Carl von Clausewitz

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Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz
Carl von Clausewitz.PNG
Portrait while in Prussian service, by Karl Wilhelm Wach
Born(1780-06-01)1 June 1780
Burg bei Magdeburg, Kingdom of Prussia, Holy Roman Empire
Died16 November 1831(1831-11-16) (aged 51)
Breslau, Province of Silesia, Kingdom of Prussia
(present-day Wrocław, Silesia Voivodeship, Poland)
AllegianceFlag of the Kingdom of Prussia (1803-1892).svg  Prussia
Flag of The Russian Empire 1883.svg  Russia (1812–1813)
Service/branchWar Ensign of Prussia (1816).svg Prussian Cavalry Officer Army
Years of service1792–1831
Rank Major-general
Unit Russian-German Legion (III Corps)
Commands held Kriegsakademie
Battles/wars French Revolutionary Wars

Napoleonic Wars

Carl Philipp Gottfried (or Gottlieb) von Clausewitz [note 1] ( /ˈklzəvɪts/ ; 1 June 1780 – 16 November 1831) [1] was a Prussian general and military theorist who stressed the "moral" (meaning, in modern terms, psychological) and political aspects of war. His most notable work, Vom Kriege (On War), was unfinished at his death. Clausewitz was a realist in many different senses and, while in some respects a romantic, also drew heavily on the rationalist ideas of the European Enlightenment.

Military theory is the analysis of normative behavior and trends in military affairs and military history, beyond simply describing events in war. Military theories, especially since the influence of Clausewitz in the nineteenth century, attempt to encapsulate the complex cultural, political and economic relationships between societies and the conflicts they create.

Military psychology is the research, design, and application of psychological theories and empirical data towards understanding, predicting, and countering behaviours in friendly and enemy forces, or in civilian populations. There is particular emphasis on behaviours that may be undesirable, threatening, or potentially dangerous to the conduct of military operations. Military psychology utilizes multiple different psychology sub-disciplines to encourage resiliency among military troops and counteract enemy forces for military victories. The stressors and mental illnesses studied under military psychology are not specific to the military. However, soldiers often face unique combinations of stressors within combat and war settings, and may go on to experience stress-related psychiatric disorders. Specific examples of the issues faced by military personnel include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), guilt, family and partner difficulties, and nightmares and flashbacks. Applied military psychology is especially focused on counselling, and treatment of stress and fatigue of military personnel and their families.

<i>On War</i> von Clausewitz treaty on strategy

Vom Kriege is a book on war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife Marie von Brühl in 1832. It has been translated into English several times as On War. On War is actually an unfinished work; Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835. His 10-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state. On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations. It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on strategic thinking.


Clausewitz's thinking is often described as Hegelian because of his dialectical method; but, although he was probably personally acquainted with Hegel, there remains debate as to whether or not Clausewitz was in fact influenced by him. [2] :183–232 He stressed the dialectical interaction of diverse factors, noting how unexpected developments unfolding under the "fog of war" (i.e., in the face of incomplete, dubious, and often completely erroneous information and high levels of fear, doubt, and excitement) call for rapid decisions by alert commanders. He saw history as a vital check on erudite abstractions that did not accord with experience. In contrast to the early work of Antoine-Henri Jomini, he argued that war could not be quantified or reduced to mapwork, geometry, and graphs. Clausewitz had many aphorisms, of which the most famous is "War is the continuation of politics by other means." [3]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel German philosopher who influenced German idealism

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was a German philosopher and an important figure of German idealism. He achieved wide recognition in his day and—while primarily influential within the continental tradition of philosophy—has become increasingly influential in the analytic tradition as well. Although Hegel remains a divisive figure, his canonical stature within Western philosophy is universally recognized.

Dialectic or dialectics, also known as the dialectical method, is at base a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned arguments. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such as emotional appeal and the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric. Dialectic may be contrasted with the didactic method, wherein one side of the conversation teaches the other. Dialectic is alternatively known as minor logic, as opposed to major logic or critique.

The fog of war is the uncertainty in situational awareness experienced by participants in military operations. The term seeks to capture the uncertainty regarding one's own capability, adversary capability, and adversary intent during an engagement, operation, or campaign. Military forces try to reduce the fog of war through military intelligence and friendly force tracking systems. The term is also used to define uncertainty mechanics in wargames.


Clausewitz's Christian names are sometimes given in non-German sources as "Karl", "Carl Philipp Gottlieb," or "Carl Maria." He spelled his own given name with a "C" in order to identify with the classical Western tradition; writers who use "Karl" are often seeking to emphasise his German (rather than European) identity. "Carl Philipp Gottfried" appears on Clausewitz's tombstone. [4] Nonetheless, sources such as military historian Peter Paret and Encyclopædia Britannica use Gottlieb instead of Gottfried. [5]

Peter Paret is a German-born American cultural and intellectual historian, whose two principal areas of research are war and the interaction of art and politics from 18th to 20th century Europe. He has also written on related subjects in more recent times.

<i>Encyclopædia Britannica</i> General knowledge English-language encyclopaedia

The Encyclopædia Britannica, formerly published by Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., is a general knowledge English-language encyclopaedia. It was written by about 100 full-time editors and more than 4,000 contributors. The 2010 version of the 15th edition, which spans 32 volumes and 32,640 pages, was the last printed edition.

