ROKS Cheonan sinking

Last updated

ROKS Cheonan sinking
Part of the Korean conflict
ROKS Cheonan salvaged debris.png
Four photos show damage to ROKS Cheonan — clockwise from upper left: (1) a damaged stack; (2) front portion (port side) showing the break point; (3) a large fragment is lifted from the sea; (4) water pressure marks on the hull bottom.
Date26 March 2010
Location
Result

Sinking of ROKS Cheonan by North Korean mini-submarine (alleged by South Korea)

Contents

  • South Korean-led investigation concluded that Cheonan was sunk by North Korean mini-submarine
  • North Korea denies involvement
Belligerents

Flag of South Korea.svg  South Korea

Flag of North Korea.svg  North Korea (presumed)

Commanders and leaders
Flag of the Republic of Korea Navy.svg Choi Won-ilNaval Ensign of North Korea.svg Unknown
Strength
1 Pohang-class corvette 1 Yono-class submarine
Casualties and losses
46 killed
58 wounded
ROKS Cheonan sunk
None
ROKS Cheonan sinking
Date26 March 2010
Time21:22 Korea Standard Time
ParticipantsFlag of the Republic of Korea Navy.svg  Republic of Korea Navy (ROK)
Flag of the Korean People's Navy (1993-2023).svg Korean People's Navy (DPRK)
Property damage1 ROKN corvette sunk, 46 personnel killed, 58 personnel wounded
InquiriesInternational investigation convened by ROK government, Russian Navy investigation
ChargesROK-convened (JIG) investigation concludes that DPRK sank the corvette using a midget submarine-launched torpedo.
Investigation results are disputed.
North Korea denies involvement.

South Korea

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak convened an emergency meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Orders were given to the military to concentrate on rescuing the survivors. In Seoul, police were put on alert. At the time, a spokesman for the South Korean military stated that there was no evidence that North Korea had been involved in the incident. [21] A large group of relatives of the missing sailors protested outside the navy base at Pyeongtaek over the lack of information provided to them. [33]

On 28 March relatives were taken to the site of the sunken vessel. Some relatives stated that survivors had claimed that the Cheonan had been in a poor state of repair. [23] The Korean media have raised the issue of why the sister ship Sokcho, which was operating nearby, did not come to the rescue of the sinking ship but instead fired shots at radar images which were later confirmed to be migratory birds. [88]

On 5 April 2010, President Lee Myung-bak visited Baengnyeong Island. He reiterated that it was risky to speculate over the cause, and the joint military and civilian investigation team would determine the cause. He said, "We have to find the cause in a way that satisfies not only our people but also the international community". [89] The president of South Korea had mourned the victims and said that he will respond "resolutely" to the sinking without yet laying blame for its cause. [90]

On 24 May Lee Myung-bak said the South would "resort to measures of self-defense in case of further military provocation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." He also supported readopting the official description of the North as the "main enemy." [91]

South Korea pursued measures from the United Nations Security Council after the incident, although the language used in the country's statements towards such measures became progressively weaker. In announcements made soon after the sinking, the government said that any draft presented by South Korea would explicitly state that North Korea was responsible for the incident, but by early July, the language had been reduced to only referring to "those responsible," in response to concerns from Russia. [92]

Diplomatic

Since the incident, the South Korean government has been reluctant to engage in further diplomacy with North Korea over disputes such as North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In response to a request by China, in April 2011 South Korea agreed to talks, but South Korean government officials commented that an apology from North Korea for the sinking would probably be necessary to facilitate any significant progress in the dialogues. [93]

Military

On 2 May it was reported that South Korea's naval minister vowed "retaliation" against those responsible. [94] Admiral Kim Sung-chan, at a publicly televised funeral for Cheonan's dead crew members in Pyeongtaek, stated that, "We will not sit back and watch whoever caused this pain for our people. We will hunt them down and make them pay a bigger price." [95]

On 4 May President Lee proposed "extensive reformations" for the South Korean military regarding the sinking incident. [96] After the official report was released South Korea has said that it will take strong countermeasures against the North. [97]

