Korean nationalism

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Korean nationalism [a] can be viewed in two different contexts. One encompasses various movements throughout history to maintain a Korean cultural identity, history, and ethnicity (or "race"). This ethnic nationalism was mainly forged in opposition to foreign incursion and rule. The second context encompasses how Korean nationalism changed after the partition in 1945, with both North and South Korea espousing their own distinct variations of a national identity. Today, the former tends to predominate. [5]

Contents

Types

Korean ethnic nationalism (Korean : 민족주의; Hanja : 民族主義; MR : minjokchuŭi) or minjok nationalism emphasizes descent as a key part of Korean identity. A number of scholars argue that it exists in both North and South Korea. [6] [7] [8] It is centered on the notion of the minjok (민족; 民族 ), a term that had been coined in Imperial Japan ("minzoku") in the early Meiji period. Minjok has a similar meaning to the German " volk ", officially translated as "nation", "people", and "ethnic group", [9] [4] or "race". [6] [10] [11] [12] A number of scholars have argued that this concept has influenced Korean society and politics, [13] and has influenced Korean reunification sentiment. [14]

Unlike pan-Korean nationalism, state-aligned nationalism (Korean : 국가주의; Hanja : 國家主義; MR : kukkajuŭi), state nationalism , statism is a nation building based on 'state/country' (국가) identity; it appears in South Korea as nationalism emphasizing the "Republic of Korea" identity and in North Korea as nationalism emphasizing the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" identity.[ citation needed ]

History

No. 50, Ruijin No. 2 Road, Huangpu District, Shanghai, the birthplace of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea Birthplace of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.jpg
No. 50, Ruijin No. 2 Road, Huangpu District, Shanghai, the birthplace of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea

Historically, Korean nationalism, or its earliest concept can be found as early as Silla, who expressed its unification as a unification of Samhan. Other examples of this would be Goryeo, whose name signifies that it is a direct descendant of Goguryeo, as they took its exact name as its own. The same goes for Joseon, who took its name from Gojoseon. [15]

Japanese occupation

However, the current concept of Korean nationalism came to be emphasized in order to resist Japanese influence during Japanese Occupation. The central objectives of Korea's nationalist movement were the advancement and protection of Korea's ancient culture and national identity from foreign influence, and the fostering of the independence movement during Japanese rule. [16] In order to obtain political and cultural autonomy, it first had to promote Korea's cultural dependency. For this reason, the nationalist movement demanded the restoration and preservation of Korea's traditional culture. The Donghak (Eastern Learning) peasant movement, also known as the Donghak Peasant Revolution, that began in the 1870s, could be seen as an early form of what would become the Korean nationalist resistance movement against foreign influences. It was succeeded by the Righteous Army movement and later a series of Korean resistance movements that led, in part, to the current status of the two Korean nations.

In the colonial period, the Imperial Japanese's assimilation policy claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of common origin but the former always subordinate. The pure blood theory was used to justify colonialist policies and to replace Korean cultural traditions with Japanese ones in order to supposedly eliminate all distinctions and achieve equality between Koreans and Japanese. [17] As was previously done with the Ainu and Ryukyuans, Japan's extensive policy of cultural genocide included changing Korean names into Japanese, exclusive use of Japanese language, school instruction in the Japanese "ethical system", and Shinto worship. [17] This policy was an attempt of forced assimilation, in which Korean language, culture, and history were suppressed. [18] Around the 1920s, the term "white-clothed people" (백의민족;paegŭiminjok) developed as an ethnonationalist term for Korean people. The term was a reference to the historic Korean practice of wearing white clothing. It also arose in response to unsuccessful Japanese attempts to end the practice. [19] [20]

National resistance movements

Nationalism in late 19th century Korea was a form of resistance movements, but with significant differences between the north and south. Since the intrusion by foreign powers in the late 19th century, Koreans have had to construct their identity in ways that pitted them against foreigners. They have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions over the past century, but all of them have been some form of resistance against foreign influences. During the colonial period, the Korean nationalists carried on the struggle for independence, fighting against Imperial Japan in Korea, China particularly Manchuria and China proper and Far East Russia. They formed 'governments in exile', armies, and secret groups to fight the imperial Japanese wherever they are.

