Action at Bir el Gubi (December 1941)

Action at Bir el Gubi (December 1941)
Part of Operation Crusader during the Second World War
Members of the Battalion Group "Giovani Fascisti" operating a Mod. 35 (81 mm) mortar in North Africa.
Date 4–6 December 1941 Location Bir el Gubi, Italian Libya 31°32′15″N24°01′51″E / 31.5374°N 24.0307°E / 31.5374; 24.0307 Result Axis victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom	Italy   Germany
Commanders and leaders
Willoughby Norrie Andrew Anderson	Ferdinando Tanucci (WIA) Ludwig Crüwell Walter Neumann  (DOW)
Strength
11th Indian Infantry Brigade 16 Valentine tanks 1 battery of field guns 1 battery of anti-tank guns 2 troops of Bofors AA guns Artillery support from 7th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery [1]	Battalion Group "Giovani Fascisti" 1,454 men 10 guns 2 tanks and 12 tankettes[ citation needed ] Later reinforced by 49 Panzers [2]
Casualties and losses
300 killed 250 wounded 71 prisoners 10 tanks[ citation needed ]	60 killed 117 wounded 31 missing and prisoners [3] 10 tankettes

The Action at Bir el Gubi (December 1941) was fought in World War II in Libya, between 4 and 6 December 1941, by the Battalion Group "Giovani Fascisti", a unit of the Royal Italian Army, and the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade, part of the British Indian Army. Fighting centred on two positions, Point 174 and Point 182, which were being held by the Giovani Fascisti. The attacking 11th Indian Brigade quickly overran Point 182, but the defenders of Point 174 successfully fought off a series of assaults, inflicting heavy casualties. The Italian position was later re-enforced by German armour. While the action is viewed as a success for the defending Italians, it was a relatively small engagement within a much larger battle, Operation Crusader, which was a major Allied victory.

Background

Main article: Operation Crusader § Bir el Gubi

On 18 November 1941, the British Commonwealth Eighth Army began Operation Crusader, which was intended to relieve Tobruk, decisively defeat the Axis armoured divisions and push the German and Italian forces out of Cyrenaica. The early phase of the battle, a sweeping flanking movement by British armour and motorised infantry, did not go as expected for the Allies. One setback was a rebuff for British 22nd Armoured Brigade by the Italian Ariete armoured division at Bir El Gubi on 19th November. ^{[4] [5]}

However, despite inflicting heavy blows on the Allies during Operation Crusader, by 1 December the Axis forces were becoming exhausted and depleted by what had turned into a battle of attrition in which the British were bringing up fresh troops. According to Ken Ford: “Eighth Army was maintaining its strength whilst Rommel’s command was being whittled away. The German commander now saw his chances of victory fading fast.” ^[6]

The Ariete division was part of the Italian XX Corps (Corpo d'Armata di Manovra or ‘CAM’), which was the most mechanised and best equipped of the two Italian Corps fighting around Tobruk. CAM had a reconnaissance force attached to it, called RECAM. This included on its strength, the Battalion Group "Giovani Fascisti" ; two infantry battalions of volunteer Fascist students, who according to Ian Walker, were fanatical, well-trained and properly equipped. The Battalion Group was deployed at two prepared positions northwest of Bir El Gubi – Point 174 and Point 182. CAM headquarters informed them on 3 December there was intelligence they would be attacked the following day. ^{[7] [8]}

Action

In early December 1941, the Allies planned a fresh attempt to breakthrough to Tobruk, and the commander of British XXX Corps positioned three brigades near Bir El Gubi – 11th Indian Brigade, 22nd Guards Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade – ready to attack. ^[9]

11th Indian Brigade, supported by 16 Valentine tanks plus artillery, was tasked with assaulting Points 174 and 182, where they were expecting light resistance. After a night march, their attack began on the morning of 4 December, with the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, supported by 13 tanks, taking Point 182 “with ease” (according to Murphy), and 250 of the Giovani Fascisti troops surrendered. However, at Point 174 the defenders held out against repeated assaults; initially from the 2nd Battalion of the Cameron Highlanders supported by 3 tanks, and later by the Mahrattas. The attackers suffered “heavy casualties”. ^[10]

