Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Last updated

Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Українська повстанська армія
Leaders
Dates of operation
  • 14 October 1942–1949
  • 1949–1956 (localized)
Active regions
Ideology
Size20,000–200,000 (estimated) [ citation needed ]
Part of Organization of Ukrainian NationalistsBandera faction
Allies
Opponents

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainian : Українська повстанська армія, УПА, romanized: Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiia, abbreviated UPA) was a Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary and partisan formation founded by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on October 14, 1942. [1] During World War II, it was engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Soviet Union, and both the Polish Underground State and Communist Poland. [2]

Contents

The goal of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was to drive out occupying powers and set up an independent government, which would be achieved by a national revolution led by a leader with dictatorial power; OUN accepted violence as a political tool against enemies of their cause. [3] In order to achieve this goal, a number of partisan units were formed, merged into a single structure in the form of the UPA, which was created on 14 October 1942. From February 1943, the organisation fought against the Germans in Volhynia and Polesia. [4] At the same time, its forces fought an evenly matched war against the Polish resistance, [5] during which the UPA carried out an ethnic cleansing of the Polish population of Volhynia and eastern Galicia, resulting in between 50,000 and 100,000 deaths. [6] [7] [8] [9] Soviet NKVD units fought against the UPA, which led armed resistance against Soviets until 1949. On the territory of communist Poland, the UPA tried to prevent the forced deportation of Ukrainians from western Galicia to the Soviet Union until 1947. [5]

Organizationally, the UPA was divided into regions. In Western Ukraine the UPA unit was called UPA West; [10] in the centre-southern regions of Podolia, parts of Kyiv region, parts of Zhytomyr region and Odesa - UPA South; [10] in the northern regions of Volhynia, Rivne, parts of Kiev and Zhytomyr regions UPA North was active; [10] in eastern Ukraine the UPA fled north, as Stalinist dictatorship had executed a number of the UPA's participants. The members of UPA East joined other UPA units in Dnipro and in Chernihiv region. [11] The UPA was a decentralised movement widespread throughout Ukraine with each regions following somewhat different agenda given the circumstances of constant moving front line and a double threat of the Soviet and Nazi powers. [12] The UPA was formally disbanded in early September 1949. However, some of its units continued operations until 1956.[ citation needed ]

In March 2019, surviving UPA members were officially granted the status of veterans by the government of Ukraine. [13]

Organization

UPA propaganda poster. The OUN/UPA's formal greeting is written in Ukrainian on two of horizontal lines Glory to Ukraine - Glory to (her) Heroes. The soldier is standing on the banners of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya (poster).jpg
UPA propaganda poster. The OUN/UPA's formal greeting is written in Ukrainian on two of horizontal lines Glory to Ukraine - Glory to (her) Heroes. The soldier is standing on the banners of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

The UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the OUN-B, local OUN and UPA leaders were frequently the same person. [14] The OUN's military referents were the superiors of UPA unit commanders. [15] The UPA was established in Volhynia and initially limited its activities to this region. Its first commander was the OUN military referent for Volhynia and Polesie, Vasily Ivachiv. In July, the UPA Supreme Command was organized with Dmytro Klyachkivsky at its head. [16]

In November 1943, the UPA adopted a new structure, creating a Main Military Headquarters and the General Staff. Roman Shuchevych headed the HQ, while Dmytro Hrytsai became chief of staff. [17] The General Staff consisted of operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel, training, political education, and military inspectors departments. [18] The area of operations has been divided into three regions: UPA-West, UPA-North and UPA-South. There was also an attempt to create a UPA-East region, including Kiev and Zhytomyr regions, but the project never came to fruition. Similarly, the UPA-South region ceased to exist in the summer of 1944, but continued to appear in documents. [18] Three military schools for low-level command staff were also established.[ citation needed ]

UPA's largest unit type, the kurin , consisting of 500–700 soldiers, [19] was equivalent to a battalion, and its smallest unit, the rii (literally bee swarm), with eight to ten soldiers, [19] equivalent to a squad. [20] Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more kurins would unite and form a zahin or brigade. [19] Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from the German, Polish and Soviet military, while UPA units based their training on a modified Red Army field unit manual. [14]

In terms of UPA soldiers' social background, 60 percent were peasants of low to moderate means, 20 to 25 percent were from the working class (primarily from the rural lumber and food industries), and 15 percent were members of the intelligentsia (students, urban professionals). The latter group provided a large portion of the UPA's military trainers and officer corps. [21]

The number of UPA fighters varied. A German Abwehr report from November 1943 estimated that the UPA had 20,000 soldiers; other estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000. [22] By the summer of 1944, estimates of UPA membership varied from 25,000 to 30,000 fighters [23] up to 100,000 [22] [24] [25] or even 200,000 soldiers. [26]

Structure

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army was structured into three units: [10]

  1. UPA-North
    Regions: Volhynia, Polissia.
    • Military District "Turiv"
      Commander – Maj. Rudyj.
      Squads: "Bohun", "Pomsta Polissja", "Nalyvajko".
    • Military District "Zahrava"
      Commander – Ptashka (Sylvester Zatovkanjuk).
      Squads: "Konovaletsj", "Enej", "Dubovyj", "Oleh".
    • Military District " Volhynia-South"
      Commander – Bereza.
      Squads: "Kruk", "H.".
  2. UPA-West
    Regions: Halychyna, Bukovina, Zakarpattia, Zakerzonia.
    • Military District "Lysonja"
      Commander – Maj. Hrim, V.
      Kurins: "Holodnojarci", "Burlaky", "Lisovyky", "Rubachi", "Bujni", "Holky".
    • Military District "Hoverlja"
      Commander – Maj. Stepovyj (from 1945 – Major Hmara).
      Kurins: "Bukovynsjkyj", "Peremoha", "Hajdamaky", "Huculjskyj", "Karpatsjkyj".
    • Military District "Black Forest"
      Commander – Col. Rizun-Hrehit (Mykola Andrusjak).
      Kurins: "Smertonosci", "Pidkarpatsjkyj", "Dzvony", "Syvulja", "Dovbush", "Beskyd", "Menyky".
    • Military District "Makivka"
      Commander – Maj. Kozak.
      Kurins: "Ljvy", "Bulava", "Zubry", "Letuny", "Zhuravli", "Bojky of Chmelnytsjkyj", "Basejn".
    • Military District "Buh"
      Commander – Col. Voronnyj
      Kurins: "Druzhynnyky", "Halajda", "Kochovyky", "Perejaslavy", "Tyhry", "Perebyjnis"
    • Military District "Sjan"
      Commander – Orest
      Kurins: "Vovky", "Menyky", Kurin of Ren, Kurin of Eugene.
  3. UPA-South
    Regions: Khmelnytskyi Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, southern region of Kyiv Oblast, southern regions of Ukraine,
    and especially in cities Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk, Mariupol, Donetsk.
    • Military District "Cholodnyj Jar"
      Commander – Kost'.
      Kurins: Kurin of Sabljuk, Kurin of Dovbush.
    • Military District "Umanj"
      Commander – Ostap.
      Kurins: Kurin of Dovbenko, Kurin of Buvalyj, Kurin of Andrij-Shum.
    • Military District "Vinnytsja"
      Commander – Jasen.
      Kurins: Kurin of Storchan, Kurin of Mamaj, Kurin of Burevij.

The fourth region, UPA-East, was planned, but never created. [18]

Greeting

World War II-era monument in memory of UPA fighters with inscription "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!", in place of the Janowa Dolina massacre, Bazaltove, Ukraine Pomnik UPA w Bazaltowe d.Janowa Dolina.jpg
World War II-era monument in memory of UPA fighters with inscription "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!", in place of the Janowa Dolina massacre, Bazaltove, Ukraine

The greeting "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!" (Slava Ukrayini! Heroiam slava!) was used among members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) who started using this slogan as a greeting to its members. [27]

Anthem

The anthem of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was called the March of Ukrainian Nationalists , also known as We were born in a great hour (Ukrainian : Зродились ми великої години). The song, written by Oles Babiy, was officially adopted by the leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1932. [28]

The organization was a successor of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, whose anthem was "Chervona Kalyna". Leaders of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, Yevhen Konovalets and Andriy Melnyk, were founding members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. For this reason, "Chervona Kalyna" was also used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. [29] [ better source needed ]

Flag

The flag of the UPA was a red-and-black banner. [30] The flag continues to be a symbol of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The colours of the flag symbolize 'red Ukrainian blood spilled on the black Ukrainian earth. [31] Use of the flag is also a "sign of the stubborn endurance of the Ukrainian national idea even under the grimmest conditions." [30]

Awards

Military ranks

The UPA made use of a dual rank system that included functional command position designations and traditional military ranks. The functional system was developed due to an acute shortage of qualified and politically reliable officers during the early stages of organization. [32]

10. UPA-Holovnyi Komandyr UPA (Alex K).svg 09. UPA-Krayevyi Komandyr (Alex K).svg 08. UPA-Komandyr Okrugu (Alex K).svg 07. UPA-Komandyr Zagonu (Alex K).svg 06. UPA-Kurinnyi (Alex K).svg 04. UPA-Sotennyi (Alex K).svg 02. UPA-Chotovyi (Alex K).svg 01. UPA-Royovyi (Alex K).svg
SUPREME
COMMANDER
REGIONAL
COMMANDER
DIVISION
(MILITARY DISTRICT)
COMMANDER
BRIGADE
(TACTICAL SECTOR)
COMMANDER
BATTALION
COMMANDER
COMPANY
COMMANDER
PLATOON LEADERSQUAD LEADER

UPA rank structure consisted of at least seven commissioned officer ranks, four non-commissioned officer ranks, and two soldier ranks. The hierarchical order of known ranks and their approximate U.S. Army equivalent is as follows: [33]

UPA RANKSUS ARMY EQUIVALENTS
Heneral-KhorunzhyjBrigadier General
PolkovnykColonel
PidpolkovnykLieutenant Colonel
MajorMajor
SotnykCaptain
PoruchnykFirst Lieutenant
KhorunzhyjSecond Lieutenant
Starshyj BulavnyjMaster Sergeant
BulavnyjSergeant First Class
Starshyj VistunStaff Sergeant
VistunSergeant
Starshyj StriletsPrivate First Class
StriletsPrivate