Heaven Lake of Baekdu Mountain where Hwanung, Dangun's father, is said to have descended from heaven, constitutes a foundation for the legend of blood purity in Korean Baitou Mountain Tianchi.jpg
Heaven Lake of Baekdu Mountain where Hwanung, Dangun's father, is said to have descended from heaven, constitutes a foundation for the legend of blood purity in Korean

Shin Chae-ho (1880–1936), the founder of the nationalistic historiography of modern Korea and a Korean independence movement activist, published his influential book of reconstructed history Chosŏn sanggosa (The Early History of Joseon) from 1924 to 1922. In it, he proclaimed that Koreans are descendants of Dangun, the legendary ancestor of Korean people, who merged with Buyo of Manchuria to form the Goguryeo people. [21] Dangun nationalism (단군 민족주의;檀君民族主義) is based around this principle. [22] In the March First Movement, the Korean Declaration of Independence marked the date of declaration as Dangun-era  [ ko ], and the identity of the Korean minjok and the subject of independence were set as 'the descendants of Dangun'. [23]

Partition of Korea

Korea was divided at the 38th parallel between north and south by the Allied powers in 1945 as part of the disarmament of Imperial Japan, and the division persists to this day. The split is perpetuated by rival regimes, opposing ideologies, and global politics; it is further deepened by a differing sense of national identity derived from the unique histories, polities, class systems, and gender roles experienced by Koreans on different sides of the border. As a result, Korean nationalism in the late 20th century has been permeated by the split between North and South. Each regime espouses its own distinctive form of nationalism, different from the opposing side's, that nonetheless seeks to encompass the entire Korean Peninsula in its scope. Despite the split between North and South Korea, neither side disputed the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation based on a firm conviction that they are purest descendant of a legendary progenitor and half-god figure called Dangun who founded Gojoseon in 2333 BCE based on the description of the Tongguk t'onggam (1485). [17] A holiday marking the mythological formation of the "Korean ethnicity", a concept shared and celebrated in both Koreas (as can be seen with the presence of the Mausoleum of Tangun in North Korea), in 2333 BC can be seen commemorated with a national holiday (National Foundation Day) in South Korea each October.[ citation needed ]

Korean reunification

With regard to Korean nationalism, the reunification of the two Koreas is a highly related issue. Ethnic nationalism that is prevalent in Korean society is likely to play a significant role in the unification process, if it does occur. As Gi-Wook Shin claims, "Ethnic consciousness would not only legitimize the drive for unification but it could also be a common ground, especially in the early stages of the unification process, that is needed to facilitate a smooth integration of the two systems." [24]

Korean reunification refers to the hypothetical future reunification of North and South Korea under a single government. South Korea had adopted a sunshine policy towards the North that was based on the hope that one day, the two countries would be re-united in the 1990s. The process towards this was started by the historic June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future. However, there are a number of hurdles in this process due to the large political and economic differences between the two countries and other state actors such as China, Russia, and the United States. Short-term problems such as a large number of refugees that would migrate from the North into the South and initial economic and political instability would need to be overcome.

From 1945 until 1950, minjok nationalism was a factor in Korean reunification sentiment, especially among political centrists. This has been dubbed "centrist [minjok] nationalism" (중도파 민족주의). For example, centre-right Kim Kyu-sik formed the National Independence Federation (centered around the minjok) and opposed the construction of a South Korean independent government promoted by Syngman Rhee; centre-left Lyuh Woon-hyung also opposed far-left proletarian internationalism and argued that "Korean minjok'" interests were more important. Centrist nationalists tried to prevent the division of the Korean Peninsula through the Left-Right Coalition Movement. [25] In 2024, North Korea officially abandoned peaceful reunification as a goal. [26]

Modern-day nationalism

North Korea

The flag of North Korea. This flag was incorporated as the new flag of North Korea after 1948. Its design was created and given to North Korea by the Soviet Union. It is used as a symbol of its state nationalism. Flag of North Korea.svg
The flag of North Korea. This flag was incorporated as the new flag of North Korea after 1948. Its design was created and given to North Korea by the Soviet Union. It is used as a symbol of its state nationalism.

In North Korea, ethnic nationalism was incorporated as part of the state-sponsored ideology of Juche .[ citation needed ] Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers argues in his 2010 book The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters that the North Korean ideology of a purest race arose from 20th century Japanese fascism. Japanese collaborators are said to have introduced the notion of racial unity in an effort to assert that Japanese and Koreans came from the same racial stock. After Japan relinquished control of Korea, Myers argues, the theory was subsequently adjusted to promote the idea of a pure Korean ethnicity. [27] Myers said in 2011 that North Koreans generally believe that their (North Korean) state and the "Korean ethnicity" (English: 민족, minjok) are analogous due to the work of propaganda.

Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing. In this respect North Korea enjoys an important advantage over its rival, for in the Republic of Korea ethnonationalism militates against support for a state that is perceived as having betrayed the race.