At this critical point, 4th Armoured Brigade was ordered by Army headquarters to move 20 miles east in response to reports of Axis troop movements elsewhere. This would leave 11th Indian Brigade vulnerable should enemy tanks arrive in force. That is what happened on 5 December, when 49 tanks from the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions broke through the lines of the Mahrattas and linked up with the Italian defenders. ^[11] In the afternoon of the 6 December, the commanding officer of the 15th Panzer Division, Major-General Neumann-Silkow, was mortally wounded as the fighting continued, then the evening saw what Murphy describes as an “inconclusive mêlée”. ^[12]

Aftermath

On 7 December, British armour arrived, and the battered remnants of the 11th Indian Brigade were withdrawn from the frontline, with 22nd Guards Brigade taking over their positions. 11th Indian was initially placed in reserve, and then withdrawn entirely for rebuilding. ^[13]

Ian Walker wrote of Battalion Group Giovani Fascisti’s performance: “The stubbornness of their two day defence against superior forces came as a complete surprise to the British, and would become one of the epics of the campaign”. ^[14]

While the action near Bir El Gubi was an Italian victory, it did not change the course of the wider battle, Operation Crusader, as on 7 December Rommel ordered a fighting retreat. The Tobruk garrison was relieved and by the end of the month Cyrenaica was captured for a second time in World War II by the British. ^[15]

See also

• List of British military equipment of World War II
• List of Italian military equipment in World War II
• List of German military equipment of World War II

References

1. Murphy 1961, p. 480.
2. Murphy 1961, p. 480.
3. Roggiero 2007, p. 128.
4. Ford 2010, pp. 25–30.
5. Walker 2003, pp. 117−124.
6. Ford 2010, p. 86.
7. Walker 2003, p. 150.
8. Murphy 1961, p. 480.
9. Ford 2010, p. 86.
10. Murphy 1961, p. 480.
11. Murphy 1961, p. 480.
12. Murphy 1961, p. 484.
13. Murphy 1961, p. 483.
14. Walker 2003, p. 150.
15. Ford 2010, pp. 10-11.

Bibliography

• Ford, Ken (2010). Operation Compass 1941: Rommel in retreat. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN   9781846035005.
• Murphy, W. E. (1961). Fairbrother, Monty C. (ed.). The Relief of Tobruk. The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945 (online scan ed.). Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs. OCLC   8000753 – via New Zealand Electronic Text Collection.
• Roggiero, Roberto (2007). El Alamein La svolta decisiva. Parma: Delta Editrice.
• Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN   1-86126-646-4.

Further reading

• Boog, H.; Rahn, W.; Stumpf, R.; Wegner, B. (2001). The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943. Germany in the Second World War. Vol. VI. Translated by Osers, E.; Brownjohn, J.; Crampton, P.; Willmot, L. (Eng trans. Oxford University Press, London ed.). Potsdam: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History). ISBN   0-19-822888-0.
• Cappellano, Filippo (2011). "Carri leggeri in Libia". Storia Militare (208). Parma: Albertelli Edizioni. ISSN   1122-5289.
• Gooch, John, ed. (1990). Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War. Abingdon: Frank Cass. ISBN   0-7146-3369-0.
• Hinsley, Harry; Thomas, E. E.; Ransom, C. F. G.; Knight, R. C. (1981). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War. Vol. II. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN   978-0-521-24290-5.
• Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (1999) [1994]. Rommel's North Africa campaign: September 1940 – November 1942. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo. ISBN   978-1-58097-018-1.
• Maughan, Barton (1966). Tobruk and El Alamein. Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 1 – Army. Vol. III (1st (online) ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC   186193977.
• Montanari, Mario (1993) [1985]. Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale Tobruk, (marzo 1941 –– gennaio 1942) Parte Seconda. Vol. II (2nd online ed.). Roma: Edizione Ufficio Storico SME. OCLC   247554269. Archived from the original on 19 August 2020 – via issuu.
• Schreiber, G.; Stegemann, B.; Vogel, D. (2015) [1995]. Falla, P. S. (ed.). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. Germany and the Second World War. Vol. III. Translated by McMurry, D. S.; Osers, E.; Willmot, L. (2nd pbk. trans. Oxford University Press, Oxford ed.). Freiburg im Breisgau: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. ISBN   978-0-19-873832-9.
• Shores, C. F.; Massimello, G.; Guest, R. (2012). A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940–1945: North Africa June 1940 – January 1942. Vol. I. London: Grub Street. ISBN   978-1-908117-07-6.