The rank scheme provided for three more higher general officer ranks: Heneral-Poruchnyk (Major General), Heneral-Polkovnyk (Lieutenant General), and Heneral-Pikhoty (General with Four Stars).[ citation needed ]

Armaments

Initially, the UPA used the weapons collected from the battlefields of 1939 and 1941.[ citation needed ] Later they bought weapons from peasants and individual soldiers or captured them in combat. Some light weapons were also brought by deserting Ukrainian auxiliary policemen. For the most part, the UPA used light infantry weapons of Soviet and, to a lesser extent, German origin (for which ammunition was less readily obtainable). In 1944, German units armed the UPA directly with captured Soviet arms. Many kurins were equipped with light 51 mm and 82 mm mortars. During large-scale operations in 1943–1944, insurgent forces also used artillery (45 mm and 76.2 mm). [34] In 1943 a light Hungarian tank was used in Volhynia. [34] [35]

In 1944, the Soviets captured a Polikarpov Po-2 aircraft and one armored car and one personnel carrier from the UPA; however, it was not stated that they were in operable condition, while no OUN/UPA documents noted the usage of such equipment. [36] By the end of World War II in Europe, the NKVD had captured 45 artillery pieces (45 and 76.2 mm calibres) and 423 mortars from the UPA. In the attacks against Polish civilians, axes and pikes were used. [34] However, the light infantry weapon was the basic weapon used by the UPA. [37]

Formation

1941

UPA Commanders left to right: Oleksander Stepchuk, Ivan Klimchak, Nikon Semeniuk 1941-1942 Upacommanders1941-1942.jpg
UPA Commanders left to right: Oleksander Stepchuk, Ivan Klimchak, Nikon Semeniuk 1941–1942

In a memorandum from 14 August 1941, the OUN (B) proposed to the Germans, to create a Ukrainian Army "which will join the German Army ... until the latter will win" (preferable translation:[ clarification needed ] "which will unite with the German Army ... until [our] final victory"), in exchange for German recognition of an allied Ukrainian independent state. [38]

At the beginning of October 1941, during the first OUN Conference, the OUN formulated its future strategy. This called for transferring part of its organizational structure underground, in order to avoid conflict with the Germans. It also refrained from open anti-German propaganda activities. [39]

A captured German document of 25 November 1941 (Nuremberg Trial O14-USSR) ordered:

"It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reichskommissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated..." [40]

1942

At the Second Conference of the OUN-B, held in April 1942, the policies for the "creation, build-up and development of Ukrainian political and future military forces" and "action against partisan activity supported by Moscow" were adopted. Although German policies were criticized, the Soviet partisans were identified as the primary enemy of the OUN (B) and its future armed wing. [41]

The "Military conference of OUN (B)" met in December 1942 near Lviv. The conference resulted in the adoption of a policy for accelerated growth for the establishment of OUN-B's military forces. The conference emphasized that "all combat capable population must support, under OUN banners, the struggle against the Bolshevik enemy". On 30 May 1947, the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of 14 October 1942 - the Feast of the Intercession of Mary, the Mother of God, and Ukrainian Cossacks' Day, as the date of the formation of the UIA, and thus marked as its official foundation anniversary. [42]

Germany

Despite the stated opinions of Dmytro Klyachkivsky and Roman Shukhevych that the Germans were a secondary threat compared to their main enemies (the communist forces of the Soviet Union and Poland), the Third Conference of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, held near Lviv from 17 to 21 February 1943, decided to begin open warfare against the Germans [43] (OUN fighters had already attacked a German garrison earlier that year on 7 February). [44] Accordingly, on 20 March 1943, the OUN-B leadership issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the collaborationist Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in 1941–1942 to desert with their weapons and join with UPA units in Volhynia. This process often involved armed conflict with German forces trying to prevent this. The number of trained and armed personnel who joined the ranks of the UPA was estimated to be between 4 and 5 thousand. [43]

Ukrainian Auxiliary Police battalion photographed in 1942 115th Battalion of Ukrainian Shuma 1943 (2).jpg
Ukrainian Auxiliary Police battalion photographed in 1942

Anti-German actions were limited to situations where the Germans attacked the Ukrainian population or UPA units. [45] Indeed, according to German general Ernst August Köstring, UPA fighters

"fought almost exclusively against German administrative agencies, the German police and the SS in their quest to establish an independent Ukraine controlled by neither Moscow nor Germany." [46] [ better source needed ]

During the German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on police stations and military convoys. In the region of Zhytomyr insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland. [47]

According to the OUN/UPA, on 12 May 1943, Germans attacked the town of Kolki using several SS-Divisions (SS units operated alongside the Wehrmacht who were responsible for intelligence, central security, policing action, and mass extermination), where both sides suffered heavy losses. [48] Soviet partisans reported the reinforcement of German auxiliary forces at Kolki from the end of April until the middle of May 1943. [49]

In June 1943, German SS and police forces under the command of Erich von dem Bach, the head of Himmler-directed Bandenbekämpfung ("bandit warfare"), attempted to destroy UPA-North in Volhynia during Operation BB (Bandenbekämpfung). [50] According to Ukrainian claims, the initial stage of the operation produced no results whatsoever. This development was the subject of several discussions by Himmler's staff that resulted in General von dem Bach-Zelewski being sent to Ukraine. [51] He failed to eliminate the UPA, which grew steadily, and the Germans, apart from terrorizing the civilian population, were virtually limited to defensive actions. [52]

From July through September 1943, in an estimated 74 clashes between German forces and the UPA, the Germans lost more than 3,000 men killed or wounded, while the UPA lost 1,237 killed or wounded. According to post-war estimates, the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid-to-late 1943 in Volhynia: 35 in July, 24 in August, 15 in September and 47 during October–November. [44] :186 [53] [54] In the fall of 1943, clashes between the UPA and the Germans declined, so that Erich Koch in his November 1943 report and New Year 1944 speech could claim that "nationalistic bands in forests do not pose any major threat" for the Germans. [44] :190

In the autumn of 1943, some detachments of the UPA attempted to find rapprochement with the Germans. Although doing so was condemned by an OUN/UPA order on 25 November 1943, these actions did not end. [44] :190–194 In early 1944, UPA forces in several Western regions cooperated with the German Wehrmacht , Waffen-SS , SiPo and SD. [44] :192–194 [55] However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to say that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and German forces, as the UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against the repressive actions of the German administration. [44] :196

For example, on 20 January, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hour long firefight with 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded. [44] :197 In March–July 1944, a senior leader of OUN-B in Galicia conducted negotiations with SD and SS officials, resulting in a German decision to supply the UPA with arms and ammunition. In May of that year, the OUN issued instructions to "switch the struggle, which had been conducted against the Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets." [44]

In a top-secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadeführer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-Obergruppenführer General Hans-Adolf Prützmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that "The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into the enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the [German] Army Group" on the southern front. [56] By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for the UPA for their anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom" [57] After the front had passed, by the end of 1944 the Germans supplied the OUN/UPA by air with arms and equipment. In the Ivano-Frankivsk region, there even existed a small landing strip for German transport planes. Some German personnel trained in terrorist and intelligence activities behind Soviet lines, as well as some OUN-B leaders, were also transported through this channel. [58]

Adopting a strategy analogous to that of the Chetnik leader General Draža Mihailović, [59] the UPA limited its actions against the Germans in order to better prepare itself for and engage in the struggle against the communists. Because of this, although the UPA managed to limit German activities to a certain extent, it failed to prevent the Germans from deporting approximately 500,000 people from Western Ukraine and from economically exploiting Western Ukraine. [59] Due to its focus on the Soviets as the principal threat, the UPA's anti-German struggle did not contribute significantly to the recapture of Ukrainian territories by Soviet forces. [44] :199

Poland

Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia

Polish victims of a massacre committed by UPA in the village of Lipniki, 1943 Lipikach.jpg
Polish victims of a massacre committed by UPA in the village of Lipniki, 1943

In 1943, the UPA adopted a policy of massacring and expelling the Polish population. [60] [61] The decision of ethnic cleansing of the area east of the Bug River was taken by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army early in 1943. In March 1943, the OUN-B (specifically Mykola Lebed [62] ) imposed a collective death sentence on all Poles living in the former east of the Second Polish Republic, and a few months later, local units of the UPA were instructed to complete the operation soon. [63] Among those who were behind the decision, Polish investigators singled out Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Vasyl Ivakhov, Ivan Lytvynchuk and Petro Oliynyk. [64]

The ethnic cleansing operation against the Poles began on a large scale in Volhynia in late February (or early Spring [61] ) of that year and lasted until the end of 1944. [65] Taras Bulba-Borovets, the founder of the UPA, criticized the attacks as soon as they began:

The axe and the flail have gone into motion. Whole families are butchered and hanged, and Polish settlements are set on fire. The “hatchet men,” to their shame, butcher and hang defenceless women and children.... By such work Ukrainians not only do a favor for the SD [German security service], but also present themselves in the eyes of the world as barbarians. We must take into account that England will surely win this war, and it will treat these “hatchet men” and lynchers and incendiaries as agents in the service of Hitlerite cannibalism, not as honest fighters for their freedom, not as state-builders. [66]

11 July 1943 was one of the deadliest days of the massacres, with UPA units marching from village to village, killing Polish civilians. On that day, UPA units surrounded and attacked 99 Polish villages and settlements in three counties – Kovel, Horokhiv, and Volodymyr. On the following day, 50 additional villages were attacked. [67] In January 1944, the UPA campaign of ethnic cleansing spread to the neighbouring province of Galicia. Unlike in Volhynia, where Polish villages were destroyed and their inhabitants murdered without warning, Poles in eastern Galicia were in some instances given the choice of fleeing or being killed. [61] Ukrainian peasants sometimes joined the UPA in the violence, [61] [68] and large bands of armed marauders, unaffiliated with the UPA, brutalized civilians. [69] In other cases however, Ukrainian civilians took significant steps to protect their Polish neighbours, either by hiding them during the UPA raids or vouching that the Poles were actually Ukrainians.

