Russo-Ukrainian War

Last updated

Russo-Ukrainian War
Part of the post-Soviet conflicts
2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.svg
Zones of control in Ukraine as of 28 November 2022
   Controlled by Ukraine
   Occupied by Russia

For a more detailed map, see the Russo-Ukrainian War detailed map
Date20 February 2014 [lower-alpha 1] – present
(8 years, 9 months, 1 week and 3 days)
Between 2014 and 2022:Since 2022:
Flag of Ukraine.svg  Ukraine

Supplied by:

For countries providing aid to Ukraine since 2022, see foreign aid to Ukraine

Flag of Russia.svg  Russia

Supported by:
Flag of Belarus.svg  Belarus (since 2022) [lower-alpha 2]
Supplied by:

For details, see


Russian military suppliers
Commanders and leaders
For details of strengths and units involved at key points in the conflict, see:
Casualties and losses
Reports vary widely, but tens of thousands at a minimum. See Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War for details.

The Russo-Ukrainian War [lower-alpha 3] has been ongoing between Russia (alongside Russian separatists in Ukraine) and Ukraine since February 2014. [lower-alpha 4] Following Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported pro-Russian separatists in the war in Donbas against Ukrainian government forces; fighting for the first eight years of the conflict also included naval incidents, cyberwarfare, and heightened political tensions. In February 2022, the conflict saw a major escalation as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In early 2014, pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted from office as a result of the pro-European Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity. Shortly after Yanukovych's overthrow and exile to Russia, pro-Russian unrest erupted in Ukraine's eastern and southern regions. Simultaneously, unmarked Russian troops moved into Ukraine's Crimea and took control of strategic positions and infrastructure, including government buildings. Russia soon annexed Crimea after a highly disputed Crimean status referendum. In April 2014, pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region proclaimed the establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic with considerable but clandestine support from Russia. Ukrainian attempts in late 2014 to retake separatist-held areas were unsuccessful, leading to a protracted war in Donbas. Although Russia continued to deny involvement, Russian troops directly participated in the undeclared war. In February 2015, the Minsk II agreements were signed by both Russia and Ukraine in an attempt to end the conflict, but the agreements were never fully implemented in the years that followed. The war in Donbas settled into a violent but static conflict between Ukraine and Russian proxies, with frequent brief ceasefires but no lasting peace and few changes in territorial control.

Beginning in 2021, Russia built up a large military presence near its border with Ukraine, including from within neighbouring Belarus. Russian president Vladimir Putin criticized the enlargement of NATO and demanded that Ukraine be barred from ever joining the military alliance. He also expressed irredentist views and questioned Ukraine's right to exist. On 21 February 2022, Russia officially recognized the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic as independent states. Three days later, Putin announced a "special military operation" in Ukraine during a televised broadcast, marking the start of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The invasion was internationally condemned, leading to many countries to impose sanctions against Russia and ramping up existing sanctions.

The ongoing full-scale war has resulted in a major refugee crisis and tens of thousands of deaths. Russia abandoned an attempt to take Kyiv in early April 2022 amid fierce resistance. In late September, Russia announced its annexation of several parts of southern and eastern Ukraine, drawing widespread condemnation. Ukrainian counteroffensives in the south and northeast have recently retaken significant areas.


Post-Soviet context and Orange Revolution

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia maintained close ties. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. [7] Former Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were removed and dismantled. [8] In return, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to uphold the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. [9] [10] In 1999, Russia was one of the signatories of the Charter for European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve." [11] In the years after the dissolution of the USSR, several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly in response to regional security threats involving Russia such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Russian leaders described this expansion as a violation of Western powers' informal assurances that NATO would not expand eastward. [12] [13]

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election campaign, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD dioxin; [14] [15] he later implicated Russian involvement. [16] In November, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner, despite allegations of vote-rigging by election observers. [17] During a two-month period which became known as the Orange Revolution, large peaceful protests successfully challenged the outcome. After the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the initial result due to widespread electoral fraud, a second round re-run was held, bringing to power Yushchenko as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, and leaving Yanukovych in opposition. [18] The Orange Revolution is often grouped together with other early-21st century protest movements, particularly within the former USSR, known as colour revolutions. According to Anthony Cordesman, Russian military officers viewed such colour revolutions as an attempt by the US and European states to destabilise neighbouring countries and undermine Russia's national security. [19] Russian President Vladimir Putin accused organisers of the 2011–2013 Russian protests of being former advisors to Yushchenko, and described the protests as an attempt to transfer the Orange Revolution to Russia. [20] Rallies in favour of Putin during this period were called "anti-Orange protests". [21]

Sergey Karaganov, who is considered close to Putin, formulated many of the core ideas that led to Russia's invasion of Ukraine Sergei Karaganov , Dean, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics; Foreign policy adviser to the Presidential Administration, Russia (18452569479).jpg
Sergey Karaganov, who is considered close to Putin, formulated many of the core ideas that led to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The response among NATO members was divided; Western European countries opposed offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) in order to avoid antagonising Russia, while US President George W. Bush pushed for their admission. [23] NATO ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also issued a statement agreeing that "these countries will become members of NATO". Putin voiced strong opposition to Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership bids. [24] By January 2022, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained remote. [25]

Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and pro-Russian unrest

In 2009, Yanukovych announced his intent to again run for president in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election, [26] which he subsequently won. [27] In November 2013, a wave of large, pro-European Union (EU) protests erupted in response to Yanukovych's sudden decision not to sign the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. The Ukrainian parliament had overwhelmingly approved of finalizing the agreement with the EU, [28] and Russia had put pressure on Ukraine to reject it. [29]

Following months of protests as part of the Euromaidan movement, on 21 February 2014 Yanukovych and the leaders of the parliamentary opposition signed a settlement agreement that called for early elections. The following day, Yanukovych fled from the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his powers as president. [30] [31] [32] [33] On 23 February, the parliament adopted a bill to repeal the 2012 law which gave Russian language an official status. [34] The bill was not enacted, [35] however, the proposal provoked negative reactions in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, [36] intensified by Russian media saying that the ethnic Russian population was in imminent danger. [37]

On 27 February, an interim government was established and early presidential elections were scheduled. The following day, Yanukovych resurfaced in Russia and in a press conference declared that he remained the acting president of Ukraine, just as Russia was beginning its overt military campaign in Crimea. Leaders of Russian-speaking eastern regions of Ukraine declared continuing loyalty to Yanukovych, [31] [38] causing the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine.

Russian military bases in Crimea

At the onset of the conflict, Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black Sea Fleet, [37] in several locations in the Crimean peninsula like Sevastopol, Kacha, Hvardiiske, Simferopol Raion, Sarych, and others. In 2005 a dispute broke out over control of the Sarych cape lighthouse near Yalta, and a number of other beacons. [39] [40] Russian presence was allowed by the basing and transit agreement with Ukraine. Under the agreements the Russian military in Crimea was constrained to a maximum of 25,000 troops, required to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, honor its legislation and to not interfere in the internal affairs of the country, and to show their "military identification cards" when crossing the international border. [41] Early in the conflict, the agreement's sizeable troop limit allowed Russia to significantly reinforce its military presence under the plausible guise of security concerns, deploy special forces and other required capabilities to conduct the operation in Crimea. [37]

According to the original treaty on the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet signed in 1997, Russia was allowed to have its military bases in Crimea until 2017, after which it would evacuate all military units including its portion of the Black Sea Fleet out of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. On 21 April 2010, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych signed a new deal known as the Kharkiv Pact, to resolve the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute; it extended the stay to 2042 with an option to renew. [42]

Declaration of military operations

No formal declaration of war has been issued in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. When the Kremlin announced the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, it claimed to commence a "special military operation", side-stepping a formal declaration of war. [43] The statement was, however, regarded as a declaration of war by the Ukrainian government [44] and reported as such by many international news sources. [45] [46] While the Ukrainian parliament refers to Russia as a "terrorist state" in regards to its military actions in Ukraine, [47] it has not issued a formal declaration of war on its behalf.


Russian annexation of Crimea (2014)

The blockade of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the capture of Crimea by Russia in February-March 2014 2014 Krim.PNG
The blockade of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the capture of Crimea by Russia in February–March 2014
Russian troops blocking the Ukrainian military base in Perevalne 2014-03-09 - Perevalne military base - 0203.JPG
Russian troops blocking the Ukrainian military base in Perevalne

On 20 February 2014, Russia began an annexation of Crimea. [48] [49] [50] [51] On 22 and 23 February, Russian troops and special forces began moving into Crimea through Novorossiysk. [50] On 27 February, Russian forces without insignias began their advance into the Crimean Peninsula. [52] They took strategic positions and captured the Crimean Parliament, raising a Russian flag. Security checkpoints isolated the Crimean Peninsula from the rest of Ukraine and restricted movement within the territory. [53] [54] [55] [56]

In the following days, Russian soldiers secured key airports and a communications center. [57] Russian cyberattacks shut down websites associated with the Ukrainian government, news media, and social media. Cyberattacks also enabled Russian access to the mobile phones of Ukrainian officials and members of parliament, further disrupting communications. [58]

On 1 March, the Russian legislature approved the use of armed forces, leading to an influx of Russian troops and military hardware into the peninsula. [57] In the following days, all remaining Ukrainian military bases and installations were surrounded and besieged, including the Southern Naval Base. After Russia formally annexed the peninsula on 18 March, Ukrainian military bases and ships were stormed by Russian forces. On 24 March, Ukraine ordered troops to withdraw; by 30 March, all Ukrainian forces had left the peninsula.

On 15 April, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily occupied by Russia. [59] After the annexation, the Russian government increased its military presence in the region and made nuclear threats. [60] Putin said that a Russian military task force would be established in Crimea. [61] In November, NATO stated that it believed Russia was deploying nuclear-capable weapons to Crimea. [62] Since the annexation of Crimea, certain NATO members have been providing training for the Ukrainian army. [63]

War in the Donbas (2014–2015)

Pro-Russia unrest

Beginning in late February 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups took place in major cities across the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. [64] The first protests across southern and eastern Ukraine were largely native expressions of discontent with the new Ukrainian government. [64] [65] Russian involvement at this stage was limited to voicing support for the demonstrations. [65] [66] Russia exploited this, however, launching a coordinated political and military campaign against Ukraine. [65] [67] Putin gave legitimacy to the separatists when he described the Donbas as part of "New Russia" (Novorossiya), and expressed bewilderment as to how the region had ever become part of Ukraine. [68]

In late March, Russia continued to gather forces near the Ukrainian eastern border, reaching 30–40,000 troops by April. [69] [37] The deployment was used to threaten escalation and disrupt Ukraine's response. [37] This threat forced Ukraine to divert forces to its borders instead of the conflict zone. [37]

Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist leaders in early March. Those leaders were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security services and interests in Russian businesses. [70] By April 2014, Russian citizens had taken control of the separatist movement, supported by volunteers and materiel from Russia, including Chechen and Cossack fighters. [71] [72] [73] [74] According to Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) commander Igor Girkin, without this support in April, the movement would have dissipated, as it had in Kharkiv and Odesa. [75] A disputed referendum on the status of Donetsk Oblast was held on 11 May. [76] [77] [78]

Armed conflict

The Russian military buildup along Ukraine's eastern border in February-March 2014 RU and UA forces, 2014.02 (February) - EN 01.jpg
The Russian military buildup along Ukraine's eastern border in February–March 2014
The Donbas status referendums in May 2014 were not officially recognised by the Ukrainian government or any UN member state. 2014-05-11. Referendum v Donetske 017.jpg
The Donbas status referendums in May 2014 were not officially recognised by the Ukrainian government or any UN member state.

In April, armed conflict began in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatist forces and Ukraine. The separatists declared the People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. From 6 April, militants occupied government buildings in many cities and took control of border crossings to Russia, transport hubs, a broadcasting center, and other strategic infrastructure. Faced with continued expansion of separatist territorial control, on 15 April the interim Ukrainian government launched an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (ATO), however, Ukrainian forces were poorly prepared and ill-positioned and the operation quickly stalled. [79]

By the end of April, Ukraine announced it had lost control of the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. It claimed to be on "full combat alert" against a possible Russian invasion and reinstated conscription to its armed forces. [80] Through May, the Ukrainian campaign focused on containing the separatists by securing key positions around the ATO zone to position the military for a decisive offensive once Ukraine's national mobilization had completed.

