Battle of Kiev (1941)

Last updated
First Battle of Kiev
Part of Operation Barbarossa on the Eastern Front of World War II
Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B12190, Kiew, Brand in der Hauptstrasse.jpg
German bombardment on Kiev (September 1941)
Date23 August – 26 September 1941
East and South of Kiev, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union

Decisive German victory

  • Encirclement of Soviet troops
  • Soviet bombings of Kiev as part of scorched earth policy
  • Massacre of Soviet POWs and civilians at Babi Yar
German occupation of Kiev
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg  Germany Flag of the Soviet Union (1936-1955).svg  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Gerd von Rundstedt
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Walther von Reichenau
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Heinz Guderian
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Ewald von Kleist
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Semyon Budyonny [lower-alpha 1]
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Semyon Timoshenko
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Mikhail Kirponos  
Flag of the Soviet Union.svg Mykhailo Burmystenko  
25 infantry divisions
9 armoured divisions
544,000 [1]
627,000 [2]
Casualties and losses
Total: 128,670 [3]
26,856 killed
96,796 wounded
5,008 missing

700,544 men [2]

616,304 killed or captured
84,240 wounded and sick
411 tanks and SPGs destroyed [4]
343 aircraft destroyed [4]
28,419 guns and mortars lost [5]

The First Battle of Kiev was the German name for the operation that resulted in a very large encirclement of Soviet troops in the vicinity of Kiev during World War II. This encirclement is considered the largest encirclement in the history of warfare (by number of troops). The operation ran from 7 August to 26 September 1941 as part of Operation Barbarossa, the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union. [6] In Soviet military history, it is referred to as the Kiev Strategic Defensive Operation, with the somewhat different dates of 7 July – 26 September 1941. [7]


Much of the Southwestern Front of the Red Army (Mikhail Kirponos) was encircled but small groups of Red Army troops managed to escape the pocket, days after the German panzers met east of the city, including the headquarters of Marshal Semyon Budyonny, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko and Commissar Nikita Khrushchev. Kirponos was trapped behind German lines and was killed while trying to break out.

The battle was an unprecedented defeat for the Red Army, exceeding even the Battle of Białystok–Minsk of June–July 1941. The encirclement trapped 452,700 soldiers, 2,642 guns and mortars and 64 tanks, of which scarcely 15,000 had escaped from the encirclement by 2 October. The Southwestern Front suffered 700,544 casualties, including 616,304 killed, captured or missing during the battle. The 5th, 37th, 26th, 21st and the 38th armies, consisting of 43 divisions, were almost annihilated and the 40th Army suffered many losses. Like the Western Front before it, the Southwestern Front had to be recreated almost from scratch.


After the rapid progress of Army Group Centre through the central sector of the Eastern front, a huge salient developed around its junction with Army Group South by late July 1941. On 7–8 July 1941 the German forces managed to break through the fortified Stalin Line in the southeast portion of Zhytomyr Oblast, which ran along the 1939 Soviet border. [8] By 11 July 1941 the Axis ground forces reached the Dnieper tributary Irpin River (15–20 km (9.3–12.4 mi) to the west from Kiev). [8] The initial attempt to enter the city right away was thwarted by troops of the Kiev ukrep-raion (KUR, Kiev fortified district) and counter offensive of 5th and 6th armies. [8] Following that the advance on Kiev was halted and main effort shifted towards the Korosten ukrep-raion where was concentrated the Soviet 5th Army. [8] At the same time the 1st Panzer Army was forced to transition to defense due to a counteroffensive of the Soviet 26th Army. [8] A substantial Soviet force, nearly the entire Southwestern Front, positioned in and around Kiev was located in the salient. [9] [10] By the end of July the Soviet front lost some of its units due to the critical situation of the Southern Front (6th and 12th armies) caused by the German 17th army. [8]

While lacking mobility and armor due to high losses in tanks at the Battle of Uman [10] on 3 August 1941, [8] they nonetheless posed a significant threat to the German advance and were the largest single concentration of Soviet troops on the Eastern Front at that time.[ citation needed ] Both Soviet 6th and 12th armies were encircled at Uman where some 102,000 Red Army soldiers and officers were taken prisoners. [8]

