders must immediately rush to provide assistance with as many forces as possible. In enemy-occupied cities and areas, if enemy forces are strong, they should be contained through siege to weaken them; always keep enemy positions under surveillance; and carry out raids on enemy units passing through. Destroy enemy communication tools such as telegraphs, telephones, and wires. Act forcefully against enemy spy organizations and punish them severely. However, those who confess their wrongdoings to us and show repentance should be forgiven. Treat captured prisoners with kindness. The command of all military and political operations will be entrusted to Enver Pasha.
  84. Gümüş, Musa (2015). "Türkistan'da "Vatan Müdafaacıları": Korbaşılar Hareketi ve Enver Paşa". Tarih Okulu Dergisi (in Turkish) (24): 649–682.
  85. Gümüş, Musa (2015). "Türkistan'da "Vatan Müdafaacıları": Korbaşılar Hareketi ve Enver Paşa". Tarih Okulu Dergisi (in Turkish) (24): 649–682.
  86. Erer, Tekin (1971). Enver Paşa'nın Türkistan Kurtuluş Savaşı (in Turkish). Mayataş Yayınları. pp. 122–123.
  87. Kara, İlyas. Enver Paşa Basmacılar İsyanı (in Turkish). p. 134.
  88. Cebesoy, Ali Fuat (1955). Moskova Hatıraları (in Turkish). Vatan Neşriyatı. p. 335.
  89. 1 2 Fraser, Glenda (1987). "Basmachi — I". Central Asian Survey. 6 (1). Taylor & Francis: 1–73. doi:10.1080/02634938708400571.
  90. Hayit, Baymirza (1997). Basmacılar: Türkistan millî mücadele tarihi (1917-1934) (in Turkish). Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. p. 205. ISBN   9789753893053.
  91. “A historical document: Decisions of the second congress of the Muslims of Turkestan,” Yaş Türkistan, Paris, 1932, No. 29, pp. 9–17; Johannes Benzing, pp. 29–31 (excerpts from the protocol); Hayit, pp. 204–209 (Secret organization in contact with the Mujahideen: Turkestan National Union); N. Bariman, Martyr Enver Pasha in Turkestan, Istanbul, 1979, p. 139.
  92. Fraser, Glenda (1987). "Basmachi — II". Central Asian Survey. 6 (2): 7–42. doi:10.1080/02634938708400582.
  93. SECTION I Article 1 – Between 1868 and 1883, under Tsar Alexander II and generals such as Perovskiy, Chernayev, Kaufmann, Skobelev, and Kuropatkin, Russian forces invaded Turkestan, defeating the local population and trampling the political and cultural values of Muslims. Article 2 – After the conquest, fertile lands were distributed among Russian settlers. During Tsar Nicholas II’s reign, “Service Centers for Migrants” were established, transferring the lands of nomadic Turkestan populations to the Tsar and gifting them to incoming Russian peasants. The Russian administration sought not only to economically subjugate Muslims but also to keep them socially backward. Measures were taken to make Muslims perpetual subjects of Russia, including denying them education, excluding them from government positions, and appointing corrupt local officials who served Russian interests. Muslim property was gradually seized. Article 3 – In 1917, Tsar Nicholas was overthrown by revolution, granting the people of Turkestan their rights. Representatives of 95% of Turkestan Muslims declared the Turkestan National Autonomous Government at a congress in Khokand. The Russian forces, representing only 5% of the population, tried to dissolve the government by force and arrest its members. Article 4 – After assuming power, the communists intensified oppression, seized movable and immovable property, and ignored the rights of Muslims. Soviet forces burned and looted cities and villages. Leaders such as Kolesov, Kazakov, Uspenskiy, Safarov, Konovalov, Frunze, Sokolnikov, and Buki destroyed Bukhara and Khokand in 1918 and later Fergana. In September 1920, they looted Bukhara and transported its wealth to Moscow. Article 5 – The Soviet “Turk Commission” removed competent Turkestan officials from government positions and replaced them with unqualified and corrupt individuals, calling them representatives of Muslims and corrupting the population. Article 6 – For four years, Soviet authorities labeled freedom fighters abroad as “thieves” or “bandits” and justified attacks, plundering Fergana, and burning homes of lower and middle-class citizens. Article 7 – They interfered with religion and Sharia, abolishing the Kadılık judicial institution. SECTION II Article 8 – Representing 95% of the Muslim Turkestan population, the second congress addressed the issues above, declared independence, and resolved to uphold justice even at the cost of blood. Article 9 – Congress members confirmed the truth of the points in Section I. If the Soviet government does not change policy, recognize the government, and restore political and cultural rights, Muslims of Turkestan will continue resistance by all means, armed or unarmed. Article 10 – Bolsheviks in Turkestan who seized power through fraud and force will be declared traitors, plunderers, and bandits. Article 11 – After four years of war and bloodshed, the government declared by this congress