Iranian nationalism

Iranian nationalism ^[a] is nationalism among the people of Iran and individuals whose national identity is Iranian. Iranian nationalism consists of political and social movements and sentiments prompted by a love for Iranian culture, Iranian languages and history, and a sense of pride in Iran and Iranian people. While national consciousness in Iran can be traced back centuries, nationalism has been a predominant determinant of Iranian attitudes mainly since the 20th century. ^[1]

Modern Iranian nationalism rose during the 1905 Persian Constitutional Revolution, when an atmosphere of unity and Iranian patriotic sentiments began. During the Pahlavi dynasty between 1925 and 1979, Iranian nationalism experienced a resurgence due to the Pahlavi government's bolstering of patriotic sentiment.

History

Origins

Iran's politics are first recorded in the twenties of the third century C.E. as an essential feature of Sasanian propaganda. ^[2]

Third-century Iran was shaken by a conflict between universalism and nationalism that was most clearly manifested in the religious and cultural sphere. The outcome of this conflict is well known: the traditionalistic and nationalistic impulses gained the upper hand, and Manichaean universalism succumbed to the nationalism of the Zoroastrian Magi. Iranian identity, which up to that point had essentially consisted of cultural and religious nature, assumed a definite political value, placing Persia and the Persians at the center of the Sasanian Empire, in other words, at the center of a state based on the twin powers of throne and altar and sustained by an antiquarian and archaizing ideology. This ideology became more and more accentuated during the Sassanian period, reaching its height in the long reign of Khosrow I (531–79 A.D.). Of course, economic and social factors favored the victory of the stronger classes in a society that was based mainly on a rural economy, namely the aristocratic landed and warrior classes and the Magian clergy. ^[2]

Shu'ubiyya

Main article: Shu'ubiyya

Iranian identity came under threat after the fall of the Sasanian Empire and the Muslim conquest of Persia. The term Shu'ubiyya refers to a response by Persian Muslims to the growing Arabization of Islam in the 9th and 10th centuries and discrimination against Iranian people by the occupiers. It was primarily concerned with preserving Persian culture and protecting Persian identity. Some of the famous Iranian Shu'ubi figures are Bashshar ibn Burd, Ismail Nisa'i, Zeyad e Ajam, Hissam ibn Ada, Abulhassan Ali Mada'ini, Abu Hatam Sajestani, Ibrahim ibn Mamshad and Abu Abdullah Muhammad Marzbani. Many consider Ferdowsi a Shu'ubi poet.

Iranian Intermezzo

Main article: Iranian Intermezzo

The term Iranian Intermezzo ^[b] represents a period in Middle Eastern history that saw the rise of various native Iranian Muslim dynasties on the Iranian Plateau. This term is noteworthy since it was an interlude between the decline of Abbasid rule and the eventual emergence of the Seljuk Turks in the 11th century. The Iranian revival consisted of Iranian support based on Iranian territory and most significantly a revived Iranian national spirit and culture in an Islamic form. ^[3]

Iranian-Shia identity under the Safavids

Main article: Safavid conversion of Iran from Sunnism to Shiism

Iran regained its political unity and was given a new distinct religious identity under the Safavids. Shia Islam became the official state religion and henceforth played an important role in the reconstruction of a new ethno-religious identity for the Iranian people. Furthermore, the rise of the Safavid empire coincided with the rise of the neighboring Ottoman Empire in West Asia and North Africa (and most importantly, for centuries Iran's geo-political as well as ideological arch-rival), the Mughal Empire in India, and the Timurid Empire in Central Asia, all adhering to Sunni Islam. The formation of these political entities helped create a distinct Iranian-Shia political identity among these polities. It also helped to expand the hegemony of the Persian language in much of the Muslim world. Persian literature was, apart from Iran and its territories stretching from the North Caucasus to the Persian Gulf, produced from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. ^{[4] [5] [6]}

Qajar Era and the start of modern nationalism

Iran in the 19th century

The state flag of the Imperial State of Iran most prominently used by Iranian expatriates