As conflict between the separatists and the Ukrainian government escalated in May, Russia began to employ a "hybrid approach", combining disinformation tactics, irregular fighters, regular Russian troops, and conventional military support. [81] [82] [83] The First Battle of Donetsk Airport followed the Ukrainian presidential elections. It marked a turning point in conflict; it was the first battle between the separatists and the Ukrainian government that involved large numbers of Russian "volunteers". [84] [85] :15 According to Ukraine, at the height of the conflict in the summer of 2014, Russian paramilitaries made up between 15% to 80% of the combatants. [73] From June Russia trickled in arms, armor, and munitions.

By the end of July, Ukrainian forces were pushing into cities, to cut off supply routes between the two, isolating Donetsk and attempting to restore control of the Russo-Ukrainian border. By 28 July, the strategic heights of Savur-Mohyla were under Ukrainian control, along with the town of Debaltseve, an important railroad hub. [86] These operational successes of Ukrainian forces threatened the existence of the DPR and LPR statelets, prompting Russian cross-border shelling targeted against Ukrainian troops on their own soil, from mid-July onwards.[ citation needed ]

August 2014 Russian invasion

June-August 2014 progression map War in donbass.svg
June–August 2014 progression map

After a series of military defeats and setbacks for the separatists, who united under the banner of "Novorossiya", [87] [88] Russia dispatched what it called a "humanitarian convoy" of trucks across the border in mid-August 2014. Ukraine called the move a "direct invasion". [89] Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council reported that convoys were arriving almost daily in November (up to 9 convoys on 30 November) and that their contents were mainly arms and ammunition. Strelkov claimed that in early August, Russian servicemen, supposedly on "vacation" from the army, began to arrive in Donbas. [90]

By August 2014, the Ukrainian "Anti-Terrorist Operation" shrank the territory under pro-Russian control, and approached the border. [91] Igor Girkin urged Russian military intervention, and said that the combat inexperience of his irregular forces, along with recruitment difficulties amongst the local population, had caused the setbacks. He stated, "Losing this war on the territory that President Vladimir Putin personally named New Russia would threaten the Kremlin's power and, personally, the power of the president". [92]

In response to the deteriorating situation, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and began a conventional invasion on 25 August 2014. [91] [93] On the following day, the Russian Defence Ministry said these soldiers had crossed the border "by accident". [94] [95] [96] According to Nikolai Mitrokhin's estimates, by mid-August 2014 during the Battle of Ilovaisk, between 20,000 and 25,000 troops were fighting in the Donbas on the separatist side, and only 40-45% were "locals". [97]

On 24 August 2014, Amvrosiivka was occupied by Russian paratroopers, [98] supported by 250 armoured vehicles and artillery pieces. [99] The same day, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko referred to the operation as Ukraine's "Patriotic War of 2014" and a war against external aggression. [100] [101] On 25 August, a column of Russian military vehicles was reported to have crossed into Ukraine near Novoazovsk on the Azov sea coast. It appeared headed towards Ukrainian-held Mariupol, [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] in an area that had not seen pro-Russian presence for weeks. [107] Russian forces captured Novoazovsk. [108] and Russian soldiers began deporting Ukrainians who did not have an address registered within the town. [109] Pro-Ukrainian anti-war protests took place in Mariupol. [109] [110] The UN Security Council called an emergency meeting. [111]

Residents of Kyiv with Sich Battalion volunteers on 26 August 2014 2014-08-26. <<Sich'>> otpravliaetsia na voinu 035.JPG
Residents of Kyiv with Sich Battalion volunteers on 26 August 2014

The Pskov-based 76th Guards Air Assault Division allegedly entered Ukrainian territory in August and engaged in a skirmish near Luhansk, suffering 80 dead. The Ukrainian Defence Ministry said that they had seized two of the unit's armoured vehicles near Luhansk, and reported destroying another three tanks and two armoured vehicles in other regions. [112] [113] The Russian government denied the skirmish took place, [113] but on 18 August, the 76th was awarded the Order of Suvorov, one of Russia's highest awards, by Russian minister of defence Sergey Shoigu for the "successful completion of military missions" and "courage and heroism". [113]

The speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament and Russian state television channels acknowledged that Russian soldiers entered Ukraine, but referred to them as "volunteers". [114] A reporter for Novaya Gazeta , an opposition newspaper in Russia, stated that the Russian military leadership paid soldiers to resign their commissions and fight in Ukraine in the early summer of 2014, and then began ordering soldiers into Ukraine. [115] Russian opposition MP Lev Shlosberg made similar statements, although he said combatants from his country are "regular Russian troops", disguised as units of the DPR and LPR. [116]

In early September 2014, Russian state-owned television channels reported on the funerals of Russian soldiers who had died in Ukraine, but described them as "volunteers" fighting for the "Russian world". Valentina Matviyenko, a top United Russia politician, also praised "volunteers" fighting in "our fraternal nation". [114] Russian state television for the first time showed the funeral of a soldier killed fighting in Ukraine. [117]

Mariupol offensive and first Minsk ceasefire

A map of the line of control and buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol on 5 September 2014 Minsk Protocol.svg
A map of the line of control and buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol on 5 September 2014

On 3 September, Poroshenko said he and Putin had reached a "permanent ceasefire" agreement. [118] Russia denied this, denying that it was a party to the conflict, adding that "they only discussed how to settle the conflict". [119] [120] Poroshenko then recanted. [121] [122] On 5 September Russia's Permanent OSCE Representative Andrey Kelin, said that it was natural that pro-Russian separatists "are going to liberate" Mariupol. Ukrainian forces stated that Russian intelligence groups had been spotted in the area. Kelin said 'there might be volunteers over there.' [123] On 4 September 2014, a NATO officer said that several thousand regular Russian forces operating in Ukraine. [124]

On 5 September 2014, the Minsk Protocol ceasefire agreement drew a line of demarcation between Ukraine and separatist-controlled portions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

End of 2014 and Minsk II agreements

On 7 and 12 November, NATO officials reconfirmed the Russian presence, citing 32 tanks, 16 howitzer cannons and 30 trucks of troops entering the country. [125] US general Philip M. Breedlove said "Russian tanks, Russian artillery, Russian air defence systems and Russian combat troops" had been sighted. [62] [126] NATO said it had seen an increase in Russian tanks, artillery pieces and other heavy military equipment in Ukraine and renewed its call for Moscow to withdraw its forces. [127] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that Russian separatists enjoyed technical advantages over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of advanced military systems in mid-2014: effective anti-aircraft weapons ("Buk", MANPADS) suppressed Ukrainian air strikes, Russian drones provided intelligence, and Russian secure communications system disrupted Ukrainian communications intelligence. The Russian side employed electronic warfare systems that Ukraine lacked. Similar conclusions about the technical advantage of the Russian separatists were voiced by the Conflict Studies Research Centre. [128] In the 12 November United Nations Security Council meeting, the United Kingdom's representative accused Russia of intentionally constraining OSCE observation missions' capabilities, pointing out that the observers were allowed to monitor only two kilometers of border, and drones deployed to extend their capabilities were jammed or shot down. [129] [ non-primary source needed ]

Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk in May 2015. Ukraine declared the Russian-backed separatist republics from eastern Ukraine to be terrorist organizations. 2015-05-07. Repetitsiia parada Pobedy v Donetske 175.jpg
Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk in May 2015. Ukraine declared the Russian-backed separatist republics from eastern Ukraine to be terrorist organizations.

In January 2014, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol represented the three battle fronts. [131] Poroshenko described a dangerous escalation on 21 January amid reports of more than 2,000 additional Russian troops, 200 tanks and armed personnel carriers crossing the border. He abbreviated his visit to the World Economic Forum because of his concerns. [132]

A new package of measures to end the conflict, known as Minsk II, was agreed on 15 February 2015. [133] On 18 February, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Debatlseve, in the last high-intensity battle of the Donbas war until 2022. In September 2015 the United Nations Human Rights Office estimated that 8000 casualties had resulted from the conflict. [134]

A stable line of conflict (2015–2022)

After the Minsk agreements, the war settled into static trench warfare around the agreed line of contact, with few changes in territorial control. The conflict was marked by artillery duels, special forces operations, and trench warfare. Hostilities never ceased for a substantial period of time, but continued at a low level despite repeated attempts at ceasefire. In the months after the fall of Debaltseve, minor skirmishes continued along the line of contact, but no territorial changes occurred. Both sides began fortifying their position by building networks of trenches, bunkers and tunnels, turning the conflict into static trench warfare. [135] [136] The relatively static conflict was labelled a "frozen" by some, [137] but Russia never achieved this as the fighting never stopped. [138] The area remained a war zone, with dozens of soldiers and civilians killed each month. [139] Between 2014 and 2022 the start of the conflict there were 29 ceasefires, each intended to remain in force indefinitely. However, none of them lasted more than two weeks, [140] and more people were killed in the years of static combat than in 2014–15.[ citation needed ]

US and international officials continued to report the active presence of Russian military in eastern Ukraine, including in the Debaltseve area. [141] In 2015, Russian separatist forces were estimated to number around 36,000 troops (compared to 34,000 Ukrainian), of whom 8,500–10,000 were Russian soldiers. Additionally, around 1,000 GRU troops were operating in the area. [142] Another 2015 estimate held that Ukrainian forces outnumbered Russian forces 40,000 to 20,000. [143] In 2017, on average one Ukrainian soldier died in combat every three days, [144] with an estimated 6,000 Russian and 40,000 separatist troops in the region. [145] [146]

Casualties of the war in Donbas 2015-05-09. Den' Pobedy v Donetske 067.jpg
Casualties of the war in Donbas

Cases of killed and wounded Russian soldiers were discussed in local Russian media. [147] Recruiting for Donbas was performed openly via veteran and paramilitary organisations. Vladimir Yefimov, leader of one such organisation, explained how the process worked in the Ural area. The organisation recruited mostly army veterans, but also policemen, firefighters etc. with military experience. The cost of equipping one volunteer was estimated at 350,000 rubles (around $6500) plus salary of 60,000 to 240,000 rubles per month. [148]

The volunteers were issued a document claiming that their participation was limited to "offering humanitarian help" to avoid Russian mercenary laws. Russia's anti-mercenary legislation defined a mercenary as someone who "takes part [in fighting] with aims counter to the interests of the Russian Federation". [148] The recruits received weapons only after arriving in the conflict zone. Often, Russian troops traveled disguised as Red Cross personnel. [149] [150] [151] [152] Igor Trunov, head of the Russian Red Cross in Moscow, condemned these convoys, saying they complicated humanitarian aid delivery. [153] Russia refused to allow OSCE to expand its mission beyond two border crossings. [154]

In August 2016, the Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU, published telephone intercepts from 2014 of Sergey Glazyev (Russian presidential adviser), Konstantin Zatulin, and other people in which they discussed covert funding of pro-Russian activists in Eastern Ukraine, the occupation of administration buildings and other actions that triggered the conflict. [155] As early as February 2014, Glazyev gave direct instructions to various pro-Russian parties on how to take over local administration offices, what to do afterwards, how to formulate demands, and promised support from Russia, including "sending our guys". [156] [157] [158]

Russian-backed separatists in May 2016 2016-05-09. Den' Pobedy v Donetske 043.jpg
Russian-backed separatists in May 2016

2018 Kerch Strait incident

The Kerch Strait incident over the passage between the Black and Azov seas Kerch Strait incident.png
The Kerch Strait incident over the passage between the Black and Azov seas

Russia gained de facto control of the Kerch Strait in 2014. In 2017, Ukraine appealed to a court of arbitration over the use of the strait. By 2018 Russia had built a bridge over the strait, limiting the size of ships that could pass through, imposed new regulations, and repeatedly detained Ukrainian vessels. [159] On 25 November 2018, three Ukrainian boats traveling from Odesa to Mariupol were seized by Russian warships; 24 Ukrainian sailors were detained. [160] [161] A day later on 26 November 2018, the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly backed the imposition of martial law along Ukraine's coastal regions and those bordering Russia. [162]


From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, France, December 2019 Putin, Macron, Merkel, Zelensky (2019-12-10) 01.jpg
From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, France, December 2019