— Brian Reynolds Myers, North Korea's state-loyalty advantage (2011) [28]

Seoul-based Daily NK reported that since 2024, after North Korea abandoned its policy of peaceful reunification, the country was moving towards "de-ethnification", de-emphasizing ethnic ties with South Korea. [29] It reported that the Institute of Enemy State Studies determined the "disinterest in reunification is rapidly spreading among South Korean youth and the very concept of ethnic unity is collapsing" and started emphasizing "cultural and genetic differences" between North Koreans and South Koreans, while Kim Jong Un said South Korean youth was "foreign youth who are no longer the same people as us and who can never be on our side". Daily NK also reported some researchers developed an approach of describing young South Koreans as "biologically foreigners who mimic the Korean language but have completely different identities". [30]

South Korea

The flag of South Korea; The flag of Korea is seen by South Koreans as a representation of the Korean identity and historical legitimacy. Flag of South Korea.svg
The flag of South Korea; The flag of Korea is seen by South Koreans as a representation of the Korean identity and historical legitimacy.

South Korea is a highly homogenous society, but has in recent decades become home to a number of foreign residents (4.9%), whereas North Korea has not experienced this trend. A number of its foreign residents are ethnic Koreans ("Overseas Koreans") with foreign citizenship. Many residents from China, post-Soviet states, the United States and Japan are who may meet criteria for expedited acquisition of South Korean citizenship. [31] [32] In recent decades, discussions have continued to be held both abroad and in Korea on the topics of race and multi-culturalism. [33] [32]

According to Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers, a professor at Dongseo University, South Koreans tend to see the "Korean ethnicity" and their (South Korean) state differently. He says:

Anglophones tend to use the words nation and state more or less interchangeably, but when one nation is divided into two states, it's important to stick to the [South] Koreans' own practice of distinguishing clearly between nationalism (minjokjuŭi) and patriotism / state spirit (aeguksim, kukka chŏngsin, kukkajuŭi, etc). Historians do this even in English when discussing the Weimar Republic, where nationalism undermined support for the state — and for liberal democracy — just as it does in South Korea today.

— Brian Reynolds Myers, "On Experts and Exegetes" (September 6, 2017), Sthele Press [34]

According to Myers, the South Korean flag is often seen by South Koreans as representing the "Korean ethnicity" rather than merely South Korea itself. [35] [36] The prioritization of ethno nationalism was also reflected in the pre-2011 South Korean military oath and pre-2007 pledge of allegiance, both of which pledged allegiance to the "Korean minjok". [37] [6] [7]

One South Korean scholar argued that ethnic nationalism served as a useful tool for the South Korean government to make its people obedient and easy to govern when the country was embroiled in ideological turmoil, especially during the presidencies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, when nationalism was incorporated into anti-communism. [38] Today, state nationalism is advocated by some conservative forces, including the New Right Movement, while left-leaning forces are more inclined to anti-imperialistic ethnic nationalism. [39] [40] [41] Examples of ethno nationalism can be seen in Korean history, such as the anti-Japanese resistance independence movement in Japanese colonial era and the anti-American/anti-dictatorship democracy movement in the 1980s. [42] However, an example of state nationalism can also be seen in South Korea, such as Park Chung Hee's authoritarian politics, which was similar to the Japanese Shōwa statism [43]

A BBC poll from 2016 of various countries, asking what the most important factor in self identity was. South Korea has the highest proportion given for "race or culture" at 23%. BBC poll, Most important defining criteria of self-identity, 2016.png
A BBC poll from 2016 of various countries, asking what the most important factor in self identity was. South Korea has the highest proportion given for "race or culture" at 23%.

Emma Campbell from the Australian National University argues that the conceptions of South Korean nationalism are evolving among young people and that a new form is emerging that has globalised cultural characteristics. [44] According to Campbell's study, for which she interviewed 150 South Koreans in their twenties, the desire for reunification is declining. However, these who are in favor of a Korean unification state reasons different from ethnic nationalism. The respondents stated that they only wanted unification if it would not disrupt life in the South or if North Korea achieves economic parity with the South. A small number of respondents further mentioned that they support a "unification on the condition that it did not take place in their lifetime." [44] Campbell argued that her interviews showed that many young South Koreans have no problems to accepting foreigners as part of uri nara. [44] : 492 

The South Korean nationality law is based on jus sanguinis [17] instead of jus solis, which is a territorial principle that takes into account the place of birth when bestowing nationality. In this context, most South Koreans have stronger attachment to South Koreans residing in foreign countries and foreigners of South Korean descent, than to naturalized South Korean citizens and expatriates residing in South Korea. [17] [ needs update ] In 2005, the opposition Grand National Party suggested a revision of the current South Korean nationality law to allow South Korean nationality to be bestowed to people who are born in South Korea regardless of the nationalities of their parents but it was discarded due to unfavorable public opinion against such a measure. [32]

