Hybrid warfare

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Hybrid warfare is a theory of military strategy, first proposed by Frank Hoffman, [1] which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare [2] [3] with other influencing methods, such as fake news, [4] diplomacy, lawfare, regime change, and foreign electoral intervention. [5] [6] By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. [7] The concept of hybrid warfare has been criticized by a number of academics and practitioners due to its alleged vagueness, its disputed constitutive elements, and its alleged historical distortions. [8] [9] [10]

Contents

Definition

Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.

—Carl von Clausewitz [11]

There is no universally-accepted definition of hybrid warfare; some[ who? ] debate whether the term is useful at all. Some argue that the term is too abstract and only the latest term to refer to irregular methods to counter a conventionally superior force. The abstractness of the term means that it is often used as a catch-all term for all non-linear threats. [12] [13] [14] [15]

Hybrid warfare is warfare which includes some, parts, or all of the following aspects:

Other definitions

The Chief of Staff of the US Army defined a hybrid threat as an adversary that incorporates "diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities." [13] The US Joint Forces Command defines a hybrid threat as "any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be a combination of state and nonstate actors." [13]

The US Army defined a hybrid threat in 2011 as "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects." [13] NATO uses the term to describe "adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives." [12]

The former US Army Chief George W. Casey Jr. talked of a new type of war that would become increasingly common in the future: "A hybrid of irregular warfare and conventional warfare." [14] According to the 2017-inaugurated European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, "hybrid threats are methods and activities that are targeted towards vulnerabilities of the opponent" where the "range of methods and activities is wide". [24]

Relation to the grey-zone

The concept of grey-zone conflicts or warfare is distinct from the concept of hybrid warfare, [10] although the two are intimately linked as in the modern era states most often apply unconventional tools and hybrid techniques in the grey-zone. [25] However many of the unconventional tools used by states in the grey-zone such as propaganda campaigns, economic pressure, and the use of non-state entities do not cross over the threshold into formalized state-level aggression. [26]

Effectiveness

Taiwanese inter-agency counter-hybrid warfare exercise 105Nian 11Yue 29Ri Nan Sha Tai Ping Dao Nan Yuan Yi Hao Cao Yan 09.jpg
Taiwanese inter-agency counter-hybrid warfare exercise

Traditional militaries find it hard to respond to hybrid warfare since it is hard to agree on the source of the conflict. An article published in Global Security Review , "What is Hybrid Warfare?" compares the notion of hybrid warfare to the Russian concept of "non-linear" warfare, which it defines as the deployment of "conventional and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber assaults." The article partially attributes the difficulty to the "rigid" or static military taxonomy used by NATO to define the very concept of warfare. [27]

To counter a hybrid threat, hard power is often insufficient. Often, the conflict evolves under the radar, and even a "rapid" response turns out to be too late. Overwhelming force is an insufficient deterrent. Many traditional militaries lack the flexibility to shift tactics, priorities, and objectives constantly. [16] [7]

History

When going through the work of philosophers who dealt with propaganda and governance in the last 3,000 years, one can find that hybrid war is not a new concept as many social anthropologists believe today. [28] [ better source needed ] The combination of conventional and irregular methods is not new and has been used throughout history. A few examples of that type of combat are found in the American Revolutionary War (a combination of George Washington's Continental Army with militia forces) and the Napoleonic Wars (British regulars co-operated with Spanish guerrillas). [29]

One can find examples of hybrid warfare in smaller conflicts during the 19th century. For instance, between 1837 and 1840, Rafael Carrera, a Conservative peasant rebel leader in Guatemala, waged a successful military campaign against the Liberals and the federal government of Central America by using a strategy that combined classical guerrilla tactics with conventional operations. Carrera's hybrid approach to warfare gave him the edge over his numerically-superior and better-armed enemies. [30]