is legally recognized as the Turkestan Government. Article 12 – This government will be called the Turkestan Turk Independent Islamic Republic. Article 13 – Full administration of the Turkestan territories, including Sir Darya, Fergana, Samarkand, Yedisu, Kapsi, and Amu Darya regions, will be under this new government. SECTION III Article 14 – When the Soviet government is dissolved in Turkestan, this new government will immediately hold a congress in Tashkent to review prior decisions and laws and implement them if approved. The congress will also organize the government and administrative mechanisms. Article 15 – For every 5,000 people aged 18+, one representative will be elected. National minorities under government authority are proportionally represented and can participate in forming the government. Members of the Bolshevik party, Cheka agents, or anyone opposing Turkestan authorities are excluded from voting or being elected. SECTION IV Article 16 – National minorities living under the majority government may live according to their customs and establish schools teaching in their native language. Article 17 – All faiths and sects are autonomous and have equal rights. Article 18 – All peoples under the majority government are equally affected by state income and expenditures. Article 19 – Domestic and foreign trade is largely free. Article 20 – Every citizen may sell personal property to another citizen. Article 21 – Foreign nationals may not own real estate but may lease it for up to ten years. Article 22 – Property seized during the Russian government period will be returned to previous owners. Land occupied under cooperative rules will remain with Turkestan residents. Article 23 – Mountains, forests, underground resources, and undeveloped rural lands belong to the state, which may lease them to foreign powers. Article 24 – Nomadic lands are distributed among communities for use. Article 25 – Unaddressed land issues will be discussed at future congresses. SECTION V Article 26 – The provisional government consists of 15 members. Article 27 – From these 15, an executive committee of a president, vice president, and general secretary is formed to manage state affairs in the capital. Article 28 – Five of the remaining 12 members will serve as military leaders in Fergana’s five regions. Article 29 – The other seven members will serve as ministers: 1. War, 2. Foreign Affairs, 3. Interior/Post/Telegraph, 4. Education, 5. Finance, 6. Justice, 7. Transport. Article 30 – The executive committee may convene to pass cabinet decisions as needed. Article 31 – Ministries may implement projects only with executive committee approval. Article 32 – Once the enemy is defeated, the government will be based in Tashkent. SECTION VI Article 33 – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will immediately send envoys abroad to promote the decisions and administration, secure recognition, and negotiate treaties if necessary. Article 34 – A copy of this directive will be formally sent to the Soviet government. Article 35 – Anyone who does not recognize this government will be considered a counter-revolutionary. SECTION VII Article 36 – The congress will appoint officials for the following positions: President Vice President General Secretary 4–8. Military leaders for Namangan, Andijan, Margilan, Khokand, and Osh War Minister Foreign Minister Interior/Post/Telegraph Minister Justice Minister Education Minister Finance Minister Transport Minister
  94. Olcott, Martha B. (1981). "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918–24". Soviet Studies. 33 (3). Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: 352–369. doi:10.1080/09668138108411365. JSTOR   151077 . Retrieved 2025-09-12.
  95. Donuk, Abdülkadir (1992). "Basmacı Hareketi". TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi (in Turkish). Retrieved 2025-09-12.
  96. Olcott, Martha B. (1981). "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918–24". Soviet Studies. 33 (3). Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: 359–360. doi:10.1080/09668138108411365. JSTOR   151077 . Retrieved 2025-09-12.
  97. Hayit, Baymirza (1997). Basmacılar: Türkistan millî mücadele tarihi (1917-1934) (in Turkish). Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. p. 283. ISBN 9789753893053.
  98. Kydyralieva, Saltanat (2015). Türk ve Rus Kaynaklarına Göre Türkistan’da Basmacı Hareketi (1916–1924) / Basmachi Movement in Turkestan According to Turkish and Russian Sources (1916–1924) (PhD thesis) (in Turkish). İstanbul, Turkey: İstanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Ana Bilim Dalı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Bilim Dalı. p. 242.
  99. Hayit, Baymirza (1997). Basmacılar: Türkistan millî mücadele tarihi (1917-1934) (in Turkish). Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. p. 205. ISBN   9789753893053.
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Bibliography

Further reading