Monument to Poles killed by the UPA, Liszna, Poland Monument to vitims of Volhynia massacre 1940-1945 at cemetery in Liszna plaque.jpg
Monument to Poles killed by the UPA, Liszna, Poland

The methods used by the UPA to carry out the massacres were particularly brutal and were committed indiscriminately without any restraint. Historian Norman Davies describes the killings:

"Villages were torched. Roman Catholic priests were axed or crucified. Churches were burned with all their parishioners. Isolated farms were attacked by gangs carrying pitchforks and kitchen knives. Throats were cut. Pregnant women were bayoneted. Children were cut in two. Men were ambushed in the field and led away." [70]

In total, the estimated numbers of Polish and Jewish civilians killed in Volhynia and Galicia is between 50,000 and 100,000. [lower-alpha 1] [77] [6]

Victims of the UPA included Ukrainians who did not adhere to its form of nationalism and so were considered traitors. [78]

After the initiation of the massacres, Polish self-defense units responded in kind. Estimates of Ukrainians killed in acts of reprisal range from 2,000 to 30,000. [79] [80] [81]

On 22 July 2016, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland passed a resolution declaring the massacres committed by the UPA a genocide. [82]

Post-war

Westward shift of Poland after World War II. The respective German, Polish and Ukrainian populations were expelled. Curzon line en.svg
Westward shift of Poland after World War II. The respective German, Polish and Ukrainian populations were expelled.

After Galicia had been taken over by the Red Army, many units of the UPA abandoned the anti-Polish course of action and some even began cooperating with local Polish anti-communist resistance against the Soviets and the NKVD. Many Ukrainians, who had nothing to do with earlier massacres against the Poles, seeking to defend themselves against communists, joined the UPA after the war on both the Soviet and Polish sides of the border. [83] Local agreements between the UPA and the Polish post-Home Army units began to appear as early as April/May 1945 and in some places lasted until 1947, such as in the Lublin Voivodeship. One of the most notable joint actions of the UPA and the post-Home Army Freedom and Independence Association (WiN) took place in May 1946, when the two partisan formations coordinated their attack and took over of the city of Hrubieszów. [84]

The cooperation between the UPA and the post-Home Army underground came about partly as a response to increasing communist terror and the deportations of Ukrainians to the Soviet Union, and Poles into the new Soviet-backed Polish regime. According to official statistics, between 1944 and 1956 around 488,000 Ukrainians and 789,000 Poles were transferred. [84] [85] On the territories of present-day Poland, 8,000–12,000 Ukrainians were killed and 6,000–8,000 Poles, between 1943 and 1947. However, unlike in Volhynia, most of the casualties occurred after 1944 and involved UPA soldiers and Ukrainian civilians on one side, and members of the Polish communist Security Office (UB) and Border Protection Troops (WOP). [84] Out of the 2,200 Poles who died in the fighting between 1945 and 1948, only a few hundred were civilians, with the remainder being functionaries or soldiers of the Communist regime in Poland. [84]

Soviet Union

German occupation

The total number of local Soviet partisans acting in Western Ukraine was never high, due to the region enduring only two years of German rule (in some places even less). [86]

In 1943, the Soviet partisan leader Sydir Kovpak was sent to the Carpathian Mountains, with help from Nikita Khrushchev. He described his mission to western Ukraine in his book Vid Putivlia do Karpat (From Putyvl to the Carpathian Mountains). Well armed by supplies delivered to secret airfields, he formed a group consisting of several thousand men which moved deep into the Carpathians. [87] Attacks by the German Luftwaffe and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units in 1944; these groups were attacked by UPA units on their way back. Soviet NKVD agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA members after unwittingly entering their camp while wearing a Wehrmacht officer uniform. [88]

Fighting

As the Red Army approached Galicia, the UPA avoided clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military. [89] Instead, the UPA focused its energy on NKVD units and Soviet officials of all levels, from NKVD and military officers to the school teachers and postal workers attempting to establish Soviet administration. [90]

In March 1944, UPA insurgents mortally wounded front commander Army General Nikolai Vatutin, who captured Kiev when he led Soviet forces in the Second battle of Kiev. [91] Several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by the UPA near Rivne. This resulted in a full-scale operation in the spring of 1944, initially involving 30,000 Soviet troops against the UPA in Volhynia. Estimates of casualties vary depending on the source. In a letter to the state defence committee of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria stated that in spring 1944 clashes between Soviet forces and the UPA resulted in 2,018 killed and 1,570 captured UPA fighters and only 11 Soviets killed and 46 wounded. Soviet archives show that a captured UPA member stated that he received reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters while the Soviet forces lost 2,000. [92] :213–214 The first significant sabotage operations against communications of the Soviet Army before their offensive against the Germans was conducted by the UPA in April–May 1944. Such actions were promptly stopped by the Soviet Army and NKVD troops, after which the OUN/UPA submitted an order to temporarily cease anti-Soviet activities and prepare for the further struggle against the Soviets. [93]

Despite heavy casualties on both sides during the initial clashes, the struggle was inconclusive. New large-scale actions of the UPA, especially in Ternopil Oblast, were launched in July–August 1944, when the Red Army advanced West. [93] By the autumn of 1944, UPA forces enjoyed virtual freedom of movement over an area of 160,000 square kilometers in size and home to over 10 million people and had established a shadow government. [94]

Christmas card made and distributed by the UPA, 1945 UPA christmascard.jpg
Christmas card made and distributed by the UPA, 1945

In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on the UPA throughout Western Ukraine, involving according to OUN/UPA estimates at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armoured units. They blockaded villages and roads and set forests on fire. [90] Soviet archival data states that on 9 October 1944, one NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with a total of 26,304 NKVD soldiers were stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, two regiments with 1,500 and 1,200 persons, one battalion (517 persons) and three armoured trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as one border guard regiment and one unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them. [95]

During late 1944 and the first half of 1945, according to Soviet data, the UPA suffered approximately 89,000 killed, approximately 91,000 captured, and approximately 39,000 surrendered while the Soviet forces lost approximately 12,000 killed, approximately 6,000 wounded and 2,600 MIA. In addition, during this time, according to Soviet data UPA actions resulted in the killing of 3,919 civilians and the disappearance of 427 others. [96] Despite the heavy losses, as late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in Western Ukraine. [97] :489 In February 1945 the UPA issued an order to liquidate kurins (battalions) and sotnya's (companies) and to act predominantly by chotys (platoons). [98]

Spring 1945–late 1946

After Germany surrendered in May 1945, the Soviet authorities turned their attention to the guerrilla wars taking place in Ukraine and the Baltics. Combat units were reorganised and special forces were sent in. One of the major complications that arose was the local support the UPA had from the population.[ citation needed ]

Areas of UPA activity were depopulated. The estimates on numbers deported vary; officially Soviet archives state that between 1944 and 1952 a total of 182,543 people [99] [100] were deported while other sources indicate the number may have been as high as to 500,000. [101]

Mass arrests of suspected UPA informants or family members were conducted; between February 1944 and May 1946 over 250,000 people were arrested in Western Ukraine. [102] Those arrested typically experienced beatings or other violence. Those suspected of being UPA members underwent torture; reports exist of some prisoners being burned alive. The many arrested women believed to be affiliating with the UPA were subjected to torture, deprivation, and rape at the hands of Soviet security in order to "break" them and get them to reveal UPA members' identities and locations or to turn them into Soviet double-agents. [56] Mutilated corpses of captured rebels were put on public display. [69] Ultimately, between 1944 and 1952 alone as many as 600,000 people may have been arrested in Western Ukraine, with about one-third executed and the rest imprisoned or exiled. [103]

Roman Shukhevych, the leader of the UPA 1307438718 arxivcdvr sh00050.jpg
Roman Shukhevych, the leader of the UPA

The UPA responded to the Soviet methods by unleashing their own terror against Soviet activists, suspected collaborators and their families. This work was particularly attributed to the Sluzhba Bezpeky (SB), the anti-espionage wing of the UPA. In a typical incident in the Lviv region, in front of horrified villagers, UPA troops gouged out the eyes of two entire families suspected of reporting on insurgent movements to Soviet authorities, before hacking their bodies to pieces. Due to public outrage concerning these violent punitive acts, the UPA stopped the practice of killing the families of collaborators by mid-1945. Other victims of the UPA included Soviet activists sent to Galicia from other parts of the Soviet Union; heads of village Soviets, those sheltering or feeding Red Army personnel, and even people turning food into collective farms. The effect of such terrorist acts was such that people refused to take posts as village heads, and until the late 1940s villages chose single men with no dependants as their leaders. [69] :109

The UPA also proved to be especially adept at assassinating key Soviet administrative officials. According to NKVD data, between February 1944 and December 1946 11,725 Soviet officers, agents and collaborators were assassinated and 2,401 were "missing", presumed kidnapped, in Western Ukraine. [69] :113–114 In one county in Lviv region alone, from August 1944 until January 1945 Ukrainian rebels killed 10 members of the Soviet active and a secretary of the county Communist party, and also kidnapped four other officials. The UPA travelled at will throughout the area. In this county, there were no courts, no prosecutor's office, and the local NKVD only had three staff members. [69] :113–114

According to a 1946 report by Khrushchev's deputy for West Ukrainian affairs A.A. Stoiantsev, out of 42,175 operations and ambushes against the UPA by destruction battalions in Western Ukraine, only 10 percent had positive results – in the vast majority there was either no contact or the individual unit was disarmed and pro-Soviet leaders murdered or kidnapped. [69] :123 Morale amongst the NKVD in Western Ukraine was particularly low. Even within the dangerous context of Soviet state service in the late-Stalin era, West Ukraine was considered to be a "hardship post", and personnel files reveal higher rates of transfer requests, alcoholism, nervous breakdowns, and refusal to serve among NKVD field agents there at that time. [69] :120

The first success of the Soviet authorities came in early 1946 in the Carpathians, which were blockaded from 11 January until 10 April. The UPA operating there ceased to exist as a combat unit. [104] The continuous heavy casualties elsewhere forced the UPA to split into small units consisting of 100 soldiers. Many of the troops demobilized and returned home, when the Soviet Union offered three amnesties during 1947–1948. [89]