A poll by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 2015 found that only 5.4% of South Koreans in their twenties saw North Koreans as people sharing the same bloodline with them. The poll also found that only 11% of South Koreans associated North Korea with Koreans, with most people associating them with words like military, war or nuclear weapons. It also found that most South Koreans expressed deeper feelings of "closeness" with Americans and Chinese than with North Koreans. [45] According to a December 2017 survey released by the Korea Institute for National Unification, 72.1% of South Koreans in their 20s believe reunification is unnecessary. [46] At the same time, Steven Denney from the University of Toronto said that, "Younger South Koreans feel closer to North Korean migrants than, say, foreign workers, but they will feel closer to a native born child of non-Korean ethnicity than a former resident of North Korea." [47]

Geopolitics

Impact on Inter-Korean relations

Scholar B. R. Myers argued in a 2010 New York Times editorial that there was relatively little public outrage in South Korea over the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan earlier that year, which he attributed partly to a feeling of sympathy towards North Korea among South Koreans, resulting from a closer identification with the Korean race than with the South Korean state. [48] Myers also argued that racialized nationalism in South Korea undermines the South Korean citizenry's patriotism towards South Korea by increasing sympathy towards North Korea, thus threatening the country's national security in the face of North Korean aggression, a sentiment shared by Korea Times columnist Jon Huer.[ needs update ] He stated that South Koreans' racialized nationalism "is no problem when you have a nation state like Japan or Denmark, but is a problem when you have a state divided". [49] Myers has also stated that conversely, North Korea does not suffer from this dilemma as by and large the North Korean people tend to equate the "Korean ethnicity" and the country of North Korea as being one and the same, unlike in South Korea where the "Korean ethnicity" and South Korea are largely seen as different entities. [50] [ needs update ]

Anti-Japanese sentiment

Due to collective memory of the Korean society of cruelty brought upon them in the era of Imperial Japanese rule, anti-Japanese sentiments have resided and still persists in Koreans through public education, although personal level interactions have proven to improve perceptions towards Japanese people. [51] [52] Contemporary Korean nationalism, at least in South Korea, often incorporates anti-Japanese sentiment as a core component of its ideology, [53] even being described by some scholars as constituting an integral part of South Korea's civil religion. [54] [ needs update ]

The legacy of the colonial period of Korean history continues to fuel recriminations and demands for restitution in both Koreas. North and South Korea have both lodged severe protests against visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which is seen as glorifying the Class A war criminals whose remains are held there. South Koreans claim that a number of Korean women who worked near Japanese military bases as comfort women were forced to serve as sex slaves against their will for Japanese soldiers during World War II which had been a persistent thorn in the side of Japan-South Korea relations from the 1990s to the 2010s. Disagreements over demands for reparations and a formal apology still remain unresolved despite the previous agreement and compensation in 1965, South Koreans started peaceful vigils in 1992 held by survivors on a weekly basis. Recent Japanese history textbook controversies have emerged as a result of what some see as an attempt at historical negationism with the aim of whitewashing or ignoring Japan's war crimes during World War II. These issues continue to separate the two countries diplomatically, and provide fuel for nationalism in both Koreas as well as anti-Japanese sentiment.

According to Robert E. Kelly, a professor at Pusan National University, anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea stems not just from Japanese atrocities during the occupation period, but also from the Korean Peninsula's division. [7] As a result, Kelly says, South Koreans take out their anger, whether rising from Korean division or otherwise, against Japan, [7] as due to the racialized nature of Korean nationalism it is considered gauche for South Koreans to be overly hostile towards North Korea. [55] [48] [ needs update ] This view is supported by another professor, Brian Reynolds Myers of Dongseo University. [48] [ verification needed ] Theoretical explanation for the link between Korean division and persistent anti-Japanese sentiment has been offered in scholarship utilizing an ontological security framework. [56]

Liancourt Rocks dispute

The Liancourt Rocks dispute has been ongoing since the end of World War II after the United States rejected Korea's claim to give sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks islands, known as Dokdo or Tokto (독도/獨島, literally "solitary island") in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, to Korea in the 1951. Since 1954, the South Koreans have administered the islands but bickering on both sides involving nationalism and lingering historical acrimony has led to the current impasse. Adding to this problem is political pressure from conservative politicians and nationalist groups in both South Korea and Japan to have more assertive territorial policies.

Due to Korea's colonial past, safeguarding the island has become equivalent to safeguarding the nation-state and its national identity. A territory's value and importance is not limited to its physical dimensions but also the psychological value it holds as a source of sovereignty and identity. [57] Triggered by perceptions and strong feelings of injustice and humiliation, Korean nationalistic sentiment has become involved in the dispute. The island itself has become to symbolize South Korean national identity and pride, making it an issue even more difficult to resolve. [58] South Korea's claim to the island holds emotional content that goes beyond material significance, and giving way on the island issue to Japan would be seen as compromising the sovereignty of the entire peninsula. The dispute has taken on the form of a national grievance rather than a simple territorial dispute.