Life and military career

Clausewitz was born on 1 June 1780 in Burg bei Magdeburg in the Prussian Duchy of Magdeburg as the fourth and youngest son of a family that made claims to noble status which Carl accepted. Clausewitz's family claimed descent from the Barons of Clausewitz in Upper Silesia, though scholars question the connection. [6] His grandfather, the son of a Lutheran pastor, had been a professor of theology. Clausewitz's father, once a lieutenant in the army of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, held a minor post in the Prussian internal-revenue service. Clausewitz entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve as a lance-corporal, eventually attaining the rank of major general. [1]

Burg bei Magdeburg Place in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany

Burg bei Magdeburg is a town of about 23,900 inhabitants on the Elbe–Havel Canal in northeastern Germany, 25 km (16 mi) northeast of Magdeburg. It is the capital of the Jerichower Land district in the state of Saxony-Anhalt.

Duchy of Magdeburg duchy in Central Europe between 1680–1807

The Duchy of Magdeburg was a province of Margraviate of Brandenburg from 1680 to 1701 and a province of the German Kingdom of Prussia from 1701 to 1807. It replaced the Archbishopric of Magdeburg after its secularization by Brandenburg. The duchy's capitals were Magdeburg and Halle, while Burg was another important town. Dissolved during the Napoleonic Wars in 1807, its territory was made part of the Province of Saxony in 1815.

Frederick the Great king of Prussia

Frederick II ruled the Kingdom of Prussia from 1740 until 1786, the longest reign of any Hohenzollern king. His most significant accomplishments during his reign included his military victories, his reorganization of Prussian armies, his patronage of the arts and the Enlightenment and his final success against great odds in the Seven Years' War. Frederick was the last Hohenzollern monarch titled King in Prussia and declared himself King of Prussia after achieving sovereignty over most historically Prussian lands in 1772. Prussia had greatly increased its territories and became a leading military power in Europe under his rule. He became known as Frederick the Great and was nicknamed Der Alte Fritz by the Prussian people and eventually the rest of Germany.

Clausewitz served in the Rhine Campaigns (1793–1794) including the Siege of Mainz, when the Prussian army invaded France during the French Revolution, and fought in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815. He entered the Kriegsakademie (also cited as "The German War School", the "Military Academy in Berlin", and the "Prussian Military Academy," later the "War College") in Berlin in 1801 (aged 21), probably studied the writings of the philosophers Immanuel Kant and/or Fichte and Schleiermacher and won the regard of General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the future first chief-of-staff of the newly reformed Prussian Army (appointed 1809). Clausewitz, Hermann von Boyen (1771–1848) and Karl von Grolman (1777–1843) were among Scharnhorst's primary allies in his efforts to reform the Prussian army between 1807 and 1814.[ citation needed ]

Siege of Mainz (1793) siege

In the Siege of Mainz, from 14 April to 23 July 1793, a coalition of Prussia, Austria, and other German states besieged and captured Mainz from revolutionary French forces. The allies, especially the Prussians, first tried negotiations, but this failed, and the bombardment of the city began on the night of 17 June.

French Revolution Revolution in France, 1789 to 1798

The French Revolution was a period of far-reaching social and political upheaval in France and its colonies beginning in 1789. The Revolution overthrew the monarchy, established a republic, catalyzed violent periods of political turmoil, and finally culminated in a dictatorship under Napoleon who brought many of its principles to areas he conquered in Western Europe and beyond. Inspired by liberal and radical ideas, the Revolution profoundly altered the course of modern history, triggering the global decline of absolute monarchies while replacing them with republics and liberal democracies. Through the Revolutionary Wars, it unleashed a wave of global conflicts that extended from the Caribbean to the Middle East. Historians widely regard the Revolution as one of the most important events in human history.

Napoleonic Wars Series of early 19th century European wars

The Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) were a series of major conflicts pitting the French Empire and its allies, led by Napoleon I, against a fluctuating array of European powers formed into various coalitions, financed and usually led by the United Kingdom. The wars stemmed from the unresolved disputes associated with the French Revolution and its resultant conflict. The wars are often categorised into five conflicts, each termed after the coalition that fought Napoleon: the Third Coalition (1805), the Fourth (1806–07), the Fifth (1809), the Sixth (1813), and the Seventh (1815).

Clausewitz served during the Jena Campaign as aide-de-camp to Prince August. At the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt on 14 October 1806 – when Napoleon invaded Prussia and defeated the massed Prussian-Saxon army commanded by Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick – he was captured, one of the 25,000 prisoners taken that day as the Prussian army disintegrated. He was 26. Clausewitz was held prisoner with his prince in France from 1807 to 1808. Returning to Prussia, he assisted in the reform of the Prussian army and state. [1]

<i>Aide-de-camp</i> personal assistant or secretary to a person of high rank

An aide-de-camp is a personal assistant or secretary to a person of high rank, usually a senior military, police or government officer, or to a member of a royal family or a head of state.

Prince Augustus Ferdinand of Prussia Prussian Prince and general

Prince August Ferdinand of Prussia was a Prussian prince and general, as well as Herrenmeister of the Bailiwick of Brandenburg of the Order of Saint John. He belonged to the House of Hohenzollern, and was the youngest son of Frederick William I of Prussia by his wife Queen Sophia Dorothea.

France Republic with mainland in Europe and numerous oversea territories

France, officially the French Republic, is a country whose territory consists of metropolitan France in Western Europe and several overseas regions and territories. The metropolitan area of France extends from the Mediterranean Sea to the English Channel and the North Sea, and from the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean. It is bordered by Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany to the northeast, Switzerland and Italy to the east, and Andorra and Spain to the south. The overseas territories include French Guiana in South America and several islands in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans. The country's 18 integral regions span a combined area of 643,801 square kilometres (248,573 sq mi) and a total population of 67.3 million. France, a sovereign state, is a unitary semi-presidential republic with its capital in Paris, the country's largest city and main cultural and commercial centre. Other major urban areas include Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Lille and Nice.

