The Allied Italian campaign after the invasion of Sicily in July of 1943 progressed slowly. The Italian campaign was not given priority in resources in Allied strategical planning as the invasion of France was considered more important. The mountainous terrain of Italy also aided the defenders and reduced the Allied advantage in mechanized units. Allied victory in Italy came with the 1945 spring offensive prompting the Axis surrender at Caserta on 29 April 1945, which came into effect on 2 May. April 25 is celebrated in Italy as liberation day.
Unlike in Germany and Japan, senior Fascists and military leaders did not face a war crimes tribunal before a panel of Allied judges, and many of Italy's war criminals either escaped justice or only served part of their sentences or received pardons; although the Italian resistance summarily executed some prominent figures, including Mussolini on 28 April 1945. In the 1947 treaty of Pariswith the Allies, Italy agreed to pay 360 million dollars in war reparations, formally gave up its empire, and lost some national provinces at the frontier with Yugoslavia; the relatively lenient treatment, with Italy avoiding the harsher conditions imposed on Germany and Japan, owed to the post-1943 co-belligerence with the Allies and other factors. The treaty was signed by the Italian Republic, which had replaced the Italian monarchy after the 1946 Italian institutional referendum.
Albania, which was a client state, was considered a territory to be annexed.
Although Italy was one of the victor nations in World War I, during the inter-war period Mussolini's Fascists felt a sense of grievance towards Britain and France on the issue of territorial gains.[2] Also, the Fascists were irredentists and laid claim to parts of France, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, as well as British-held Malta.[3] This ultimately led Rome to gravitate towards those countries who felt aggrieved with the Treaty of Versailles and sought a new political order in the world, such as Nazi Germany and Japan.[4]
A goal of the Fascist regime was political "hegemony in the Mediterranean–Danubian–Balkan region", more grandiosely Mussolini imagined the conquest "of an empire stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Strait of Hormuz", with the Roman Empire cited as a model.[5] The regime also sought to establish protective patron–client relationships with Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which all lay on the outside edges of its European sphere of influence.[6]
Mussolini also wanted Italy to assert itself in Africa, and began pursuing his imperial agenda with two colonial wars. Firstly, he brutally put down the rebellions in Italy's Libyan colonies, in a long campaign that included the use of poison gas, executions and internment camps, and has been described as the Libyan genocide.[7] Then in 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia, one of the few independent African countries and a soft target, given its army was mostly irregular troops and had few modern weapons. Time was taken to build up overwhelming invasion forces, with the necessary logistical support - in contrast to Italy's unprepared and badly planned entry into World War Two in June 1940.[8] The trump card of large quantities of modern arms won the day for Italy.[9]
During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) Mussolini sent considerable aid, including an expeditionary corps of the Italian air force (the Aviazione Legionaria) and ground forces known as the Corpo Truppe Volontarie (CTV), to support Franco's Nationalists, viewing the conflict as an opportunity to install a dictatorship that might become an Italian client state.[10] Despite an embarrassing defeat at Guadalajara, the CTV evolved into an effective addition to Franco's forces. Successes achieved by Italy's troops and biplanes in the battles of Santander, Ebro, Aragon, Catalonia, and in the final offensive, caused overconfidence in the leadership of the Italian military and air force. Errors of judgment and the cost of the campaign delayed modernization.[11] While the war had highlighted the shortcomings of Italian tanks and showed better co-ordination was needed between infantry and armour, these issues had not been adequately addressed by the time Italy entered World War II.[12]
Drawing closer to Germany
The aftermath of the war in Ethiopia saw an improvement in German-Italian relations following years of a previously strained relationship, resulting in a treaty of mutual interest in October 1936. Mussolini referred to this treaty as the creation of a Berlin-Rome Axis, which Europe would revolve around. The treaty was the result of increasing dependence on German coal following League of Nations sanctions, similar policies between the two countries over the conflict in Spain, and German sympathy towards Italy following European backlash to the Ethiopian War. The aftermath of the treaty saw the increasing ties between Italy and Germany, and Mussolini falling under Adolf Hitler's influence from which "he never escaped".[13][14]
In October 1938, following the Munich Agreement, Italy demanded concessions from France. These included a free port at Djibouti, control of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad, Italian participation in the management of Suez Canal Company, some form of French-Italian condominium over French Tunisia, and the preservation of Italian culture on Corsica with no French assimilation of the people. The French refused the demands, believing the true Italian intention was the territorial acquisition of Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and Djibouti.[15] On 30 November 1938, Foreign MinisterGaleazzo Ciano addressed the Chamber of Deputies on the "natural aspirations of the Italian people" and was met with shouts of "Nice! Corsica! Savoy! Tunisia! Djibouti! Malta!"[16] Later that day, Mussolini addressed the Fascist Grand Council "on the subject of what he called the immediate goals of 'Fascist dynamism'." These were Albania; Tunisia; Corsica; the Ticino, a canton of Switzerland; and all "French territory east of the River Var".[17]
On 4 February 1939, Mussolini addressed the Fascist Grand Council on foreign policy in a closed session, delivering "the familiar lament that Italy was a prisoner in the Mediterranean". He called Corsica, Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus "the bars of this prison", and described Gibraltar and Suez as the prison guards.[18][19] Increasingly, Italian foreign policy was dominated by plans for territorial conquest, putting the country on a road to war with Britain and France.[20]
On 7 April 1939, Italian forces invaded Albania, even though the country was already politically dominated by Italy. While in part, Mussolini wanted to be seen to be keeping pace with Hitler's recent annexations, according to Goeschel, Albania "was above all a clear demonstration of the aggression of Fascism and its core belief that war was necessary to strengthen the Italian nation".[21]
On 22 May 1939, Italy and Germany signed the Pact of Steel joining both countries in a military alliance. The pact was the culmination of German-Italian relations from 1936 and was not defensive in nature.[22] Rather, the pact was designed for a "joint war against France and Britain", although the Italian hierarchy held the understanding that such a war would not take place for several years.[23] However, despite the Italian impression, the pact made no reference to such a period of peace and the Germans proceeded with their plans to invade Poland.[24]
Mussolini's Under-Secretary for War Production, Carlo Favagrossa, had estimated that Italy could not possibly be prepared for major military operations until at least October 1942. This had been made clear during the Italo-German negotiations for the Pact of Steel, whereby it was stipulated that neither signatory was to make war without the other earlier than 1943.[25] Although considered a great power, the Italian industrial sector was relatively weak compared to other European major powers. Italian industry did not equal more than 15% of that of France or of Britain in militarily critical areas such as automobile production: the number of automobiles in Italy before the war was around 374,000, in comparison to around 2,500,000 in Britain and France. The lack of a stronger automotive industry made it difficult for Italy to mechanize its military. Italy still had a predominantly agricultural-based economy, with demographics more akin to a developing country (high illiteracy, poverty and rapid population growth) and a lower proportion of GNP derived from industry than other great powers.[26] In terms of strategic materials, Italy's production of coal and steel was a fraction of that of Great Britain,[27] while many essential raw materials had to be imported. Approximately one quarter of the ships of Italy's merchant fleet were in allied ports at the outbreak of hostilities, and, given no forewarning, were immediately impounded.[28][29]
Economy
The huge assistance Mussolini had provided to Franco's Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War had cost Italy between 6 and 8.5 billion lire, approximately 14 to 20 per cent of the country's annual expenditure.[30] This was on top of the 12.1 billion lire bill for conquering Ethiopia, which meant Italy was now facing the financial burden of another war straight after the huge expense of two recent conflicts.[31]
German coal entering Italy through the Brenner Pass.