The Soviet Union engaged in an early case of hybrid warfare in 1944. When the Tuvan Army was away in Europe, fighting along the Red Army against the Third Reich, Moscow annexed the Tuvan People's Republic by pressing the Tuvan government to ask for joining the Soviet Union. [31]

After 1945

The Vietnam War saw hybrid warfare tactics employed by both sides, with the US using the CIA to support civil war parties in Laos and the Cambodian Civil War as well as ethnic groups inside Vietnam for its cause and the Soviet Union supported the Viet Cong militia. [32] [33]

After 1989

The end of the Cold War created a unipolar system with a preponderant American military power. Though that has tempered traditional conflicts, regional conflicts and threats that leverage the weaknesses of conventional military structures are becoming more frequent. [16] [34]

At the same time, the sophistication and the lethality of non-state actors has increased. They are well armed with technologically advanced weapons, which are now available at low prices. Similarly, commercial technologies such as cellphones and digital networks are being adapted to the battlefield. [12] [14] Another new element is the ability of non-state actors to persist within the modern system. [16]

Modern examples

2006 Israel–Hezbollah War

One of the most often quoted examples[ dubious – discuss ] of a hybrid war is the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a sophisticated non-state actor that is sponsored by Iran. While the group often acts as a proxy for Iran, it has its agenda. It was Hezbollah's policy, rather than Iran's, that led to the kidnapping of Israeli troops, which was the impetus for the war. [16] The war featured about 3,000 Hezbollah fighters embedded in the local population attacked by about 30,000 Israeli regular troops. [14]

The group used decentralized cells composed of guerrillas and regular troops, armed with weaponry that nation-states use, such as anti-tank missiles, rockets, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and advanced improvised explosive devices. [35] Hezbollah cells downed Israeli helicopters, damaged Merkava IV tanks, communicated with encrypted cell phones, and monitored Israeli troops movements with night vision and thermal imaging devices. Iranian Quds Force operatives acted as mentors and suppliers of advanced systems. [14]

Hezbollah leveraged mass communication immediately distributing battlefield photos and videos dominating the perception battle throughout the conflict. Israel did not lose the war on the battlefield but lost the information battle, as the overwhelming perception then of Israeli defeat. [36]

2014 ISIL advance into Iraq

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a non-state actor that uses hybrid tactics against the conventional Iraqi military. ISIL has transitional aspirations and uses irregular and regular tactics and terrorism. [12] In response, Iraq turned to hybrid tactics itself by using non-state and international actors to counter the ISIL advance. The United States was a hybrid participant and used a combination of traditional air power, advisers to Iraqi government troops, Kurdish peshmerga, sectarian militias; it also trained opposition forces within Syria. The hybrid war is a conflict with an interconnected group of state and non-state actors pursuing overlapping goals and a weak local state. [37]

Russian activities in the 2010s

The Russian government's wide use in conflicts the Syrian Civil War and the Russo-Ukrainian War, of private military contractors such as those of the Wagner Group was in 2018 singled out by experts as a key part of Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare to advance its interests and obfuscating its involvement and role. [38] Specifically, Russia employed a combination of traditional combat warfare, economic influence, cyber strategies, and disinformation attacks against Ukraine. [39]

Regarding Russia, Jānis Bērziņš, the director of the Center for Security and Strategic Research, has widely published to argue that using the term "hybrid" to characterize the Russian strategy is misleading since Russia has its own definitions and concepts: "the word 'hybrid' is catchy since it can represent a mix of anything. However, its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians due to the former being a military concept and the result of American military thought. Moreover, the concept of New Generation Warfare includes conventional operations. In other words, Hybrid Warfare might be part of New Generation Warfare but cannot define it." [9]

Michael Kofman, a senior research scientist at CNA and a fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, noted in March 2018 that the West′s frequent references to hybrid warfare were in effect "an unintelligible Western reaction, after decades of wars of choice against paltry adversaries, to confrontation with another power that is capable across the full spectrum of conflict." [8]

Russia's activities in the former Soviet states have been described as Hobbesian and redolent of Cold War thinking. [40]