Marie von Clausewitz (nee, Countess von Bruhl) Marievonclausewitz.jpg
Marie von Clausewitz (née, Countess von Brühl)

On 10 December 1810 he married the socially prominent Countess Marie von Brühl, whom he had first met in 1803. She was a member of the noble German von Brühl family originating in Thuringia. The couple moved in the highest circles, socialising with Berlin's political, literary and intellectual élite. Marie was well-educated and politically well-connected—she played an important role in her husband's career progress and intellectual evolution. [7] She also edited, published, and introduced his collected works. [8]

Opposed to Prussia's enforced alliance with Napoleon I, Clausewitz left the Prussian army and served in the Imperial Russian Army from 1812 to 1813 during the Russian Campaign, taking part in the Battle of Borodino (1812). Like many Prussian officers serving in Russia, he joined the Russian-German Legion in 1813. In the service of the Russian Empire, Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen (1812), which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom that ultimately defeated Napoleon and his allies. [1]

In 1815 the Russian-German Legion became integrated into the Prussian Army and Clausewitz re-entered Prussian service as a colonel. [9] He was soon appointed chief-of-staff of Johann von Thielmann's III Corps. In that capacity he served at the Battle of Ligny and the Battle of Wavre during the Waterloo Campaign in 1815. An army led personally by Napoleon defeated the Prussians at Ligny (south of Mont-Saint-Jean and the village of Waterloo) on 16 June 1815, but Napoleon's failure to destroy the Prussian forces led to his defeat a few days later at the Battle of Waterloo (18 June 1815), when the Prussian forces unexpectedly arrived on his right flank late in the afternoon to support the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian forces pressing his front. Clausewitz's unit fought at Wavre (18–19 June 1815), preventing large reinforcements from reaching Napoleon at Waterloo. After the war Clausewitz served as the director of the Kriegsakademie , where he served until 1830. In that year he returned to duty with the army. Soon afterwards, the outbreak of several revolutions around Europe and a crisis in Poland appeared to presage another major European war. Clausewitz was appointed chief of staff of the only army Prussia was able to mobilise in this emergency, which was sent to the Polish border. Its commander, Gneisenau, died of cholera (August 1831), and Clausewitz took command of the Prussian army's efforts to construct a cordon sanitaire to contain the great cholera outbreak (the first time cholera had appeared in modern heartland Europe, causing a continent-wide panic). Clausewitz himself died of the same disease shortly afterwards, on 17 November 1831. [1]

His widow edited, published, and wrote the introduction to his magnum opus on the philosophy of war in 1832. (He had started working on the text in 1816, but had not completed it.) [10] She wrote the preface for On War and by 1835 had published most of his collected works. [8] She died in January 1836.

Theory of war

Clausewitz was a professional combat soldier who was involved in numerous military campaigns, but he is famous primarily as a military theorist interested in the examination of war, utilising the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon as frames of reference for his work. [11] He wrote a careful, systematic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects. The result was his principal book, On War, a major work on the philosophy of war. It was unfinished when Clausewitz died and contains material written at different stages in his intellectual evolution, producing some significant contradictions between different sections. The sequence and precise character of that evolution is a source of much debate, as are exact meaning behind his seemingly contradictory claims (discussions pertinent to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war are one example). Clausewitz constantly sought to revise the text, particularly between 1827 and his departure on his last field assignments, to include more material on "people's war" and forms of war other than high-intensity warfare between states, but relatively little of this material was included in the book. [10] Soldiers before this time had written treatises on various military subjects, but none had undertaken a great philosophical examination of war on the scale of those written by Clausewitz and Leo Tolstoy, both of which were inspired by the events of the Napoleonic Era.

Clausewitz's work is still studied today, demonstrating its continued relevance. More than sixteen major English-language books that focused specifically on his work were published between 2005 and 2014, whereas his 19th-century rival Jomini faded from influence. The historian Lynn Montross said the outcome, "may be explained by the fact that Jomini produced a system of war, Clausewitz a philosophy. The one has been outdated by new weapons, the other still influences the strategy behind those weapons." [12] Jomini did not attempt to define war but Clausewitz did, providing (and dialectically comparing) a number of definitions. The first is his dialectical thesis: "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." The second, often treated as Clausewitz's 'bottom line,' is in fact merely his dialectical antithesis: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." The synthesis of his dialectical examination of the nature of war is his famous "trinity," saying that war is "a fascinating trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason." [13] Christopher Bassford says the best shorthand for Clausewitz's trinity should be something like "violent emotion/chance/rational calculation." However, it is frequently presented as "people/army/government," a misunderstanding based on a later paragraph in the same chapter. This misrepresentation was popularised by U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers' Vietnam-era interpretation, [14] facilitated by weaknesses in the 1976 Howard/Paret translation. [15]

The degree to which Clausewitz managed to revise his manuscript to reflect that synthesis is the subject of much debate. His final reference to war and Politik, however, goes beyond his widely quoted antithesis: "War is simply the continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace." [16]

A prince or general who knows exactly how to organise his war according to his object and means, who does neither too little nor too much, gives by that the greatest proof of his genius. But the effects of this talent are exhibited not so much by the invention of new modes of action, which might strike the eye immediately, as in the successful final result of the whole. It is the exact fulfilment of silent suppositions, it is the noiseless harmony of the whole action which we should admire, and which only makes itself known in the total result.