In September 1939, Britain declared as contraband coal from Germany which was shipped out of Rotterdam to Italy. The Germans promised to keep up shipments by train, over the Alps, and Britain offered to supply all of Italy's needs in exchange for Italian armaments. The Italians could not agree to the latter terms without shattering their alliance with Germany.[32] On 2 February 1940, however, Mussolini approved a draft contract with the Royal Air Force to provide 400 Caproni aircraft, yet scrapped the deal on 8 February. British intelligence officer Francis Rodd believed that Mussolini was convinced to reverse policy by German pressure in the week of 2–8 February, a view shared by the British ambassador in Rome, Percy Loraine.[33] On 1 March, the British announced that they would block all coal exports from Rotterdam to Italy.[32][33] Italian coal was one of the most discussed issues in diplomatic circles in the spring of 1940. Germany supplied Italy with about one million tons of coal a month beginning in the spring of 1940,[34] which increased Italy's dependence upon the Third Reich, and in turn strengthened Hitler's control over Mussolini.[35]
Military
Fiat CR.42
The Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) was comparatively depleted and weak at the beginning of the war. Italian tanks were of poor quality and radios few in number. The bulk of Italian artillery dated to World War I. The primary fighter of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) was the Fiat CR.42 Falco, a biplane which was technically outclassed by monoplane fighters of other nations.[36] The Italian Royal Navy (Regia Marina) had several modern battleships but no aircraft carriers.[37]
While there are some examples of well-made, high-quality Italian weapons, such as the Beretta Model 38 submachine gun and the 90/53 AA/AT gun, these were exceptions that proved the rule that the bulk of the military's equipment was obsolete and poor.[38] The relatively weak economy, lack of suitable raw materials and consequent inability to produce sufficient quantities of armaments were major reasons behind Fascist Italy's military failures.[39]
L3/33Tankette in Greece. Italy made extensive use of Tankettes in the interwar period, but despite being outdated by the time of World War II, they were still in use with the army.
On paper, Italy had one of the world's largest armies,[40] but the reality was dramatically different. According to the estimates of Bierman and Smith, the Italian regular army could field only about 200,000 troops at the war's beginning.[37] Irrespective of the attempts to modernize, the majority of Italian army personnel were lightly armed infantry lacking sufficient motor transport. Not enough money was budgeted to train the men in the services, such that the bulk of personnel received much of their training at the front, too late to be of use.[41] Air units had not been trained to operate with the naval fleet and the majority of ships had been built for fleet actions, rather than the convoy protection duties in which they were primarily employed during the war.[42] In any event, a critical lack of fuel kept naval activities to a minimum.[43]
Senior leadership was also a problem. Mussolini personally assumed control of all three individual military service ministries with the intention of influencing detailed planning.[44]Comando Supremo (the Italian High Command) consisted of only a small complement of staff that could do little more than inform the individual service commands of Mussolini's intentions, after which it was up to the individual service commands to develop proper plans and execution.[45] The result was that there was no central direction for operations; the three military services tended to work independently, focusing only on their fields, with little inter-service cooperation.[45][46]
A flight of SM.79 Sparviero medium bombers, which were widely used by Italy in World War II.
Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, marked the beginning of World War II. Despite being an Axis power, Italy remained non-belligerent until June 1940. Previous conversations between Rome and Berlin on a war against Britain and France had focussed on 1941 or 1942 as a likely start date.[47] So, by going to war in 1939, Hitler had begun a war before Italy was militarily ready - for instance, as late as January 1940, the Italian small arms industry was estimated by the Italian military to have only 13% of the capacity needed to meet wartime demand.[48]
However, Mussolini, while accepting Italy needed more time to re-arm, was dissatisfied with the country's non-belligerent status and wanted a way into the war - on 2nd September 1939, Count Ciano, the Italian foreign minister and Mussolini's son-in-law, wrote in his diary: "The Duce is convinced of the need to remain neutral, but he is not at all happy. Whenever he can he reverts to the possibility of our action."[49]
As war with Italy began to look inevitable, the British and the French re-enforced their respective Mediterranean fleets and garrisons, thus strengthening the forces that would oppose any future Italian offensives.[50][51]
Decision to declare war
The exact timing of Italy's entry into the war was greatly influenced by political opportunism, coming at a time when Britain and France were in full retreat during the Battle of France. Mussolini wanted a seat at the peace conference table to make territorial gains, and feared if Italy was not among the victor nations negotiating the post-war settlement then Italy would be viewed internationally as a "second order nation".[52] Mussolini told the heads of the armed forces on 29 May 1940, he feared if Italy entered the war after Anglo-French resistance had collapsed, the Germans would take the view that Italy had only joined in "when the job was done", and thus would be reluctant to share the spoils with the Italians. All this persuaded Mussolini he needed to join the conflict, even though the military were not ready for war in 1940.[53]
By early June 1940, with the Allied situation deteriorating in France, Mussolini was looking for a way into the war that did not place too great a strain on Italy's unprepared armed forces; which led to a lack of consistency in planning, with principal objectives and enemies being changed with little regard for the consequences.[54] Mussolini was well aware of the military and material deficiencies but thought the war would be over soon and did not expect to do much fighting.[55]
Mussolini delivering his declaration of war speech, from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia in Rome
On 10 June 1940, as the French government fled to Bordeaux during the German invasion, declaring Paris an open city, Mussolini felt the conflict would soon end and declared war on Britain and France. As he said to the Army's Chief-of-Staff, Marshal Badoglio:
I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man who has fought.[56]
About Mussolini's declaration of war in France, President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States said:
On this tenth day of June 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor.[57]
Despite the 10 June 1940 declaration of war, the main Italian offensive into southern France only began on 21 June, and quickly stalled at the fortified Alpine Line, having encountered stronger-than-expected resistance. On 24 June, France and Italy agreed an armistice. Italian casualties totalled just over 6,000 (a third of whom were troops hospitalised with frostbite), compared to less than 500 casualties for the French. According to the historian, John Keegan, "Italy played an ignominious and Johnny-come-lately part" in the Battle of France.[58]
As a result of the campaign, Italy was left occupying some French territory, and consequently, rather than learning lessons from the poor performance, Mussolini persuaded himself a fine victory had been achieved, even telling his mistress, Clara Petacci, "our soldiers overcame very strong resistance".[59]
The Italian Navy established a submarine base at Bordeaux, BETASOM, and 27 submarines were operating from there in the Atlantic by autumn 1940.[60]
In November 1942, the Italian Royal Army occupied south-eastern Vichy France and Corsica as part of Case Anton. From December 1942, Italian military government of French departments east of the Rhône River was established, and continued until September 1943, when Italy quit the war.[61]
The Italian invasion and British counter-offensive
Within a week of Italy's declaration of war on 10 June 1940, the British 11th Hussars had seized Fort Capuzzo in Libya. In an ambush east of Bardia, the British captured the Italian 10th Army Engineer-in-Chief, General Lastucci. On 28 June Marshal Italo Balbo, the Governor-General of Libya, was killed by friendly fire while his aircraft was landing in Tobruk. Mussolini ordered Balbo's replacement, General Rodolfo Graziani, to launch an attack into Egypt immediately. Graziani complained to Mussolini that his forces were not properly equipped, and that an attack into Egypt could not possibly succeed. Nevertheless, Mussolini ordered him to proceed.[62] On 13 September, elements of the 10th Army retook Fort Capuzzo and crossed the border into Egypt. Lightly opposed, they slowly advanced 50 miles (80 km) to Sidi Barrani, where they stopped and began entrenching themselves in a series of fortified camps.[63]
Italian infantry in action in North Africa.