General Philip Breedlove, in a US Senate hearing in February 2016, claimed that Russia is using refugees to weaken Europe and is directing the influx of refugees to destabilize areas and regions in terms of economy and to create social unrest. On 10 February 2016, Finnish Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö told a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers that Finland expects Russia to open a second front, with as many as 1 million migrants possibly arriving over the Finnish-Russian border. A similar statement was made by Ilkka Kanerva, Finland's former foreign minister and now the chairman of the country's parliamentary Defense Committee. [41]

United States on Russian activities

Moscow has accused Washington of conducting hybrid warfare against Russia during the colour revolutions. Its perception of being at war or in a permanent state of conflict with the US and its allies was furthered by the 2014 Maidan uprising in Ukraine.

Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in November 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: [42] [43]

It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy – it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as proxies and of course information and ideological pressure through externally financed non-governmental organisations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war?

Iranian activities in the 2010s

Iran has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare.[ by whom? ] [44] [45] [46] According to the BBC, "Iran, along with its Houthi allies [in Yemen], is conducting a classic war of the weak against the strong; a "hybrid conflict" as it is known in the strategic textbooks. It is borrowing many of the tactics from the Russian play-book – the use of deniability; proxies; cyber-operations and information warfare." [47]

Iran perceptions of US

The US was accused in 2019 by Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, of conducting hybrid warfare against Iran and other countries. [48]

Saudi and Emirati activities in the 2010s

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have been accused[ by whom? ] of conducting hybrid warfare against Qatar. [49]

Chinese activities

China has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Taiwan [50] and in the South China Sea. [51] [52]

Belarusian activities in 2021

Poland and the Baltic states have accused Belarus of conducting hybrid warfare against the European Union by organizing illegal border crossings with migrants into Latvia, Lithuania and Poland with the aim of destabilizing the 27-nation bloc. [53] [54]