The South Korean government has also played a role in fanning nationalism in this dispute. President Roh Moo-hyun began a speech on Korea-Japan relations in April 2006 by bluntly stating, "The island is our land" and "for Koreans, the island is a symbol of the complete recovery of sovereignty." [59] The issue of the island is clearly tied to the protection of the nation-state that was once taken away by Japan. President Roh emphasizes this point again by saying:

"Dokdo for us is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust chapter in our history with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea's sovereignty." [59]

Later on in his speech Roh also mentions the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese history textbook controversy, saying that they will be dealt with together. [60] Having placed the Liancourt Rocks issue "in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan" and "the safeguarding of [Korea's] sovereignty", compromise becomes impossible. [61] As the French theorist Ernest Renan said, "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." [62]

Manchuria and Gando disputes

Historical Korean claims of Manchuria can be traced back to the late Joseon dynasty. It was common in late Joseon dynasty to write about old lands of Goguryeo, an expression of nostalgia for the north. In the early 20th century, Korean nationalist historians like Shin Chaeho, advocated a complete unification of Korean peninsula and Manchuria in order to restore the ancient lands of Dangun . [63]

Today, irredentist Korean nationalist historians have claimed that Manchuria (now called Northeast China), in particular Gando (known in China as Jiandao), a region bordering China, North Korea, and Russia, and home to the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture should be part of Korea, based on ancient Gojoseon, Goguryeo and Balhae control of the area. [64] [65] The term Greater Korea, sometimes used in nationalist works, usually encompasses those regions located. [66] [65] The claim for Gando is said to be stronger than the claim for the whole of Manchuria, due to later Balhae presence in Gando after the fall of the Koguryo kingdom, the current area population's consisting of 1/3 ethnic Koreans, [67] and the circumstances of the 1909 Gando Convention that relegated the area to Chinese control. [68] While the Manchurian claims have not received official attention in South Korea, claims for Gando were the subject of a bill introduced in 2004, at a time when China had been claiming that Balhae and Koguryo had been "minority states" within China and the resulting controversy was at its height. [69] The legislation proposed by 59 South Korean lawmakers would have declared the Gando Convention signed under Japanese rule to be "null and void". [70] Later that year, the two countries reached an understanding that their governments would refrain from further involvement in the historical controversy. [71]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 민족주의 (民族主義), which is most commonly used to refer to a Korean nationalist agenda in the Korean language, sometimes translates to "nationalism" [1] [2] [3] [4] and sometimes to "ethnic nationalism". It is also referred to as 국가주의 (國家主義) or 국민주의 (國民主義) when referring to South Korean-based "state nationalism". Also, "ultra-nationalism" is called 극단적 민족주의 (極端的民族主義) or 국수주의 (國粹主義). 내셔널리즘 is Hangul notation for the English word "nationalism".