At this time, the British had only 36,000 troops available (out of about 100,000 under Middle East Command) to defend Egypt, against 236,000 Italian troops.[64] The Italians, however, were divided between the 5th army in the west and the 10th army in the east and thus spread out from the Tunisian border in western Libya to Sidi Barrani in Egypt. At Sidi Barrani, Graziani, unaware how greatly he outnumbered the British,[nb 1] planned to build fortifications and stock them with supplies, establish a water pipeline, and extend the Via Balbia highway to that location, creating a single road to Alexandria.[66] This task was hampered by British Royal Navy attacks on supply ships in the Mediterranean. Mussolini was fiercely disappointed with Graziani's slow progress. The Commander-in-Chief of British Middle East Command General Wavell was hoping to see the Italians overextend themselves before his intended counter attack, and this was now happening.[66]
One officer of Graziani wrote: "We're trying to fight this... as though it were a colonial war... this is a European war... fought with European weapons against a European enemy. We take too little account of this in building our stone forts.... We are not fighting the Ethiopians now."[67] (This was a reference to the Second Italo-Abyssinian War where Italian forces had fought against a poorly equipped opponent.) Balbo had said "Our light tanks, already old and armed only with machine guns, are completely out-classed. The machine guns of the British armoured cars pepper them with bullets which easily pierce their armour."[66]
Italian forces around Sidi Barrani had severe weaknesses in their deployment. Their five main fortifications were placed too far apart to allow mutual support against an attacking force, and the areas between were weakly patrolled. The absence of motorised transport did not allow for rapid reorganisation, if needed. The rocky terrain had prevented an anti-tank ditch from being dug and there were too few mines and 47mm anti-tank guns to repel an armoured advance.[65]
Italian soldiers taken prisoner during Operation Compass
On 8 December 1940, the British launched Operation Compass. Planned as an extended raid, it resulted in a force of British, Indian, and Australian troops cutting off the Italian 10th Army. Pressing the British advantage home, General Richard O'Connor succeeded in reaching El Agheila, deep in Libya (an advance of 800 kilometres or 500 miles) and taking some 130,000 prisoners.[68] The Allies nearly destroyed the 10th Army, and seemed on the point of sweeping the Italians out of Libya altogether. Winston Churchill, however, directed the advance be stopped, initially because of supply problems and because of a new Italian offensive that had gained ground in Albania, and ordered troops dispatched to defend Greece. Weeks later the first troops of the German Afrika Korps started to arrive in North Africa (February 1941), along with six Italian divisions including the motorized Trento and armored Ariete.[69][70]
"The German soldier has impressed the world, the Italian Bersagliere has impressed the German soldier." Quote attributed to Rommel at the Italian War Memorial at El Alamein
German General Erwin Rommel now became the principal Axis field commander in North Africa. Although the bulk of Rommel's troops were Italian, the German panzer divisions played a decisive role during Axis victories in the campaign, thanks to their modern tanks, well-developed tactics and powerful 88mm anti-tank/anti-aircraft guns. From early March 1941, two British Commonwealth infantry divisions and an armoured brigade were sent from North Africa to Greece, which meant troops and tanks that very soon would be urgently needed in Libya were heading to the Balkans. On 24 March, Rommel launched a counter-offensive in Libya and British Commonwealth troops were quickly pushed back into Egypt. However, the failure to capture the Allied enclave at Tobruk left the Axis army's supply lines over-extended and vulnerable, forcing a halt to the advance. After reorganising, the Allies launched Operation Crusader in November 1941 which, after heavy fighting, saw Tobruk relieved and pushed the Axis frontline back once more to El Agheila by the end of the year. However, this left the British now in the precarious position of having over-extended lines of communication.[71]
In January 1942 the Axis struck back again, advancing to Gazala where the front lines stabilised while both sides raced to build up their strength. At the end of May, the German-Italian Panzer Army, launched the Battle of Gazala where the British armoured divisions were soundly defeated. The Axis seemed on the verge of sweeping the British out of Egypt, but at the First Battle of El Alamein, the Allies halted the Axis advance towards Alexandria. The Axis forces made a final attempt to break through during the Battle of Alam el Halfa, but the Eighth Army held firm. After a period of reinforcement and training the Allies assumed the offensive at the Second Battle of Alamein (October/November 1942) where they scored a decisive victory and the remains of the Axis army were forced to engage in a fighting retreat for 2,600km (1,600mi) to the Libyan border with Tunisia.[72]
Italian troops in a cactus field in Tunisia, 1943
After the Operation Torch landings in the Vichy French territories of Morocco and Algeria (November 1942) British, American and French forces advanced east to engage the German-Italian forces in the Tunisia Campaign. By February, the Axis forces in Tunisia were joined by Rommel's forces, after their long withdrawal from El Alamein, which were re-designated the Italian First Army (under Giovanni Messe) when Rommel left to command the Axis forces to the north at the Battle of the Kasserine Pass. Despite the Axis success at Kasserine, the Allies were able to reorganise (with all forces under the unified direction of 18th Army Group commanded by General Sir Harold Alexander) and regain the initiative in April. The Allies completed the defeat of the Axis armies in North Africa in May 1943.[73]
Amedeo Guillet with his Amhara cavalry.Fascist poster calling for revenge against the British takeover of Italian East Africa.
In addition to the well-known campaigns in the western desert during 1940, the Italians initiated operations in July 1940 from their colonies in Italian East Africa into surrounding British territories.[74]
Italian forces (nearly 68,000 Italian soldiers, around 180,000 native colonial troops, plus a further 32,000 irregulars) outnumbered their British opponents. However, with the outbreak of war, Italian East Africa was immediately cut off from Italy and Libya, precluding any re-enforcement. Many of the locally recruited units were poorly organised, short of officers and NCOs and were widely dispersed.[75] The Viceroy of Italian East Africa, and the military commander there, Prince Amedeo, Duke of Aosta, has been described as, "amateurish and unimaginative".[76] Limited infrastructure hampered the movement of forces.[77] Nor were the British Commonwealth the only threat, as the Italians faced a native insurgency in Ethiopia.[78]
Initial Italian attacks in July 1940 pushed north into Sudan and south into Kenya. Some border villages were captured, after which the Italians adopted a defensive posture in preparation for British counterattacks. In August, the Italians advanced into British Somaliland. The heavily outnumbered British garrison was evacuated by sea to Aden, following limited fighting, leaving Italy in full possession of the colony.[79]
The Regia Marina maintained a small squadron in the Italian East Africa area. The "Red Sea Flotilla", consisting of seven destroyers and eight submarines, was based at the port of Massawa in Eritrea. Despite a severe shortage of fuel, the flotilla posed a threat to British convoys traversing the Red Sea. However, Italian attempts to attack British convoys resulted in the loss of four submarines and one destroyer.[80]
Italian M11/39 tanks captured at the Battle of Agordat, Eritrea, 1941.