More than 110 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the conflict in 2019. [163] In May 2019, newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took office promising to end the war in Donbas. [163] In December 2019, Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists began swapping prisoners of war. Around 200 prisoners were exchanged on 29 December 2019. [164] [165] [166] [167] According to Ukrainian authorities, 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2020. [168] Since 2019, Russia has issued over 650,000 internal Russian passports to Ukrainians. [169] [170]

Russian military buildup around Ukraine

From March to April 2021, Russia commenced a major military build-up near the border, followed by a second build-up between October 2021 to February 2022 in Russia and Belarus. [171] Throughout, the Russian government repeatedly denied it had plans to attack Ukraine. [172] [173]

In early December 2021, following Russian denials, the US released intelligence of Russian invasion plans, including satellite photographs showing Russian troops and equipment near the border. [174] The intelligence reported a Russian list of key sites and individuals to be killed or neutralized. [175] The US released multiple reports that accurately predicted the invasion plans. [175]

Russian accusations and demands

Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna with NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg at a conference on 10 January 2022 regarding a potential Russian invasion Olga Stefanishyna held press conference along with NATO SG Stoltenberg about possible Russia invasion.jpg
Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna with NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg at a conference on 10 January 2022 regarding a potential Russian invasion

In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused Ukraine of inciting tensions, Russophobia, and repressing Russian speakers. They made multiple security demands of Ukraine, NATO, and other EU countries. On 9 December 2021 Putin said that "Russophobia is a first step towards genocide". [176] [177] Putin's claims were dismissed by the international community, [178] and Russian claims of genocide were rejected as baseless. [179] [180] [181]

US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment depart Italy's Aviano Air Base for Latvia, 23 February 2022. Thousands of US troops were deployed to Eastern Europe amid Russia's military build-up. 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade depart Aviano Air Base, Italy, Feb. 24, 2022.jpg
US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment depart Italy's Aviano Air Base for Latvia, 23 February 2022. Thousands of US troops were deployed to Eastern Europe amid Russia's military build-up.

In a 21 February speech, [183] Putin questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, repeating an inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood". [184] He incorrectly stated that Vladimir Lenin had created Ukraine, by carving a separate Soviet Republic out of what Putin said was Russian land, that Joseph Stalin extended Ukrainian territory with lands from other eastern European countries following the Second World War, and that Nikita Khrushchev "took Crimea away from Russia for some reason and gave it to Ukraine" in 1954. [185]

Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian society and government were dominated by neo-Nazism, invoking the history of collaboration in German-occupied Ukraine during World War II, [186] [187] and echoing an antisemitic conspiracy theory that cast Russian Christians, rather than Jews, as the true victims of Nazi Germany. [188] [178] Ukraine does suffer a far-right fringe, including the neo-Nazi linked Azov Battalion and Right Sector. [189] [187] Analysts described Putin's rhetoric as greatly exaggerated. [190] [186] Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, stated that his grandfather served in the Soviet army fighting against the Nazis; [191] three of his family members were killed in the Holocaust. [190]

A U.S. intelligence assessment map and imagery on Russian military movement nearby the Ukrainian border, as on 3 December 2021. It assessed that Russia had deployed about 70,000 military personnel mostly about 100-200 kilometres (62-124 mi) from the Ukrainian border, with an assessment this could be increased to 175,000 personnel. Published by The Washington Post. Russian forces near Ukraine, 2021-12-03 (crop).jpg
A U.S. intelligence assessment map and imagery on Russian military movement nearby the Ukrainian border, as on 3 December 2021. It assessed that Russia had deployed about 70,000 military personnel mostly about 100–200 kilometres (62–124 mi) from the Ukrainian border, with an assessment this could be increased to 175,000 personnel. Published by The Washington Post .

During the second build-up, Russia issued demands to the US and NATO, insisting on a legally binding arrangement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and the removal of multinational forces stationed in NATO's Eastern European member states. [193] These demands were rejected by the US and NATO. [194] The demand for a formal treaty preventing Ukraine from joining NATO was rejected by Western officials as it would contravene the treaty's "open door" policy, although NATO made no efforts to comply with Ukraine's requests to join. [195]

Prelude to full invasion

Fighting in Donbas escalated significantly from 17 February 2022 onwards. [196] The Ukrainians and the pro-Russian separatists each accused the other of attacks. [197] [198] There was a sharp increase in artillery shelling by the Russian-led militants in Donbas, which was considered by Ukraine and its allies to be an attempt to provoke the Ukrainian army or create a pretext for invasion. [199] [200] [201] On 18 February, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics ordered mandatory emergency evacuations of civilians from their respective capital cities, [202] [203] [204] although observers noted that full evacuations would take months. [205] The Russian government intensified its disinformation campaign, with Russian state media promoting fabricated videos (false flags) on a nearly hourly basis purporting to show Ukrainian forces attacking Russia. [206] Many of the disinformation videos were amateurish, and evidence showed that the claimed attacks, explosions, and evacuations in Donbas were staged by Russia. [206] [207] [208]

Putin's address to the nation on 21 February (English subtitles available)

On 21 February at 22:35 (UTC+3), [209] Putin announced that the Russian government would diplomatically recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. [210] The same evening, Putin directed that Russian troops deploy into Donbas, in what Russia referred to as a "peacekeeping mission". [211] [212] On 22 February, the Federation Council unanimously authorised Putin to use military force outside Russia. [213] In response, Zelenskyy ordered the conscription of army reservists; [214] The following day, Ukraine's parliament proclaimed a 30-day nationwide state of emergency and ordered the mobilisation of all reservists. [215] [216] [217] Russia began to evacuate its embassy in Kyiv. [218]

On the night of 23 February, [219] Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian in which he appealed to the citizens of Russia to prevent war. [220] [221] He rejected Russia's claims about neo-Nazis and stated that he had no intention of attacking the Donbas. [222] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 23 February that the separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent a letter to Putin stating that Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths and appealing for military support. [223]

Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022)

Animated map of Russia's invasion of Ukraine (click to play animation) 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine animated.gif
Animated map of Russia's invasion of Ukraine (click to play animation)

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine began on the morning of 24 February, [224] when Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine. [225] [226] Minutes later, missiles and airstrikes hit across Ukraine, including Kyiv, shortly followed by a large ground invasion along multiple fronts. [227] [228] Zelenskyy declared martial law and a general mobilisation of all male Ukrainian citizens between 18 and 60, who were banned from leaving the country. [229] [230]

Russian attacks were initially launched on a northern front from Belarus towards Kyiv, a north-eastern front towards Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea, and a south-eastern front from Luhansk and Donetsk. [231] [232] In the northern front, amidst heavy losses and strong Ukrainian resistance surrounding Kyiv, Russia's advance stalled in March, and by April its troops retreated. On 8 April, Russia placed its forces in southern and eastern Ukraine under the command of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, and some units withdrawn from the north were redeployed to the Donbas. [233] On 19 April, Russia launched a renewed attack across a 500 kilometres (300 mi) long front extending from Kharkiv to Donetsk and Luhansk. [234] By 13 May, a Ukraine counter-offensive had driven back Russian forces near Kharkiv. By 20 May, Mariupol fell to Russian troops following a prolonged siege of the Azovstal steel works. [235] [236] Russian forces continued to bomb both military and civilian targets far from the frontline. [237] [238] The war caused the largest refugee and humanitarian crisis within Europe since the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s; [239] [240] the UN described it as the fastest-growing such crisis since World War II. [241] In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had fled Ukraine; this subsequently rose to over 7,405,590 by 24 September, a reduction from over eight million due to some refugees' return. [242] [243]

Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensives in the south in August, and in the northeast in September. On 30 September, Russia annexed four oblasts of Ukraine which it had partially conquered during the invasion. [244] This annexation was generally unrecognized and condemned by the countries of the world. [245] After Putin announced that he would begin conscription drawn from the 300,000 citizens with military training and potentially the pool of about 25 million Russians who could be eligible for conscription, one-way tickets out of the country nearly or completely sold out. [246] [247] The Ukrainian offensive in the northeast successfully recaptured the majority of Kharkiv Oblast in September. In the course of the southern counteroffensive, Ukraine retook the city of Kherson in November and Russian forces withdrew to the east bank of the Dnieper River.

The invasion was internationally condemned as a war of aggression. [248] [249] A United Nations General Assembly resolution demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces, the International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed new sanctions, which affected the economies of Russia and the world, [250] and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. [251] In September 2022, Putin signed a law that would punish anyone who resists conscription with a 10-year prison sentence [252] resulting in an international push to allow asylum for Russians fleeing conscription. [253]

Human rights violations

The war has been accompanied by violations of human rights. From 2014 to 2021, there were more than 3,000 civilian casualties, with most occurring in 2014 and 2015. [254] The right of movement was impeded for the inhabitants of the conflict zone. [255] Arbitrary detention was practiced by both sides in the first years of the conflict. It decreased after 2016 in government-held areas, while in the separatist-held ones it continued. [256] The investigation into the abuses, including torture, committed by both sides made little progress. [257] [258] According to OHCHR the closure of three TV channels amounted to a violation of the freedom of expression. [257] There were cases of conflict-related sexual violence, however OHCHR believes that "there are no grounds to believe that sexual violence has been used for strategic or tactical ends by Government forces or the armed groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine." [259] OHCHR estimates that from 2014 to 2021 around 4,000 detainees were subjected to torture and ill-treatment, approximately 1,500 by government actors and 2,500 by separatist armed groups, and reckons that around 340 of them were also victims of sexual violence. [260]

Gas disputes

Major Russian natural gas pipelines to Europe Major russian gas pipelines to europe.png
Major Russian natural gas pipelines to Europe
Europe TTF natural gas TTF natural gas.webp
  Europe TTF natural gas

Until 2014 Ukraine was the main transit route for Russian natural gas sold to Europe, which earned Ukraine about US$3 billion a year in transit fees, making it the country's most lucrative export service. [261] Following Russia's launch of the Nord Stream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine, gas transit volumes steadily decreased. [261] Following the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2014, severe tensions extended to the gas sector. [262] [263] The subsequent outbreak of war in the Donbas region forced the suspension of a project to develop Ukraine's own shale gas reserves at the Yuzivska gas field, which had been planned as a way to reduce Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas imports. [264] Eventually, the EU commissioner for energy Günther Oettinger was called in to broker a deal securing supplies to Ukraine and transit to the EU. [265]

An explosion damaged a Ukrainian portion of the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod pipeline in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast in May 2014. Ukrainian officials blamed Russian terrorists. [266] Another section of the pipeline exploded in the Poltava Oblast on 17 June 2014, one day after Russia limited the supply of gas to Ukrainian customers due to non-payment. Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said the following day that the explosion had been caused by a bomb. [267]

In 2015, Russian state media reported that Russia planned to completely abandon gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine after 2018. [268] [269] Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom had already substantially reduced the volumes of gas transited across Ukraine, and expressed its intention to reduce the level further by means of transit-diversification pipelines (Turkish Stream, Nord Stream, etc.). [270] Gazprom and Ukraine agreed to a five-year deal on Russian gas transit to Europe at the end of 2019. [271] [272]

In 2020, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey changed the regional gas flows in South-East Europe by diverting the transit through Ukraine and the Trans Balkan Pipeline system. [273] [274]

In May 2021, the Biden administration waived Trump's CAATSA sanctions on the company behind Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany. [275] [276] Ukrainian President Zelenskyy said he was "surprised" and "disappointed" by Joe Biden's decision. [277] In July 2021, the U.S. urged Ukraine not to criticise a forthcoming agreement with Germany over the pipeline. [278] [279]

In July 2021, Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel concluded a deal that the U.S. might trigger sanctions if Russia used Nord Stream as a "political weapon". The deal aimed to prevent Poland and Ukraine from being cut off from Russian gas supplies. Ukraine will get a $50 million loan for green technology until 2024 and Germany will set up a billion dollar fund to promote Ukraine's transition to green energy to compensate for the loss of the gas-transit fees. The contract for transiting Russian gas through Ukraine will be prolonged until 2034, if the Russian government agrees. [280] [281] [282]

In August 2021, Zelenskyy warned that the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany was "a dangerous weapon, not only for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe." [283] [284] In September 2021, Ukraine's Naftogaz CEO Yuriy Vitrenko accused Russia of using natural gas as a "geopolitical weapon". [285] Vitrenko stated that "A joint statement from the United States and Germany said that if the Kremlin used gas as a weapon, there would be an appropriate response. We are now waiting for the imposition of sanctions on a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom, the operator of Nord Stream 2." [286]

Hybrid warfare

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has also included elements of hybrid warfare using non-traditional means. Cyberwarfare has been used by Russia in operations including the Ukraine power grid hack in December 2015 and 2016, which was the first successful cyber attack on a power grid, [287] and the Mass hacker supply-chain attack in June 2017, which the US claimed was the largest known cyber attack. [288] In retaliation, Ukrainian operations have included the Surkov Leaks in October 2016 which released 2,337 e-mails in relation to Russian plans for seizing Crimea from Ukraine and fomenting separatist unrest in Donbas. [289] The Russian information war against Ukraine has been another front of hybrid warfare waged by Russia.