Clausewitz, On War, Book III, Chapter 1 [17] :Vol. I pgs. 85–86

Clausewitz introduced systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thinking, with powerful implications not only for historical and analytical writing but also for practical policy, military instruction, and operational planning. He relied on his own experiences, contemporary writings about Napoleon, and on deep historical research. His historiographical approach is evident in his first extended study, written when he was 25, of the Thirty Years War. He rejects the Enlightenment's view of the war as a chaotic muddle and instead explains its drawn-out operations by the economy and technology of the age, the social characteristics of the troops, and the commanders' politics and psychology. In On War, Clausewitz sees all wars as the sum of decisions, actions, and reactions in an uncertain and dangerous context, and also as a socio-political phenomenon. He also stressed the complex nature of war, which encompasses both the socio-political and the operational and stresses the primacy of state policy. [18] :viii

The word "strategy" had only recently come into usage in modern Europe, and Clausewitz's definition is quite narrow: "the use of engagements for the object of war." Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, and military phenomenon which might — depending on circumstances — involve the entire population of a nation at war. In any case, Clausewitz saw military force as an instrument that states and other political actors use to pursue the ends of policy, in a dialectic between opposing wills, each with the aim of imposing his policies and will upon his enemy. [19]

Clausewitz's emphasis on the inherent superiority of the defence suggests that habitual aggressors are likely to end up as failures. The inherent superiority of the defence obviously does not mean that the defender will always win, however: there are other asymmetries to be considered. He was interested in co-operation between the regular army and militia or partisan forces, or citizen soldiers, as one possible — sometimes the only — method of defence. In the circumstances of the Wars of the French Revolution and with Napoleon, which were energised by a rising spirit of nationalism, he emphasised the need for states to involve their entire populations in the conduct of war. This point is especially important, as these wars demonstrated that such energies could be of decisive importance and for a time led to a democratisation of the armed forces much as universal suffrage democratised politics. [20]

While Clausewitz was intensely aware of the value of intelligence at all levels, he was also very sceptical of the accuracy of much military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.... In short, most intelligence is false." [17] :Vol. I pg. 38 This circumstance is generally described as part of the fog of war. Such sceptical comments apply only to intelligence at the tactical and operational levels; at the strategic and political levels he constantly stressed the requirement for the best possible understanding of what today would be called strategic and political intelligence. His conclusions were influenced by his experiences in the Prussian Army, which was often in an intelligence fog due partly to the superior abilities of Napoleon's system but even more to the nature of war. Clausewitz acknowledges that friction creates enormous difficulties for the realisation of any plan, and the fog of war hinders commanders from knowing what is happening. It is precisely in the context of this challenge that he develops the concept of military genius, whose capabilities are seen above all in the execution of operations. 'Military genius' is not simply a matter of intellect, but a combination of qualities of intellect, experience, personality, and temperament (and there are many possible such combinations) that create a very highly developed mental aptitude for the waging of war. [21]

Principal ideas

The young Clausewitz CarlvonClausewitz.jpg
The young Clausewitz

Key ideas discussed in On War include: [18]

Interpretation and misinterpretation

Clausewitz used a dialectical method to construct his argument, leading to frequent misinterpretation of his ideas. British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart contends that the enthusiastic acceptance by the Prussian military establishment – especially Moltke the Elder, a former student of his [23] – of what they believed to be Clausewitz's ideas, and the subsequent widespread adoption of the Prussian military system worldwide, had a deleterious effect on military theory and practice, due to their egregious misinterpretation of his ideas:

As so often happens, Clausewitz's disciples carried his teaching to an extreme which their master had not intended.... [Clausewitz's] theory of war was expounded in a way too abstract and involved for ordinary soldier-minds, essentially concrete, to follow the course of his argument – which often turned back from the direction in which it was apparently leading. Impressed yet befogged, they grasped at his vivid leading phrases, seeing only their surface meaning, and missing the deeper current of his thought. [24]

As described by Christopher Bassford, then-professor of strategy at the National War College of the United States:

One of the main sources of confusion about Clausewitz's approach lies in his dialectical method of presentation. For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is a mere continuation of politics by other means," ("Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln") while accurate as far as it goes, was not intended as a statement of fact. It is the antithesis in a dialectical argument whose thesis is the point – made earlier in the analysis – that "war is nothing but a duel [or wrestling match, a better translation of the German Zweikampf] on a larger scale." His synthesis, which resolves the deficiencies of these two bold statements, says that war is neither "nothing but" an act of brute force nor "merely" a rational act of politics or policy. This synthesis lies in his "fascinating trinity" [wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit]: a dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation. [1]

Another example of this confusion is the idea that Clausewitz was a proponent of total war as used in the Third Reich's propaganda in the 1940s. In fact, he never used the term "total war": rather, he discussed "absolute war," a concept which evolved into the much more abstract notion of "ideal war" discussed at the very beginning of Vom Kriege--the purely logical result of the forces underlying a "pure," Platonic "ideal" of war. [25] In what he called a "logical fantasy," war cannot be waged in a limited way: the rules of competition will force participants to use all means at their disposal to achieve victory. But in the real world, he said, such rigid logic is unrealistic and dangerous. As a practical matter, the military objectives in real war that support political objectives generally fall into two broad types: "war to achieve limited aims"; and war to "disarm" the enemy, "to render [him] politically helpless or militarily impotent." Thus the complete defeat of the enemy may not be necessary, desirable, or even possible. [26]

In modern times the reconstruction of Clausewitzian theory has been a matter of much dispute. One analysis was that of Panagiotis Kondylis, a Greek-German writer and philosopher, who opposed the interpretations of Raymond Aron in Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz, and other liberal writers. According to Aron, Clausewitz was one of the first writers to condemn the militarism of the Prussian general staff and its war-proneness, based on Clausewitz's argument that "war is a continuation of politics by other means." In Theory of War, Kondylis claims that this is inconsistent with Clausewitzian thought. He claims that Clausewitz was morally indifferent to war (though this probably reflects a lack of familiarity with personal letters from Clausewitz, which demonstrate an acute awareness of war's tragic aspects) and that his advice regarding politics' dominance over the conduct of war has nothing to do with pacifist ideas. For Clausewitz, war is simply one unique means that is sometimes applied to the eternal quest for power, of raison d'État in an anarchic and unsafe world.[ citation needed ]

Other notable writers who have studied Clausewitz's texts and translated them into English are historians Peter Paret of the Institute for Advanced Study and Sir Michael Howard, and the philosopher, musician, and game theorist Anatol Rapoport. Howard and Paret edited the most widely used edition of On War (Princeton University Press, 1976/1984) and have produced comparative studies of Clausewitz and other theorists, such as Tolstoy. Bernard Brodie's A Guide to the Reading of "On War", in the 1976 Princeton translation, expressed his interpretations of the Prussian's theories and provided students with an influential synopsis of this vital work.