On 30 July 1941, the German forces resumed their advance onto Kiev with the German 6th army attacking positions between the Soviet 26th army and the Kiev ukrep-raion troops. [8] On 7 August 1941 it was halted again by the Soviet 5th, 37th, 26th and supported by the Pinsk Naval Flotilla. [8] With the help of the local population around the city of Kiev along the 45 km (28 mi) frontline segment were dug anti-tanks ditches and installed other obstacles, established 750 pillboxes, planted 100,000 of mines. [8] Some 35,000 soldiers were mobilized from local population along with some partisan detachments and couple of armored trains. [8]

On 19 July Hitler issued Directive No. 33 which would cancel the assault on Moscow in favor of driving south to complete the encirclement of Soviet forces surrounded in Kiev. [11] However, on 12 August 1941, Supplement to Directive No. 34 was issued, and it represented a compromise between Hitler, who was convinced the correct strategy was to clear the salient occupied by Soviet forces on right flank of Army Group Center in the vicinity of Kiev before resuming the drive to Moscow, and Halder, Bock and Guderian, who advocated an advance on Moscow as soon as possible. The compromise required 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups of Army Group Centre, which were redeploying in order to aid Army Group North and Army Group South respectively, be returned to Army Group Centre, together with the 4th Panzer Group of Army Group North, once their objectives were achieved. Then the three Panzer Groups, under the control of Army Group Center, would lead the advance on Moscow. [12] Initially, Halder, chief of staff of the OKH, and Bock, commander of Army Group Center, were satisfied by the compromise, but soon their optimism faded as the operational realities of the plan proved too challenging. [13]

On 18 August, OKH submitted a strategic survey (Denkschrift) to Hitler regarding the continuation of operations in the East. The paper made the case for the drive to Moscow, arguing once again that Army Groups North and South were strong enough to accomplish their objectives without any assistance from Army Group Center. It pointed out that there was enough time left before winter to conduct only a single decisive operation against Moscow. [13]

German pontoon bridge over the Dnieper near Kiev in September 1941, set up in less than 24 hours Bundesarchiv Bild 183-L20392, Kiew, Pioniere errichten Pontonbrucke.jpg
German pontoon bridge over the Dnieper near Kiev in September 1941, set up in less than 24 hours

On 20 August, Hitler rejected the proposal based on the idea that the most important objective was to deprive the Soviets of their industrial areas. On 21 August Jodl of OKW issued a directive, which summarized Hitler's instructions, to Brauchitsch commander of the Army. The paper reiterated that the capture of Moscow before the onset of winter was not a primary objective. Rather, that the most important missions before the onset of winter were to seize the Crimea, and the industrial and coal region of the Don; isolate the oil-producing regions of the Caucasus from the rest of the Soviet Union and in the north, to encircle Leningrad and link up with the Finns. Among other instructions, it also instructed that Army Group Center is to allocate sufficient forces to ensure the destruction of the "Russian 5th Army" and, at the same time, to prepare to repel enemy counterattacks in the central sector of its front. [14] Hitler referred to the Soviet forces in the salient collectively as the "Russian 5th Army". [15] Halder was dismayed, and later described Hitler's plan as "utopian and unacceptable", concluding that the orders were contradictory and Hitler alone must bear the responsibility for inconsistency of his orders and that the OKH can no longer assume responsibility for what was occurring; however, Hitler's instructions still accurately reflected the original intent of the Barbarossa directive of which the OKH was aware all along. [16] Engel in his diary for 21 August 1941, simply summarized it as, "it was a black day for the Army". [17] Halder offered his own resignation and advised Brauchitsch to do the same. However, Brauchitsch declined, stating Hitler would not accept the gesture, and nothing would change anyhow. [16] Halder withdrew his offer of resignation.