On 19 January 1941, the British counterattack arrived in the shape of the Indian 4th and Indian 5th Infantry Divisions, which made a thrust from Sudan. A supporting attack was made from Kenya by the South African 1st Division, the 11th African Division, and the 12th African Division. On 16 March, an invasion force of British Indian infantry, sent by sea from Aden, re-took the capital of British Somaliland, Berbera, facing only token resistance. Its port was soon re-opened, creating a new supply line for British forces in East Africa.[81]
Fought from February to March, the outcome of the Battle of Keren determined the fate of Italian East Africa. In early April, after Keren fell, Asmara and Massawa followed. The Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa also fell on 5 April 1941, and one month later Emperor Haile Selassie returned to his capital. The Italian Viceroy, Amedeo, Duke of Aosta, surrendered at the stronghold of Amba Alagi in May. By this point, the campaign was almost over and the British began redeploying some of their forces to other fronts, while the remaining units mopped up the scattered pockets of resistance. The surrender of the Italian force at Gondar on 27 November is generally considered to be the end of the campaign.[82]
When the port of Massawa fell to the British, the remaining destroyers all put to sea where they were all either abandoned, scuttled or sunk.[83]
Italian army machine gun crew in action in the Greco-Italian War, 1940.
On 28 October 1940, Italy started the Greco-Italian War by launching an invasion of the Kingdom of Greece from Albania. Mussolini had long hoped to turn the Balkans into an Italian sphere of influence. However, Italy's entry into World War II presented the opportunity to pursue a more aggressive agenda, and over the summer and early autumn of 1940 various war plans were worked up against Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as moves against Egypt and Vichy France, with Mussolini causing confusion and frustration among the military by flitting between the various schemes.[84]
The decision to attack Greece was driven in part by opportunism, as Rome viewed Greece as a soft target, as they greatly underestimated the strength and professionalism of the Greek military.[85] According to Battistellli, "with one-fifth of the population of Italy and little heavy industry, Greece presented quite a weak opponent".[86] Also, Mussolini was spurred into action after being told by Ribbentrop in September that Germany planned to send troops to Romania, a country that Rome had viewed as part of Italy's sphere of influence. The first German soldiers were deployed in Romania on 8 October 1940. As well as seeing the move as an afront, Mussolini is believed to have concluded that Italy needed to make territorial gains in the Balkans via military occupation before the Germans grabbed everything.[87] Mussolini also wanted a show of Italian strength and independence, as Hitler was working to draw Vichy France closer to the Axis; something the Duce feared would prevent him pursuing territorial claims against the French and their colonies.[88]
However, Italy was going into this invasion with several fundamental disadvantages. During an army re-organisation in 1939, Italian divisions had seen the number of infantry regiments they contained cut from three to two.[89] The loss was to be made up by the attachment to each division (excluding Alpini) of a Blackshirt Legion - roughly the equivalent in size of a regiment - although it would be 1941 before most army divisions in Albania contained a Legion, and Blackshirt units were poorly trained and short of weapons.[90] This meant that the typical Greek division outnumbered its Italian equivalent (if the Blackshirt component was set aside) by approximately 3,000 troops.[91] Also, from 1936 onwards, the Greeks had begun investing more in their armed forces and ammunition factories, which by 1940 had turned Greece into a foe that was stronger than the Italians were assuming.[92]
Greek soldier sitting on a captured Italian L3/35 tankette in 1940.
The initial Italian offensive from Albania into Greece advanced at a sluggish pace through mountainous countryside, hampered by the destruction of bridges, flooding, harassment from Greek artillery and an effective defence from the Greek army divisions on the border.[93] The Italian tanks and tankettes struggled with the terrain and anti-tank obstacles, so armour was not providing the attacker with any significant advantage.[94] In an embarrassing turn of events, the offensive was halted on 7 November, and the Italians switched to the defensive, having achieved limited gains.[95]
Taking advantage of Bulgaria's decision to remain neutral to redeploy troops to the front, the Greek Commander-in-Chief, Lt Gen Alexandros Papagos, was able to establish numerical superiority ,[nb 2] and on 14 November he launched a counter-offensive that drove the Italians back over the border, and quickly turned into a Greek invasion of Albania.[98] Heading into late November, the weather was getting colder but the Italians had not issued winter uniforms, indeed for many soldiers their boots were now falling apart; while the army's communications were "hopelessly inadequate", according to Gooch.[99] The Italians were now in full retreat, and re-enforcements had to be rushed from Italy to Albania in order to stabilise the situation, with 89,000 fresh troops arriving in December 1940, followed by another 90,000 in January 1941.[100]
Italian soldiers at the front in Greece, 1941.
An Italian "Spring Offensive" in March 1941, which tried to salvage the situation prior to German intervention, amounted to little in terms of territorial gains. At this point, combat casualties amounted to over 102,000 for the Italians (with 13,700 dead and 3,900 missing) and fifty thousand sick; the Greek suffered over 90,000 combat casualties (including 14,000 killed and 5,000 missing) and an unknown number of sick.[101] While an embarrassment for the Italians, losses on this scale were devastating for the less numerous Greeks; additionally, the Greek Army had bled a significant amount of materiel. They were short on every area of equipment despite heavy infusion of British aid in February and March, with the army as a whole having only 1 month of artillery ammunition left by the start of April and insufficient arms and equipment to mobilize its reserves.[102]
Australian soldiers in Alexandria, Egypt, embarking for Greece, March 1941.
From November 1940, British bombers (and some fighters) commenced operations from Greek bases, which raised the possibility of future air raids against Romanian oil fields (which were critical to the Nazi war effort), and a small force of British infantry landed on the island of Crete.[103] This resulted in German plans being drafted for an invasion of Greece. In March 1941, a force of British Commonwealth ground troops, W Force - consisting of two infantry divisions (one each from Australia and New Zealand) and a British armoured brigade - began arriving on the Greek mainland, with the first elements reaching Greece on 7 March 1941, six days after Bulgaria joined the Axis.[104] The steady British build up in Greece presented a threat to Germany's rear and fuel supply, prompting Hitler to order a German offensive against Greece and Yugoslavia (where a coup had deposed the German-friendly government).[105]
The Germans attacked Greece on 6 April 1941, smashing through the skeleton garrisons opposing them, while the Italians continued a slow advance in Albania and Epirus, with the Greek mainland falling to the Axis by the end of the month. The Germans completed the conquest of Greece by capturing the last bastion of resistance, the island of Crete, in May 1941, but only after suffering heavy losses.[106]
The Greco-Italian War had been a public embarrassment for Mussolini and the Italian armed forces. Attacking Greece had been intended to raise the prestige of Italy within the Axis, but it had the opposite effect and, along with Italian setbacks in North Africa in late 1940, had left Italy firmly the subordinate in its alliance with Germany. During the Axis occupation, Italy was given by far the most territory to garrison, including most of the countryside. However, occupying Greece turned into a drain on Italy's overstretched military resources, as a major resistance uprising soon began that in some districts saw Italian forces eventually driven out.[107]
Invasion of Yugoslavia
Italian Bersaglieri during the invasion of Yugoslavia.