By 1946, the UPA was reduced to a core group of 5,000–10,000 fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border. Here, in 1947, they killed the Polish Communist deputy defence minister General Karol Świerczewski. In spring 1946, the OUN/UPA established contacts with the Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and US. [105]

End of UPA resistance

Guerrilla war in Ukraine
Part of World War II from 1944–1945 and the Eastern European anti-Communist insurgencies from 1945 onwards
Date1944–1953
Location
Result

Soviet-Polish victory

  • Defeat of national partisans
Belligerents
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg  Soviet Union
Flag of Poland.svg Polish People's Republic
OUN-r Flag 1941.svg Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Commanders and leaders
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Joseph Stalin
Flag of Poland.svg Bolesław Bierut
OUN-r Flag 1941.svg Dmytro Klyachkivsky  
OUN-r Flag 1941.svg Roman Shukhevych  
OUN-r Flag 1941.svg Vasyl Kuk
Strength
Variable ~100,000 partisans (peak)
300,000+ partisans (total) [106]
Casualties and losses
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Soviet Union:
Source 1: 8,788 dead
5,587 paramilitaries
3,199 regular soldiers [107]
Source 2:
12,000 dead and 2,600 missing in late 1944 to early 1945 alone [96]
Flag of Poland.svg Polish People's Republic:
Unknown
153,000 dead
134,000 arrested
(Soviet claim) [108]
21,888 civilians killed by insurgents [107]
Unknown number of civilians killed by Soviets

The turning point in the struggle against the UPA came in 1947 when the Soviets established an intelligence gathering network within the UPA and shifted the focus of their actions from mass terror to infiltration and espionage. After 1947 the UPA's activity began to subside. On May 30, 1947, Shukhevych issued instructions for joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare. [109] In 1947–1948 UPA resistance was weakened enough to allow the Soviets to begin implementation of large-scale collectivization throughout Western Ukraine. [110]

In 1948, the Soviet central authorities purged local officials who had mistreated peasants and engaged in "vicious methods". At the same time, Soviet agents planted within the UPA had taken their toll on morale and on the UPA's effectiveness. According to the writing of one slain Ukrainian rebel, "the Bolsheviks tried to take us from within...you can never know exactly in whose hands you will find yourself. From such a network of spies, the work of whole teams is often penetrated...". In November 1948, the work of Soviet agents led to two important victories against the UPA: the defeat and deaths of the heads of the most active UPA network in Western Ukraine, and the removal of "Myron", the head of the UPA's counter-intelligence SB unit. [69] :125–130

The Soviet authorities tried to win over the local population by making significant economic investments in Western Ukraine,[ citation needed ] and by setting up rapid reaction groups in many regions to combat the UPA. According to one retired MVD major, "By 1948 ideologically we had the support of most of the population." [89]

The UPA's leader, Roman Shukhevych, was killed during an ambush near Lviv on 5 March 1950. Although sporadic UPA activity continued until the mid-1950s, after Shukhevich's death the UPA rapidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of UPA manpower by Soviet authorities on 17 April 1952 claimed that UPA/OUN had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. The UPA's last commander, Vasyl Kuk, was captured on 24 May 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished by the beginning of 1956". [109]

NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters [111] are known to have committed atrocities against the civilian population in order to discredit the UPA. [112] Among these NKVD units were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD. [113] The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) recently published information that about 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954. [114]

Prominent people killed by UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church, killed while travelling in a German convoy, [115] and pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan. [89]

In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas affiliated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the period after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of Ukrainian nationalists during the period 1944–1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defence units. According to Soviet data, the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. [107] Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against the UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents. [116]

Many UPA members were imprisoned in the Gulag. They actively participated in Gulag uprisings of Norilsk, Vorkuta, and Kengir.

Soviet infiltration

In 1944–1945 the NKVD carried out 26,693 operations against the Ukrainian underground. These resulted in the deaths of 22,474 Ukrainian soldiers and the capture of 62,142 prisoners. During this time the NKVD formed special groups known as spetshrupy made up of former Soviet partisans. The goal of these groups was to discredit and disorganize the OUN and UPA. In August 1944, Sydir Kovpak was placed under NKVD authority. Posing as Ukrainian insurgents, these special formations used violence against the civilian population of Western Ukraine. In June 1945 there were 156 such special groups with 1,783 members. [108] [ better source needed ]

From December 1945 to 1946, 15,562 operations were carried out in which 4,200 were killed and more than 9,400 were arrested. From 1944 to 1953, the Soviets killed 153,000 and arrested 134,000 members of the UPA. 66,000 families (204,000 people) were forcibly deported to Siberia and half a million people were subject to repression. In the same period, Polish communist authorities deported 450,000 people. [108] Soviet infiltration of British intelligence also meant that MI6 assisted in training some of the guerrillas in parachuting and unmarked planes used to drop them into Ukraine from bases in Cyprus and Malta, were counter-acted by the fact that one MI6 agent with knowledge of the operation was Kim Philby. Working with Anthony Blunt, he alerted Soviet security forces about planned drops. Ukrainian guerrillas were intercepted and most were executed. [117]

Holocaust

Ukrainian Insurgent Army, September 1944 Instruction abstract. Text in Ukrainian: "Jewish question" - "No actions against Jews to be taken. Jewish issue is no longer a problem (only few of them remain). This does not apply to those who stand out against us actively." JewUPA1944.jpg
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, September 1944 Instruction abstract. Text in Ukrainian: "Jewish question" – "No actions against Jews to be taken. Jewish issue is no longer a problem (only few of them remain). This does not apply to those who stand out against us actively."

The OUN pursued a policy of infiltrating the German police to obtain weapons and training for fighters. In that role, it helped the Germans to carry out the Holocaust. The Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, working for the Germans, played a crucial supporting role in the murder of 200,000 Jews in Volhynia in the second half of 1942. [118] Most of the police deserted in the following spring and joined the UPA. [118] Historian Shmuel Spector estimated in 1990 that the UPA and OUN together hunted down and killed several thousand Jews. [119]

With the first antisemitic ideology and acts traced back to the Russian Civil War,[ vague ] by 1940–41 the publications of Ukrainian terrorist organizations[ vague ] became explicitly antisemitic. [120] German documents of the period give the impression that Ukrainian ultranationalists [ vague ] were indifferent to the plight of the Jews and would either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate for their political goals. [121]

According to Timothy D. Snyder, the Soviet partisans were known for their brutality by retaliating against entire villages suspected of working with the Germans, killing individuals deemed to be collaborators, and provoking the Germans to attack villages.[ citation needed ] The UPA would later attempt to match that brutality. [122] By early 1943, the OUN had entered into open armed conflict with Nazi Germany. According to Ukrainian historian and former UPA soldier Lew Shankowsky, immediately upon assuming the position of commander of the UPA in August 1943, Roman Shukhevych issued an order banning participation in anti-Jewish activities. No written record of this order, however, has been found. [123] In 1944, the OUN formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity". [97] :474 Nevertheless, Jews hiding from the Germans with Poles in Polish villages were often killed by the UPA along with their Polish saviors, although in at least one case, they were spared as the Poles were murdered. [122] Some Jews who fled the ghettos for the forests were killed by members of the UPA. [124] [ full citation needed ]

According to Herbert Romerstein, Soviet propaganda complained about Zionist membership in the UPA, [125] and during the persecution of Jews in the early 1950s, they described the alleged connection between Jewish and Ukrainian nationalists. [126]

One well-known claimed example of Jewish participation in the UPA was most likely a hoax, according to sources such as Friedman. [127] [128] According to the report, Stella Krenzbach, the daughter of a rabbi and a Zionist, joined the UPA as a nurse and intelligence agent. She is alleged to have written, "I attribute the fact that I am alive today and devoting all the strength of my thirty-eight years to a free Israel only to God and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. I became a member of the heroic UPA on 7 November 1943. In our group I counted twelve Jews, eight of whom were doctors". [129] Later, Friedman concluded that Krenzbach was a fictional character, as the only evidence for her existence was in an OUN paper. No one knew of such an employee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she supposedly worked after the war. A Jew, Leiba Dubrovskii, pretended to be Ukrainian. [130]

Reconciliation

During the following years, the UPA was officially taboo in the Soviet Union, mentioned only as a terrorist organization. [131] Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, there have been heated debates about the possible award of official recognition to former UPA members as legitimate combatants, with the accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. [131] UPA veterans have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from Soviet Army veterans and some Ukrainian politicians, particularly from the south and east of the country. [131]

Recently, attempts to reconcile former Polish Home Army and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former UPA members have expressed their readiness for a mutual apology. Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for their past misdeeds. [132] Restorations of graves and cemeteries in Poland where fallen UPA soldiers were buried have been agreed to by the Polish side. [133]

2019 official veteran status

In late March 2019 former members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (and other living former members of Ukrainian irregular nationalist armed groups that were active during World War II and the first decade after the war) were officially granted the status of veterans. [13] This meant that for the first time they could receive veteran benefits, including free public transport, subsidized medical services, annual monetary aid, and public utility discounts (and will enjoy the same social benefits as former Ukrainian soldiers who served in the Soviet Union's Red Army). [13]

There had been several previous attempts to provide former Ukrainian nationalist fighters with official veteran status, especially during the 2005–2009 administration of President Viktor Yushchenko, but all failed. [13]

Prior to December 2018 legally only former UPA members who "participated in hostilities against Nazi invaders in occupied Ukraine in 1941–1944, who did not commit crimes against humanity and were rehabilitated" were recognized as war veterans. [134]

Monuments for combatants

Without waiting for official notice from Kyiv, many regional authorities have already decided to approach the UPA's history on their own. In many western cities and villages monuments, memorials and plaques to the leaders and troops of the UPA have been erected. In eastern Ukraine's city of Kharkiv, a memorial to the soldiers of the UPA was erected in 1992. [135]