On 23 August, Franz Halder convened with Bock and Guderian in Borisov (in Belorussia), and afterwards flew with Guderian to Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia. During a meeting between Guderian and Hitler, with neither Halder nor Brauchitsch present, Hitler allowed Guderian to make the case for driving on to Moscow, and then rejected his argument. Hitler claimed his decision to secure the northern and southern sectors of western Soviet Union were "tasks which stripped the Moscow problem of much of its significance" and was "not a new proposition, but a fact I have clearly and unequivocally stated since the beginning of the operation." Hitler also argued that the situation was even more critical because the opportunity to encircle the Soviet forces in the salient was "an unexpected opportunity, and a reprieve from past failures to trap the Soviet armies in the south." [16] Hitler also declared, "the objections that time will be lost and the offensive on Moscow might be undertaken too late, or that the armoured units might no longer be technically able to fulfil their mission, are not valid." Hitler reiterated that once the flanks of Army Group Center were cleared, especially the salient in the south, then he would allow the army to resume its drive on Moscow; an offensive, he concluded, which "must not fail". [17] In point of fact, Hitler had already issued the orders for the shift of Guderian's panzer group to the south. [18] Guderian returned to his panzer group and began the southern thrust in an effort to encircle the Soviet forces in the salient. [16]

Men from a German forward detachment attack a Soviet village west of Kiev in August 1941 Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1974-099-45, Russland, Gatnoje, Soldaten bei Besetzung einer Ortschaft.jpg
Men from a German forward detachment attack a Soviet village west of Kiev in August 1941

The bulk of 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Army were detached from Army Group Centre and sent south. [19] Its mission was to encircle the Southwestern Front, commanded by Budyonny, in conjunction with 1st Panzer Group of Army Group South under Kleist, which was driving up from a southeasterly direction. [20]

Following the crossing of Dnieper by German forces on 22 August 1941, the city of Kiev came under threat of complete encirclement and the command of the Southwestern Front appealed to the Stavka to allow withdrawal of forces from Kiev. [8] However the permission to do so was not received until 17 September 1941 when the encirclement was completed at Lokhvytsia in Poltava region. [8]


Guderian at a forward command post for one of his panzer regiments, 1941 Bundesarchiv Bild 183-L19885, Russland, Heinz Guderian vor Gefechtsstand.jpg
Guderian at a forward command post for one of his panzer regiments, 1941

The Panzer armies made rapid progress. On 12 September, Kleist's 1st Panzer Group, which had by now turned north and crossed the Dnieper river, emerged from its bridgeheads at Cherkassy and Kremenchug. Continuing north, it cut across the rear of Budyonny's Southwestern Front. On 16 September, it made contact with Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group advancing south, at the town of Lokhvitsa, 120 miles east of Kiev. [21] Budyonny was now trapped and soon relieved by Stalin's order of 13 September.

After that, the fate of the encircled Soviet armies was sealed. With no mobile forces or supreme commander left, there was no possibility to effect a breakout. The infantry of the German 17th Army and 6th Army of Army Group South soon arrived, along with 2nd Army (also on loan from Army Group Center and marching behind Guderian's tanks). They systematically began to reduce the pocket assisted by the two Panzer armies. The encircled Soviet armies at Kiev did not give up easily. A savage battle in which the Soviets were bombarded by artillery, tanks and aircraft had to be fought before the pocket was overcome.

By 19 September, Kiev had fallen, but the encirclement battle continued. After 10 days of heavy fighting, the last remnants of troops east of Kiev surrendered on 26 September. Encircled became several Soviet armies, 5th, 37th, 26th, and separate detachments of 38th and 21st armies. [8] The Germans claimed 600,000 Red Army soldiers (up to 665,000) [8] captured, although these claims have included a large number of civilians suspected of evading capture.

During withdrawal from Kiev, on 20–22 September 1941 at Shumeikove Hai near Dryukivshchyna (today in Lokhvytsia Raion) perished several members of headquarter staff Mikhail Kirponos (commander), Mikhail Burmistenko (member of military council), and Vasiliy Tupikov (chief of staff). [8] Some 15,000 Soviet troops managed to break through the encirclement. [8]


German sentinel in the citadel of Kiev on 19 September. Bundesarchiv Bild 183-L20208, Ukraine, Kiew, deutscher Wachposten auf der Zitadelle.jpg
German sentinel in the citadel of Kiev on 19 September.