References

  1. ↑ 인종·언어·영토, 민족 구성 요건 아니다: 에르네스트 르낭 《민족이란 무엇인가》 [Race, language, and territory are not the constituent requirements of the nation: Ernest Renan "What Is a Nation?"]. The Korea Economic Daily (in Korean). Retrieved 15 August 2024. 르낭은 "공동체 삶을 지속하려는 욕구, 각자가 받은 유산을 발전시키고자 하는 의지가 중요하고, 이런 것이 존중될 때 '열린 민족주의'가 된다"고 강조했다.
  2. ↑ '시민민족주의'가 답이다 ['Civic nationalism' is the answer.]. JoongAng Ilbo (in Korean). Retrieved 15 August 2024.
  3. ↑ 민족주의 (民族主義) [Nationalism]. National Institute of Korean Language's: Korean-English Learners' Dictionary (in Korean). Retrieved 15 August 2024. 'nation'과 'nationalism'의 번역어는 국민과 국민주의, 국가와 국가주의, 민족과 민족주의 등 다양할 수 있는데 이 중에서 민족과 민족주의가 지배적 번역어로 채택된 사정은 한국의 식민화 과정과 밀접하게 관련되는 것이었다.[The translations of 'nation' or 'nationalism' can be diverse, including 국가 or 국가주의, 국민 or 국민주의, and 민족 or 민족주의, the situation in which 민족 or 민족주의 were adopted as the dominant translation language was closely related to the colonization process of Korea.]
  4. 1 2 민족주의 (民族主義). National Institute of Korean Language's: Korean-English Learners' Dictionary (in Korean). Retrieved 15 August 2024. nationalism
  5. ↑ Kim, Hee-sun (2007). "Musical Representation of Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea" 민족주의의 음악적 표상: 한국 전통 음악 담론과 연행에서 민족주의[Musical Representation of Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea]. 동양음악(Journal of the Asian Music Research Institute)동양음악[Journal of the Asian Music Research Institute]. 29: 165–194. hdl: 10371/87889 . ISSN   1975-0218.
  6. 1 2 3 Doolan, Yuri W. (June 2012). Being Amerasian in South Korea: Purebloodness, Multiculturalism, and Living Alongside the U.S. Military Empire (Thesis). The Ohio State University. p. 63. hdl:1811/52015.
  7. 1 2 3 4 Kelly, Robert E. (4 June 2015). "Why South Korea is So Obsessed with Japan". Real Clear Defense.
  8. ↑ Marshall, Colin (2017). "How Korea got cool: The continued rise of a country named Hanguk". The Times Literary Supplement. Retrieved 24 June 2019. Breen rates ethnicity, and more specifically "the belief in a unique bloodline", as the first standout characteristic of Korea's special brand of nationalism...
  9. ↑ 민족 (民族). National Institute of Korean Language's: Korean-English Learners' Dictionary (in Korean). Retrieved 14 February 2024. people; ethnic group
  10. ↑ Lee, Jin-seo (2016). North Korean Prison Camps. Radio Free Asia. p. 26. ISBN   9781632180230 . Retrieved 3 March 2016.
  11. ↑ Em, Henry H. (2013). The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea, Part 2. Duke University Press. p. 77. ISBN   978-0822353720. As noted earlier, the word minjok (read as minzoku in Japanese) was a neologism created in Meiji Japan. When Korean (and Chinese and Japanese) nationalists wrote in English in the first half of the twentieth century, the English word they generally utilized for minjok was 'race.'
  12. ↑ Choi, Hee-an (2015). A Postcolonial Self: Korean Immigrant Theology and Church. SUNY Press. p. 24. ISBN   9781438457352. The word minjok (민족,民族) translates as race.
  13. ↑ Gi-wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (2006), pp. 1–3.
  14. ↑ Gi-wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, chapter 10: "Ethnic Identity and National Unification" (pp. 185–203).
  15. ↑ 천자국 체제의 밑그림; 일통 의식(一統 意識). National Institute of Korean History .
  16. ↑ Ryu Tongshik (1999) - While Japanese scholars were pursuing colonialist aims in research on Korea culture, Korean scholars on the other hand began their own research in order to discover in the traditional culture the spiritual basis for the independence movement against Japan.
  17. 1 2 3 4 5 Shin, Gi-Wook (2 August 2006). "Korea's ethnic nationalism is a source of both pride and prejudice". aparc.fsi.stanford.edu. Retrieved 16 January 2024.
  18. ↑ "Korea – Korea under Japanese rule | Britannica". www.britannica.com. Archived from the original on 27 April 2022. Retrieved 27 April 2022.
  19. ↑ Lee, Yeseung (November 2022). "The white-clad people: The white hanbok and Korean nationalism". Cultural Dynamics. 34 (4): 271–296. doi: 10.1177/09213740221117811 . ISSN   0921-3740. S2CID   251363822.
  20. ↑ 박, 성수. 백의민족 (白衣民族) [The White Clothed People]. Encyclopedia of Korean Culture (in Korean). Retrieved 29 September 2023.
  21. ↑ The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today Archived 9 August 2017 at the Wayback Machine , Peter Hays Gries, Institute for US-China Issues, The University of Oklahoma
  22. ↑ Jeong, Young-hun (June 2003). '단군민족주의'의 前史 [Dangun Nationalism in Pre-Modern Period of Korea]. DBpia (8): 145–185. Retrieved 6 October 2024.
  23. ↑ 정, 영훈. 단군민족주의 (檀君民族主義). Encyclopedia of Korean Culture (in Korean). Retrieved 29 September 2023.
  24. ↑ Shin, Gi-Wook (2006). Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. California: Stanford University Press. p. 203. ISBN   0-8047-5407-1.
  25. ↑ 제4부 두 개의 분단정부(5) – 중도파 민족주의세력의 동향(2): 임영태의 '다시 보는 해방 전후사 이야기'(65). Tongil News . 9 August 2021. Retrieved 5 August 2024.