In response, many southern and eastern provinces, although the UPA had not operated in those regions, have responded by opening memorials of their own dedicated to the UPA's victims. The first one, "The Shot in the Back", was unveiled by the Communist Party of Ukraine in Simferopol, Crimea in September 2007. [136] In 2008, one was erected in Svatove, Luhansk oblast, and another in Luhansk on 8 May 2010 by the city deputy, Arsen Klinchaev, and the Party of Regions. [137] The unveiling ceremony was attended by Vice Prime Minister Viktor Tikhonov, the leader of the parliamentary faction of the Pro-Russian Party of Regions Oleksandr Yefremov, Russian State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin, Luhansk Regional Governor Valerii Holenko, and Luhansk Mayor Serhii Kravchenko. [137]

Commemoration in Ukraine

March of UPA veterans through Przemysl UPAPrzemysl.jpg
March of UPA veterans through Przemyśl
Ultras of FC Karpaty Lviv and FC Dynamo Kyiv wave the UPA flag in May 2011 Spil'nii baner KL-DK - Dusha ta Sertse Ukrayini.jpg
Ultras of FC Karpaty Lviv and FC Dynamo Kyiv wave the UPA flag in May 2011

According to John Armstrong,

"If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979... the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million... however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950". [138]

On 10 January 2008, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko submitted a draft law "on the official Status of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence from the 1920s to the 1990s". Under the draft, persons who took part in political, guerrilla, underground and combat activities for the freedom and independence of Ukraine from 1920 to 1990 as part of or assisting the following:

They will be recognised as war veterans. [139]

Ukrainian postage stamp honoring Roman Shukhevych on 100th anniversary (2007) of his birth. Shukhevych stamp 2007.jpg
Ukrainian postage stamp honoring Roman Shukhevych on 100th anniversary (2007) of his birth.
Golden Cross "25th anniversary of UPA" of Albert Hasenbroekx [pl; uk] (1967) Golden Cross 25-UPA.jpg
Golden Cross "25th anniversary of UPA" of Albert Hasenbroekx  [ pl; uk ] (1967)

In 2007, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) set up a special working group to study archive documents of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to make public original sources. [140]

Since 2006, the SBU has been actively involved in declassifying documents relating to the operations of Soviet security services and the history of the liberation movement in Ukraine. The SBU Information Centre provides an opportunity for scholars to get acquainted with electronic copies of archive documents. The documents are arranged by topics (1932–1933 Holodomor, OUN/UPA Activities, Repression in Ukraine, Movement of Dissident). [141]

Since September 2009, Ukrainian schoolchildren take a more extensive course of the history of the Holodomor and the fighters of the OUN and the UPA fighters. [142]

Yushchenko took part in the celebration of the 67th anniversary of the UPA and the 65th anniversary of Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council on 14 October 2009. [143]

On 16 January 2012, the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld the presidential decree of 28 January 2010 "About recognition of OUN members and soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as participants in the struggle for independence of Ukraine" after it was challenged by the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, Nataliya Vitrenko, recognising the UPA as war combatants. [144] [145]

On 10 October 2014, the date of 14 October as Defenders of Ukraine Day was confirmed by Presidential decree, officially granting state sanction to the date of the anniversary of the raising of the Insurgent Army, which has been celebrated in the past by Ukrainian Cossacks as the Feast of the Intercession of the Virgin Mary.[ citation needed ] The date would be moved to 1 October in 2023 with the move of all Orthodox fixed solemnities to the Revised Julian Calendar, but minor commemorations on the 14th continue as usual it was the date in 1942 wherein the UIA was founded.

On 15 May 2015, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a bill into law "On the legal status and commemoration of the fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century", including Ukrainian Insurgent Army combatants. [146]

In June 2017, the Kyiv City Council renamed the city's General Vatutin Avenue into Roman Shukhevych Avenue. [147] [148]

According to Russia's RIA Novosti in 2018, in Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zhytomyr, the UPA flag may be displayed on government buildings "on certain holidays". [149]

In December 2018, Poroshenko confirmed the status of veterans and combatants for independence of Ukraine for UPA fighters. [150]

On 5 March 2021, the Ternopil City Council named the largest stadium in the city of Ternopil after Roman Shukhevych as the Roman Shukhevych Ternopil city stadium. [151] On 16 March 2021, the Lviv Oblast Council approved the renaming of their largest stadium after Roman Shukhevych. [151]

The Ukrainian black metal band Drudkh recorded a song entitled Ukrainian Insurgent Army on its 2006 release, Кров у Наших Криницях ( Blood in our wells ), dedicated to Stepan Bandera. Ukrainian Neo-Nazi black metal band Nokturnal Mortum have a song titled "Hailed Be the Heroes" (Слава героям) on the Weltanschauung/Мировоззрение album which contains lyrics pertaining to World War II and Western Ukraine (Galicia), and its title, Slava Heroyam, is a traditional UPA salute.[ citation needed ]

Cross of Combat Merit Zolotii Khrest Boiovoyi Zaslugi UPA.svg
Cross of Combat Merit

Two Czech films by František Vláčil, Shadows of the Hot Summer (Stíny horkého léta, 1977) and The Little Shepherd Boy from the Valley (Pasáček z doliny, 1983) are set in 1947, and feature UPA guerrillas in significant supporting roles. The first film resembles Sam Peckinpah's Straw Dogs (1971), in that it is about a farmer whose family is taken hostage by five UPA guerrillas, and he has to resort to his own ingenuity, plus reserves of violence that he never knew he possessed, to defeat them. In the second, the shepherd boy (actually a cowherd) imagines that a group of UPA guerrillas is made up of fairytale characters of his grandfather's stories, and that their leader is the Goblin King.[ citation needed ]

Also films such as Neskorenyi ("The Undefeated"), Zalizna Sotnia ("The Company of Heroes") and Atentat ("Assassination. An Autumn Murder in Munich") feature more description about the role of the UPA on their terrain. The Undefeated is about the life of Roman Shukhevych and the hunt for him by both German and Soviet forces, The Company of Heroes shows how UPA soldiers had everyday life as they fight against Armia Krajowa, Assassination is about the life of Stepan Bandera and how KGB agents murdered him.[ citation needed ]

The rally on European Square in Kyiv, 24 November 2013 The rally on European Square in Kiev on Sunday, November 24, 2013 (cropped).jpg
The rally on European Square in Kyiv, 24 November 2013
Headquarters of the Euromaidan. At the front entrance there is a portrait of Stepan Bandera, a 20th-century Ukrainian nationalist. Headquarters of the Euromaidan revolution.jpg
Headquarters of the Euromaidan. At the front entrance there is a portrait of Stepan Bandera, a 20th-century Ukrainian nationalist.

The red-and-black battle flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a popular symbol among Euromaidan protesters, and the wartime insurgents have acted as a large inspiration for them. [152] Serhy Yekelchyk of the University of Victoria says the use of UPA imagery and slogans was more of a potent symbol of protest against the current government and Russia rather than adulation for the insurgents themselves, explaining "The reason for the sudden prominence of [UPA symbolism] in Kiev is that it is the strongest possible expression of protest against the pro-Russian orientation of the current government." [153]

Films

Fiction

Songs

The most obvious characteristic of the insurgent songs genre is the theme of rising up against occupying powers, enslavement and tyranny. Insurgent songs express an open call to battle and to revenge against the enemies of Ukraine, as well as love for the country and devotion to her revolutionary leaders (Bandera, Chuprynka and others). UPA actions, heroic deeds of individual soldiers, the hard underground life, longing for one's girl, family or boy are also important subject of this genre. [155]

See also


Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia</span> Massacres of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists during World War II

The massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were carried out in German-occupied Poland by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) with the support of parts of the local Ukrainian population against the Polish minority in Volhynia, Eastern Galicia, parts of Polesia and the Lublin region from 1943 to 1945. The ruling Germans also actively encouraged both Ukrainians and Poles to kill each other.

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists was a Ukrainian nationalist organisation established in 1929 in Vienna, uniting the Ukrainian Military Organization with smaller, mainly youth, radical nationalist right-wing groups. The OUN was the largest and one of the most important far-right Ukrainian organizations operating in the interwar period on the territory of the Second Polish Republic.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Roman Shukhevych</span> Ukrainian nationalist (1907–1950)

Roman-Taras Yosypovych Shukhevych was a Ukrainian nationalist and a military leader of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which during the Second World War fought against the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent against the Nazi Germany for Ukrainian independence. He collaborated with the Nazis from February 1941 to December 1942 as commanding officer of the Nachtigall Battalion in early 1941, and as a Hauptmann of the German Schutzmannschaft 201 auxiliary police battalion in late 1941 and 1942.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army</span> Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary in Nazi-occupied Ukraine

Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army, also known as the Polissian Sich or the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was a paramilitary formation of Ukrainian nationalists, nominally proclaimed in Olevsk region in December 1941 by Taras Bulba-Borovets, by renaming an existing military unit known from July 1941 as the UPA-Polissian Sich. It was a warlord-type military formation without a strict central command. From spring 1942 until the autumn of 1943, it acted against the German rural civil administration and warehouses, from spring 1943 it also fought against Soviet Partisans and some units against Poles; from July–August 1943, it clashed with OUN-B Bandera's UPA and UB units.

During the Soviet struggle to establish control over Western Ukraine, NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population, and to turn the people against nationalist groups.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Vasyl Kuk</span> Ukrainian nationalist activist and militant (1913–2007)

Vasyl Stepanovych Kuk was a Ukrainian nationalist activist and militant who was the last leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, following the death of Roman Shukhevych. In 1954, he was captured by Soviet KGB troops and spent six years in prison without a court sentence.

Sluzhba Bezpeky or SB OUN, was the Ukrainian partisan underground intelligence service, and a division of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists responsible for clandestine operations and anti-espionage during World War II. In its short history, the SB committed acts of terror against civilians and non-civilians and their families, including people suspected either of collaborating, or serving with the Soviet forces in western Ukraine. In this capacity, the SB also played a significant role in the ethnic cleansing and killing of the Polish population in Volhynia and Galicia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Dmytro Klyachkivsky</span> Ukrainian Insurgent Army commander (1911–1945)

Dmytro Semenovych Klyachkivsky, also known by the pseudonyms of Klym Savur, Okhrim, and Bilash, was a commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the first head-commander of UPA-North. He was responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Poles from Volhynia.