A Russian fifth column in Ukraine has also been claimed to exist among the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Russian Orthodox Church. [290] [291] [292]

Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns

Pro-Kremlin TV and radio host Vladimir Solovyov voiced support for his country's invasion of Ukraine. Interv'iu Vladimira Putina VGTRK 02.jpeg
Pro-Kremlin TV and radio host Vladimir Solovyov voiced support for his country's invasion of Ukraine.

False stories have been used to provoke public outrage during the war. In April 2014, Russian news channels Russia-1 and NTV showed a man saying he was attacked by a fascist Ukrainian gang on one channel and on the other channel saying he was funding the training of right-wing anti-Russia radicals. [294] [295] A third segment portrayed the man as a neo-Nazi surgeon. [296] In May 2014, Russia-1 aired a story about Ukrainian atrocities using footage of a 2012 Russian operation in North Caucasus. [297] In the same month, the Russian news network Life presented a 2013 photograph of a wounded child in Syria as a victim of Ukrainian troops who had just retaken Donetsk International Airport. [298]

In June 2014, several Russian state news outlets reported that Ukraine was using white phosphorus using 2004 footage of white phosphorus being used by the United States in Iraq. [297] In July 2014, Channel One Russia broadcast an interview with a woman who said that a 3-year-old boy who spoke Russian was crucified by Ukrainian nationalists in a fictitious square in Sloviansk that turned out to be false. [299] [300] [295] [297]

In 2022, Russian state media told stories of genocide and mass graves full of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine. One set of graves outside Luhansk was dug when intense fighting in 2014 cut off the electricity in the local morgue. Amnesty International investigated 2014 Russian claims of mass graves filled with hundreds of bodies and instead found isolated incidents of extrajudicial executions by both sides. [301] [302] [303]

Russian artist Alexandra Skochilenko was arrested for replacing price tags in supermarkets with anti-war messages. Skochilenko.jpg
Russian artist Alexandra Skochilenko was arrested for replacing price tags in supermarkets with anti-war messages.

The Russian censorship apparatus Roskomnadzor ordered the country's media to employ information only from Russian state sources or face fines and blocks, [305] and ordered media and schools to describe the war as a "special military operation". [306] On 4 March 2022, Putin signed into law a bill introducing prison sentences of up to 15 years for those who publish "fake news" about the Russian military and its operations, [307] leading to some media outlets to stop reporting on Ukraine. [308] Russia's opposition politician Alexei Navalny said the "monstrosity of lies" in the Russian state media "is unimaginable. And, unfortunately, so is its persuasiveness for those who have no access to alternative information." [309] He tweeted that "warmongers" among Russian state media personalities "should be treated as war criminals. From the editors-in-chief to the talk show hosts to the news editors, [they] should be sanctioned now and tried someday." [310]

Putin and Russian media have described the government of Ukraine as being led by neo-Nazis persecuting ethnic Russians who are in need of protection by Russia, despite Ukraine's President Zelenskyy being Jewish. [311] [312] [302] According to journalist Natalia Antonova, "Russia's present-day war of aggression is refashioned by propaganda into a direct continuation of the legacy of the millions of Russian soldiers who died to stop" Nazi Germany in World War II. [313] Ukraine's rejection of the adoption of Russia-initiated General Assembly resolutions on combating the glorification of Nazism, the latest iteration of which is General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/76/L.57/Rev.1 on Combating Glorification of Nazism, Neo-Nazism and other Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, serve to present Ukraine as a pro-Nazi state, and indeed likely forms the basis for Russia's claims, with the only other state rejecting the adoption of the resolution being the US. [314] [315] The Deputy US Representative for ECOSOC describes such resolutions as "thinly veiled attempts to legitimize Russian disinformation campaigns denigrating neighboring nations and promoting the distorted Soviet narrative of much of contemporary European history, using the cynical guise of halting Nazi glorification". [316]

NAFO ('North Atlantic Fellas Organization'), a loose cadre of online 'shitposters' vowing to fight Russian disinformation generally identified by cartoon Shiba Inu dogs in social media, gained notoriety after June 2022, in the wake of a Twitter quarrel with Russian diplomat Mikhail Ulyanov. [317]

Russia–NATO relations

Russian military aircraft flying over the Baltic and Black Seas often do not indicate their position or communicate with air traffic controllers, thus posing a potential risk to civilian airliners. NATO aircraft scrambled many times in late April 2022 in order to track and intercept these aircraft near alliance airspace. The Russian aircraft intercepted never entered NATO airspace, and the interceptions were conducted in a safe and routine manner. [318] Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has characterized the conflict as a proxy war instigated by NATO, [319] he said: "We don't think we're at war with NATO ... Unfortunately, NATO believes it is at war with Russia." [320] British Prime Minister Boris Johnson rejected Lavrov's allegation that NATO is fighting a 'proxy war' in Ukraine. [321] Former CIA director Leon Panetta told the ABC that the U.S. is 'without question' involved in a proxy war with Russia. [322]

International reactions

Reactions to the Russian annexation of Crimea

Ukrainian response

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine blocked the North Crimean Canal, which provided 85% of Crimea's drinking and irrigation water. Bezvodnyi Severo-Krymskii kanal.jpg
Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine blocked the North Crimean Canal, which provided 85% of Crimea's drinking and irrigation water.

Interim Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov accused Russia of "provoking a conflict" by backing the seizure of the Crimean parliament building and other government offices on the Crimean peninsula. He compared Russia's military actions to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, when Russian troops occupied parts of the Republic of Georgia and the breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were established under the control of Russian-backed administrations. He called on Putin to withdraw Russian troops from Crimea and stated that Ukraine will "preserve its territory" and "defend its independence". [324] On 1 March, he warned, "Military intervention would be the beginning of war and the end of any relations between Ukraine and Russia." [325] On 1 March, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov placed the Armed Forces of Ukraine on full alert and combat readiness. [326]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs was established by Ukrainian government on 20 April 2016 to manage occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea regions affected by Russian military intervention of 2014. [327]

NATO and United States military response

A U.S. Army convoy in Vilseck, Germany during Operation Atlantic Resolve, NATO's efforts to reassert its military presence in central and eastern Europe that began in April 2014. 2CR returns home to Vilseck (16999448822).jpg
A U.S. Army convoy in Vilseck, Germany during Operation Atlantic Resolve, NATO's efforts to reassert its military presence in central and eastern Europe that began in April 2014.

On 4 March 2014, the United States pledged $1 billion in aid to Ukraine. [328] Russia's actions increased tensions in nearby countries historically within its sphere of influence, particularly the Baltic and Moldova. All have large Russian-speaking populations, and Russian troops are stationed in the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transnistria. [329] Some devoted resources to increasing defensive capabilities, [330] and many requested increased support from the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which they had joined in recent years. [329] [330] The conflict "reinvigorated" NATO, which had been created to face the Soviet Union, but had devoted more resources to "expeditionary missions" in recent years. [331]

In addition to diplomatic support in its conflict with Russia, the U.S. provided Ukraine with US$1.5 billion in military aid during the 2010s. [332] In 2018 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a provision blocking any training of Azov Battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard by American forces. In previous years, between 2014 and 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed amendments banning support of Azov, but due to pressure from the Pentagon, the amendments were quietly lifted. [333] [334] [335]

Financial markets

The initial reaction to the escalation of tensions in Crimea caused the Russian and European stock market to tumble. [336] The intervention caused the Swiss franc to climb to a 2-year high against the dollar and 1-year high against the Euro. The Euro and the US dollar both rose, as did the Australian dollar. [337] The Russian stock market declined by more than 10 percent, while the Russian ruble hit all-time lows against the US dollar and the Euro. [338] [339] [340] The Russian central bank hiked interest rates and intervened in the foreign exchange markets to the tune of $12 billion[ clarification needed ] to try to stabilize its currency. [337] Prices for wheat and grain rose, with Ukraine being a major exporter of both crops. [341]

Later in March 2014, the reaction of the financial markets to the Crimea annexation was surprisingly mellow, with global financial markets rising immediately after the referendum held in Crimea, one explanation being that the sanctions were already priced in following the earlier Russian incursion. [342] Other observers considered that the positive reaction of the global financial markets on Monday 17 March 2014, after the announcement of sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US, revealed that these sanctions were too weak to hurt Russia. [343] In early August 2014, the German DAX was down by 6 percent for the year, and 11 percent since June, over concerns Russia, Germany's 13th biggest trade partner, would retaliate against sanctions. [344]

Reactions to the Russian intervention in the Donbas

Peace march in Moscow, 21 September 2014 Marsh mira Moskva 21 sent 2014 L1450559.jpg
Peace march in Moscow, 21 September 2014
Pro-Russian supporters in Donetsk, 20 December 2014 2014-12-20. Prazdnik solidarnosti 054.jpg
Pro-Russian supporters in Donetsk, 20 December 2014

Ukrainian public opinion

A poll of the Ukrainian public, excluding Russian-annexed Crimea, was taken by the International Republican Institute from 12 to 25 September 2014. [345] 89% of those polled opposed 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine. As broken down by region, 78% of those polled from Eastern Ukraine (including Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) opposed said intervention, along with 89% in Southern Ukraine, 93% in Central Ukraine, and 99% in Western Ukraine. [345] As broken down by native language, 79% of Russian speakers and 95% of Ukrainian speakers opposed the intervention. 80% of those polled said the country should remain a unitary country. [345]

A poll of the Crimean public in Russian-annexed Crimea was taken by the Ukrainian branch of Germany's biggest market research organization, GfK, on 16–22 January 2015. According to its results: "Eighty-two percent of those polled said they fully supported Crimea's inclusion in Russia, and another 11 percent expressed partial support. Only 4 percent spoke out against it." [346] [347] [348]

A joint poll conducted by Levada and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology from September to October 2020 found that in the breakaway regions controlled by the DPR/LNR, just over half of the respondents wanted to join Russia (either with or without some autonomous status) while less than one-tenth wanted independence and 12% wanted reintegration into Ukraine. It contrasted with respondents in Kyiv-controlled Donbas, where a vast majority felt the separatist regions should be returned to Ukraine. [349] According to results from Levada in January 2022, roughly 70% of those in the breakaway regions said their territories should become part of the Russian Federation. [350]

Russian public opinion

An August 2014 survey by the Levada Centre reported that only 13% of those Russians polled would support the Russian government in an open war with Ukraine. [351] Street protests against the war in Ukraine arose in Russia. Notable protests first occurred in March [352] [353] and large protests occurred in September when "tens of thousands" protested the war in Ukraine with a peace march in downtown Moscow on Sunday, 21 September 2014, "under heavy police supervision". [354]

Reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukrainian public opinion

Ukrainian refugees in Krakow protest against the war, 6 March 2022 02022 1199 Refugees from Ukraine in Krakow.jpg
Ukrainian refugees in Kraków protest against the war, 6 March 2022

In March 2022, a week after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 98% of Ukrainians – including 82% of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine – said they did not believe that any part of Ukraine was rightfully part of Russia, according to Lord Ashcroft's polls which did not include Crimea and the separatist-controlled part of Donbas. 97% of Ukrainians said they had an unfavourable view of Russian President Vladimir Putin, with a further 94% saying they had an unfavourable view of the Russian Armed Forces. [355]