On 6 April 1941, Germany began its simultaneous invasions of both Yugoslavia and Greece. Although Mussolini had contemplated invading Yugoslavia in 1940, in the 1941 invasion Germany did most of the work of breaking the Yugoslav military, with Italy and Hungary in secondary roles.[108]
While mostly on the defensive in this war, the Yugoslavs did launch small offensives against the Italians in Albania on 7-8 April 1941, but these were short-lived. On 11 April, Italian forces in Albania began to counter-attack, and crossed into Yugoslavia. Further north, the Italian Second Army in northern Italy crossed the border on 11 April and captured Ljubljana in Slovenia. On 3 May, it was renamed 'Lubiana' and annexed, becoming an Italian province, a move which was followed by mass deportations of many ethnic Slovenes to concentration camps. Dubrovnik was captured by Italian forces on 17 April, which was where the Italian forces invading from the north linked up with those advancing from Albania.[109]
Occupation and partition of Yugoslavia 1941
Yugoslavia's armed forces formally surrendered on 18 April 1941 - although in reality, this marked a shift from a conventional war to a complicated, multi-factional guerrilla war that was costly for the Axis. A swathe of the Adriatic coast was annexed by Italy as the Governorate of Dalmatia, with some other regions occupied by Germany and Hungary. A German and Italian puppet state was created, the Independent State of Croatia, under the nominal sovereignty of Prince Aimone, Duke of Aosta, but actually governed by the Croatian leader Ante Pavelić, who according to Goeschel presided over a "regime of terror... persecuting and murdering tens of thousands of Jews and several hundred thousand Serbs".[110]
Across the former-Yugoslavia, nationalist, ideological and religious tensions were turning violent, and according to Gooch, "in every one of Italy's new Balkan fiefdoms the Italian army found itself standing on highly unstable ground".[111] The Italian occupation forces soon found themselves in difficulty, starting with a major uprising in Montenegro in July 1941. Further resistance then followed elsewhere. Like Greece, Yugoslavia was to be a drain on Italy's military as it fought against partisan forces. In Yugoslavia, the Italian military pursued a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, including summary executions, hostage taking, reprisals, burning down villages and deportations to concentration camps; earning General Roatta the nickname, the 'Black Beast of Yugoslavia'.[112]
In 1940, the Italian Royal Navy (Regia Marina) had a large and modern fleet of capital ships, and the Italian peninsula occupied a commanding central position in the Mediterranean Sea. The opposing British Royal Navy had a strong Mediterranean fleet, the advantage of aircraft carriers, and naval bases in highly strategic locations in the theatre of operations. After some early inconclusive engagements, such as the Battle of Calabria, the Italian Navy mostly declined to engage in a confrontation of capital ships. Since the British Royal Navy had as a principal task the supply and protection of convoys supplying Britain's outposts in the Mediterranean, the mere continued existence of the Italian fleet (the so-called "fleet in being" concept) caused problems for Britain, which had to use warships sorely needed elsewhere to protect Mediterranean convoys. On 11 November, Britain used carrier-launched Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers to attack Taranto. The raid left three Italian battleships crippled or destroyed for the loss of two British aircraft shot down, and damaged the reputation of the Italians in the eyes of the Germans.[113]
The heavy cruiser, Bolzano, under air attack at the Battle of Cape Matapan.
One of the largest surface fleet battles fought by the Regia Marina in the war was the Battle of Cape Matapan, where it suffered a major defeat against the British Royal Navy. The British fully utilised Ultra signal intercepts on the movements of the Italian fleet, conducted a successful misinformation campaign on the whereabouts of British ships, and leveraged their strategic edge in having an aircraft carrier in the theatre.[114] A major advantage for the British was the battleship HMS Valiant had a surface-search radar set, a recent innovation which could detect surface ships up to a range of 16 miles, something the Italian ships had no equivalent of.[115] This allowed the British to ambush part of the Italian fleet in the dark.[116] The Italians suffered the loss of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers sunk, plus a battleship and one destroyer damaged. British losses were comparatively light, with one aircraft destroyed and four light cruisers damaged. The defeat drew the attention of Italian naval commanders to deficiencies compared to the British on use of air power, technology and crew training.[117]
The Italian navy found other ways to attack the British. An innovative and successful campaign involved the use of frogmen and manned torpedoes to attack ships in harbour. The 10th Light Flotilla, also known as Decima Flottiglia MAS or Xª MAS, which carried out these attacks, sank or damaged 28 ships from September 1940 to the end of 1942. These included the battleships HMSQueen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant (damaged in the harbour of Alexandria on 18 December 1941), and 111,527 long tons (113,317t) of merchant shipping. The Xª MAS used a particular kind of torpedo, the SLC (Siluro a Lenta Corsa), whose crew was composed of two frogmen, and motorboats packed with explosives, called MTM (Motoscafo da Turismo Modificato). The Allies developed countermeasures, such as guard frogmen and harbour patrol boats.[118]
In 1942, following the attacks on the two British battleships, the Regia Marina went on the offensive against the Royal Navy, achieving some success at the Second Battle of Sirte in March, and Operation Vigorous and Operation Harpoon in June. However, Mussolini's brief period of relative success did not last. The oil supplies brought to Malta in August 1942, at great cost, by Operation Pedestal, kept the highly strategic naval and air bases there operational. Axis forces were ejected from Libya and Tunisia six months after the Battle of El Alamein, while their supply lines were harassed day after day by the growing and overwhelming aerial and naval supremacy of the Allies.[119]
Italian Bersaglieri troops with artillery advancing to the front line, July 1942.
On 10 July 1941, around 62,000 Italian troops of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia, CSIR) left for the Eastern Front to aid in the German invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa). In July 1942, the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) expanded the CSIR to a full army of about 200,000 men named the Italian Army in Russia (Armata Italiana in Russia, or ARMIR), also known as the 8th Army.[120]
From August 1942 to February 1943, the 8th Army took part in the decisive Battle of Stalingrad, where the Red Army isolated German forces by attacking the over-stretched Hungarian, Romanian, and Italian forces protecting the Germans' flanks. The Italians suffered heavy losses (some 84,830 dead or missing) during the battle and subsequent retreat. Around 70,000 Italian soldiers were taken prisoner, and due to harsh conditions in Soviet prison camps just 10,032 lived to return to Italy again in 1946. By the summer of 1943, Rome had withdrawn the remnants of the 8th Army to Italy, with the Italians and Germans exchanging accusations on who was to blame for the defeat.[121]
The Alliance with Germany
Undoubtedly, there were several occasions where the timely arrival of German military assistance helped avert disaster for the Italians, such as the dispatch of the Afrika Korps to Libya in 1941, and the German invasion of Greece, also in 1941. Italy sent a force to fight alongside the Germans on the Eastern Front between July 1941 and March 1943.[122]
Mussolini inspecting Italian soldiers in Russia.