By virtue of Guderian's southward turn, the Wehrmacht destroyed the entire Southwestern Front east of Kiev during September, inflicting 600,000 losses on the Red Army, while Soviet forces west of Moscow conducted a futile and costly offensive against German Army Group Center near Smolensk. These operations, such as the Yelnya Offensive, were conducted over very bad terrain against defenders in fortified strong points, and nearly all of these counter-offensives ended in disaster for the Red Army. As a result of these failed offensives, Red Army formations defending Moscow were seriously weakened. With its southern flank secured, Army Group Center launched Operation Typhoon in the direction of Vyazma in October.

Over the objections of Gerd von Rundstedt, Army Group South was ordered to resume the offensive and overran nearly all of the Crimea and Left-bank Ukraine before reaching the edges of the Donbas industrial region. However, after four months of continuous operations his forces were at the brink of exhaustion, and suffered a major defeat in the Battle of Rostov (1941). Army Group South's infantry fared little better and failed to capture the vital city of Kharkov before nearly all of its factories, skilled laborers and equipment were evacuated east of the Ural Mountains.


German artillery overlooking the Dnieper river after the fall of Kiev Bundesarchiv Bild 183-L29208, Ukraine, Kiew, deutsche Pak auf der Zitadelle.jpg
German artillery overlooking the Dnieper river after the fall of Kiev
107,540 Soviet personnel were awarded the Medal "For the Defence of Kiev" from 21 June 1961. Defense of Kiev OBVERSE.jpg
107,540 Soviet personnel were awarded the Medal "For the Defence of Kiev" from 21 June 1961.

Immediately after World War II ended, prominent German commanders argued that had operations at Kiev been delayed and had Operation Typhoon been launched in September rather than October, the Wehrmacht would have reached and captured Moscow before the onset of winter. [22] Heinz Guderian and Fedor von Bock in particular fiercely argued that the "diversion" to Kiev would have dire consequences if the operation dragged on for too long. Winter was coming in a few weeks, and if Moscow was not taken before the first snow, the entire operation would bog down in the mud. Indeed, this is what happened.

David Glantz argued, however, that had Operation Typhoon been launched in September, it would have met greater resistance due to Soviet forces not having been weakened by their offensives east of Smolensk. The offensive would have also been launched with an extended right flank. [22] Glantz also claims that regardless of the final position of German troops when winter came, they would have still faced a counteroffensive by the 10 reserve armies raised by the Soviets toward the end of the year, who would also be better equipped by the vast industrial resources in the area of Kiev. Glantz asserts that had Kiev not been taken before the Battle of Moscow, the entire operation would have ended in a disaster for the Germans. [22]

See also

Related Research Articles

Operation Barbarossa 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War

Operation Barbarossa was the code name for the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, which started on Sunday, 22 June 1941, during World War II. The operation put into action Nazi Germany's ideological goal of conquering the western Soviet Union so as to repopulate it with Germans. The German Generalplan Ost aimed to use some of the conquered as slave labour for the Axis war effort, to acquire the oil reserves of the Caucasus and the agricultural resources of Soviet territories, and eventually to annihilate the Slavic peoples and create Lebensraum for Germany.

Heinz Guderian German general (1888–1954)

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was a German general during World War II. An early pioneer and advocate of the "blitzkrieg" approach, he played a central role in the development of the panzer division concept. In 1936, he became the Inspector of Motorized Troops.

Third Battle of Kharkov 1943 series of battles on the Eastern Front of World War II

The Third Battle of Kharkov was a series of battles on the Eastern Front of World War II, undertaken by the German Army Group South against the Red Army, around the city of Kharkov between 19 February and 15 March 1943. Known to the German side as the Donets Campaign, and in the Soviet Union as the Donbas and Kharkov operations, the German counterstrike led to the recapture of the cities of Kharkov and Belgorod.

Operation Citadel

Operation Citadel was a German offensive operation against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient during the Second World War on the Eastern Front that initiated the Battle of Kursk. The deliberate defensive operation that the Soviets implemented to repel the German offensive is referred to as the Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation. The German offensive was countered by two Soviet counter-offensives, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev and Operation Kutuzov. For the Germans, the battle was the final strategic offensive that they were able to launch on the Eastern Front. As the Allied invasion of Sicily began, Adolf Hitler was forced to divert troops training in France to meet the Allied threats in the Mediterranean, rather than use them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front. Germany's extensive loss of men and tanks ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army enjoyed the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war.