At the end of 2021, 75% of Ukrainians said they had a positive attitude toward ordinary Russians, while in May 2022, 82% of Ukrainians said they had a negative attitude toward ordinary Russians. [356]

Russian public opinion

An April 2022 survey by the Levada Centre reported that approximately 74% of the Russians polled supported the "special military operation" in Ukraine, suggesting that Russian public opinion has shifted considerably since 2014. [357] According to some sources, a reason many Russians supported the "special military operation" has to do with the propaganda and disinformation. [358] [359] In addition, it has been suggested that some respondents did not want to answer pollsters' questions for fear of negative consequences. [360] [361] At the end of March, a poll conducted in Russia by the Levada Center concluded the following: When asked why they think the military operation is taking place, respondents said it was to protect and defend civilians, ethnic Russians or Russian speakers in Ukraine (43%), to prevent an attack on Russia (25%), to get rid of nationalists and "denazify" Ukraine (21%), and to incorporate Ukraine and/or the Donbas region into Russia (3%)." [362]

United States

On 28 April 2022, US President Joe Biden asked Congress for an additional $33 billion to assist Ukraine, including $20 billion to provide weapons to Ukraine. [363] On 5 May, Ukraine's Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Ukraine had received more than $12 billion worth of weapons and financial aid from Western countries since the start of Russia's invasion on 24 February. [364] On 21 May 2022, the United States passed legislation providing $40 billion in new military and humanitarian foreign aid to Ukraine, marking a historically large commitment of funds. [365] [366] In August 2022, U.S. defense spending to counter the Russian war effort exceeded the first 5 years of war costs in Afghanistan. The Washington Post reported that new U.S. weapons delivered to the Ukrainian war front suggest a closer combat scenario with more casualties. [367] The United States looks to build "enduring strength in Ukraine" with increased arms shipments and a record-breaking $3 billion military aid package. [367]

Russian military suppliers

After expending large amounts of heavy weapons and munitions over months, the Russian Federation received combat drones and loitering munitions from Iran, deliveries of tanks and other armoured vehicles from Belarus, and reportedly planned to trade for artillery ammunition from North Korea and ballistic missiles from Iran. [368] [369] [370] [371]

See also


  1. There remain "some contradictions and inherent problems" regarding the date on which the annexation began. [1] Ukraine claims 20 February 2014 as "the beginning of the temporary occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia", citing the timeframe inscribed on the Russian medal "For the Return of Crimea", [2] and in 2015 the Ukrainian parliament officially designated the date as such. [3] On 20 February 2014, Vladimir Konstantinov who at that time was a chairman of the republican council of Crimea and representing the Party of Regions expressed his thoughts about secession of the region from Ukraine. [4] On 23 February 2014 the Russian ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov was recalled to Moscow due to a "worsening of [the] situation in Ukraine". In early March 2015, President Putin stated in a Russian movie about the annexation of Crimea that he ordered the operation to "restore" Crimea to Russia following an all-night emergency meeting on 22–23 February 2014, [1] [5] and in 2018 the Russian Foreign Minister claimed that the earlier "start date" on the medal was due to a "technical misunderstanding". [6]
  2. For further details, see Belarusian involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
  3. Russian: pоссийско-украинская война, romanized: rossiysko-ukrainskaya voyna; Ukrainian: російсько-українська війна, romanized: rosiisko-ukrainska viina.
  4. Many countries have provided various levels of support to Ukraine short of becoming belligerents in the war, while Belarus has provided Russian forces territorial access for the 2022 invasion.

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Donbas</span> Region in eastern Ukraine

The Donbas or Donbass is a historical, cultural, and economic region in eastern Ukraine. Parts of the Donbas are controlled by Russian separatist groups as a result of the Russo-Ukrainian War: the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russia–Ukraine relations</span> Bilateral relations

There are no diplomatic or bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia. The two countries have been in a state of war since 24 February 2022. Following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula was occupied by unmarked Russian forces, and later annexed by Russia, while pro-Russia separatists simultaneously engaged the Ukrainian military in an armed conflict for control over eastern Ukraine; these events marked the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War. In a major escalation of the conflict on 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of the Ukrainian mainland across a broad front, causing Ukraine to sever all formal diplomatic ties with Russia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine</span> Anti-government demonstrations in Ukraine

From the end of February 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups took place in major cities across the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity, which resulted in the success of Euromaidan in ousting then-President Viktor Yanukovych. The unrest, supported by Russia in the midst of the Russo-Ukrainian War, has been referred to in Russia as the "Russian Spring".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">National Guard of Ukraine</span> Militarised police force in Ukraine

The National Guard of Ukraine is the Ukrainian national gendarmerie and internal military force. It is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for public security. Originally created as an agency under the direct control of the Verkhovna Rada on 4 November 1991, following Ukrainian independence. It was later disbanded and merged into the Internal Troops of Ukraine on 11 January 2000 by then-President Leonid Kuchma as part of a "cost-saving" scheme. Following the early 2014 Ukrainian revolution on 13 March 2014, amidst the Russian intervention, the National Guard was reestablished, and the Internal Troops were disbanded.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Donetsk People's Republic</span> Disputed Russian republic in eastern Ukraine

The Donetsk People's Republic is a disputed entity created by Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine. It began as a breakaway state (2014–2022) and was later annexed by Russia (2022–present). The DPR claims Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast. The city of Donetsk is the contested administrative centre of the region.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">War in Donbas (2014–2022)</span> 2014–2022 conflict between Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists

The War in Donbas was an armed conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine, part of the broader Russo-Ukrainian War. In March 2014, immediately following the Euromaidan protest movement and subsequent Revolution of Dignity, protests by pro-Russian, anti-government separatist groups arose in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, collectively called the Donbas. These demonstrations began around the same time as Russia's annexation of Crimea, and were part of wider pro-Russian protests across southern and eastern Ukraine. Declaring the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, armed Russian-backed separatist groups seized government buildings throughout the Donbas, leading to armed conflict with Ukrainian government forces.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Little green men (Russo-Ukrainian War)</span> Troops without insignia, participated in the 2014 Crimean crisis

The phrase "little green men" refers to masked soldiers of the Russian Federation in unmarked green army uniforms and carrying modern Russian military weapons and equipment who appeared during the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Minsk agreements</span> Series of agreements to stop the Donbas War

The Minsk agreements were a series of international agreements which sought to end the Donbas war fought between armed Russian separatist groups and Armed Forces of Ukraine, with Russian regular forces playing a central part. The first, known as the Minsk Protocol, was drafted in 2014 by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with mediation by the leaders of France and Germany in the so-called Normandy Format. After extensive talks in Minsk, Belarus, the agreement was signed on 5 September 2014 by representatives of the Trilateral Contact Group and, without recognition of their status, by the then-leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). This agreement followed multiple previous attempts to stop the fighting in the region and aimed to implement an immediate ceasefire.

Many states and international organisations have reacted to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War in the Donbas region of Ukraine, which began in April 2014. In August 2014 when the intervention of Russian troops in Donbas scaled up, many states condemned this violation of Ukraine's sovereignty.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anti-terrorist Operation Zone</span> Official name for territory where the War in Donbass takes place

Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone, or ATO zone, is a term used by the media, publicity, the government of Ukraine, and the OSCE and other foreign institutions to identify Ukrainian territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (oblasts) under the control of Russian military forces and pro-Russian separatists. A significant part of ATO zone is considered temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine</span>

Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine are areas of Ukraine that are currently de facto controlled by the Russian government in the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war. In Ukrainian law, they are defined as the "temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine". Ukrainian law made no distinction between Russian and "pro-Russian" administrations before the Russian government claimed to "annex" them in September 2022.

Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War included six deaths during the 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, 14,200–14,400 civilians and military troops killed during the War in Donbas (2014–2022), and tens of thousands of deaths during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Events in the year 2021 in Ukraine.

The combatants of the war in Donbas include foreign and domestic forces.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine</span>

In March and April 2021, the Russian Armed Forces began massing thousands of personnel and military equipment near Russia's border with Ukraine and in Crimea, representing the largest mobilization since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. This precipitated an international crisis due to concerns over a potential invasion. Satellite imagery showed movements of armour, missiles, and heavy weaponry. The troops were partially withdrawn by June 2021, though the infrastructure was left in place. A second build-up began in October 2021, this time with more soldiers and with deployments on new fronts; by December over 100,000 Russian troops were massed around Ukraine on three sides, including Belarus from the north and Crimea from the south. Despite the Russian military build-ups, Russian officials from November 2021 to 20 February 2022 repeatedly denied that Russia had plans to invade Ukraine.

Many states, international organizations, and civil society actors worldwide had expressed their reactions to the then-escalating crisis between Russia and Ukraine that started in March 2021. The crisis eventually culminated in a Russian invasion of Ukraine, beginning on 24 February 2022.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine</span> Escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. The invasion has likely resulted in tens of thousands of deaths on both sides and caused Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II, with an estimated 8 million people being displaced within the country by late May as well as 7.8 million Ukrainians fleeing the country as of 8 November 2022. Within five weeks of the invasion, Russia experienced its greatest emigration since the 1917 October Revolution. The invasion has also caused global food shortages.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Timeline of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine</span>

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">On conducting a special military operation</span> 2022 speech by Russian president Vladimir Putin

"On conducting a special military operation" was a televised address by Russian president Vladimir Putin on 24 February 2022, immediately preceding the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, addressed to the citizens of Russia and Ukraine, and the military personnel of both the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Russian Armed Forces. The speech was intended to sway public opinion by describing Putin's motivations and goals for the operation. To justify the invasion, Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine was a neo-Nazi state and made references to Article 51 of the UN Charter, referencing self-defense.

This timeline of the first phase of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 24 February 2022, when Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine, to 7 April 2022 when fighting focused away from the Northeast and Kyiv and towards the south and east of Ukraine.