See also

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References

  1. ↑ Hoffman, Frank (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (PDF). Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
  2. ↑ Nyagudi, Nyagudi (31 March 2022). "Election Shenanigans Kenya Hybrid Warfare". Figshare. Retrieved 31 March 2022.
  3. ↑ "Menacing Malware Shows the Dangers of Industrial System Sabotage". Wired.
  4. ↑ "It's the (Democracy-Poisoning) Golden Age of Free Speech". Wired.
  5. 1 2 3 Standish, Reid (2018-01-18). "Inside a European Center to Combat Russia's Hybrid Warfare". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2018-01-31. [...] hybrid warfare: the blending of diplomacy, politics, media, cyberspace, and military force to destabilize and undermine an opponent's government.
  6. ↑ "Defense lacks doctrine to guide it through cyberwarfare". nexgov.com. Archived from the original on 2012-03-03. Retrieved 2010-09-17.
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  8. 1 2 Russia v the West: Is this a new Cold War? BBC, 1 April 2018.
  9. 1 2 Berzins, J. (2019). "Not 'Hybrid' but New Generation Warfare". in Howard, G. and Czekaj, M. (Eds.) Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation.
  10. 1 2 Stoker, Donald; Whiteside, Craig (Winter 2020). "Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking". Naval War College Review. 73 (1): 1–37.
  11. ↑ von Clausewitz, Carl (1989). Howard, Michael; Paret, Peter (eds.). On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 593.
  12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Jasper, Scott; Moreland, Scott (2014-12-02). "The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does That Matter?". Small Wars Journal . Small Wars Foundation. Retrieved 2015-08-05.
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  15. ↑ Burkle, Frederick (24 March 2022). "Bastardizing Peacekeeping and the Birth of Hybrid Warfare". Prehospital and Disaster Medicine. 37 (2): 147–149. doi: 10.1017/S1049023X22000425 . PMID   35322776. S2CID   247617444.
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  30. ↑ Visoni-Alonzo, G. (2017). "The Carrera Revolt and "Hybrid Warfare" in Nineteenth Century Central America". London: Palgrave Macmillan.{{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help) 2.
  31. ↑ Kamusella, Tomasz (March 20, 2020). "Dreaming of Tannu-Tuva: Soviet precursors to Russia's hybrid warfare". New Eastern Europe.
  32. ↑ Simo: Vietnam War – The New Aspect of Warfare, 23 July 2019, retrieved 28. November 2019
  33. ↑ Lowe, Karl (2012), Murray, Williamson; Mansoor, Peter R. (eds.), "Hybrid War in Vietnam", Hybrid Warfare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 254–288, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139199254.010, ISBN   978-1-139-19925-4 , retrieved 2021-09-06
  34. ↑ "Training a "Hybrid" Warrior at the Infantry Officer Course". Small Wars Journal . Small Wars Foundation. 2008-01-27. Retrieved 2015-08-05.
  35. ↑ Hoffman, Frank (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 35–38.
  36. ↑ Hoffman, Frank (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 38–39.
  37. ↑ Schroefl, Josef; Kaufman, Stuart J. (2014-10-03). "Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 37 (10): 862–880. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2014.941435. ISSN   1057-610X. S2CID   109217877.
  38. ↑ Don't Be Fooled: Russia Attacked U.S. Troops in Syria: Mattis gave Putin "plausible deniability" for a military assault that went badly awry. Bloomberg, 16 February 2018.
  39. ↑ Wither, James K. (2016). "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare". Connections. 15 (2): 73–87. doi: 10.11610/Connections.15.2.06 . ISSN   1812-1098. JSTOR   26326441.
  40. ↑ Thornton, Rod (4 September 2015). "The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare". The RUSI Journal. 160 (4): 40–48. doi:10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047. S2CID   153391556.
  41. ↑ Higgins, Andrew (2016-04-02). "E.U. Suspects Russian Agenda in Migrants' Shifting Arctic Route". New York Times. Retrieved 2016-04-02.
  42. ↑ Lavrov, Sergey (2014-11-25). "REMARKS BY FOREIGN MINISTER SERGEY LAVROV AT THE XXII ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY" . Retrieved 2017-02-02.
  43. ↑ Carden, James (6 December 2014). "Russia and America's Dangerous Dance". The National Interest. Retrieved 19 February 2017.
  44. ↑ "The Strategic Threat from Iranian Hybrid Warfare in the Gulf". Center for Strategic and International Studies . 13 June 2019.
  45. ↑ "The Iran crisis will show Russia and China the West still has no answer for 'hybrid warfare'". The Daily Telegraph. 13 July 2019.
  46. ↑ "Has Iran chosen hybrid warfare?". The Hill. 14 June 2019.
  47. ↑ "'Drone' attack on Saudis destabilises an already volatile region". BBC News. 16 September 2019.
  48. ↑ "The necessity of "effective reaction" against U.S. hybrid war". Tehran Times. 22 June 2019.
  49. ↑ "The current crisis in the Persian Gulf in the context of hybrid warfare". Australian Defence Force Journal. 2018.
  50. ↑ Hung, Tzu-Chieh; Hung, Tzu-Wei (2022-07-19). "How China's Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan's Anti-Disinformation Wars". Journal of Global Security Studies . 7 (4): ogac016. doi:10.1093/jogss/ogac016. ISSN   2057-3170.
  51. ↑ "China's Hybrid Warfare and Taiwan". The Diplomat . 13 January 2018.
  52. ↑ "Hybrid Warriors: China's Unmanned, Guerrilla-Style Warfare in Asia's Littorals". The Diplomat. 16 February 2017.
  53. ↑ Cook, Lorne; Dapkus, Liudas. "EU condemns Belarus for 'direct attack' using migrants". msn. Associated Press. Retrieved 30 August 2021.
  54. ↑ BNS (23 August 2021). "Baltic, Polish PMs condemn 'hybrid attack' by Belarus". Lrt.lt . Retrieved 30 August 2021.

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