Fedor von Bock German field marshal

Moritz Albrecht Franz Friedrich Fedor von Bock was a German Generalfeldmarschall who served in the German Army during the Second World War. Bock served as the commander of Army Group North during the Invasion of Poland in 1939, commander of Army Group B during the Invasion of France in 1940, and later as the commander of Army Group Center during the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941; his final command was that of Army Group South in 1942.

Battle of Moscow periods of strategically significant fighting on a 600 km (370 mi) sector of the Eastern Front during World War II

The Battle of Moscow was a military campaign that consisted of two periods of strategically significant fighting on a 600 km (370 mi) sector of the Eastern Front during World War II. It took place between October 1941 and January 1942. The Soviet defensive effort frustrated Hitler's attack on Moscow, the capital and largest city of the Soviet Union. Moscow was one of the primary military and political objectives for Axis forces in their invasion of the Soviet Union.

Nikolai Vatutin Soviet military officer

Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin was a Soviet military commander during World War II. Vatutin was responsible for many Red Army operations in Ukraine as commander of the Southwestern Front, and the Voronezh Front during the Battle of Kursk. During the Soviet offensive to retake right-bank Ukraine, Vatutin led the 1st Ukrainian Front, responsible for the Red Army's offensives to the west and south-west of Kiev and the eventual liberation of the city.

Günther von Kluge German general

Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge, also known as Hans Günther von Kluge, was a German field marshal during World War II who held commands on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. He commanded the 4th Army of the Wehrmacht during the invasion of Poland in 1939 and the Battle of France in 1940, earning a promotion to Generalfeldmarschall. Kluge went on to command the 4th Army in Operation Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow in 1941.

Andrey Yeryomenko Marshal of the Soviet Union

Andrey (Andrei) Ivanovich Yeryomenko was a Ukrainian-Soviet general during World War II and, subsequently, a Marshal of the Soviet Union. During the war, Yeryomenko commanded the Southeastern Front during the Battle of Stalingrad in summer 1942 and planned the successful defense of the city. He later commanded the armies responsible for the liberation of Western Hungary and Czechslovakia in 1945.

Second Battle of Kharkov May 1942 battle during World War II

The Second Battle of Kharkov or Operation Fredericus was an Axis counter-offensive in the region around Kharkov against the Red Army Izium bridgehead offensive conducted 12–28 May 1942, on the Eastern Front during World War II. Its objective was to eliminate the Izium bridgehead over Seversky Donets or the "Barvenkovo bulge" which was one of the Soviet offensive's staging areas. After a winter counter-offensive that drove German troops away from Moscow but depleted the Red Army's reserves, the Kharkov offensive was a new Soviet attempt to expand upon their strategic initiative, although it failed to secure a significant element of surprise.

Battle of Smolensk (1941) battle during the second phase of Operation Barbarossa

The First Battle of Smolensk was a battle during the second phase of Operation Barbarossa, the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, in World War II. It was fought around the city of Smolensk between 10 July and 10 September 1941, about 400 km (250 mi) west of Moscow. The Wehrmacht had advanced 500 km (310 mi) into the USSR in the 18 days after the invasion on 22 June 1941. The German army encountered unexpected resistance during the battle, leading to a two-month delay in their advance on Moscow.

Western Front (Soviet Union) Front of the Red Army

The Western Front was a front of the Red Army, one of the Red Army Fronts during World War II.

Battle of Rostov (1941) battle

The Battle of Rostov (1941) was a battle of the Eastern Front of World War II, fought around Rostov-on-Don between the Army Group South of Nazi Germany and the Southern Front of the Soviet Union.

Battle of Uman battle

The Battle of Uman was the German offensive operation against the 6th and 12th Soviet Armies – under the command of Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko and Major General P. G. Ponedelin, respectively. The battle occurred during the Kiev defensive operation between the elements of the Red Army's Southwestern Front, retreating from the Lwow salient, and German Army Group South commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, as part of Operation Barbarossa on the Eastern Front during World War II. The Soviet forces were under overall command of the Southwestern Direction, commanded by Marshal Semyon Budyonny, which included the Southwestern Front commanded by Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos and Southern Front commanded by General Ivan Tyulenev. The battle finished by the encirclement and annihilation of 6th and 12th armies to the southeast of the Uman city.