  1. 1 2 McDermott, Roger N. (2016). "Brothers Disunited: Russia's use of military power in Ukraine". In Black, J.L.; Johns, Michael (eds.). The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. London. pp. 99–129. doi:10.4324/9781315684567-5. ISBN   978-1-138-92409-3. OCLC   909325250.
  2. "7683rd meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Thursday, 28 April 2016, 3 p.m. New York". Mr. Prystaiko (Ukraine): ... In that regard, I have to remind the Council that the official medal that was produced by the Russian Federation for the so-called return of Crimea has the dates on it, starting with 20 February, which is the day before that agreement was brought to the attention of the Security Council by the representative of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Russian Federation started – not just planned, but started – the annexation of Crimea the day before we reached the first agreement and while President Yanukovych was still in power.
  3. "'Няша' Поклонська обіцяє бійцям 'Беркута' покарати учасників Майдану". (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 3 February 2022.
  4. "Спікер ВР АРК вважає, що Крим може відокремитися від України". Українська правда (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 3 February 2022.
  5. "Putin describes secret operation to seize Crimea". Yahoo News. 8 March 2015. Retrieved 24 March 2015.
  6. "Russia's Orwellian 'diplomacy'". Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  7. Revisiting Ukraine's Nuclear Past Will Not Help Secure Its Future, Mariana Budjeryn, Lawfare. May 21, 2021
  8. Budjeryn, Mariana. "Issue Brief #3: The Breach: Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum" (PDF). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars . Retrieved 6 March 2022.
  9. Vasylenko, Volodymyr (15 December 2009). "On assurances without guarantees in a 'shelved document'". The Day. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  10. Harahan, Joseph P. (2014). "With Courage and Persistence: Eliminating and Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction with the Nunn-Luger Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs" (PDF). DTRA History Series. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. ASIN   B01LYEJ56H. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  11. "Istanbul Document 1999". Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 19 November 1999. Archived from the original on 1 June 2014. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
  12. Wiegrefe, Klaus (15 February 2022). "NATO's Eastward Expansion: Is Vladimir Putin Right?". Der Spiegel. ISSN   2195-1349 . Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  13. Hall, Gavin E. L. (14 February 2022). "Ukraine: the history behind Russia's claim that Nato promised not to expand to the east". The Conversation . Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  14. Leung, Rebecca (11 February 2009). "Yushchenko: 'Live And Carry On'". CBS News . CBS. Archived from the original on 25 October 2012. Retrieved 17 April 2020.
  15. "Study: Dioxin that poisoned Yushchenko made in lab". Kyiv Post . London: Businessgroup. Associated Press. 5 August 2009. ISSN   1563-6429. Archived from the original on 31 January 2022. Retrieved 29 January 2022.
  16. "Yushchenko to Russia: Hand over witnesses". Kyiv Post . Businessgroup. 28 October 2009. ISSN   1563-6429. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 11 February 2010.
  17. "The Supreme Court findings" (in Ukrainian). Supreme Court of Ukraine. 3 December 2004. Archived from the original on 25 July 2013. Retrieved 7 July 2008.
  18. "Ukraine-Independent Ukraine". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica. 15 January 2008. Archived from the original on 15 January 2008. Retrieved 14 January 2008.
  19. Cordesman, Anthony H. (28 May 2014). "Russia and the 'Color Revolution'". Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  20. "Putin calls 'color revolutions' an instrument of destabilization – Dec. 15, 2011". Kyiv Post . Interfax Ukraine. 15 December 2011. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  21. "Антиоранжевый митинг проходит на Поклонной горе" [Anti-orange rally takes place on Poklonnaya Hill] (in Russian). RIA Novosti. 4 February 2012. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  22. "We are at war with the West. The European security order is illegitimate". Russian International Affairs Council . 15 April 2022.
  23. Brown, Colin (3 April 2008). "EU allies unite against Bush over Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine". The Independent . p. 24.
  24. Evans, Michael (5 April 2008). "President tells summit he wants security and friendship". The Times . p. 46. President Putin, in a bravura performance before the world's media at the end of the Nato summit, warned President Bush and other alliance leaders that their plan to expand eastwards to Ukraine and Georgia "didn't contribute to trust and predictability in our relations.
  25. Wong, Edward; Jakes, Lara (13 January 2022). "NATO Won't Let Ukraine Join Soon. Here's Why". The New York Times . Retrieved 12 March 2022.
  26. "Yanukovych tops list of presidential candidates in Ukraine – poll". Ukrainian Independent Information Agency. 2 June 2009. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 13 June 2009.
  27. Harding, Luke (8 February 2010). "Yanukovych set to become president as observers say Ukraine election was fair". The Guardian . Kyiv. ISSN   1756-3224. OCLC   60623878. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022.
  28. "Parliament passes statement on Ukraine's aspirations for European integration". Kyiv Post . 22 February 2013.
  29. Dinan, Desmond; Nugent, Neil (eds.). The European Union in Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 3, 274.
  30. "Rada removes Yanukovych from office, schedules new elections for May 25". Interfax-Ukraine . 24 February 2014. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
  31. 1 2 "Ukraine President Yanukovich impeached". Al Jazeera. 22 February 2014. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
  32. Sindelar, Daisy (23 February 2014). "Was Yanukovych's Ouster Constitutional?". Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty ( Retrieved 25 February 2014.
  33. Feffer, John (14 March 2014). "Who Are These 'People,' Anyway?". The Huffington Post. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
  34. Traynor, Ian (24 February 2014). "Western nations scramble to contain fallout from Ukraine crisis". The Guardian. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
  35. На отмену закона о региональных языках на Украине наложат вето [The abolition of the law on regional languages in Ukraine will be vetoed] (in Russian). 1 March 2014. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
  36. Ayres, Sabra (28 February 2014). "Is it too late for Kyiv to woo Russian-speaking Ukraine?". The Christian Science Monitor . Retrieved 25 February 2015.
  37. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Kofman, Michael (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. ISBN   978-0-8330-9617-3. OCLC   990544142. By March 26, the annexation was essentially complete, and Russia began returning seized military hardware to Ukraine.
  38. Polityuk, Pavel; Robinson, Matt (22 February 2014). Roche, Andrew (ed.). "Ukraine parliament removes Yanukovich, who flees Kyiv in "coup"". Reuters . Gabriela Baczynska, Marcin Goettig, Peter Graff, Giles Elgood. Retrieved 18 November 2020.
  39. "Янукович пошел по стопам Ющенко – суды опять отбирают маяки у российских военных" [Yanukovych followed in Yushchenko's footsteps – courts again take away beacons from Russian military]. DELO (in Russian). 11 August 2011. Retrieved 26 November 2020.
  40. Chris Stephen (16 January 2006). "Russian anger as Ukraine seizes lighthouse". Irish Times. Retrieved 20 May 2022.
  41. "Bound by treaty: Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea". Deutsche Welle. 11 March 2014. Retrieved 17 December 2020.
  42. "Янукович віддав крим російському флоту ще на 25 років". Українська правда (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 3 February 2022.
  43. Putin's Ukraine invasion – do declarations of war still exist?, R. Pullen, C. Frost, The Conversation, March 3, 2022]
  44. Ukraine's envoy says Russia 'declared war', The Economic Times, February 24, 2022]
  45. 'No other option': Excerpts of Putin's speech declaring war, AlJazeera, February 24, 2022
  46. Battles flare across Ukraine after Putin declares war Battles flare as Putin declares war, Zoya Sheftalovic,, February 24, 2022
  47. Verkhovna Rada recognized Russia as a terrorist state,, April 15, 2022
  48. Cathcart, Will (25 April 2014). "Putin's Crimean Medal of Honor, Forged Before the War Even Began" . The Daily Beast. Retrieved 3 February 2022.
  49. "В России учредили медаль За возвращение Крыма". (in Russian). Retrieved 3 February 2022.
  50. 1 2 "The Russian Invasion of the Crimean Peninsula 2014–2015" (PDF). Johns Hopkins University . Retrieved 24 September 2021.
  51. "10 facts you should know about russian military aggression against Ukraine". Ukraine government. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 September 2021.
  52. "Armed men seize two airports in Ukraine's Crimea, Russia denies involvement — Yahoo News". Retrieved 14 September 2014.
  53. Birnbaum, Michael (15 March 2015). "Putin Details Crimea Takeover Before First Anniversary". The Washington Post. Retrieved 11 June 2015.
  54. Mackinnon, Mark (26 February 2014). "Globe in Ukraine: Russian-backed fighters restrict access to Crimean city". Toronto: The Globe & Mail. Retrieved 2 March 2014.
  55. "Russia flexes military muscle as tensions rise in Ukraine's Crimea". CNN. 26 February 2014. Retrieved 2 March 2014. A CNN team in the area encountered more than one pro-Russian militia checkpoint on the road from Sevastopol to Simferopol.
  56. "Checkpoints put at all entrances to Sevastopol". Kyiv Post. 26 February 2014. Archived from the original on 26 February 2014. Retrieved 23 April 2014. Checkpoints were put up at all entrances to Sevastopol last night and the borders to the city are guarded by groups of people, police units, and traffic police.
  57. 1 2 "Russian parliament approves use of armed forces in Crimea". 26 February 2014. Retrieved 24 September 2021.
  58. Jen Weedon, FireEye (2015). "Beyond 'Cyber War': Russia's Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage and Information Operations in Ukraine". In Kenneth Geers (ed.). Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications. ISBN   978-9949-9544-5-2. Archived from the original on 16 August 2016. Retrieved 10 May 2016.
  59. "Ukraine Parliament declares Crimea temporarily occupied territory". IANS. Retrieved 15 April 2014.
  60. ""Russia Threatens Nuclear Strikes Over Crimea"". The Diplomat. 11 July 2014. Retrieved 22 September 2021.
  61. "Putin: Russia to set up military force in Crimea". ITV. 19 August 2014. Retrieved 28 August 2014.
  62. 1 2 "Ukraine crisis: Russian troops crossed border, Nato says". BBC News. 12 November 2014. Retrieved 11 January 2015.
  63. "Doorstep statement". NATO Allies have provided training to Ukrainian forces since 2014. In particular, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, have conducted significant training in Ukraine since the illegal annexation of Crimea, but also some EU NATO members have been part of these efforts.
  64. 1 2 Platonova, Daria (2022). The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine : elites, protest, and partition. Abingdon, Oxon. ISBN   978-1-003-21371-0. OCLC   1249709944.
  65. 1 2 3 Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. pp. 33–34.
  66. Wilson, Andrew (20 April 2016). "The Donbas in 2014: Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, but not Civil War". Europe-Asia Studies. 68 (4): 631–652. doi:10.1080/09668136.2016.1176994. ISSN   0966-8136. S2CID   148334453.
  67. Karber, Phillip A. (29 September 2015). "Lessons Learned" from the Russo-Ukrainian War (Report). The Potomac Foundation.
  68. Freedman, Lawrence (2 November 2014). "Ukraine and the Art of Limited War". Survival. 56 (6): 13. doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.985432. ISSN   0039-6338. S2CID   154981360.
  69. "Russia's buildup near Ukraine may reach 40,000 troops: U.S. sources". Reuters. 28 March 2014. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
  70. Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. p. 38.
  71. Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. pp. 43–44.
  72. "Strelkov/Girkin Demoted, Transnistrian Siloviki Strengthened in 'Donetsk People's Republic'". Jamestown. Retrieved 3 February 2022.
  73. 1 2 "Pushing locals aside, Russians take top rebel posts in east Ukraine". Reuters. 27 July 2014. Retrieved 27 July 2014.
  74. Matsuzato, Kimitaka (22 March 2017). "The Donbass War: Outbreak and Deadlock". Demokratizatsiya. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 25 (2): 175–202. ISBN   978-1-4008-8731-6.
  75. Wilson, Andrew (20 April 2016). "The Donbas in 2014: Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, but not Civil War". Europe-Asia Studies. 68 (4): 647–648. doi:10.1080/09668136.2016.1176994. ISSN   0966-8136. S2CID   148334453.
  76. 1 2 "Rebels appeal to join Russia after east Ukraine referendum". Reuters. 12 May 2014.
  77. "Ukraine rebels hold referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk". BBC News. 11 May 2014.
  78. "Rebels declare victory in East Ukraine vote on self-rule". Reuters. 11 May 2014.
  79. Holcomb, Franklin (2017). The Kremlin's Irregular Army (PDF). Institute for the Study of War.
  80. "Ukraine reinstates conscription as crisis deepens". 2 May 2017. Retrieved 4 October 2021.
  81. Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. p. 69.
  82. Fedorov, Yury E. (15 January 2019). "Russia's 'Hybrid' Aggression Against Ukraine". Routledge Handbook of Russian Security. Routledge. ISBN   978-1-351-18122-8.
  83. Karber, Phillip A. (29 September 2015). "Lessons Learned" from the Russo-Ukrainian War (Report). The Potomac Foundation. p. 34.
  84. Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. p. 43.