However, the alliance between Italy and Nazi Germany never saw the same level of co-operation, trust and mutual respect that occurred between the USA and Britain in World War Two. James Holland wrote of the "naked contempt with which Nazi Germany regarded its allies".[123] While the alliance between Germany and Italy had started well, with good personal relations between Hitler and Mussolini, by 1939 it was already beginning to sour with the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact without consulting Italy and Germany starting a major European war when Italy was far from militarily ready to fight.[124] Illustrating the level of underlying mistrust, in early 1940 Rome assigned more money to strengthening the Alpine fortifications facing the Third Reich than to those on the border with France, and work on these forts continued until October 1942.[125]
After the Italian invasion of Greece stalled in late 1940, and in the aftermath of the British air attack on the navy base at Taranto, the Italian military attaché in Berlin, General Luigi Efisio Marras, was no longer given the special treatment afforded to the representative of an ally.[126] During a joint visit to troops on the Eastern Front in 1941 by Hitler and Mussolini, a German official was overheard referring to Mussolini as the Gauleiter of Italy.[127] According to Goeschel, some German soldiers viewed the Italian soldiers sent to the Eastern Front as "auxiliary troops".[128]
Discontent on the Home Front
Allied air raid on Rome, 1943
The outbreak of war saw big demands being made of the Italian population, many of whom were poor to start with, and this placed a strain on the economy, society and adversely impacted the popularity of the war. When Allied air raids on Italy began, there were few air raid shelters and according to Behan in the big industrial cities, "people would frequently walk out and sleep in the surrounding countryside".[129] Food was in short supply resulting in rapid price inflation, but wages did not keep pace which spread discontent, as shown by a rise in the number of industrial strikes in early 1943.[130] Many agricultural workers in Sicily struggled to obtain shoes, as the price had risen from around 150 lire a pair before the war to 1,000 lire in 1943.[131] According to Behan, "by early 1943 the anti-fascists had grown in confidence, as they could see more and more people agreeing with them."[132]
The popularity of the war was also hindered by a lack of historic enmity between the Italian people and the main western Allied nations - Britain and the United States. Indeed, Keegan notes that many Italian aristocrats were Anglophiles, while working class Italians held the United States in "high regard".[133]
The shortage of modern weapons
The Carro Armato P40 was developed to close the gap with Allied medium tanks, but only one had been made by the time of the 1943 Armistice.
The High Command were acutely aware of the need to modernize weapons, to close the technology gap with the Allies.[134] Almost 40% of the 1939 government budget was allocated for military spending.[135]
However, when new Italian weapons were delivered they were often immediately outclassed by the latest upgrade in the equivalent Allied weapon. For instance, in 1941, Italian tank units in North Africa began to receive the new M14/41 tank, which weighed 14.0 tonnes, had fuel capacity of 60 gallons and a top road speed was 20.5 mph, just as some British units began receiving the Crusader tank, weighing 19.8 tonnes, with fuel capacity of 200 gallons (plus an auxiliary tank of 30 gallons) and a top road speed of 26.7 mph.[136]
Modern equipment was in the pipeline during the 1940-1943 period. Work began converting two commercial ships into aircraft carriers.[nb 3] Three series of modern fighters[nb 4] were in development, as was a medium tank, the Carro Armato P40 - although aspects of the tank, like its riveted armour, meant it was partially obsolete before it had even entered service. However, much of this modern equipment was either still in development at the time of 1943 Armistice, or was delivered in insufficient numbers to turn the tide for Italy.[138][139]
In March 1943, the Germans agreed to a licence for Italy to manufacture the Panzer IV medium tank, but growing Nazi suspicions about their ally meant the scheme had made no progress by the time of the September Armistice.[140]
British troops scramble over rubble in a devastated street in Catania, Sicily, 5 August 1943.
On 10 July 1943, a combined force of American and British Commonwealth troops invaded Sicily. Although the Axis lost the island after weeks of bitter fighting, they succeeded in ferrying large numbers of German and Italian forces safely off Sicily to the Italian mainland. On 19 July, an Allied air raid on Rome hit railways yards, a steel works and an airport, and caused collateral damage to homes in the vicinity of the targets. With these two events, popular support for the war diminished in Italy.[141]
On 25 July, the Grand Council of Fascismvoted to limit the power of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and handed control of the Italian armed forces over to King Victor Emmanuel III. The next day, Mussolini met with the King, was dismissed as prime minister, and then imprisoned. A new Italian government, led by General Pietro Badoglio and Victor Emmanuel III, took over in Italy. [142]
Although they publicly declared that they would keep fighting alongside the Germans, the new Italian government began secret negotiations with the Allies to come over to the Allied side.[143]
Armistice with the Allies and German invasion
On 3 September, a secret armistice was signed with the Allies at Fairfield Camp in Sicily. The armistice was publicly announced on 8 September. By then, the Allies were on the Italian mainland. On 3 September, British troops crossed the short distance from Sicily to the 'toe' of Italy in Operation Baytown. Two more Allied landings took place on 9 September at Salerno (Operation Avalanche) and at Taranto (Operation Slapstick). The Italian surrender meant that the Allied landings at Taranto took place unopposed, with the troops simply disembarking from warships at the docks rather than assaulting the coastline.[144]
Chronology of the Italian military situation in September-December 1943
Because of the time it took for the new Italian government to negotiate the armistice, the Germans were able to reinforce their presence in Italy and prepare for the defection. In the first weeks of August, they increased the number of divisions in Italy from two to seven and took control of vital infrastructure.[145] Once the signing of the armistice was announced on 8 September, German troops quickly disarmed the Italian forces and took over critical defensive positions in Operation Achse. This included Italian-occupied zones in south eastern France and the Balkans.[146]
Italian soldiers preparing to clash with the Germans at Porta San Paolo in Rome, 10 September 1943
Skirmishing on the outskirts of Rome between elite German Parachute and Panzer Grenadier divisions and the Italian army began on 8 September 1943. King Victor Emmanuel III and his family, with Marshal Badoglio, General Mario Roatta, and others, fled Rome on 9 September, and headed to Allied-controlled Brindisi, which for the next few months became the Kingdom of Italy's seat of government. Italian troops in Rome made a last stand at Porta San Paolo on 10 September, then the city was surrendered.[147]
As part of the terms of the armistice, the Italian fleet was to sail to Malta for internment; as it did so, it came under air attack by German bombers, and on 9 September two German Fritz X guided bombs sank the Italian battleship Roma off the coast of Sardinia.[148] A Supermarina (Italian Naval Command) broadcast led the Italians to initially believe this attack was carried out by the British.[149]
Italian soldiers taken prisoner by the Germans in Corfu, September 1943.
On the Greek island of Cephallonia, General Antonio Gandin, commander of the 12,000-strong Italian Acqui Division, decided to resist the German attempt to forcibly disarm his force. The battle raged from 13 to 22 September, when the Italians capitulated having suffered some 1,300 casualties. Following the surrender, the Germans proceeded to massacre thousands of the Italian prisoners.[150]
Italian troops captured by the Germans were given a choice to keep fighting with the Germans, and the 615,000 who refused were designated Italian military internees and were transported as forced labour to Germany, of whom 30,000 died in captivity.[151] Some Italian troops that evaded German capture in the Balkans joined the Yugoslav (about 40,000 soldiers) and Greek Resistance (about 20,000).[152] The same happened in Albania.[153]
Mussolini rescued by German troops from his prison in Campo Imperatore on 12 September 1943.