The modern Iranian national movement began in the late 19th century. Iranian nationalism is in origin a reaction to 19th-century European colonialism in the region, which led to the loss of Qajar possessions in the Caucasus. ^[7] In the course of the 19th century, through the Russo-Persian War (1804–1813) and the Russo-Persian War (1826–1828) and the out-coming Treaty of Gulistan and Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1813 and 1828 respectively, Iran was forced to irrevocably cede swaths of its territory in the North and South Caucasus comprising what is now Georgia, Dagestan, Azerbaijan and Armenia to Imperial Russia. ^[8] These territories had made, for centuries, part of the concept of Iran until their loss. ^[9]

The initial objectives of these nationalists e.g. ending the feudalistic landholding system, governmental sloth and corruption and, the wholesale distribution of Iranian resources to foreigners also greatly appealed to modernizers. ^[1]

One of the principal and most noted forerunners of Iranian nationalism of the Qajar era was Mirza Fatali Akhundov, born in the recently taken territories in the Caucasus to a landowner family originally stemming from Iranian Azerbaijan. ^[10]

Modern nationalism

Mohammad Mossadegh

Modern nationalism in Iran dates back to 1905 when an almost bloodless constitutional revolution created Iran's first parliament. Reza Shah helped shape Iranian nationalism by infusing it with a distinctly secular ideology and diminishing the influence of Islam on Iran. By integrating European legal policies in the place of Islamic courts, Shah reassured the efficiency of the state bureaucracy and promoted a strong sense of Iranian nationalism. ^[11] In 1935, Reza Shah asked foreign delegates and League of Nations to use the term Iran in formal correspondence. In addition, Reza Shah sought to change the names of various towns to honor pre-Islamic Persian kings and mythological heroes and to continue to reduce the power of the mullahs by seeking to modernize Iran. The Pahlavi dynasty thus was set irrevocably down the road towards infusing the country with a form of secular nationalism, a path that would eventually bring it into conflict with the country's clerical class.

Iranian nationalism was a deciding force in the 1951 movement to nationalize Iran's oil wealth.

Mossadegh's goal of nationalizing Iran’s oil came into effect in the year 1951. By allowing Iran to have full power and control over their prime resource, the AIOC and other European programs participated in an international boycott which eventually caused a deter in Iran's economy. ^[12] After Mossadegh's deposition guided by help from the U.S. and Britain, Reza Shah's son and successor Mohammad Reza Pahlavi retained control and used the increased gas prices to expand modernization in Iran. ^[13]

Iranian nationalist discourse often focuses on the pre-Islamic history of Iran. ^[14] In the 20th century, different aspects of this romantic nationalism would be referenced by both the Pahlavi monarchy, which employed titles such as Āryāmehr ('Light of the Aryans'), and by some leaders of the Islamic Republic that followed it. ^[15]

Despite the secular tendencies of the vast majority of Iranian nationalists, there is a grouping called the Religious Nationalists who are Iranian nationalists but also religious Muslims.

Ethnic Discontent

Iran's 2016 parliamentary elections saw the reformists' victory, signalling support for President Hassan Rouhani's moderate government and the nuclear deal. However, the campaign also focused on addressing the demands of Iran's ethnic minorities, who make up 40-50% of the population. The five major ethnic groups—Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmen—have a long history of political struggle for their rights, and many of them are Sunni, in contrast to the country's Shia majority. ^[16]

Ethnic grievances have been a prominent feature in election rhetoric, with candidates using sharper language to mobilize minority communities. While previous leaders, such as President Khatami in 1997, promised civil rights for all Iranians, these promises often remained unfulfilled, widening the gap between minorities' expectations and their realities. ^[16]

This pattern of ethnic politicking has undermined Iran's democracy by creating divisions between ethnic groups and political factions. The country’s ethnic diversity is also seen as a national security threat, with minority groups living near or across borders, especially in the context of Iran's sectarian rivalry with Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia. Despite many of these groups' demands being legally recognized, Iran’s ethnic policies are ultimately shaped by the Supreme National Security Council, not elected officials. ^[16]