  85. Loshkariov, Ivan D.; Sushentsov, Andrey A. (2 January 2016). "Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from 'accidental' diaspora to rebel movement". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. Informa UK Limited. 16 (1): 71–90. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1149349. ISSN   1468-3857. S2CID   147321629.
  86. "ATO forces take over Debaltseve, Shakhtarsk, Torez, Lutuhyne, fighting for Pervomaisk and Snizhne underway – ATO press center". Interfax-Ukraine News Agency. 28 July 2014. Retrieved 28 July 2014.
  87. "Here's Why Putin Calling Eastern Ukraine 'Novorossiya' Is Important". The Huffington Post. 18 April 2014. Retrieved 28 August 2014.
  88. Herszenhorn, David M. (17 April 2014). "Away From Show of Diplomacy in Geneva, Putin Puts on a Show of His Own". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 August 2014.
  89. Luhn, Alec; Roberts, Dan (23 August 2014). "Ukraine condemns 'direct invasion' as Russian aid convoy crosses border". The Guardian . Retrieved 28 August 2014.
  90. Dolgov, Anna (21 November 2014). "Russia's Igor Strelkov: I Am Responsible for War in Eastern Ukraine". The Moscow Times . Retrieved 11 April 2015.
  91. 1 2 Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. p. 44.
  92. "Putin's Number One Gunman in Ukraine Warns Him of Possible Defeat". The Daily Beast. 25 July 2014. Retrieved 2 August 2014.
  93. Snyder, Timothy (3 April 2018). The road to unfreedom : Russia, Europe, America (First ed.). New York, NY. p. 191. ISBN   978-0-525-57446-0. OCLC   1029484935.
  94. "Captured Russian troops 'in Ukraine by accident'". BBC News . 26 August 2014. Retrieved 13 March 2015.
  95. Walker, Shaun (26 August 2014). "Russia admits its soldiers have been caught in Ukraine". The Guardian . Kyiv. Retrieved 20 October 2022.
  96. Freedman, Lawrence (2 November 2014). "Ukraine and the Art of Limited War". Survival. 56 (6): 35. doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.985432. ISSN   0039-6338. S2CID   154981360.
  97. Wilson, Andrew (20 April 2016). "The Donbas in 2014: Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, but not Civil War". Europe-Asia Studies. 68 (4): 649. doi:10.1080/09668136.2016.1176994. ISSN   0966-8136. S2CID   148334453.
  98. Геращенко каже, що Росія напала на Україну ще 24 серпня — Новини Укрінформ. (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original on 8 December 2015. Retrieved 20 October 2015.
  99. В Амвросиевку вошли российские войска без знаков отличия. Liga Novosti (in Russian). 24 August 2014. Retrieved 20 October 2015.
  100. "Poroshenko: ATO Is Ukraine's Patriotic War". Archived from the original on 27 August 2014. Retrieved 11 April 2015. President Petro Poroshenko considers the government's anti-terrorist operation (ATO) against separatists as Ukraine's patriotic war.
  101. Gearin, Mary (24 August 2014). "Ukrainian POWs marched at bayonet-point through city". ABC (Australia) . Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  102. Jim Heintz (25 August 2014). "Ukraine: Russian Tank Column Enters Southeast". Abcnews. Archived from the original on 25 August 2014. Retrieved 26 August 2014.
  103. "Ukraine crisis: 'Column from Russia' crosses border". BBC News. 25 August 2014. Retrieved 26 August 2014.
  104. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson (26 August 2014). "Russian Separatists Open New Front in Southern Ukraine". National Public Radio (NPR). Archived from the original on 27 August 2014. Retrieved 26 August 2014.
  105. Kramer, Andrew. "Ukraine Says Russian Forces Lead Major New Offensive in East". CNBC. Archived from the original on 28 August 2014. Tanks, artillery and infantry have crossed from Russia into an unbreached part of eastern Ukraine in recent days, attacking Ukrainian forces and causing panic and wholesale retreat not only in this small border town but a wide swath of territory, in what Ukrainian and Western military officials are calling a stealth invasion.
  106. Tsevtkova, Maria (26 August 2014). "'Men in green' raise suspicions of east Ukrainian villagers". Reuters. Unidentified, heavily-armed strangers with Russian accents have appeared in an eastern Ukrainian village, arousing residents' suspicions despite Moscow's denials that its troops have deliberately infiltrated the frontier.
  107. Lowe, Christian; Tsvetkova, Maria (26 August 2014). "Exclusive – In Ukraine, an armoured column appears out of nowhere". Reuters. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
  108. Gowen, Annie; Gearan, Anne (28 August 2014). "Russian armored columns said to capture key Ukrainian towns". The Washington Post . Retrieved 30 August 2014.
  109. 1 2 "NATO: 1000 rosyjskich żołnierzy działa na Ukrainie. A Rosja znów: Nie przekraczaliśmy granicy [NA ŻYWO]". (in Polish). 28 August 2014. Archived from the original on 3 September 2014. Retrieved 14 October 2014.
  110. "BBC:Ukraine crisis: 'Thousands of Russians' fighting in east, August 28". BBC News. 28 August 2014. Retrieved 14 October 2014.
  111. "U.S. says Russia has 'outright lied' about Ukraine". USA Today. 28 August 2014. Retrieved 1 September 2014.
  112. "Сили АТО активно наступають. Терористи-найманці несуть чималі втрати". Міністерство оборони України.
  113. 1 2 3 Sanderson, Bill (21 September 2014). "Leaked transcripts reveal Putin's secret Ukraine attack – New York Post". New York Post.
  114. 1 2 Morgan, Martin (5 September 2014). "Russia 'will react' to EU sanctions". BBC News. Retrieved 6 September 2014.
  115. Alfred, Charlotte (6 September 2014). "Russian Journalist: 'Convincing Evidence' Moscow Sent Fighters To Ukraine". The Huffington Post. Retrieved 6 September 2014.
  116. Warketin, Alexander (29 August 2014). "Disowned and forgotten: Russian soldiers in Ukraine". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 5 May 2015. Retrieved 6 September 2014.
  117. "Russian TV shows funeral of soldier killed 'on leave' in Ukraine". The Guardian . Agence France-Presse. 5 September 2014. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  118. В Кремле и Киеве разъяснили заявление о прекращении огня в Донбассе (in Russian). Interfax. Retrieved 14 September 2014.
  119. "Ukraine crisis: Putin hopes for peace deal by Friday". BBC News . 3 September 2014. Retrieved 26 November 2020.
  120. "Kremlin denies that Poroshenko and Putin agreed on ceasefire (UPDATES)". 3 September 2014. Retrieved 14 September 2014.
  121. MacFarquhar, Neil (3 September 2014). "Putin Lays Out Proposal to End Ukraine Conflict". The New York Times . Retrieved 15 February 2015.
  122. Walker, Shaun; Luhn, Alec; Willsher, Kim (3 September 2014). "Vladimir Putin drafts peace plan for eastern Ukraine". The Guardian . Retrieved 26 November 2020.
  123. "Russian ambassador anticipates 'liberation' of Mariupol in Ukraine". 5 September 2014. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
  124. Croft, Adrian (4 September 2014). Faulconbridge, Guy (ed.). "Russia has 'several thousand' combat troops in Ukraine: NATO officer". Reuters . Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  125. "Russia Sends Dozens Of Tanks Into Ukraine". Sky News. 7 November 2014. Retrieved 8 November 2014.
  126. "Lithuania's statement at the UN Security Council briefing on Ukraine". Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to UN in New York. 13 November 2014. Archived from the original on 13 November 2014. Retrieved 21 November 2013.
  127. "NATO sees increase of Russian tanks and artillery in Ukraine". Ukraine Today. 22 January 2015. Retrieved 11 August 2016.
  128. Giles, Keir (6 February 2015). "Ukraine crisis: Russia tests new weapons". BBC. Retrieved 7 February 2015.
  129. "Ukraine — Security Council, 7311th meeting" (PDF). United Nations. 12 November 2014. Retrieved 28 July 2022.
  130. "Pro-Russian rebels officially labelled terrorists by Ukraine government". CBC News. 27 January 2015.
  131. Miller, Michael Weiss (26 January 2015). "Putin Is Winning the Ukraine War on Three Fronts". The Daily Beast. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
  132. Francine Lacqua (21 January 2015). "Ukraine Talks Start as Poroshenko Warns of an Escalation". Retrieved 11 April 2015.
  133. "Ukraine crisis: Leaders agree peace roadmap". BBC News. 12 February 2015. Retrieved 2 March 2022.
  134. "UN News – Close to 8,000 people killed in eastern Ukraine, says UN human rights report". UN News Service Section. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
  135. "Go Inside the Frozen Trenches of Eastern Ukraine". Time. Retrieved 26 April 2022.
  136. Brown, Daniel. "Here's what it's like inside the bunkers Ukrainian troops are living in every day". Business Insider. Retrieved 26 April 2022.
  137. Tsvetkova, Maria (21 July 2015). "Ceasefire brings limited respite for east Ukrainians". Euronews. Reuters. Archived from the original on 25 July 2015. Retrieved 26 July 2015.
  138. Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. pp. 52–54.
  139. Whitmore, Brian (26 July 2016). "The Daily Vertical: Ukraine's Forgotten War (Transcript)". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 9 September 2016.
  140. (in Ukrainian) The longest truce in Donbas. Does it really exist, Ukrayinska Pravda (7 September 2020)
  141. Bender, Jeremy (11 February 2015). "US Army commander for Europe: Russian troops are currently fighting on Ukraine's front lines". Business Insider. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
  142. "Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do" (PDF). Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 2015. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 February 2015. Retrieved 7 February 2015.
  143. Laurence Peter (6 February 2015). "Ukraine 'can't stop Russian armour'". BBC. Retrieved 7 February 2015.
  144. In Ukraine It's Beginning to Look a Lot Like Christmas, and a Lot Less Like Russia, The Daily Signal (4 December 2017) Kurt Volker: The Full Transcript, Politico (27 November 2017)
  145. "Kyiv says there are about 6,000 Russian soldiers, 40,000 separatists in Donbas". Kyiv Post. 11 September 2017. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
  146. Miller, Christopher (30 January 2017). "Anxious Ukraine Risks Escalation In 'Creeping Offensive'". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 27 April 2018.
  147. Alec Luhn (19 January 2015). "They were never there: Russia's silence for families of troops killed in Ukraine". Guardian. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
  148. 1 2 Quinn, Allison (25 June 2015). "Russia trolls world by saying it can not stop its citizens from fighting in Ukraine". Kyiv Post . Retrieved 26 November 2020.
  149. James Rupert (5 January 2015). "How Russians Are Sent to Fight in Ukraine". Newsweek. Retrieved 10 January 2015.
  150. "Head of Sverdlovsk special forces veterans union: 'I help to send volunteers to war in Ukraine'". Kyiv Post. 26 December 2014. Retrieved 27 December 2014.
  151. Ilya Kozakov (24 December 2014). "Глава фонда свердловских ветеранов спецназа: "Я помогаю добровольцам отправиться воевать на Украину"" [Head of spetsnaz veteran fund in Sverdlovsk: "I'm helping volunteers go to the war in Ukraine"]. Retrieved 26 December 2014.
  152. "Russians Used Humanitarian Convoys to Send Militants into Ukraine, Russian Organizer Says". The Interpreter Magazine. 26 December 2014. Retrieved 27 December 2014.
  153. "Red Cross Official Says Moscow Used 'Humanitarian' Convoys to Ship Arms to Militants in Ukraine". The Interpreter Magazine. 28 December 2014. Retrieved 28 December 2014.
  154. Theise, Eugen (24 June 2015). "OSCE caught in the crossfire of the Ukraine propaganda war". Deutsche Welle .
  155. Беседы "Сергея Глазьева" о Крыме и беспорядках на востоке Украины. Расшифровка — Meduza (in Russian). Retrieved 22 August 2016.
  156. Whitmore, Brian (26 August 2016). "Podcast: The Tale Of The Tape". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 29 August 2016.
  157. Uapositon (29 August 2016). "English translation of audio evidence of Putin's Adviser Glazyev and other Russian politicians involvement in war in Ukraine". Uaposition. Focus on Ukraine. Retrieved 29 August 2016.
  158. Umland, Andreas. "Glazyev Tapes: What Moscow's interference in Ukraine means for the Minsk Agreements". Raam op Rusland (in Dutch). Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  159. Larter, David B.; Bodner, Matthew (28 November 2018). "The Sea of Azov won't become the new South China Sea (and Russia knows it)". Defense News .
  160. "Russia-Ukraine sea clash in 300 words". BBC News . 30 November 2018. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  161. "The Kerch Strait incident". International Institute for Strategic Studies . December 2018. Retrieved 26 September 2021.
  162. "Kiev declares martial law after Russian seizure of Ukrainian ships in Black Sea". The Independent. Retrieved 26 November 2018.
  163. 1 2 "Two Ukrainian Soldiers Killed Over Bloody Weekend In Donbas". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 3 February 2020.
  164. Betz, Bradford (29 December 2019). "Ukraine, pro-Russian separatists swap prisoners in step to end 5-year war". Fox News.
  165. "Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists exchange prisoners". BBC News. 29 December 2019.
  166. Reuters Staff (29 December 2019). "France's Macron, Germany's Merkel welcome prisoner swap in Ukraine". Reuters via
  167. Ukraine government and separatists begin prisoners swap. Al Jazeera English. 29 December 2019. Archived from the original on 26 December 2021. Retrieved 2 March 2022 via YouTube.
  168. "Ukraine conflict: Moscow could 'defend' Russia-backed rebels". BBC News. 9 April 2021. Retrieved 3 February 2022.
  169. "Kremlin defends Russian military buildup on Ukraine border". The Guardian . 9 April 2021.
  170. "Zelenskiy: Russian passports in Donbass are a step towards 'annexation'". Reuters . 20 May 2021.
  171. Schogol, Jeff (22 February 2022). "Here's what those mysterious white 'Z' markings on Russian military equipment may mean". Task & Purpose . North Equity. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 27 February 2022. [B]ottom line is the 'Z' markings (and others like it) are a deconfliction measure to help prevent fratricide, or friendly fire incidents.
