Fabian strategy

Last updated

The Fabian strategy is a military strategy where pitched battles and frontal assaults are avoided in favor of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition and indirection. While avoiding decisive battles, the side employing this strategy harasses its enemy through skirmishes to cause attrition, disrupt supply and affect morale. Employment of this strategy implies that the side adopting this strategy believes time is on its side, usually because the side employing the strategy is fighting in, or close to, their homeland and the enemy is far from home and by necessity has long and costly supply lines. It may also be adopted when no feasible alternative strategy can be devised.

Contents

By extension, the term is also applied to other situations in which a large, ambitious goal is seen as being out of reach, but may be accomplished in little steps. [1]

Rome versus Carthage: The Second Punic War

Statue of Quintus Fabius Maximus, the strategy's namesake N26 Fabius Cunctator, Schonbrunn (04).jpg
Statue of Quintus Fabius Maximus, the strategy's namesake

This strategy derives its name from Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, [2] the dictator of the Roman Republic given the task of defeating the great Carthaginian general Hannibal in southern Italy during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC). [3] At the start of the war, Hannibal boldly crossed the Alps and invaded Italy. [4] Due to his skill as a general, Hannibal repeatedly inflicted devastating losses on the Romans—quickly achieving two crushing victories over Roman armies at Trebia and Lake Trasimene [5] [6] After these disasters, the Romans gave full authority to Fabius Maximus as dictator. Fabius initiated a war of attrition, fought through constant skirmishes, limiting the ability of the Carthaginians to forage for food and denying them significant victories. [7] [8]

Hannibal was handicapped by two weaknesses. First, he was commander of an invading foreign army (on Italian soil), and was effectively cut off from his home country in North Africa by difficulty of seaborne resupply over the Mediterranean Sea. [9] As long as Rome's allies remained loyal, there was little he could do to win. Hannibal tried to convince the allies of Rome that it was more beneficial for them to side with Carthage (through a combination of victory and negotiation). [10] Fabius calculated that, in order to defeat Hannibal, he had to avoid engaging him altogether (so as to deprive him of victories). He determined that Hannibal's largely extended supply lines (as well as the cost of maintaining the Carthaginian army in the field) meant that Rome had time on its side.[ citation needed ]

Fabius avoided battle as a deliberate strategy. [11] He sent out small military units to attack Hannibal's foraging parties [12] while keeping the Roman army in hilly terrain to nullify Carthaginian cavalry superiority. [13] Residents of small villages in the path of the Carthaginians were ordered by Fabius to burn their crops creating scorched earth and take refuge in fortified towns. [14] Fabius used interior lines to ensure that Hannibal could not march directly on Rome without having to first abandon his Mediterranean ports (supply lines). At the same time, Fabius began to inflict constant, small, debilitating defeats on the Carthaginians. This, Fabius had concluded, would wear down the invaders' endurance and discourage Rome's allies from switching sides, without challenging the Carthaginians to major battles. Once the Carthaginians were sufficiently weakened and demoralized by lack of food and supplies, Fabius and his well-fed legions would then fight a decisive battle in the hope of crushing the Carthaginians once and for all.

Hannibal's second weakness was much of his army being made up of Spanish mercenaries and Gaulish allies. Their loyalty to Hannibal was shallow; though they disliked Rome, they mainly desired quick battles and raids for plunder. They were unsuited for long sieges, and possessed neither the equipment nor the patience for such tactics. The tedium of countless small-skirmish defeats sapped their morale, and they began to desert.

With no main Roman army to attack, Hannibal's army became virtually no threat to Rome, which was a walled city that required a long siege to take. Fabius's strategy struck at the heart of Hannibal's weakness. Time, not major battles, would cripple Hannibal.

Political opposition

Fabius's strategy, though a military success and tolerable to wiser minds in the Roman Senate, was unpopular; the Romans had been long accustomed to facing and besting their enemies directly on the field of battle. The Fabian strategy was, in part, ruined because of a lack of unity in the command of the Roman army. The magister equitum, Marcus Minucius Rufus, a political enemy of Fabius, famously exclaiming:

Are we come here to see our allies butchered, and their property burned, as a spectacle to be enjoyed? And if we are not moved with shame on account of any others, are we not on account of these citizens... which now not the neighboring Samnite wastes with fire, but a Carthaginian foreigner, who has advanced even this far from the remotest limits of the world, through our dilatoriness and inactivity? [15]

As the memory of the shock of Hannibal's victories grew dimmer, the Roman populace gradually started to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy, the very thing which had given them time to recover. It was especially frustrating to the mass of the people, who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. Moreover, it was widely believed that if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, the allies, believing that Rome was incapable of protecting them, might defect to the Carthaginians.