  26. ↑ "North Korea's Kim Jong Un abandons unification goal with South". BBC News . 16 January 2024. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  27. ↑ Cockrell (2010). But in the early 20th century the Japanese annexed Korea and launched a campaign to persuade the peninsula's people that they were of the same pure racial stock as the Japanese themselves, said Myers. Then, when Japan left Korea at the end of WWII, pro-Japanese collaborators Koreanized the notion of a pure blood line, promoting pride in a morally superior Korean race.
  28. ↑ "North Korea's state-loyalty advantage".
  29. ↑ Lee, Sang-yong (21 July 2025). "Pyongyang's new strategy: Exploiting S. Korea's political divisions and weakened NGOs". Daily NK . Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  30. ↑ Lee, Sang-yong (13 August 2025). "N. Korea exploits South Korean youth's disinterest in reunification". Daily NK . Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  31. ↑ Kwon, Jessie Yeung, Jake (15 May 2023). "They left South Korea for the American Dream. Now their children are moving back". CNN. Retrieved 4 December 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  32. 1 2 3 Park, Chung-a (14 August 2006). "Myth of Pure-Blood Nationalism Blocks Multi-Ethnic Society". The Korea Times . Archived from the original on 25 July 2011. Retrieved 25 July 2011.
  33. ↑ Kim, Nadia Y. (2008). Imperial citizens: Koreans and race from Seoul to LA. Stanford University Press. p. 24. ISBN   978-0-8047-5887-1. Koreans' beloved trope of tanil minjok—'the single ethnic nation'— would soon come into its own (see Shin 1998). The centrality of "blood" has been revived in more current times as well.
  34. ↑ Myers, Brian Reynolds (6 September 2017). "On Experts and Exegetes". Sthele Press. Retrieved 26 June 2019.
  35. ↑ O'Carroll, Chad (2014). "BR Myers - Current Issues". YouTube . Retrieved 11 September 2017. [T]he South Korean flag continues to function, at least in South Korea, not as a symbol of the state but as a symbol of the race.
  36. ↑ Marshall, Colin (2017). "How Korea got cool: The continued rise of a country named Hanguk". The Times Literary Supplement. Retrieved 24 June 2019. When people wave the South Korean flag, in other words, they wave the flag not of a country but of a people.
  37. ↑ "New Pledge of Allegiance to Reflect Growing Multiculturalism". The Chosun Ilbo . South Korea. 18 April 2011. Archived from the original on 20 April 2011. Retrieved 20 April 2011. The military has decided to omit the word 'minjok,' which refers to the Korean race, from the oath of enlistment for officers and soldiers, and replace it with 'the citizen.' The measure reflects the growing number of foreigners who gain Korean citizenship and of children from mixed marriages entering military service.
  38. ↑ Kim Sok-soo, professor at Kyungpook National University, cited in Park Chung-a, "Myth of Pure-Blood Nationalism Blocks Multi-Ethnic Society," The Korea Times, 14 August 2006.
  39. ↑ "[Column] Distorting nation". The Hankyoreh . 2 April 2008. The booklet titled An Alternative Textbook of Modern and Contemporary Korean History (Daean Gyogwaseo Hanguk Geun-Hyeondae Sa) demonstrates something about that civil war. The publication adopts in full the historical interpretations of the book "Looking Again at History Around the Time of Liberation" ("Haebang Jeonju Sa-ui Jae Insik"), published two years ago by "New Right" scholars and received with much fanfare by conservative newspapers. The authors of these two publications reject minjok, the Korean people, and believe in gukga, the state.
  40. ↑ Cloudy forecast for Moon's 'Sunshine Policy 2.0' Archived 31 October 2023 at the Wayback Machine East Asia Forum (2017. 07. 20).
  41. ↑ 건국절 논란, 국가주의 vs 민족주의 사이에서. 뉴스워치. 3 August 2018. Retrieved 7 September 2024.
  42. ↑ Sang-hoon Jang (20 January 2020). A Representation of Nationhood in the Museum. Taylor & Francis. ISBN   978-0-429-75396-1. Korean ethnic nationalism which tended to be against authoritarian regimes and foreign powers
  43. ↑ Post-War Korean Conservatism, Japanese Statism, and the Legacy of President Park Chung-hee in South Korea. The Korean Journal of International. Studies 16-1 (April 2018), 57-76.
  44. 1 2 3 Campbell, Emma (22 June 2015). "The end of ethnic nationalism? Changing conceptions of national identity and belonging among young South Koreans". Nations and Nationalism . 21 (3): 483–502. doi:10.1111/nana.12120.
  45. ↑ Cheng, Jonathan (26 January 2015). "In South Korea, Reunification Call Misses the Jackpot". WSJ. Retrieved 31 July 2019.
  46. ↑ "As Olympics open door to reunification, young Koreans are tuning out".
  47. ↑ Diplomat, Clint Work, The. "What Do Younger South Koreans Think of North Korea?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 29 July 2019.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  48. 1 2 3 Myers, Brian Reynolds (27 May 2010). "South Korea's Collective Shrug". The New York Times . New York. Archived from the original on 19 April 2015. Retrieved 19 April 2015.
  49. ↑ "(Yonhap Feature) Brian Myers: Korea's most dangerous writer?". Yonhap News Agency . 10 August 2011. This is no problem when you have a nation state like Japan or Denmark, but is a problem when you have a state divided.