Societal

Writing in The New York Times, Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers stated that there was not much anger or outrage among ordinary South Koreans over the sinking. [98] He stated that due to the inherently ethnic nature of Korean nationalism, there was no major uproar over the incident in South Korean society because of ethnic solidarity with North Koreans that many South Koreans feel, which Myers said overruled patriotism towards South Korea in many cases involving North Korea. [98]

Trade

On 24 May 2010, South Korea announced it would stop nearly all its trade with North Korea as a result of the official report blaming North Korea for the sinking. South Korea also announced it would prohibit North Korean vessels from using its shipping channels. [99] According to the New York Times , the trade embargoes were "the most serious action" South Korea could take short of military action. [100] The United States openly supported South Korea's decision. [101] The embargo is expected to cost the North Korean economy roughly $200 million a year. [102] The decision to cease trade was followed up with the United States and South Korea announcing they would conduct joint naval exercises in response to the sinking. [103]

Psychological warfare

The South Korean military announced that it would resume psychological warfare directed at North Korea. This would include both loudspeaker and FM radio propaganda broadcasts across the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Daily NK, a South Korean based news website, has claimed that a North Korean commander has stated, "If South Korea establishes new psychological warfare services, we will fire against them in order to eliminate them". [104]

South Korea began propaganda broadcasts into North Korea by radio on 25 May. North Korea responded by putting its troops on high alert, and severed most remaining ties and communications with South Korea in response to what it called a "smear campaign" by Seoul. South Korean military propaganda FM broadcasts were resumed at 18:00 (local time) starting with the song "HuH" by K-pop band 4minute. [105] [106]

As part of the propaganda broadcasts, South Korea reinstalled loudspeakers at eleven places along the DMZ. There was originally a plan to also use electronic signs, although due to cost, the plan was reportedly being reconsidered. On 13 June, South Korean media announced that the South Korean Defense Minister, Kim Tae-young, had said that anti-North Korea broadcasts were planned to resume. [107]

Suppressing internal dissent

Discourse over the events leading to the sinking of Cheonan was tightly controlled by the South Korean government in the months after the incident. On 8 May 2010, a former senior presidential secretary who served under Roh Moo-hyun, Park Seon-won, [108] was charged with libel by South Korea's Defense Minister, Kim Tae-young, over comments he made during a 22 April interview on MBC radio asking for greater disclosure from the military and government. Park Seon-won's response to the charge was: "I asked for the disclosure of information for a transparent and impartial investigation into the cause of the Cheonan sinking;" he added that "the libel suit seeks to silence public suspicion over the incident." [109]

South Korea's Minister of Public Administration and Security, Maeng Hyung-kyu, announced on 20 May 2010 that the government was stepping up efforts to prosecute people who spread "groundless rumors" over the internet: "Anyone who makes false reports or articles about the incident could seriously damage national security. We will not let these be the basis of any risks the nation faces." Moreover, he announced the government would step up efforts to prevent "illegal gatherings" regarding the sinking of Cheonan. [110]

A South Korean military oversight board, the Board of Inspection and Audit, has accused senior South Korean naval leaders of lying and hiding information. Said the board, "Military officers deliberately left out or distorted key information in their report to senior officials and the public because they wanted to avoid being held to account for being unprepared." [65]

In 2013, a documentary film named Project Cheonan Ship was released in South Korea about the sinking, including a number of possible alternative causes for the sinking. Members and relatives of the South Korean navy sought a court injunction to block the film's release on the basis that the film distorted the facts. The injunction was denied in court, however, a major cinema chain, Megabox, withdrew the film after warnings from conservative groups that they planned to picket showings the film. [111] [112]

North Korea

North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released an official response to the investigation on 28 May 2010 stating that part of a torpedo doing so much damage to a ship would not survive:

Besides, the assertion that the screw shaft and engine remained undamaged and unchanged in shape is also a laughing shock. Even U.S. and British members of the international investigation team, which had blindly backed the South Korean regime in its 'investigation', were perplexed at the exhibit in a glass box. [113]

On 17 April 2010, it was reported that North Korea officially denied having had anything to do with the sinking. An article from KCNA entitled "Military Commentator Denies Involvement in Ship Sinking" stated that the event was an accident.