This article presents the historiography of the Volyn genocide as presented by historians in Poland and Ukraine after World War II. The Genocide of Poles in Volhynia were part of the ethnic cleansing operation in the Polish province of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia that took place beginning in March 1943 and lasted until the end of 1944. According to political scientist Nathaniel Copsey, research into this event was quite partisan until 2009 and dominated by Polish researchers, some of whom lived there at the time or are descended from those who did. The most thorough is the work of Ewa and Władysław Siemaszko, the result of years of research conducted with the goal of demonstrating that the Poles were victims of genocide. Nonetheless, the 45 years of state censorship resulted in an excessive supply of works described as "heavy in narrative", "light in analysis" and "inherently - though perhaps unconsciously - biased against Ukrainians."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Stara Huta, Volyn Oblast</span> Village in Volyn Oblast, Ukraine

Stara Huta is a village in northwestern Ukraine, in Kovel Raion of Volyn Oblast, but was formerly administered within Stara Vyzhivka Raion. The population of the village is 1024 people.

Maksym Skorupsky was a Ukrainian military leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Volodymyr Viatrovych</span> Ukrainian politician (born 1977)

Volodymyr Mykhailovych Viatrovych is a Ukrainian historian, civic activist and politician.

The Litopys UPA volume series was created under the auspices of the Litopys UPA Publishing Company, an Ontario Corporation Without Share Capital incorporated in 1978. Publishing primary source, archival material and documents, and first person accounts that relate to the military history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army UPA, underground resistance organizations, as well as the history of Ukraine during World War II and post war decade. Each volume or group of volumes is devoted to a specific theme. Some deal with the military history in a specific period of time or region - for example, in Volyn, in Halychyna, as in the regions of Ukraine under Poland and so on. Two, three, or more volumes may be devoted to specicific themes. Memoirs, or books by individual authors dealing with particular questions offer insight into individual topics. Ukrainian language with English introductions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Olha Ilkiv</span> Ukrainian resistance leader (1920–2021)

Olha Faustinivna Ilkiv was a member of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), partisan and signaller of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. She is best known in Ukraine for being the signaller of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anti-Soviet resistance by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army</span>

The Anti-Soviet resistance by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was a guerrilla war waged by Ukrainian nationalist partisan formations against the Soviet Union in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and southwestern regions of the Byelorussian SSR, during and after World War II.

The Bukovinian Ukrainian Self-Defense Army(BUSA) (Ukrainian: Буковинська українська самооборонна армія, romanized: Bukovynska ukrainska samooboronna armiia) was an underground armed formation consisting mainly of Ukrainians from Bukovina and Bessarabia during World War II. Its goal was to create an Independent Conciliar Ukrainian State.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Self-defense Kushch Units</span> Units formed to protect Ukrainian villages

Self-defense Kushch Units (SKU) — Ukrainian self-defense units formed to protect Ukrainian villages, as well as to create a rear for the UPA. They operated in 1942–1946 and were inspected by the district leaders of the separate formation of OUN – OUN(b).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Bust of Roman Shukhevych</span> Statue in Edmonton

The bust of Roman Shukhevych in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada is a controversial sculpture located near the Ukrainian Youth Association narodny dim of the Ukrainian nationalist and Nazi collaborator Roman Shukhevych, a military leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and one of the perpetrators of the Galicia-Volhynia massacres of approximately 100,000 Poles.

The Battle of Gurby - according to the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the largest battle that took place from 21 to 25 April 1944 near the village of Gurby in the south of Zdolbuniv Raion, between the USSR NKVD troops and UPA forces. It ended with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the breakthrough of the remnants of Ukrainian fighters from the encirclement. The number of military and civilian casualties is not precisely known.

The Northern Operational Group of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, also known as UPA-North, was one of the three operational groups of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. It operated in Volhynia, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, and in the southern Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

References

Notes

  1. The exact number of ethnic Polish fatal victims is unknown. Most estimates vary from 50,000 [71] to 100,000 [72] [73] [74] [75] depending on the source used, though lower and higher numbers are occasionally cited too (when different regions and perpetrators are included). A neutral halfway point between the most often cited numbers that was mentioned in an IPN conference of Polish and Ukrainian scholars is 85,000 deaths. [76]