  50. ↑ "Propaganda in the age of Kim Jong Un: A discussion with Professor B.R. Myers". freekorea.us. August 2017.
  51. ↑ Burton, Antoinette; Ballantyne, Tony (31 January 2005). Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History. Duke University Press. p. 374. ISBN   978-0-8223-8645-2.
  52. ↑ Barbari, Jamal (December 2017). "Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Graduates of South Korean Public Schools". SIT | Digital Collections.
  53. ↑ Cha, Victor D. Peaceful Korea (PDF). p. 230. Retrieved 24 June 2019. Because [South] Korean nationalism is anti-Japanism, difficulties in the relationship remain prevalent despite seemingly compelling material forces for less friction ...
  54. ↑ "What North Korea Wants". Reuters War College. SoundCloud. April 2017. The South needs to retire the conventional civic religion here, which is anti-Japanese pan-Korean nationalism ...
  55. ↑ Chotiner, Isaac (3 January 2018). "Sympathy for North Korea: Why South Koreans might just be willing to align with Kim Jong-un". Slate. Retrieved 25 June 2019. Trump's rhetoric has also encouraged sympathy with Pyongyang in South Korea, where people balk at harsh criticism of their ethnic brethren.
  56. ↑ Deacon, Chris (2023). "Perpetual ontological crisis: national division, enduring anxieties and South Korea's discursive relationship with Japan". European Journal of International Relations. 29 (4): 1041–1065. doi: 10.1177/13540661221143925 .
  57. ↑ Wang (2003), page 391.
  58. ↑ Min Gyo Koo. In addition, the symbolic attachment of territory to national identity and pride has made the island dispute all the more intractable and difficult to resolve.
  59. 1 2 Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006)
  60. ↑ Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006) - The government will revisit the entirety of our response with regard to the matter of Dokdo. Together with the distortion of Japanese history textbooks and visits to the Yasukuni shrine, the matter of Dokdo will be dealt with head on. It will be reviewed in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan and historical awareness building, our history of self-reliance and independence, and the safeguarding of our sovereignty.
  61. ↑ Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006) For this is a matter where no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and sacrifices may be.
  62. ↑ Ernest Renan (17 October 2010) [1882]. "The Nationalism Project - Ernest Renan Defining the Nation". - Delivered as a lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882.
  63. ↑ Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919 By Andre Schmid
  64. ↑ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. Since long ago, the more radical Korean nationalist historians have paid much attention to the "Manchurian question", insisting that the vast lands of China's northeast, which once were realms of the Koguryo rulers, should be returned to the "lawful owner" - that is, to the present-day Korean state.
  65. 1 2 Lankov, Andrei (1 July 2007). "China's Korean Autonomous Prefecture and China-Korea Border Politics | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus". apjjf.org. The Asia Pacific Journal. Retrieved 21 January 2017.
  66. ↑ Yun, Peter (28 February 2016). "Guest Editor's Introduction: Manchuria and Korea in East Asian History". International Journal of Korean History. 21 (1): 1–9. doi: 10.22372/ijkh.2016.21.1.1 . ISSN   1598-2041.
  67. ↑ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. It does not help that the claimed territory already has a large Korean presence, with ethnic Koreans constituting about a third of all Kando residents. At this stage it seems that their loyalties overwhelmingly remain with Beijing, but the Korean activity in the area is unnerving for Chinese policy planners.
  68. ↑ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. In 1909, the Japanese, acting "on behalf" of the Koreans, agreed to complete Chinese sovereignty over the area. In recent years it became clear that a large number of Koreans were demanding the revision of the 1909 treaty.
  69. ↑ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. in 2004, the Koreans discovered that both Koguryo and its quasi-successor state of Parhae are presented in the new Chinese-language books as parts of China, as "minority states" that existed within the supposedly single Chinese nation. Statements to this effect even appeared on the Chinese Foreign Ministry website.
  70. ↑ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. In late 2004, when the first round of the "history war" reached its height, a group of 59 South Korean lawmakers even introduced a bill that declared the 1909 Sino-Japanese treaty "null and void" and demanded recognition of Korean territorial rights over Kando.
  71. ↑ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. Finally, in August 2004, the sides reached an agreement: the bureaucracies promised to refrain from waging "history wars", leaving arguments to the historians.

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