  172. Taylor, Adam (24 February 2022). "Russia's attack on Ukraine came after months of denials it would attack" . The Washington Post . Photograph by Evgeniy Maloletka (Associated Press). Nash Holdings. ISSN   0190-8286. OCLC   2269358. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022. On Sunday ... "There is no invasion. There is no such plans," Antonov said.
  173. "Putin attacked Ukraine after insisting for months there was no plan to do so. Now he says there's no plan to take over". CBS News . Kharkiv: CBS (published 22 February 2022). 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  174. Harris, Shane; Sonne, Paul (3 December 2021). "Russia planning massive military offensive against Ukraine involving 175,000 troops, U.S. intelligence warns" . The Washington Post . Nash Holdings . Retrieved 4 March 2022. [U].S. intelligence has found the Kremlin is planning a multi-frontal offensive as soon as early next year involving up to 175,000 troops ... .
  175. 1 2 Merchant, Normaan (25 February 2022). "US intel predicted Russia's invasion plans. Did it matter?". Associated Press . Photographs by Alexei Alexandrov and Alex Brandon (AP Photo). Washington, D.C. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  176. "Putin Says Conflict in Eastern Ukraine 'Looks Like Genocide'". The Moscow Times . 10 December 2021. Archived from the original on 21 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  177. "Путин заявил о геноциде на Донбассе" [Putin announced the genocide in the Donbas]. Rossiyskaya Gazeta (in Russian). 9 December 2021. Archived from the original on 22 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  178. 1 2 Stanley, Jason (26 February 2022). "The antisemitism animating Putin's claim to 'denazify' Ukraine". The Guardian . Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  179. "Ukraine crisis: Vladimir Putin address fact-checked". BBC News. 22 February 2022. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  180. Hinton, Alexander (24 February 2022). "Putin's claims that Ukraine is committing genocide are baseless, but not unprecedented". The Conversation . Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  181. "Disinformation About the Current Russia-Ukraine Conflict – Seven Myths Debunked". Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (Press release). 24 January 2022. Archived from the original on 18 February 2022. Retrieved 22 February 2022.
  182. "173rd Airborne Brigade battalion heads to Latvia as Ukraine comes under Russian attack". Stars and Stripes . 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  183. "Extracts from Putin's speech on Ukraine". Reuters. 21 February 2022. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  184. Düben, Björn Alexander (1 July 2020). "'There is no Ukraine': Fact-Checking the Kremlin's Version of Ukrainian History". LSE International History. London School of Economics . Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  185. Perrigo, Billy (22 February 2022). "How Putin's Denial of Ukraine's Statehood Rewrites History". Time . Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  186. 1 2 Abbruzzese, Jason (24 February 2022). "Putin says he is fighting a resurgence of Nazism. That's not true". NBC News. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  187. 1 2 Campbell, Eric (3 March 2022). "Inside Donetsk, the separatist republic that triggered the war in Ukraine". Australian Broadcasting Corporation . Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  188. Waxman, Olivia B. (3 March 2022). "Historians on What Putin Gets Wrong About 'Denazification' in Ukraine". Time . Retrieved 6 March 2022.
  189. Berger, Miriam (24 February 2022). "Putin says he will 'denazify' Ukraine. Here's the history behind that claim". The Washington Post . Archived from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 27 February 2022.
  190. 1 2 Li, David K.; Allen, Jonathan; Siemaszko, Corky (24 February 2022). "Putin using false 'Nazi' narrative to justify Russia's attack on Ukraine, experts say". NBC News . Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  191. Lawler, Dave; Basu, Zachary (24 February 2022). "Ukrainian President Zelensky says Putin has ordered invasion as country prepares for war". Axios . Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  192. Harris, Shane; Sonne, Paul (3 December 2021). "Russia planning massive military offensive against Ukraine involving 175,000 troops, U.S. intelligence warns". Washington Post. Retrieved 12 January 2022.
  193. Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle; Balmforth, Tom (17 December 2021). "Russia demands NATO roll back from East Europe and stay out of Ukraine". Reuters . Archived from the original on 22 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  194. Szayna, Thomas S. (29 October 1997). "The Enlargement of NATO and Central European Politics". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars . Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  195. Coyer, Cassandre (25 February 2022). "Why is Ukraine not in NATO and is it too late to join? Here's what experts, NATO say". The Miami Herald . Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  196. MacKinnon, Mark; Morrow, Adrian (18 February 2022). "Biden 'convinced' Putin will invade Ukraine as Donbas region ordered evacuated". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 11 September 2022.
  197. Brown, David (17 February 2022). "Ukraine: How big is Russia's military build-up?". BBC News . Photograph by the Russian Defence Ministry; Graphics by Sandra Rodriguez Chillida and Prina Shah. BBC. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  198. Talmazan, Yuliya; Shabad, Rebecca; Williams, Abigail (17 February 2022). "Ukraine, West accuse Russia of trying to create pretext for invasion after shelling in east". NBC News . NBC. Archived from the original on 22 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022 via MSN.
  199. Khurshudyan, Isabelle; Hendrix, Steve (19 February 2022). "In Ukraine's war-weary east, intensifying shelling and battered homes signal attempts at provocation by Russia". Washington Post. Retrieved 11 September 2022.
  200. Ponomarenko, Illia (18 February 2022). "47 shelling incidents leave 5 injured in Donbas". The Kyiv Independent . Archived from the original on 17 February 2022. Retrieved 18 February 2022.
  201. Volvach, Yaroslava (18 February 2022). "How Russian proxy forces are attempting to provoke the Ukrainian army and are lying about a new Ukrainian offensive". NV.UA. Archived from the original on 18 February 2022. Retrieved 18 February 2022.
  202. "Russian-backed separatists announce civilian evacuation from eastern Ukraine as escalation stokes Russian invasion fears". NBC News . 18 February 2022. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  203. Smith, Alexander (18 February 2022). "Warning siren sounds in rebel-held capital in east Ukraine -Reuters witness". MSN News . Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  204. "Ukraine conflict: Rebels declare general mobilisation as fighting grows". BBC News. 19 February 2022. Archived from the original on 19 February 2022. Retrieved 19 February 2022.
  205. Light, Felix (20 February 2022). "In the Closest Russian City to Ukraine's Separatist Region, There Are Few Signs of Refugees". The Moscow Times . Archived from the original on 20 February 2022. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
  206. 1 2 Gilbert, David (21 February 2022). "Russia's 'Idiotic' Disinformation Campaign Could Still Lead to War in Ukraine". Vice Media. Archived from the original on 21 February 2022. Retrieved 22 February 2022.
  207. Bellingcat Investigation Team (23 February 2022). "Documenting and Debunking Dubious Footage from Ukraine's Frontlines". Bellingcat . Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  208. Harding, Luke; Roth, Andrew; Walker, Shaun (21 February 2022). "'Dumb and lazy': the flawed films of Ukrainian 'attacks' made by Russia's 'fake factory'". The Guardian . Archived from the original on 21 February 2022. Retrieved 22 February 2022.
  209. "Address by the President of the Russian Federation". President of Russia . 21 February 2022. Archived from the original on 21 February 2022. Retrieved 2 March 2022.
  210. "Extracts from Putin's speech on Ukraine". Reuters . 21 February 2022. Retrieved 2 March 2022.
  211. Kottasová, Ivana; Qiblawi, Tamara; Regan, Helen (21 February 2022). "Putin orders troops into separatist-held parts of Ukraine". CNN. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  212. Philp, Catherine; Wright, Oliver; Brown, Larissa (22 February 2022). "Putin sends Russian tanks into Ukraine". The Times . Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  213. Hodge, Nathan (26 February 2022). "Russia's Federation Council gives consent to Putin on use of armed forces abroad, Russian agencies report". CNN . Moscow. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  214. Zinets, Natalia; Williams, Matthias (22 February 2022). "Ukrainian president drafts reservists but rules out general mobilisation for now". Reuters. Archived from the original on 22 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  215. Kingsley, Thomas (23 February 2022). "Ukraine to introduce a state of emergency and tells its citizens to leave Russia immediately". The Independent . Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  216. "Ukraine's Parliament approves state of emergency". Reuters. 23 February 2022. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  217. D'agata, Charlie; Redman, Justine; Ott, Haley (23 February 2022). "Ukraine calls up reservists, declares national emergency as U.S. and allies hit Russia with new sanctions". CBS News . Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  218. Litvinova, Dasha (23 February 2022). "Russia evacuates embassy in Ukraine as crisis escalates". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  219. Zelenskyy, Volodymyr (23 February 2022). Україна прагне миру! І робить для цього все! [Ukraine seeks peace! And does everything for this!] (Video) (in Russian). Ukraine. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Alt URL
  220. Sonne, Paul (24 February 2022). "Ukraine's Zelensky to Russians: 'What are you fighting for and with whom?'". The Washington Post . Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  221. "Zelensky's Last-Ditch Plea for Peace". Foreign Policy. 23 February 2022. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  222. Cruz Bustillos, Dominic (24 February 2022). "Full Translation: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's Feb. 23 Speech". Lawfare . Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  223. "Kremlin Says Ukraine Rebels Have Asked Russia for 'Help' Against Kyiv". The Moscow Times . 23 February 2022. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022.
  224. Nikolskaya, Polina; Osborn, Andrew (24 February 2022). "Russia's Putin authorises 'special military operation' against Ukraine". Reuters. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  225. Grunau, Andrea; von Hein, Matthias; Theise, Eugen; Weber, Joscha (25 February 2022). "Fact check: Do Vladimir Putin's justifications for going to war against Ukraine add up?". Deutsche Welle . Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  226. Waxman, Olivia B. (3 March 2022). "Historians on What Putin Gets Wrong About 'Denazification' in Ukraine". Time . Retrieved 6 March 2022.
  227. "Russia attacks Ukraine". CNN International . 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  228. Kirby, Paul (9 March 2022). "Why is Russia invading Ukraine and what does Putin want?". BBC News . Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  229. "Ukrainian president signs decree on general mobilisation of population -Interfax". Reuters. 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  230. "Zelensky signs decree declaring general mobilization". Interfax-Ukraine . 25 February 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  231. "Ukraine rejects Russian demand to surrender port city of Mariupol in exchange for safe passage". CBS News. 20 March 2022. Retrieved 21 March 2022.
  232. "Ukraine refuses to surrender Mariupol as scope of human toll remains unclear". Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 21 March 2022. Retrieved 21 March 2022.
  233. "Trending news: BBC: Putin replaces military commander in Ukraine – The Moscow Times". Hindustan News Hub. 8 April 2022. Retrieved 9 April 2022.
  234. Arraf, Jane; Nechepurenko, Ivan; Landler, Mark (19 April 2022). "Ukraine Says Russia Begins Assault in the East After Raining Missiles Nationwide". The New York Times . Retrieved 20 April 2022.
  235. "Russia says remaining 531 Azovstal defenders surrender, steelworks siege over". Yahoo!News. 20 May 2022.
  236. Sommerville, Quentin (11 May 2022). "Ukraine war: Russia pushed back from Kharkiv – report from front line". BBC . Archived from the original on 11 May 2022. Retrieved 23 May 2022.
  237. Myre, Greg (26 June 2022). "Russia bombs Kyiv in a weekend missile barrage across Ukraine". NPR. Retrieved 7 July 2022.
  238. "Russia hits Lviv again as Putin's campaign of terror focuses on Ukraine's shell-shocked east". Retrieved 7 July 2022.
  239. Rutter, Jill (7 March 2022). "Protecting Ukrainian refugees: What can we learn from the response to Kosovo in the 90s?". British Future . Retrieved 29 March 2022.
  240. "IntelBrief: China Seeks to Balance Its Interests as Russia's War on Ukraine Intensifies". The Soufan Center . 4 March 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2022. Over a week into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the war has raged on, spurring the most serious humanitarian crisis in Europe since the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s.
  241. Beaumont, Peter (6 March 2022). "Ukraine has fastest-growing refugee crisis since second world war, says UN". The Guardian . Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  242. "Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation". United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees . Retrieved 23 July 2022.
  243. "Liz Truss mulls seizure of Russian assets in UK to give to Ukraine". the Guardian. 3 July 2022. Retrieved 4 July 2022.