Citations

  1. Arad, Yitzhak; Arad, Yitzchak (2010). In the Shadow of the Red Banner: Soviet Jews in the War Against Nazi Germany. Gefen Publishing House Ltd. p. 189. ISBN   978-965-229-487-6. The first UPA unit was officially established on October 14, 1942. …The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armia-UPA) was an arm of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsia Ukrainskikh Nationalistiv – OUN).
  2. Rudling, Per A. (2011). "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths". The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies (2107). p. 14. doi: 10.5195/cbp.2011.164 . While anti-German sentiments were widespread, according to captured activists, at the time of the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN(b), held in August 1943, its anti-German declarations were intended to mobilize support against the Soviets, and stayed mostly on the paper.
  3. Myroslav Yurkevich, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv) This article originally appeared in the Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 3 (1993).
  4. Piotrowski, Tadeusz (1998). Poland's holocaust. Internet Archive. McFarland. p. 234. ISBN   978-0-7864-0371-4. By October (1944), all of Eastern Poland lay in Soviet hands. As the German army began its withdrawal, the UPA began to attack its rearguard and seize its equipment. The Germans reacted with raids on UPA positions. On July 15, 1944, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, or UHVR, an OUN-B outfit) was formed and, at the end of that month, signed an agreement with the Germans for a unified front against the Soviet threat. This ended the UPA attacks as well as the German countermeasures. In exchange for diversionary activities in the rear of the Soviet front, Germans began providing the Ukrainian underground with supplies, arms, and training materials
  5. 1 2 Timothy Snyder. The reconstruction of nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. Yale University Press. 2003. pp. 175–178.
  6. 1 2 Motyka, Grzegorz (2016). "Czy zbrodnia wołyńsko-galicyjska 1943–1945 była ludobójstwem". Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki / Deutsch-Polnisches Jahrbuch (in Polish). 2 (24): 45–71. doi: 10.35757/RPN.2016.24.15 . ISSN   1230-4360.
  7. Aleksander V. Prusin. Ethnic Cleansing: Poles from Western Ukraine. In: Matthew J. Gibney, Randall Hansen. Immigration and asylum: from 1900 to the present. Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO. 2005. pp. 204–205.
  8. Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe. "The Ukrainian National Revolution" of 1941. Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. Vol. 12/No. 1 (Winter 2011). p. 83.
  9. "Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian anti-hero glorified following the Russian invasion". Le Monde . 12 January 2023.
  10. 1 2 3 4 Петро Мірчук, Українська Повстанська Армія. 1942–1952. Мюнхен, 1953. – 233–234 ст.
  11. "БОРОТЬБА УКРАЇНСЬКОГО НАРОДУ НА СХІДНОУКРАЇНСЬКИХ ЗЕМЛЯХ 1941-1944 (Спомини очевидця і учасника)". Bandera.lviv.ua :: Бібліотека націоналіста. 9 September 2011. Archived from the original on 6 February 2023.
  12. Snyder, Timothy (2012). Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. Basic Books.
  13. 1 2 3 4 "Former WWII nationalist guerrillas granted veteran status in Ukraine". Kyiv Post . 26 March 2019. Archived from the original on 17 August 2022.
  14. 1 2 Zhukov 2007, pp. 442–443.
  15. Motyka 2006, p. 138-139.
  16. Motyka 2006, p. 139.
  17. Motyka 2006, pp. 139–140.
  18. 1 2 3 Motyka 2006, p. 140.
  19. 1 2 3 Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 169
  20. Zhukov 2007, p. 443.
  21. Zhukov 2007, p. 444.
  22. 1 2 Magoscy, R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
  23. Sodol, Petro (1994). Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1943–1949. New York. p. 28.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  24. Armstrong, John (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 156.
  25. Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe; Bastiaan Willems (24 February 2022). "Putin's Abuse of History: Ukrainian 'Nazis', 'Genocide' and a Fake Threat Scenario". L.I.S.A. Science Portal Gerda Henkel Foundation. Archived from the original on 1 October 2022. Retrieved 9 December 2022.
  26. Taubman 2004, p. 193.
  27. Ivan Katchanovski (2004). "The Politics of World War II in Contemporary Ukraine". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. p. 214.
  28. Символіка Українських Націоналістів [The symbolism of Ukrainian Nationalists] (in Ukrainian). Virtual museum of Ukrainian phaleristics. 22 June 2010. Archived from the original on 8 December 2013.
  29. "Avramenko, O.M., Shabelnykova, L.P. Chapter 12. Riflemen songs. Ukrainian literature. Sixth grade. (textbook)" (in Russian). School.xvatit.com. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  30. 1 2 Carlyl, Christian (9 May 2014). "In a Divided Ukraine, Even Victory Over Hitler Isn't What It Used to Be". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 12 May 2014.
  31. ""Свободовцы" послали Лукьянченко красно-черный флаг – Донбасс.comments.ua". Donetsk.comments.ua. Archived from the original on 13 April 2016. Retrieved 4 August 2014.
  32. Major Petro R. Sodol, USA (ret.). UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin. New York 1987. p. 34
  33. Major Petro R. Sodol, USA (ret.). UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin. New York 1987. p. 36
  34. 1 2 3 Motyka, p. 148
  35. However it is not true that UPA had a Soviet T-35 tank.
  36. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN   5-325-00599-5 p. 585
  37. (in Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія – Історія нескорених – Львів, 2007 p. 203
  38. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1 p. 69
  39. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2, p. 92
  40. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946 (PDF). Vol. 39. Nuremberg: The International Military Tribunal. 1949. pp. 269–270. Retrieved 31 March 2016.
  41. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2, pp. 95–97.
  42. Shevchuk, Dmytro (20 January 2006). Бандерівці ідуть! [The Banderists are coming!] (in Ukrainian). ukrnationalism.org.ua. Archived from the original on 30 January 2009.
  43. 1 2 Розділ 4 – 'Двофронтова' боротьба УПА (1943 – перша половина 1944 рр.) [Chapter 4 – The 'two front' combat of the UPA (1943 – first half of 1944)](PDF) (in Ukrainian). history.org.ua. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2008.
  44. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Розділ 4. – 4. Протинімецький фронт ОУН і УПА [Chapter 4. – 4. Anti-German front of the OUN and UPA](PDF) (in Ukrainian). history.org.ua. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2008.
  45. 3. Стратегія 'двофронтової' боротьби ОУН і УПА [3. Strategy for the 'two front' combat of the OUN and UPA](PDF) (in Ukrainian). history.org.ua. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2008.
  46. Debriefing of General Kostring Department of the Army, 3 November 1948, MSC – 035, cited in Sodol, Petro R., 1987, UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin, New York: Committee for the World Convention and Reunion of Soldiers in the UIA, p. 58.
  47. Toynbee, T.R.V. (1954). Survey of International Affairs: Hitler's Europe 1939–1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[ page needed ]
  48. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army LCCN   72-80823 pp. 58–59
  49. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol. 2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN   5-325-00599-5 pp, 384, 391
  50. James K. Anderson, Unknown Soldiers of an Unknown Army, Army Magazine, May 1968, p. 63
  51. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army LCCN   72-80823 pp. 238–239
  52. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army LCCN   72-80823 pp. 242–243
  53. Mukovsky, Ivan; Lysenko, Oleksander (2002). Українська повстанська армія та збройні формування ОУН у другій світовій війни [Ukrainian Insurgent Army and armed formations of the OUN in World War II]. Military History (in Ukrainian) (5–6). Archived from the original on 3 April 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2016. (Translation) ... 35 clashes took place in July, 24 in August, 15 in September; the insurgents lost 1,237 soldiers and officers, enemy losses amounted to 3000 people.
  54. L. Shankovskyy (1953). History of Ukrainian Army (Історія українського війська). Winnipeg. p. 32.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  55. Yaroslav Hrytsak, "History of Ukraine 1772–1999"
  56. 1 2 Burds, Jeffrey. "Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948" (PDF). history.neu.edu. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 January 2007.
  57. Martovych O. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Munchen, 1950 p. 20
  58. Розділ 6 – 2. Самостійницький рух у 1944 р. [Chapter 6 – 2. Independence Movement in 1944](PDF) (in Ukrainian). history.org.ua. p. 338. Archived from the original (PDF) on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2016.
  59. 1 2 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, pp. 174–180
  60. Martin, Terry (December 1998). "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing" (PDF). The Journal of Modern History. 70 (4). The University of Chicago Press: 820. doi:10.1086/235168. S2CID   32917643. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 June 2023. Retrieved 3 May 2018.
  61. 1 2 3 4 Timothy Snyder. The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. Yale University Press. 2003. pp. 168–170, 176
  62. Viktor Polishchuk "Gorkaya Pravda. Prestuplenya OUN-UPA." (in Russian). Sevdig.sevastopol.ws. Retrieved on 11 July 2011.
  63. Karel Cornelis Berkhoff, "Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule", Harvard University Press, 2004, ISBN   0-674-01313-1 p. 291
  64. "Historical Gallery". 28 August 2003. Archived from the original on 28 August 2003. Retrieved 9 July 2022.
  65. "16" (PDF). Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. pp. 247–295.[ dead link ]
  66. Himka, John-Paul (2010). "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: Unwelcome Elements of an Identity Project". Ab Imperio. 2010 (4): 83–101 [96]. doi:10.1353/imp.2010.0101. S2CID   130590374.
  67. Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraińska Partyzantka 1942–1960, Warszawa 2006, p. 329
  68. 11. Українсько-польське протистояння [11. Ukrainian-Polish confrontation](PDF) (in Ukrainian). Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. p. 24. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 August 2008.
  69. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Burds, Jeffrey (1996). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944–48" (PDF). East European Politics and Societies . 11 (1): 89–130. doi:10.1177/0888325497011001003. ISSN   0888-3254. S2CID   144312569. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 October 2003.
  70. Norman Davies, Europe at War 1939–1945: No Simple Victory Publisher: Pan Books, November 2007, 544 pages, ISBN   978-0-330-35212-3
  71. Snyder, Timothy (1999). ""To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All": The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947". Journal of Cold War Studies. 1 (2): 86–120. doi:10.1162/15203979952559531. S2CID   57564179.
  72. J. P. Himka. Interventions: Challenging the Myths of Twentieth-Century Ukrainian history. University of Alberta. 28 March 2011. p. 4
  73. Massacre, Volhynia. "The Effects of the Volhynian Massacres". Volhynia Massacre. Archived from the original on 29 May 2023. Retrieved 10 March 2018.
  74. Pertti, Ahonen (2008). Peoples on the Move: Population Transfers and Ethnic Cleansing Policies During World War II and Its Aftermath. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 99.
  75. Grzegorz Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji "Wisła", Kraków 2011, p. 447.
  76. "Wołyń 1943 – Rozliczenie" (PDF), Konferencje IPN, 41: 27–30, 2010, archived from the original (PDF) on 22 March 2023
  77. Rudling, Per Anders (1 July 2012). "'They Defended Ukraine': The 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Galizische Nr. 1) Revisited". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 25 (3): 329–368. doi:10.1080/13518046.2012.705633. ISSN   1351-8046. S2CID   144432759. In 1943–44 the OUN(b) and its armed wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) carried out a brutal campaign of mass murder of the Polish, Jewish, and other minorities in Volhynia and Galicia which claimed up to 100,000 lives
  78. Timothy Snyder (24 February 2010). "A Fascist Hero in Democratic Kiev". NYR Daily. The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on 28 May 2023.
  79. A. Rudling. Theory and Practice. Historical representation of the wartime accounts of the activities of OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists–Ukrainian Insurgent Army). East European Jewish Affairs. Vol. 36. No. 2. December 2006. pp. 163–179.
  80. G. Rossolinski-Liebe. Celebrating Fascism and War Criminality in Edmonton. The Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada. Kakanien Revisited. 29 December 2010.
  81. Kataryna Wolczuk, "The Difficulties of Polish-Ukrainian Historical Reconciliation," Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2002.
  82. Radio Poland "Polish MPs adopt resolution calling 1940s massacre genocide" http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/263005,Polish-MPs-adopt-resolution-calling-1940s-massacre-genocide Archived 19 November 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  83. A fascist hero in democratic Kiev. Timothy Snyder. New York Review of Books. 24 February 2010.
  84. 1 2 3 4 Grzegorz Motyka, "W Kregu Lun w Bieszczadach, Rytm, Warsaw, 2009, pp. 12–14, 43
  85. "Ukraine-Poland: history wars rage on". Opendemocracy.net. 26 October 2011. Archived from the original on 8 August 2014. Retrieved 4 August 2014.
  86. Партизанское движение на Украине [The Partisan Movement in Ukraine]. All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (in Russian). Archived from the original on 24 February 2008.
  87. Subtelny, p. 476
  88. Ihor Sundiukov, "The Other Side of the Legend: Nikolai Kuznetsov Revisited", 24 January 2006. Retrieved on 18 December 2007.