The British military historian John Keegan attacked Clausewitz's theory in his book A History of Warfare . [27] Keegan argued that Clausewitz assumed the existence of states, yet 'war antedates the state, diplomacy and strategy by many millennia.'


Clausewitz died without completing On War, but despite this his ideas have been widely influential in military theory and have had a strong influence on German military thought specifically. Later Prussian and German generals, such as Helmuth Graf von Moltke, were clearly influenced by Clausewitz: Moltke's widely quoted statement that "No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy" is a classic reflection of Clausewitz's insistence on the roles of chance, friction, "fog," uncertainty, and interactivity in war. [28] :20–21

Clausewitz's influence spread to British thinking as well, though at first more as a historian and analyst than as a theorist. [28] See for example Wellington's extended essay discussing Clausewitz's study of the Campaign of 1815—Wellington's only serious written discussion of the battle, which was widely discussed in 19th-century Britain. Clausewitz's broader thinking came to the fore following Britain's military embarrassments in the Boer War (1899–1902). One example of a heavy Clausewitzian influence in that era is Spenser Wilkinson, journalist, the first Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, and perhaps the most prominent military analyst in Britain from c. 1885 until well into the interwar period. Another is naval historian Julian Corbett (1854–1922), whose work reflected a deep if idiosyncratic adherence to Clausewitz's concepts and frequently an emphasis on Clausewitz's ideas about 'limited war' and the inherent strengths of the defensive form of war. Corbett's practical strategic views were often in prominent public conflict with Wilkinson's – see, for example, Wilkinson's article "Strategy at Sea," The Morning Post, 12 February 1912. Following the First World War, however, the influential British military commentator B. H. Liddell Hart in the 1920s erroneously attributed to him the doctrine of "total war" that during the First World War had been embraced by many European general staffs and emulated by the British. More recent scholars typically see that war as so confused in terms of political rationale that it in fact contradicts much of On War. [29] One of the most influential British Clausewitzians today is Colin S. Gray; historian Hew Strachan (like Wilkinson also the Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, since 2001) has been an energetic proponent of the study of Clausewitz, but his own views on Clausewitz's ideas are somewhat ambivalent.

With some interesting exceptions (e.g., John McAuley Palmer, Robert M. Johnston, Hoffman Nickerson), Clausewitz had little influence on American military thought before 1945 other than via British writers, though Generals Eisenhower and Patton were avid readers. He did influence Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky [2] :233–60 and Mao Zedong, and thus the Communist Soviet and Chinese traditions, as Lenin emphasised the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war. [30] Because Lenin was an admirer of Clausewitz and called him "one of the great military writers", his influence on the Red Army was immense. [31] The Russian historian A.N. Mertsalov commented that "It was an irony of fate that the view in the USSR was that it was Lenin who shaped the attitude towards Clausewitz, and that Lenin's dictum that war is a continuation of politics is taken from the work of this [allegedly] anti-humanist anti-revolutionary." [31] The American mathematician Anatol Rapoport wrote in 1968 that Clausewitz as interpreted by Lenin formed the basis of all Soviet military thinking since 1917, and quoted the remarks by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky:

In describing the essence of war, Marxism-Leninism takes as its point of departure the premise that war is not an aim in itself, but rather a tool of politics. In his remarks on Clausewitz's On War, Lenin stressed that "Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political". [32] :37

Henry A. Kissinger, however, described Lenin's approach as being that politics is a continuation of war by other means, thus turning Clausewitz's argument "on its head." [28] :198

Rapoport argued that:

As for Lenin's approval of Clausewitz, it probably stems from his obsession with the struggle for power. The whole Marxist conception of history is that of successive struggles for power, primarily between social classes. This was constantly applied by Lenin in a variety of contexts. Thus the entire history of philosophy appears in Lenin's writings as a vast struggle between "idealism" and "materialism". The fate of the socialist movement was to be decided by a struggle between the revolutionists and the reformers. Clausewitz's acceptance of the struggle for power as the essence of international politics must have impressed Lenin as starkly realistic. [32] :37–38

Clausewitz directly influenced Mao Zedong, who read On War in 1938 and organised a seminar on Clausewitz for the Party leadership in Yan'an. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely a regurgitation of Lenin but reflects Mao's study. [33] The idea that war involves inherent "friction" that distorts, to a greater or lesser degree, all prior arrangements, has become common currency in fields such as business strategy and sport. The phrase fog of war derives from Clausewitz's stress on how confused warfare can seem while immersed within it. [34] The term center of gravity, used in a military context derives from Clausewitz's usage, which he took from Newtonian mechanics. In U.S. military doctrine, "center of gravity" refers to the basis of an opponent's power at the operational, strategic, or political level, though this is only one aspect of Clausewitz's use of the term. [35]