If Iran continues to make promises to ethnic groups during elections without follow-through, the long-term damage to ethnic relations and the country's democracy could be severe. Addressing ethnic discontent is essential for maintaining national unity and stability. ^[16]

Alex Shams, colomonist and writer of Ajam Media Collective, explored the complexities of Iranian and Persian identities, addressing the question, "Are you Iranian or Persian, and what’s the difference?" Initially, Shams viewed "Persian" as a politically and socially convenient term for Iranians, often used to dissociate from the Islamic Republic or to evoke exotic appeal. However, a conversation with an Iranian-American of Azeri-Bakhtiari heritage highlighted the ethnic diversity within Iran, revealing that not all Iranians identify as Persian. While Persians, whose mother tongue is Persian (Farsi), make up about half of Iran's population, the rest includes a mosaic of ethnic and linguistic minorities, such as Azeris, Arabs, Kurds, and Balochs, among others. ^[17]

Shams critiques the erasure of this diversity, tracing its roots to Persian nationalism fostered under Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 20th century. Reza Shah centralized power by crafting a Persian-centric national identity, banning non-Persian languages, and co-opting Aryanist ideologies, which linked Persian identity to a pseudo-scientific racial hierarchy. This framework marginalized ethnic minorities and ignored the historical diversity of the Persian Empire, which was unified by imperial structures rather than ethnicity. ^[17]

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 shifted Iranian identity from secular Persian nationalism to Shia religious identity, ^[17] this is why the terms Shia, Persian, and Iranian in Arab Gulf states (where Bahraini Ajams, Kuwaiti Ajams, Qatari, and Emirati Iranian people of Iranian origins live) are often conflated, even by Sunni Achums. ^[18] While it offered greater inclusion for Shia Muslims regardless of ethnicity, it marginalized religious minorities and secular individuals. Ethnic minorities, such as Azeris and Kurds, gained some linguistic freedoms, but Persian ethnocentrism and Aryanist ideologies persisted, particularly in diaspora communities seeking validation from Western perceptions. ^[17]

Shams argues that these exclusivist identities undermine Iran's cultural diversity and hinder the possibility of an inclusive, egalitarian society. Instead, he calls for recognition of Iran's multi-ethnic and multicultural heritage as essential to its national identity. ^[17]

Nationalist parties of Iran

Active parties

• Pan-Iranist Party (founded 1941; banned, operating inside Iran)
• National Front (founded 1949; banned, operating inside Iran)
  • Iran Party (founded 1944; banned, operating inside Iran)
  • Party of the Iranian People (founded 1949; banned, operating inside Iran)
• Nation Party of Iran (founded 1951; banned, operating inside Iran)
• Freedom Movement of Iran (founded 1961; banned, operating inside Iran)
• Marze Por Gohar (founded 1998; banned, exiled)
• Council of Nationalist-Religious Activists of Iran (founded 2000; banned, operating inside Iran)

Historic parties

• Society for the Progress of Iran (1909–1911)
• Revival Party (1920–1927)
• Iran-e-No Party (1927)
• Progress Party (1927–1932)
• Motherland Party (1940–1946)
• Justice Party (1941–1946)
• Azure Party (1942–1953)
• National Will Party (1943–1951)
• Movement of God-Worshipping Socialists (1943–1960)
• Democrat Party of Iran (1946–1984)
• Aria Party (1946–1953)
• Iran Unity Party (1946–1948)
• Society of Muslim Warriors (1948–1955)
• Third Force (1948–1960)
• National Socialist Workers Party of Iran (1952–1953)
• Nationalists’ Party (1957–1963)
• League of Iranian Socialists (1960–1982)
• The Liberation Movement of People of Iran (1964–1988)
• National Democratic Front (1979–1981)
• Iranians' Party (1970–1975)
• Rastakhiz Party (1975–1979)