After Mussolini had been stripped of power, he was imprisoned at Gran Sasso in the Apennine mountains. On 12 September 1943 he was rescued by the Germans in Operation Eiche ("Oak"). Once in northern Italy, he was installed as the head of a German puppet state, the Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana or RSI).[154]
After the German invasion, deportations of Italian Jews to Nazi death camps began. Fascist Italy had been an anti-Semitic country since 1938, with the introduction of the Italian Racial Laws, although prior to the occupation the persecution had been less severe than in Germany. In October 1943, Nazis raided the Jewish ghetto in Rome. In November 1943, Jews of Genoa and Florence were deported to Auschwitz; the same month saw Italy's Fascists at a congress in Verona declare Italian Jews as foreign enemies.[155]. According to Goeschel: "While the order for the deportations came from Germany, they would not have been possible without the assistance of RSI officials, including the police, and the opportunism of some ordinary Italians who became complicit in the persecution of Jews through denunciations, casting into doubt the powerful post-war stereotype of Italians as incapable of inhumanity and anti-Semitism."[156]
Insurgents celebrating the liberation of Naples after the Four days of Naples (27–30 September 1943)
The Allied armies continued to advance through Italy despite increasing opposition from the Germans. The Allies soon controlled most of southern Italy, and Naples rose against and ejected the occupying German forces. From a domestic Italian perspective, the conflict now began to resemble a civil war between the Fascists who collaborated with the Germans versus pro-Allied Italian forces, including those loyal to the King of Italy, plus resistance fighters in the Nazi-occupied areas.[157]
On 13 October 1943, the Kingdom of Italy formally became a co-belligerent of the Allies by declaring war on Nazi Germany.[158] With Allied assistance some Italian troops in the south were re-organized into what were known as "Co-belligerent" or "Royalist" forces. Autumn 1943 saw the Co-belligerent Army raise its first combat unit, 1 Motorized Grouping, which was made up of troops who had served in two former-Italian Army divisions, the Legnano and the Messina, and avoided capture by the Germans following the Armistice.[159]
1 Motorized Grouping first saw action against Axis forces in December 1943, fighting alongside the US II Corps at the Battle of San Pietro Infine, where it suffered heavy casualties but impressed the Americans enough for the commander of the US Fifth Army, General Clark, to send a message of congratulations to the commanding officer, General Dapino. The Allies consequently provided the equipment and resources to expand the Co-belligerent Army, which over the course of 1944 grew into six 'Combat Groups', each consisting of two infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. They were re-equipped with British uniforms and helmets, and provided with Allied weapons.[160]
Soldiers of the National Republican Army during the Battle of Anzio, 1944.
The army of the RSI was the National Republican Army (Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano, or ENR), which saw action mostly against partisans, and sometimes fought the Allies. Established with those troops who had agreed to continue fighting for the Axis, it was then expanded by recruiting in the camps holding Italian military internees in Germany. This created issues of loyalty, as some internees joined the ENR simply to escape the appalling conditions in the camps. Attached to the ENR were a number of autonomous combat units. The RSI also had a large gendarmerie, which contained many former Blackshirts, called the National Republican Guard (Guardia Nazionale Repubblicano, or GNR), which was responsible for internal security, particularly fighting the partisans. With the RSI unable to cope with the rising tide of partisan attacks, some local Fascist parties began to form armed groups for their own protection, which in June 1944 were given formal recognition and became known as the Black Brigades. Many Black Brigade units were low quality, poorly armed and had a reputation for brutality.[161]
The other major combat force in the civil war was the large Italian resistance movement located in central and northern Italy, which fought a guerrilla war against the German and RSI forces. While the resistance spanned anti-fascists from a wide political spectrum, as well as the apolitical, there was a preponderance of communists and socialists, reflecting the more industrialised and urbanised economy of northern Italy. In May 1944, General Alexander, commander of Allied 15th Army Group, estimated six Axis divisions in northern Italy were tied up fighting partisan groups.[162]
In the summer and autumn of 1944, there were a number of partisan republics established, which briefly operated free of the RSI and the German occupation forces, but all were over-run by Axis forces within weeks or months of establishment. It has been estimated that by spring 1945, around 300,000 people were fighting with the partisan forces.[163]
Allied advance and Liberation of Italy
Allied progress on the Italian mainland was slow and difficult, hindered by mountainous terrain, fast-flowing rivers and the narrowness of the peninsula, which meant the battle favoured the defender.[164] Axis forces were able to retreat from one fortified line to the next, the strongest being the Gustav Line and the Gothic Line, resulting in a difficult campaign for the Allies. Following protracted and heavy fighting at the Battle of Monte Cassino and the Battle of Anzio, the Allies broke through and took Rome on 4 June 1944, two days before the Normandy landings in France.[165]
Mussolini (second from left) deceased, next to Clara Petacci, on display at Piazzale Loreto, Milan, 1945
Despite the sluggish advance for the Allies - in part due to veteran Allied divisions and commanders being withdrawn from Italy to participate in the invasion of France (both for the landings in Normandy and the Côte d'Azur), plus other resources being diverted - the Italian Campaign played an important role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. By the time the Allies reached the Gothic Line, 26 Axis divisions were tied-up fighting in Italy that otherwise could have been committed to other fronts.[166]
The final and total Allied victory over the Axis in Italy was secured by the spring offensive of 1945. On 25 April 1945, the umbrella organisation for the partisan groups in the north, the National Liberation Committee for Northern Italy, declared a general insurrection, with the resistance seizing control of major localities. In this context, several important cities in the north were liberated by resistance fighters before Allied troops arrived, including Genoa, Milan and Turin.[167] This greatly assisted the Allied advance, and 25 April is now a national holiday in Italy. Mussolini was captured and killed on 28 April 1945 by the Italian resistance while attempting to flee. The surrender of German and RSI forces in Italy occurred on 2 May, shortly before Germany finally surrendered ending World War II in Europe on 8 May.[168]
Italy and Japan after the armistice
The Italian destroyer Carabiniere fought with the Allies against the Japanese in 1945.