Late 20th and early 21st century

The deterrence strategy of the United States in the 1950s was closely inspired by President Dwight Eisenhower’s reading of Clausewitz as a young officer in the 1920s. Eisenhower was greatly impressed by Clausewitz’s example of a theoretical, idealised “absolute war” in Vom Krieg as a way of demonstrating how absurd it would be to attempt such a strategy in practice. For Eisenhower, the age of nuclear weapons had made what was for Clausewitz in the early 19th century only a theoretical vision an all too real possibility in the mid-20th century. From Eisenhower's viewpoint, the best deterrent to war was to show the world just how appalling and horrific a nuclear “absolute war” would be if it should ever occur, hence a series of much publicised nuclear tests in the Pacific, giving first priority in the defence budget to nuclear weapons and delivery systems over conventional weapons, and making repeated statements in public that the United States was able and willing at all times to use nuclear weapons. In this way through the massive retaliation doctrine and the closely related foreign policy concept of brinkmanship, Eisenhower hoped to hold out a creditable vision of Clausewitzian nuclear “absolute war” in order to deter the Soviet Union and/or China from ever risking a war or even conditions that might lead to a war with the United States. [36]

...Philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise. By such means the former dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities, to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side.

Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter 1 [17] :Vol. I pgs. 1–2

After 1970, some theorists claimed that nuclear proliferation made Clausewitzian concepts obsolete after the 20th-century period in which they dominated the world. [37] John E. Sheppard, Jr., argues that by developing nuclear weapons, state-based conventional armies simultaneously both perfected their original purpose, to destroy a mirror image of themselves, and made themselves obsolete. No two powers have used nuclear weapons against each other, instead using conventional means or proxy wars to settle disputes. If such a conflict did occur, presumably both combatants would be annihilated. Heavily influenced by the war in Vietnam and by antipathy to American strategist Henry Kissinger, the American biologist, musician, and game-theorist Anatol Rapoport argued in 1968 that a Clausewitzian view of war was not only obsolete in the age of nuclear weapons, but also highly dangerous as it promoted a "zero-sum paradigm" to international relations and a "dissolution of rationality" amongst decision-makers. [32] :73–77

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have seen many instances of state armies attempting to suppress insurgencies, terrorism, and other forms of asymmetrical warfare. Clausewitz did not focus solely on wars between countries with well-defined armies. The era of the French Revolution and Napoleon was full of revolutions, rebellions, and violence by "non-state actors", such as the wars in the French Vendée and in Spain. Clausewitz wrote a series of “Lectures on Small War” and studied the rebellion in the Vendée (1793–1796) and the Tyrolean uprising of 1809. In his famous “Bekenntnisdenkschrift” of 1812, he called for a “Spanish war in Germany” and laid out a comprehensive guerrilla strategy to be waged against Napoleon. In On War he included a famous chapter on “The People in Arms.” [38]

One prominent critic of Clausewitz is the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld. In his book The Transformation of War, [39] Creveld argued that Clausewitz's famous "Trinity" of people, army, and government was an obsolete socio-political construct based on the state, which was rapidly passing from the scene as the key player in war, and that he (Creveld) had constructed a new "non-trinitarian" model for modern warfare. Creveld's work has had great influence. Daniel Moran replied, 'The most egregious misrepresentation of Clausewitz's famous metaphor must be that of Martin van Creveld, who has declared Clausewitz to be an apostle of Trinitarian War, by which he means, incomprehensibly, a war of 'state against state and army against army,' from which the influence of the people is entirely excluded." [40] Christopher Bassford went further, noting that one need only read the paragraph in which Clausewitz defined his Trinity to see "that the words 'people,' 'army,' and 'government' appear nowhere at all in the list of the Trinity’s components.... Creveld's and Keegan's assault on Clausewitz's Trinity is not only a classic 'blow into the air,' i.e., an assault on a position Clausewitz doesn't occupy. It is also a pointless attack on a concept that is quite useful in its own right. In any case, their failure to read the actual wording of the theory they so vociferously attack, and to grasp its deep relevance to the phenomena they describe, is hard to credit." [22]

Some have gone further and suggested that Clausewitz's best-known aphorism, that war is a continuation of politics by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically. [41] For an opposing view see the sixteen essays presented in Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. [42]

In military academies, schools, and universities worldwide, Clausewitz's literature is often mandatory reading. [43]



Video games

See also

August Otto Rühle von Lilienstern – Prussian officer from whom Clausewitz allegedly took, without acknowledgment, several important ideas (including that about war as pursuing political aims) made famous in On War. However, such ideas as Clausewitz and Lilienstern shared in common derived from a common influence, i.e., Scharnhorst, who was Clausewitz's "second father" and professional mentor.

Related Research Articles

Military strategy is a set of ideas implemented by military organizations to pursue desired strategic goals. Derived from the Greek word strategos, the term strategy, when it appeared in use during the 18th century, was seen in its narrow sense as the "art of the general", or "'the art of arrangement" of troops. Military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy.

Battle of Jena–Auerstedt decisive battle of the Napoleonic Wars, allowing the French Grande Armée to occupy Prussia

The twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt were fought on 14 October 1806 on the plateau west of the river Saale in today's Germany, between the forces of Napoleon I of France and Frederick William III of Prussia. The decisive defeat suffered by the Prussian Army subjugated the Kingdom of Prussia to the French Empire until the Sixth Coalition was formed in 1812.

Sir John Desmond Patrick Keegan was an English military historian, lecturer, writer and journalist. He was the author of many published works on the nature of combat between the 14th and 21st centuries concerning land, air, maritime, and intelligence warfare, as well as the psychology of battle.