Yelnya Offensive military offensive

The Yelnya Offensive was a military operation by the Soviet Army during the Battle of Smolensk during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which began the German-Soviet War. The offensive was an attack against the semi-circular Yelnya salient which the German 4th Army had extended 50 kilometres (31 mi) south-east of Smolensk, forming a staging area for an offensive towards Vyazma and eventually Moscow. Under heavy pressure on its flanks, the German army (Heer) evacuated the salient by 8 September 1941, leaving behind a devastated and depopulated region. As the first reverse that the Heer suffered during Barbarossa and the first recapture of the Soviet territory by the Red Army, the battle was covered by Nazi and Soviet propaganda and served as a morale boost to the Soviet population.

The 2nd Panzer Army was a German armoured formation during World War II, formed from the 2nd Panzer Group on October 5, 1941.

Battle of Białystok–Minsk battle

The Battle of Białystok–Minsk was a German strategic operation conducted by the Wehrmacht's Army Group Centre under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock during the penetration of the Soviet border region in the opening stage of Operation Barbarossa, lasting from 22 June to 9 July 1941.

Battle of Bryansk (1941) 2–21 October 1941

The Battle of Bryansk was a twenty-day battle during World War II conducted in the Bryansk Oblast as a part of the overall Moscow campaign. Returning from the Kiev operation, Heinz Guderian attacked in an unexpected direction capturing Bryansk and Oryol with few casualties thereby encircling two Soviet formations, the 13th Army and 3rd Army. A third Soviet formation, the 50th Army was encircled by infantry of the German 2nd Army north of Bryansk. However the encircled Red Army units continued fighting, delaying the drive on Moscow for two weeks. This delay, as well as the casualties taken by the Wehrmacht liquidating the pockets contributed to the German collapse at the gates of Moscow. See also: Vyazma and Bryansk pockets. As a result of this battle, the Germans occupied Bryansk until they were expelled by the Red Army on September 17, 1943 as a part of the Smolensk campaign.

Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation August 1943 Soviet strategic summer offensive

The Belgorod-Kharkov Strategic Offensive Operation, or simply Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation, was a Soviet strategic summer offensive that aimed to recapture Belgorod and Kharkov a, and destroy the German forces of the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf. The operation was codenamed Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, after the 18th-century Field Marshal Peter Rumyantsev and was conducted by the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge. The battle was referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans.

The Roslavl–Nozozybkov Offensive was an offensive conducted by the Red Army's Bryansk Front against the German 2nd Panzer Group and 2nd Army in Bryansk Oblast and parts of Sumy Oblast on the Eastern Front of World War II between 30 August and 12 September 1941, part of the Battle of Smolensk in Soviet historiography.


  1. G.K. Zhukov. Nhớ lại và suy nghĩ. tập 2. trang 99
  2. 1 2 Glantz 1995, p. 293.
  3. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 25 October 2012. Retrieved 9 August 2014.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  4. 1 2 Krivosheev 1997, p. 260.
  5. Liedtke 2016, p. 148.
  6. Read 2005, p. 731.
  7. Krivosheev 1997, p. 114.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Koval, M. The 1941 Kiev Defense Operation (КИЇВСЬКА ОБОРОННА ОПЕРАЦІЯ 1941) . Encyclopedia of History of Ukraine
  9. Glantz 2011, pp. 54–55.
  10. 1 2 Clark 1965, p. 130.
  11. Clark 1965, p. 101.
  12. Glantz 2011, p. 55.
  13. 1 2 Glantz 2011, p. 56.
  14. Glantz 2011, p. 57.
  15. Glantz 2011, p. 60.
  16. 1 2 3 4 Glantz 2011, p. 58.
  17. 1 2 Glantz 2011, p. 59.
  18. Guderian 1952, p. 202.
  19. Clark 1965, pp. 111, 139.
  20. Clark 1965, p. 133.
  21. Clark 1965, pp. 135, 141.
  22. 1 2 3 Glantz 2001, p. 23.
  1. Until 13 September.


Further reading

Coordinates: 50°27′13″N30°30′59″E / 50.4536°N 30.5164°E / 50.4536; 30.5164