See also

• Pan-Iranism
• Greater Iran

Notes

1. • Persian: ملی‌گرایی ایرانی
   • Balochi: راج دوستی ایرانی
   • Kurdish: نەتەوە پەروەریی ئێرانی
   • Gilaki and Mazanderani: ایجانایی ایرانی
   • Azerbaijani: ایران میلتچیلی‌یی
   • Turkmen: ایرانؽڭ میلتچیل‌یگی
   • Arabic: القومية الإيرانية
   • Armenian: ايراناكان آزگايناكاتھيون
   • Adyghe: يران ࢦپقپس
2. Such an obviously coined designation was introduced by Vladimir Minorsky, "The Iranian Intermezzo", in Studies in Caucasian history (London, 1953) and has been taken up by Bernard Lewis, among others, in his The Middle East: A brief history of the last 2,000 years (New York, 1995).

References

1. Cottam, Richard W. (1979). Nationalism In Iran: Updated through 1978. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press. ISBN   0-8229-5299-8 . Retrieved 2011-01-31.
2. Gnoli, Gherardo. "IRANIAN IDENTITY ii. PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD". Encyclopædia Iranica. Archived from the original on 2011-11-17. Retrieved 2011-09-11.
3. Lewis, Bernard. The Middle East: 2,000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day. pp. 81–82.
4. Ashraf, Ahmad. "IRANIAN IDENTITY iii. MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC PERIOD". Encyclopedia Iranica. Retrieved 2012-02-08.
5. Matthee, Rudi (2009). "Was Safavid Iran an Empire?". Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 53 (1–2). Brill: 244. doi:10.1163/002249910X12573963244449. S2CID   55237025.
6. Eaton, R. The Persian Cosmopolis. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. Retrieved 3 May. 2023, from https://oxfordre.com/asianhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-402.
7. Patrick Clawson writes:

   "Since the days of the Achaemenids, the Iranians had the protection of geography. But high mountains and vast emptiness of the Iranian plateau were no longer enough to shield Iran from the Russian army or British navy. Both literally, and figuratively, Iran shrank. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Azerbaijan, Armenia, much of Georgia were Iranian, but by the end of the century, all this territory had been lost as a result of European military action. Iran translated her territorial losses into a sense of both victimization and a propensity to interpret European action through the lens of conspiracy. This in turn has helped shape Iranian nationalism into the twenty first century."Clawson, Patrick; Rubin, Michael (2005). Eternal Iran ([Online-Ausg.]. ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.  31–32. ISBN   1-4039-6276-6.

8. Timothy C. Dowling Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond pp 728-729 ABC-CLIO, 2 dec. 2014 ISBN   1598849484
9. Fisher et al. 1991, p. 329.
10. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition (New York: Columbia University Press), 1995, page 27-28:
11. Hunt, Michael (2014). The World Transformed 1945 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 279. ISBN   9780199371020.
12. Hunt, Michael (2014). The World Transformed 1945 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 280–281. ISBN   9780199371020.
13. Hunt, Michael (2014). The World Transformed 1945 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 282.
14. Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (2006). "Reflections on Arab and Iranian Ultra-Nationalism". Monthly Review Magazine. 11/06..
15. Keddie, Nikki R.; Richard, Yann (2006). Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution . Yale University Press. pp.  178f. ISBN   0-300-12105-9..
16. Saleh, Alam (2016-03-01). "Iran's cynical pandering to its ethnic minorities will do it no good". The Conversation. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
17. Shams, Alex (2012-05-18). "A "Persian" Iran?: Challenging the Aryan Myth and Persian Ethnocentrism". Ajam Media Collective. Archived from the original on 2024-09-14. Retrieved 2024-11-29.
18. "إلى إسماعيل أكبري... افتخر بعجميّتك ولا تبالي" [To Ismael Akbari... be proud of your Ajaminess and don't care]. مرآة البحرين (in Arabic). Archived from the original on 2019-09-02. Retrieved 2024-09-10.

Sources

• Fisher, William Bayne; Avery, P.; Hambly, G. R. G; Melville, C. (1991). The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN   0521200954.

Further reading

• Zia-Ebrahimi, Reza (2016). The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation. Columbia University Press. ISBN   978-0231175760.