Antoine-Henri Jomini Swiss general and military scholar who fought on belhalf of Switzerland, France, and Russia

Antoine-Henri, Baron Jomini was a Swiss officer who served as a general in the French and later in the Russian service, and one of the most celebrated writers on the Napoleonic art of war. Jomini's ideas were a staple at military academies, the United States Military Academy at West Point being a prominent example; his theories were thought to have affected many officers who later served in the American Civil War. He may have coined the term logistics in his Summary of the Art of War (1838).

August Neidhardt von Gneisenau Prussian general

August Wilhelm Antonius Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau was a Prussian field marshal. He was a prominent figure in the reform of the Prussian military and the War of Liberation.

Helmuth von Moltke the Elder German Field Marshal

Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was a Prussian field marshal. The chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years, he is regarded as the creator of a new, more modern method of directing armies in the field. He is described as embodying "Prussian military organization and tactical genius." He is often referred to as Moltke the Elder to distinguish him from his nephew Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke, who commanded the German Army at the outbreak of World War I.

A strategist is a person with responsibility for the formulation and implementation of a strategy. Strategy generally involves setting goals, determining actions to achieve the goals, and mobilizing resources to execute the actions. A strategy describes how the ends (goals) will be achieved by the means (resources). The senior leadership of an organization is generally tasked with determining strategy. Strategy can be intended or can emerge as a pattern of activity as the organization adapts to its environment or competes. It involves activities such as strategic planning and strategic thinking.

Waterloo Campaign

The Waterloo Campaign was fought between the French Army of the North and two Seventh Coalition armies, an Anglo-allied army and a Prussian army. Initially the French army was commanded by Napoleon Bonaparte, but he left for Paris after the French defeat at the Battle of Waterloo. Command then rested on Marshals Soult and Grouchy, who were in turn replaced by Marshal Davout, who took command at the request of the French Provisional Government. The Anglo-allied army was commanded by the Duke of Wellington and the Prussian army by Prince Blücher.

Maneuver warfare, or manoeuvre warfare, is a military strategy that advocates attempting to defeat the enemy by incapacitating their decision-making through shock and disruption.

Sir Michael Eliot Howard is a British military historian, formerly Chichele Professor of the History of War, Honorary Fellow of All Souls College, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University, Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University and founder of the Department of War Studies, King's College London.

The concept of absolute war was a theoretical construct developed by the Prussian military theorist General Carl von Clausewitz in his famous but unfinished philosophical exploration of war, Vom Kriege. It is discussed only in the first half of Book VIII and it does not appear in sections of the text written later. This indicates that it was an experiment that failed and was meant to be dropped.

Henry Spenser Wilkinson was the first Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University. While he was an English writer known primarily for his work on military subjects, he had wide interests. Earlier in his career he was the drama critic for London's Morning Post.

Otto Jolle Matthijs Jolles (1911–1968) performed a major service to strategic studies in the United States by providing the first American translation of Carl von Clausewitz's magnum opus, On War. Jolles himself is a bit obscure to students of military affairs, largely because his translation of On War was his only published effort in that field. Even his nationality has been misidentified—he has been variously identified as Hungarian, Czech, and Dutch. Military historian Jay Luvaas once quoted an unidentified Israeli professor as saying "whereas the first English translation was by an Englishman who did not know German, the 1943 American translation was by a Hungarian who did not know English." There is little in the Jolles translation to warrant such a comment. In the field of German literature, Jolles is quite well known, especially for his work on Friedrich Schiller. Most of his published work, however, is in German.

Christopher Bassford American historian

Christopher Bassford is an American military historian, best known for his works on the Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. Bassford graduated from the College of William and Mary with a degree in history and honors for his dissertation on tactical nuclear weapons and completed his MA in American diplomatic history at Ohio University. Subsequent to receiving his MA, he served five years on active duty as a U.S. Army field artillery officer, with tours in Korea and Germany. He completed a Ph.D. in modern European history at Purdue University and became director of studies in the theory and nature of war at the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Command and Staff College, then associate professor of National Policy Issues at the U.S. Army War College. He was Professor of Strategy at the National War College, in Washington, D.C., from 1999 until 2012, when he joined the faculty of the College of International Security Affairs as part of the JSOMA program supporting U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). He is the webeditor of The Clausewitz Homepage, a large educational website that has been on-line since 1995.

Jakob Meckel German general

Klemens Wilhelm Jacob Meckel was a general in the Prussian army and foreign advisor to the government of Meiji period Japan.

Jean Colin, was a French general and military writer. He has been judged "one of the brilliant members of the French General Staff before 1914."

Coup d'œil is a term taken from French, that more or less corresponds to the words glimpse or glance in English. The literal meaning is "stroke of [the] eye".

<i>Mozg Armii</i> book by Boris Shaposhnikov

Mozg Armii, in English The Brain of the Army, is a three-volume military theory book published between 1927 and 1929. It is the most important work of Boris Shaposhnikov, a Soviet military commander then in command of the Moscow military region. Mozg Armii gained a wide popularity throughout the Red Army, and Shaposhnikov himself was held in high regard by Joseph Stalin.