... we have so far regarded the accident as a regretful accident that should not happen in the light of the fact that many missing persons and most of rescued members of the crew are fellow countrymen forced to live a tiresome life in the puppet army. [114]

On 21 May 2010, North Korea offered to send their own investigative team to review the evidence compiled by South Korea, [115] and the Hankyoreh quoted Kim Yeon-chul, professor of unification studies at Inje University, commenting on the offer: "It is unprecedented in the history of inter-Korean relations for North Korea to propose sending an investigation team in response to an issue that has been deemed a 'military provocation by North Korea,'"and thus "The Cheonan situation has entered a new phase." [116]

According to the New Zealand based news website, Stuff, North Korea also warned of a wide range of hostile reactions to any move by South Korea to hold it accountable for the sinking.

If the South puppet group comes out with 'response' and 'retaliation', we will respond strongly with ruthless punishment including the total shutdown of North-South ties, abrogation of the North-South agreement on non-aggression and abolition of all North-South cooperation projects. [117]

On 24 May, new reports indicated Kim Jong-il had ordered the armed forces of North Korea to be ready for combat a week before. [118] North Korea released a list of measures that it will take in response to South Korea's sanctions. This would include the cutting of all ties and communications, except for the Kaesong industrial complex. They would revert to a wartime footing in regard to South Korea and disallow any South Korean ships or aircraft to enter the territory of North Korea. [119]

On 27 May, North Korea announced that it would scrap an agreement aimed at preventing accidental naval clashes with South Korea. It also announced that any South Korean vessel found crossing the disputed maritime border would be immediately attacked. [120]

On 28 May, KCNA stated that "it is the United States that is behind the case of Cheonan. The investigation was steered by the U.S. from its very outset." It also accused the United States of manipulating the investigation and named the administration of US President Barack Obama directly of using the case for "escalating instability in the Asia-Pacific region, containing big powers and emerging unchallenged in the region." [121]

On 29 May, North Korea warned the United Nations to be wary of evidence presented in the international investigation, likening the case to the claims of weapons of mass destruction that the United States used to justify its war against Iraq in 2003 and stated that "the U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks it can occupy the Korean Peninsula just as it did Iraq with sheer lies." The North Korea foreign minister warned the United Nations Security Council of risks of being "misused". It also accused the United States of joining South Korea in putting "China into an awkward position and keep hold on Japan and South Korea as its servants." [72]

High ranking North Korean military officials denounced the international investigation and said North Korea does not have the type of submarines that supposedly carried out the attack. They also dismissed claims regarding writings on the torpedo and clarified that "when we put serial numbers on weapons, we engrave them with machines." South Korea's Yonhap News Agency quoted South Korean officials as saying that North Korea has about ten of the Yono-class submarine. [72]

On 2 November, KCNA published a detailed rebuttal of the South Korean joint investigative team report. [122]

The Rodong Sinmun claimed that the "probability of a torpedo attack on (the) Cheonan Warship" was 0%. [123]

International

When the official report on the sinking was released on 20 May there was widespread international condemnation of North Korea's actions. China was one of few exceptions, simply terming the incident "unfortunate" and "urged stability on the peninsula". This was speculated to be China's concern for instability in the Korean Peninsula. [97] Researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, drawing on interviews with Chinese officials and foreign policy experts, later argued that there existed an "inability of the top leadership to reach a consensus on how to react" to the issue, contributing to its comparatively restrained response. [124]

On 14 June 2010, South Korea presented the results of its investigation to United Nations Security Council members. [1] [125] In a subsequent meeting with council members North Korea stated that it had nothing to do with the incident. [126] On 9 July 2010 the United Nations Security Council made a Presidential Statement condemning the attack but without identifying the attacker. [9] [127] China had resisted U.S. calls for a tougher line against North Korea. [128]

Later reports

A member of the North Korean cabinet who defected to the south in 2011 said on 7 December 2012 that the crew of the North Korean submarine which sank Cheonan had been honored by the North Korean military and government. The defector, known by the alias "Ahn Cheol-nam", stated that the captain, co-captain, engineer, and boatswain of the mini-sub which sank Cheonan had been awarded "Hero of the DPRK" in October 2010. [129]

Literature

See also

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Further reading

37°55′45″N124°36′02″E / 37.92917°N 124.60056°E / 37.92917; 124.60056