  89. 1 2 3 4 Sokolovskaia, Yanina (13 October 2003). Последний Бандеровец: Командир украинских повстанцев Василь Кук прекратил войну с Россией [The last Banderovets: Ukrainian rebel commander Vasyl Kuk stopped the war with Russia] (in Russian). Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Izvestia. Archived from the original on 24 December 2007.
  90. 1 2 Krokhmaluk, Y. (1972). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. p. 242.
  91. Grenkevich, L. (1999). The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944: Critical analysis of. Routledge. p. 134.
  92. Розділ 4 – 5. Боротьба ОУН і УПА на протібільшовицькому фронті [Chapter 4 – 5. Battle of the OUN and UPA on the Anti-Bolshevik Front](PDF) (in Ukrainian). history.org.ua. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2008.
  93. 1 2 Bilas, Ivan (1994). Репресивно-каральна система в Україні (1917–1953)[The Repressive-Punitive System in Ukraine (1917–1953)] (in Ukrainian). Vol. 2. Kyïv: Lybid. pp. 549–570. ISBN   5-325-00599-5.
  94. Zhukov 2007, p. 446.
  95. According to Soviet archives, the NKVD units located in Western Ukraine were: the 9th Rifle division; 16, 20, 21, 25, 17, 18, 19, 23rd brigades; 1 cavalry regiment. Sent to reinforce them: 256, 192nd regiments; 1 battalion three armoured trains (45, 26, 42). The 42nd border guard regiment and another unit (27th) were sent to reinforce them. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN   5-325-00599-5 pp. 478–482
  96. 1 2 Exact statistics of UPA casualties by the Soviets and Soviet casualties by UPA, in specific time periods, according to data compiled by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRR: during February – December 1944 the UPA suffered the following casualties: 57,405 killed; 50,387 captured; 15,990 surrendered. During the period from 1 January 1945 until 1 May 1945 the following casualties were reported: 31,157 killed; 40,760 captured; 23,156 surrendered. The UPA's actions numbered 2,903 in 1944, and from 1 January 1945 until 1 May 1945 – 1,289. During February until December 1944 Soviet losses were: 9,521 "killed and hanged"; 3,494 wounded; 2,131 MIA; amongst them NKVD-NKGB suffered 401 killed and hanged, 227 wounded, 98 MIA and captured. From January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 the NKVD and Soviet Army troops suffered 2,513 killed, 2,489 wounded, 524 MIA and captured. Soviet Authorities personnel suffered 1,225 killed or hanged, 239 wounded, 427 MIA or captured. In addition, 3,919 civilians were killed or hanged, 320 wounded, and 814 MIA or captured. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN   5-325-00599-5 pp. 604–605
  97. 1 2 Subtelny, Orest (2000). Ukraine: A History . University of Toronto Press. ISBN   978-0-8020-8390-6 . Retrieved 20 January 2016.
  98. 4. Протистояння ОУН та УПА і радянської системи у 1945 р. [4. The confrontation of the OUN and UPA and the Soviet system in 1945](PDF) (in Ukrainian). history.org.ua. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2008.
  99. Складна доля української діаспори [The complicated fate of the Ukrainian diaspora]. Ukrainian World Coordinating Council (in Ukrainian). 2005. Archived from the original on 5 March 2007.
  100. Theses include deported (1944–47): families of OUN/UPA members – 15,040 families (37,145) persons; OUN/UPA underground families – 26,332 (77,791 persons) taken from: Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol. 2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN   5-325-00599-5 pp. 545–546
  101. Subtelny, p. 489
  102. Burds, p.97
  103. Taubman 2004, p. 195.
  104. "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (PDF) (in Ukrainian). Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 May 2006. Retrieved 26 May 2013.
  105. "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (PDF) (in Ukrainian). Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2008. Retrieved 26 May 2013.
  106. Going by Soviet claims of killed and arrested members.
  107. 1 2 3 Розділ 7 – 3. Націоналістичне підпілля в 1949–1956 рр. [Chapter 7 – 3. Nationalist Underground During 1949–1956](PDF) (in Ukrainian). history.org.ua. p. 439. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 April 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2016.
  108. 1 2 3 Viatrovych, V.; Hrytskiv, R.; Dereviany, I.; Zabily, R.; Sova, A.; Sodol, P. (2007). Viatrovych, Volodymyr (ed.). Українська Повстанська Армія – Історія нескорених[Ukrainian Insurgent Army – History of the unconquered] (in Ukrainian). Lviv Liberation Movement Research Centre. pp. 307–310.
  109. 1 2 Vladzimirsky, Mykola. "'Воєнна історія' #5–6 за 2002 рік Війна після війни". Warhistory.ukrlife.org. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  110. Zhukov 2016.
  111. Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 15.
  112. Kuzio, Taras (28 July 2002). "Ukrainian government prepares bill on recognition of OUN-UPA". The Ukrainian Weekly . LXX (30). Archived from the original on 30 September 2007.
  113. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN   5-325-00599-5 pp. 460–464, 470–477
  114. "SBU Unveils Documents About Operations Of Soviet Security Ministry's Special Groups In Western Ukraine In 1944–1954". Ukranews.com. 30 November 2007. Archived from the original on 3 December 2007. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  115. John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 205–206
  116. Розділ 6 – 5. Боротьба радянських силових структур проти ОУН і УПА в 1944 р. [Chapter 6 – 5. Combat of the Soviet power structures against the OUN and UPA in 1944](PDF) (in Ukrainian). Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. pp. 385–386. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2008.
  117. Ben McIntyre, A Spy Amongst Friends pp. 134–136
  118. 1 2 Timothy D. Snyder. (2004) The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press: p. 162
  119. Burzlaff, Jan (2020). "Confronting the Communal Grave: a Reassessment of Social Relations During the Holocaust in Eastern Europe". The Historical Journal. 63 (4): 1054–1077. doi:10.1017/S0018246X19000566. S2CID   212957318., citing Spector, Shmuel (1990). The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941–1944. Yad Vashem. p. 256. ISBN   978-965-308-014-0.
  120. Barkan, Elazar (2007). Shared History- Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet Occupied Poland, 1939–1941. Leipziger Universitätsverlag. p. 311.
  121. Himka, John-Paul (1997). "Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during the Second World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors". In Frankel, Jonathan (ed.). Studies in Contemporary Jewry: Volume XIII: The Fate of the European Jews, 1939–1945: Continuity or Contingency?. Oxford University Press. pp. 170–189. ISBN   978-0-19-535325-9. Archived from the original on 24 February 2017. Retrieved 31 March 2016.
  122. 1 2 Timothy Snyder. (2008). "The life and death of Volhynian Jewry, 1921–1945." In Brandon, Lowler (Eds.) The Shoah in Ukraine: history, testimony, memorialization. Indiana: Indiana University Press, p. 101
  123. Friedman, Filip (1980). "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation. In: Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust". New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies: 203.
  124. The World Reacts to the Holocaust edited by David S. Wyman, Charles H. Rosenzveig с. 320
  125. Romerstein, Herbert (2004). "Divide and Conquer: the KGB Disinformation Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews". Ukrainian Quarterly. Iwp.edu. Archived from the original on 5 April 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2016.
  126. Koropecky, Iwan S. (ed.). The Selected Works of Viacheslav Holubnychy. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. p. 123.
  127. John Paul Himka. Falsifying World War II history in Ukraine. Himka notes that Bohdan Kordiuk, an OUN member who had been incarcerated in Auschwitz, described Krenzbach's memoirs as false in the newspaper Suchasna Ukraina (no. 15/194, 20 July 1958), and he wrote, "None of the UPA men known to the author of these lines knows the legendary Stella Krenzbach or have heard of her. The Jews do not know her either. It is unlikely that anyone of the tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees after the war met Stella Krenzbach". Himka also noted that Friedman failed to find evidence of her existence.
  128. Friedman, Filip (1980). "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation. In: Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust". New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies: 203–204.
  129. Moses Fishbein, transcript of a delivered at the 26th Conference on Ukrainian Subjects at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 24–27 June 2009 posted on the website of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine
  130. McBride, Jared (9 November 2017). "Ukraine's Invented a 'Jewish-Ukrainian Nationalist' to Whitewash Its Nazi-era Past". Haaretz . Archived from the original on 26 November 2022. Retrieved 16 July 2018.
  131. 1 2 3 Pancake, John (6 January 2010). "In Ukraine, movement to honor members of WWII underground sets off debate". The Washington Post . Archived from the original on 6 January 2010. Retrieved 7 March 2017.
  132. Nowakowska, Jadwiga (13 July 2003). "Pojednanie na cmentarzu" [Reconciliation in the cemetery] (in Polish). Wprost.pl. Archived from the original on 23 August 2004. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  133. Przewoźnik, A. "w Polsce nie można stawiać pomników UPA" [UPA monuments cannot be erected in Poland] (in Polish). Money.pl. Archived from the original on 11 February 2009. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  134. (in Ukrainian) The Council recognized all the soldiers of the OUN-UPA as combatants, Ukrayinska Pravda (6 December 2018)
  135. Grishenko, Aleksei (12 January 2015). В Харькове восстановят памятник УПА [The monument to the UPA in Kharkov will be restored] (in Russian). sq.com.ua. Archived from the original on 8 June 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2017.
  136. В Крыму открыт монумент жертвам бандеровцев [In Crimea, a monument to the victims of Bandera has opened] (in Russian). Lenta.ru. 14 September 2007. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2017.
  137. 1 2 "Luhansk unveils monument to victims of OUN-UPA". Kyiv Post . 9 May 2010. Archived from the original on 6 June 2011.
  138. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd edition. Englewood, Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990. ISBN   0-87287-755-8 (2nd ed.: New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) pp. 223–224
  139. "Yushchenko pushes for official recognition of OUN-UPA combatants". Zik.com.ua. 11 January 2008. Archived from the original on 24 February 2019. Retrieved 7 March 2017.
  140. "SBU to study archive documents on activity of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists / News / NRCU". Nrcu.gov.ua. Archived from the original on 23 February 2012. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  141. "Articles. Analysis of events in Ukraine. Political and economical Ukraine – ForUm". En.for-ua.com. 15 October 2008. Archived from the original on 6 January 2009. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  142. "Schoolchildren to study in detail about Holodomor and OUN-UPA". UNIAN . 12 June 2009. Archived from the original on 15 June 2009.
  143. "President takes part in celebration of the 67th anniversary of the UPA". Kyiv Post . 14 October 2009. Archived from the original on 16 October 2009.
  144. Historic Pravda. 2013-2-5
  145. Rachkevych, Mark (7 February 2013). "High court upholds decree recognizing UPA partisans as World War II combatants". Kyiv Post. Archived from the original on 8 February 2013. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  146. Poroshenko signed the laws about decomunization. Ukrayinska Pravda. 15 May 2015
  147. "Kyiv's General Vatutin Avenue renamed Roman Shukhevych Avenue". Kyiv Post . 1 June 2017. Archived from the original on 14 June 2023.
  148. "Court leaves avenues named after Bandera, Shukhevych in Kiev". Kyiv Post . 9 December 2019. Archived from the original on 11 February 2021.
  149. "Vinnitsa, a deputy and an activist quarreled because of the banner of the flag" (in Russian). RIA Novosti. 30 March 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2018.
  150. "Poroshenko enacts law granting fighters for Ukraine's independence in 20th century combatant status". UNIAN . 23 December 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023.
  151. 1 2 "Local governments name stadiums after Bandera and Shukhevych, provoking protest from Israel and Poland". The Ukrainian Weekly. 19 March 2021. Archived from the original on 5 April 2023.
  152. "Ukraine Radicals Steer Violence as Nationalist Zeal Grows". Bloomberg News. 11 February 2014. Archived from the original on 9 April 2021.
  153. "UPA: Controversial partisans who inspire Ukraine protesters". New Straits Times. 31 January 2014. Archived from the original on 3 March 2014. Retrieved 16 March 2014.
  154. Українські фільми: Страчені світанки [Ukrainian films: Executed Dawns]. Nashformat.ua. Archived from the original on 16 March 2016. Retrieved 30 March 2016.
  155. Zenon Lavryshyn. Songs of the UPA. Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1996, p. 19
  156. "Синам УПА. Тарас Житинський" [Sinam UPA. Taras Zhytynsky] (in Ukrainian). YouTube. 11 February 2010. Archived from the original on 10 November 2021. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  157. "Не кажучи нікому Пісня про УПА Тартак.avi" [Without telling anyone Song about the UPA Tartak.avi] (in Ukrainian). YouTube. Archived from the original on 27 July 2013. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  158. "До витоку Дністра! Ой у лісі, на полянці.УПА" [To the source of the Dniester! Oh in the woods, on the glade] (in Ukrainian). YouTube. 23 September 2009. Archived from the original on 10 November 2021. Retrieved 15 October 2013.
  159. "Drudkh – Ukrainian Insurgent Army". YouTube. 16 October 2015. Archived from the original on 10 November 2021. Retrieved 8 September 2017.

Books

English

Ukrainian

Polish