Informational notes

  1. In German personal names, von is a preposition which approximately means of or from and usually denotes some sort of nobility. While von (always lower case) is part of the family name or territorial designation, not a first or middle name, if the noble is referred to by surname alone in English, use Schiller or Clausewitz or Goethe , not von Schiller, etc.
  2. "[T]he great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance." [17] :Vol. I pg. 54
  3. "As the centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity of the power used, so it is also in war. The armed forces of every belligerent, whether of a single state or of an alliance of states, have a certain unity, and in that way, connection; but where connection is there come in analogies of the centre of gravity. There are, therefore, in these armed forces certain centres of gravity, the movement and direction of which decide upon other points, and these centres of gravity are situated where the greatest bodies of troops are assembled. But just as, in the world of inert matter, the action against the centre of gravity has its measure and limits in the connection of the parts, so it is in war, and here as well as there the force exerted may easily be greater than the resistance requires, and then there is a blow in the air, a waste of force." [17] :Vol. II pg. 180


  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Bassford, Christopher (March 8, 2016). "Clausewitz and His Works". Retrieved July 9, 2018.
  2. 1 2 Cormier, Youri. War As Paradox: Clausewitz & Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 2016)
  3. Clausewitz, Carl von (1984) [1832]. Howard, Michael; Paret, Peter (eds.). On War[Vom Krieg] (Indexed ed.). New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 87. ISBN   978-0-691-01854-6.
  4. "Clausewitz's tombstone". Retrieved July 9, 2018.
  5. "Carl von Clausewitz". Encyclopædia Britannica.
  6. Aron, Raymond (1983). Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. Taylor & Francis. pp. 12–14. ISBN   9780710090096.
  7. Bellinger, Vanya Eftimova. Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War. New York/London: Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN   978-0-19-022543-8
  8. 1 2 Bellinger, Vanya Eftimova (January 6, 2016). "Five Things You Didn't Know About Carl von Clausewitz". Real Clear Defense. Retrieved 7 January 2016.
  9. See Timothy McCranor, "On the Pedagogical Intent of Clausewitz's On War," MCU Journal vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 2018, pp.133-154.
  10. 1 2 Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force, Penguin Books, 2006, p. 57
  11. Paret, Peter (2012). "Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy". Journal of Military History. 76 (3): 837–45.
  12. Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (2nd ed. 1946) p. 583.
  13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, originally Vom Kriege (3 vols., Berlin: 1832–34). The edition cited here was edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 75, 87, 89, 605.
  14. Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982).
  15. Bassford, Christopher (2007). "The Primacy of Policy and the "Trinity" in Clausewitz's Mature Thought.". In Strachan, Hew; Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (eds.). Clausewitz in the Twenty-First CenturyProceedings of a March, 2005 conference at Oxford. Oxford University Press. pp. 74–90.
  16. Evan Luard, ed. (2016). Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas about International Society. Springer. p. 244. ISBN   9781349221073.CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)
  17. 1 2 3 4 5 von Clausewitz, Carl (1873) [1832]. On War [Vom Krieg]. Translated by Graham, J.J. London: N. Trübner & Co.
  18. 1 2 Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times
  19. Heuser, Beatrice (2007). "Clausewitz' Ideas of Strategy and Victory". In Strachan, Hew; Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (eds.). Clausewitz in the 21st CenturyProceedings of a March, 2005 conference at Oxford. Oxford University Press. pp. 132–163.
  20. Handel, Michael I. (1986). Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. Psychology Press. p. 71. ISBN   9780714632940.
  21. Shepherd III, Frederick L. (2014). The Fog Of War: Effects Of Uncertainty On Airpower Employment. Pickle Partners. p. 9. ISBN   9781782896807.
  22. 1 2 Tip-Toe Through the Trinity: The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare by Christopher Bassford
  23. Moltke, Helmuth (1892). Moltke: His Life and His CharacterSketched in Journals, Letters, Memoirs, a Novel, and Autobiographical Notes. Translated by Herms, Mary. New York: Harper & Brothers Franklin Square. p. 35.
  24. Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy London:Faber, 1967. Second rev. ed.
  26. Brands, Hal; Suri, Jeremi (2015). The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft. Brookings Institution Press. p. 147. ISBN   9780815727132.
  27. John Keegan, A History of Warfare . 1993. Second edition 2004, p. 3.
  28. 1 2 3 Bassford, Christopher (1994). Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945. Oxford UP. pp. 20–21. ISBN   9780195083835.
  29. Strachan, Hew (2011). "Clausewitz and the First World War". Journal of Military History. 75 (2): 367–391.
  30. Kipp, Joseph W. "Lenin and Clausewitz: the Militarization of Marxism, 1914–1921." Military Affairs 1985 49(4): 184–91. ISSN   0026-3931. In JSTOR
  31. 1 2 Mertsalov, A.N. "Jomini versus Clausewitz" pp. 11–19 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited by Mark and Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004 p. 16.
  32. 1 2 3 Rapoport, Anatol "Introduction" pp. 11–82 from On War, London: Penguin, 1968.
  33. Zhang, Yuanlin (1999). "Mao Zedongs Bezugnahme auf Clausewitz". Archiv für Kulturgeschichte. 81 (2): 443–71. doi:10.7788/akg.1999.81.2.443.
  34. Berkun, Scott (2005). The Art of Project Management. Beijing: OŔeilly. ISBN   978-0-596-00786-7.
  35. Joseph W Graham (2002). What the U. S. Military Can Do to Defeat Terrorism. p. 7. ISBN   9780595222599.
  36. Gaddis, John Lewis "We Now Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 1998 pp. 233–234.
  37. Sheppard, John E., Jr. (September 1990). "On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?". Parameters. 20 (3): 85–99.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)
  38. Reiner Pommerin (2014). Clausewitz Goes Global: Carl von Clausewitz in the 21st century. p. 293. ISBN   9783937885780.
  39. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
  40. Daniel Moran, "Clausewitz on Waterloo: Napoleon at Bay," in Carl von Clausewitz and Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815, ed./trans. Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran, and Gregory W. Pedlow (, 2010), p.242, n.11.
  41. See for instance John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), passim.
  42. Strachan, Hew; Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, eds. (2007). Clausewitz in the Twenty-First CenturyProceedings of a March, 2005 conference at Oxford. Oxford University Press.
  43. Giuseppe Caforio, Social sciences and the military: an interdisciplinary overview (2006) p. 221
  44. "Lions for Lambs script (retrieved 14/06/09)".

Further reading

Scholarly studies
Primary sources