In response to the surrender of Italy to the Allied forces in September 1943, Japanese troops occupied the Italian concession of Tientsin with no resistance from its garrison.[169]
Alberto Tarchiani, an anti-fascist journalist and activist, was appointed as Ambassador to Washington D.C. by the cabinet of Badoglio, and on his suggestion, Italy issued a formal declaration of war on Japan on 14 July 1945.[170]
In May 1945, the Italian destroyer Carabiniere was refitted with a new radar and camouflage scheme to operate in the Indian and Pacific Ocean against the Japanese Empire, in collaboration with the Allies. By August 1945, the Carabiniere, under Captain Fabio Tani, had undertaken 38 missions of escorting British warships and search and rescue operations.[171]
Casualties
Estimates[172] based on government data suggest the following military losses (killed and missing) for Italy in World War II (1940–45):
Total military dead and missing from 1940 to 1945: 291,376.[173]
The worst year for killed and missing was 1943: 106,994.[175]
However, The National WWII Museum in New Orleans put the figures for Italy at 301,400 military deaths and 155,600 civilian deaths.[176]
Deaths of African soldiers conscripted by Italy were estimated by the Italian military to be 10,000 in the 1940–41 East African Campaign.[177]
Around 1,000 died in the genocide of the Roma people in Italy.[178] Italian Jewish Holocaust victims totalled 8,562 (including Libya).[179]
After the armistice with the Allies, some 615,000 members of the Italian armed forces who refused to side with the occupying Germans were interned in labour camps in the Third Reich, of which around 30,000 died while imprisoned.[180]
Aftermath
The 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy spelled the end of the Italian colonial empire, along with other border revisions. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaties compelled Italy to pay $360,000,000 (US dollars at 1938 prices) in war reparations: $125,000,000 to Yugoslavia, $105,000,000 to Greece, $100,000,000 to the Soviet Union, $25,000,000 to Ethiopia and $5,000,000 to Albania. Italy also agreed to pay £1,765,000 to Greek nationals whose property in Italian territory had been destroyed or seized during the war.[181] In the 1946 Italian constitutional referendum, the Italian monarchy was abolished, in part due to public anger at the King and senior establishment figures for fleeing Rome in September 1943 as German troops converged on the city.[182]
The Kingdom of Italy's Co-belligerent status meant that senior Fascists and military leaders did not face an Allied war crimes tribunal (where the judges came from Allied nations), as occurred in Germany and Japan.[183] A trial of Fascist war criminals in Rome held in an Italian court in 1945 saw General Mario Roatta escape and flee to Spain where he lived in exile, which sparked public outcry.[184] In June 1946, the Italian government announced the Togliatti amnesty, which pardoned or reduced sentences for many war criminals below senior level. The amnesty applied to both Fascists and Partisans, but accusations followed that the wording and implementation of the amnesty meant that imprisoned Fascists benefited more than former-Partisans.[185] In 1950, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani was sentenced to 19 years in prison for collaboration with the Nazis, but only served four months.[186]
Evolution of the historiography
The destruction of the Italian 10th Army by a significantly smaller British force during Operation Compass, which drew inevitable parallels to the World War I Italian defeat at the Battle of Caporetto, left a lasting impression that shaped public attitudes in Britain and its Commonwealth long after the war ended, promoting a popular culture stereotype of an Italian soldier who quickly surrendered.[187] Many histories of the North African campaign written in the immediate decades after the Second World War often focussed on the exploits of Erwin Rommel, and consequently downplayed the Italian role; with some historians relying too heavily on Allied and German primary sources, in part hampered by few Italian sources having been translated into English.[188][189][190]
Italian tanks in North Africa.
While there is no disputing Italy suffered several heavy defeats in World War II, in recent decades it has become more common for historians to present the Italian soldier as someone who was plunged into bad (even hopeless) situations, with obsolete equipment and inadequate logistics; and certainly not as lacking personal courage. During the Tunisian campaign, where Italian units were involved in most encounters, such as the battles of Kasserine Pass, Mareth, Akarit, and Enfidaville, it was observed by General Alexander, "...the Italians fought particularly well, outdoing the Germans in line with them".[191] The historian, Gerhard Weinberg, in his 2011 George C. Marshall Lecture "Military History – Some Myths of World War II" (2011), observed that "there is far too much denigration of the performance of Italy's forces during the conflict."[192]
Assessment
Historians have long debated why in World War II Italy's military and Fascist regime proved ineffective at an activity — war — that was central to their identity. MacGregor Knox explains that this "was first and foremost a failure of Italy's military culture and military institutions."[193] Indeed, other historians, such as Battistelli, have noted that the Italian army's rigid lines of authority hindered initiative taking by middle ranking and junior officers.[194]
However, a large share of the responsibility for Fascist Italy's poor military performance in World War II rests with Mussolini. The Duce plunged Italy into the war for opportunistic reasons in June 1940, despite having been repeatedly warned the armed forces were not ready - Mussolini told General Carlo Rossi in May 1940: "If I had to wait for the army to be ready, I would have to wait years to enter the war, but I have to enter it now. We shall do what we can."[195] General Giuseppe Castellano, who signed the armistice with the Allies in 1943, wrote of Mussolini: "the errors were essentially of a political nature and many times the military were thrust into more dangerous adventures through the incompetence and intemperance of the man who ran the government."[196] Gooch concluded: "Mussolini had little if any comprehension of military strategy and none at all of grand strategy."[197]
Italian partisans celebrate the liberation of Venice in Piazza San Marco.
Historians also attribute Italian military shortcomings to poor equipment and inadequate resources. Italian equipment was generally substandard. Many tanks and aircraft were "a whole generation outdated" by those used by the British in the early war, with Italian weapons then becoming hopelessly obsolete with the arrival of US equipment, such as the M4 Sherman, and as the British upgraded their weapon designs.[198] Crucially, Italian forces lacked suitable quantities of equipment of all kinds,[199] and Italy's relative backwardness in industrialisation hampered ramping up production in wartime, with weapons (according to Keegan) "produced by artisan methods which could not match the output of British - and eventually American - factories working to volume demands".[200] This was compounded by Mussolini's assigning unqualified political favourites to key positions. Mussolini also dramatically overestimated the ability of the Italian military at times, sending them into situations where failure was likely, such as the invasion of Greece.[201]
Donald Detwiler, dealing with the military relations between the two Axis partners, writes that in the pre-war period the Italian and German general staffs did not prepare "any mutual policy" and that "Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940 without the German general staff knowing anything about the Italian intentions", adding that "Italy's entrance into the war showed very early that her military strength was only a hollow shell."[202]
It should though be remembered that while Fascist Italy was defeated in World War II, the Co-belligerent forces and the Resistance Movement were among the victors at the end of the conflict. Indeed the Italian resistance typically draws respect from historians for its contribution to the defeat of the Axis. As the historian Tom Behan wrote: "The historical record shows that the Italian Resistance was an inspiring story, in which a largely inexperienced movement took on vastly superior military and economic forces, often making their ability to rule over large swathes of the country impossible."[203]
↑Graziani believed the British numbered over 200,000.[65]
↑Walker states[96] that the Greeks had assembled 250,000 men against 150,000 Italians; Bauer[97] states that by 12 November, General Papagos had at the front over 100 infantry battalions fighting in terrain to which they were accustomed, compared with less than 50 Italian battalions.
↑This involved the conversion of two passenger liners and the scavenging of parts from other vessels. The SS Roma was to become the Aquila, while the MS Augustus was to be turned into the Sparviero. Neither were ready by the time of the armistice with the Allies in 1943, and both fell into the hands of Germany and the Italian Social Republic but were never completed.[137]
↑Rocca, Gianni (1998). I Disperati: La tragedia dell'Aeronautica Italiana nella seconda guerra mondiale (in Italian). Milan: Mondadori. ISBN88-04-44940-3.
↑O'Reilly, Charles T., Forgotten battles: Italy's war of liberation, 1943–1945. Illustrated ed., Publisher: Lexington Books, Year: 2001, ISBN0-7391-0195-1, p. 14
↑O'Reilly, Charles T., Forgotten battles: Italy's war of liberation, 1943–1945. Illustrated ed., Publisher: Lexington Books, Year: 2001, ISBN0-7391-0195-1, p. 96.
↑Glei, Bruzzone & Caselli. "Effects of war losses on mortality estimates for Italy: a first attempt." Demographic Research Vol.13, Article 15 (2005): pp.363–388.
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