Since Fabius won no large-scale victories, the Senate removed him from command. Their chosen replacement, Gaius Terentius Varro, led the Roman army into a debacle at the Battle of Cannae. The Romans, after experiencing this catastrophic defeat and losing countless other battles, had by this point learned their lesson. They utilized the strategies that Fabius had taught them, which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of driving Hannibal from Italy.

This strategy of attrition earned Fabius the cognomen "Cunctator" (The Delayer). [3]

Later examples

During Antony's Atropatene campaign, the Parthians first destroyed the isolated baggage train and siege engines of the invaders. As Antony proceeded to lay siege on the Atropatenian capital, they began harassing the besiegers, forcing them to retreat.

During the Roman campaign against Persia prosecuted by Julian in 363 AD, the main Persian army under Shapur II let the numerically superior Romans advance deep into their territory, avoiding a full-scale battle at the expense of the destruction of their fortresses. As the fortified Persian capital seemed impregnable, Julian was lured into Persia's interior, where the Persians employed scorched earth tactics. Shapur II's army appeared later and engaged in continuous skirmishes only after the starving Romans were in retreat, resulting in a disastrous Roman defeat. [16]

The strategy was used by the medieval French general Bertrand du Guesclin during the Hundred Years' War against the English following a series of disastrous defeats in pitched battles against Edward, the Black Prince. Eventually du Guesclin was able to recover most of the territory that had been lost.

The most noted use of Fabian strategy in American history was by George Washington, sometimes called the "American Fabius" for his use of the strategy during the first year of the American Revolutionary War. While Washington had initially pushed for traditional direct engagements using battle lines, he was convinced of the merits of using his army to harass the British rather than engage them, both by the urging of his generals in his councils of war, and by the pitched-battle disasters of 1776, especially the Battle of Long Island. In addition, given his background as a colonial officer who had participated in asymmetric campaigns against Native Americans, Washington predicted that this style would aid in defeating the traditional tactics of the British Army. [17]

During the American Revolution, John Adams' dissatisfaction with Washington's conduct of the war led him to declare, "I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters." [18]

Throughout history, the Fabian strategy has been employed all over the world. Used against Napoleon's Grande Armée in combination with scorched earth and guerrilla war, it proved decisive in defeating the French invasion of Russia. Sam Houston effectively employed a Fabian defense in the aftermath of the Battle of the Alamo, using delaying tactics and small-unit harrying against Santa Anna's much larger force, to give time for the Army of Texas to grow into a viable fighting force. [19] When he finally met Santa Anna at San Jacinto, the resulting victory ensured the establishment of the Republic of Texas. During the First World War in German East Africa, Generals Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and Jan Smuts both used the Fabian strategy in their campaigns. [20]

During the First Indochina War, the Viet Minh used the strategy by utilizing delaying and hit-and-run tactics and scorched-earth strategy against the better-equipped French forces, which prolonged the war and caused both the French high command and home front to grow weary of the fighting, ending with the decisive Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Cong and the PAVN would later use this strategy against the Americans and ARVN forces during the Vietnam War.

Fabian socialism

Fabian socialism, the ideology of the Fabian Society (founded in 1884), significantly influenced the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. It utilizes the same strategy of a "war of attrition" to facilitate the society's aim to bring about a socialist state. The advocation of gradualism distinguished this brand of socialism from those who favor revolutionary action. [21]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus</span> Roman statesman and general (c. 280 – 203 BC)

Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, surnamed Cunctator, was a Roman statesman and general of the third century BC. He was consul five times and was appointed dictator in 221 and 217 BC. He was censor in 230 BC. His agnomen, Cunctator, usually translated as "the delayer", refers to the strategy that he employed against Hannibal's forces during the Second Punic War. Facing an outstanding commander with superior numbers, he pursued a then-novel strategy of targeting the enemy's supply lines, and accepting only smaller engagements on favourable ground, rather than risking his entire army on direct confrontation with Hannibal himself. As a result, he is regarded as the originator of many tactics used in guerrilla warfare.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">First Punic War</span> 264–241 BC war between Rome and Carthage

The First Punic War was the first of three wars fought between Rome and Carthage, the two main powers of the western Mediterranean in the early 3rd century BC. For 23 years, in the longest continuous conflict and greatest naval war of antiquity, the two powers struggled for supremacy. The war was fought primarily on the Mediterranean island of Sicily and its surrounding waters, and also in North Africa. After immense losses on both sides, the Carthaginians were defeated.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hannibal</span> Carthaginian general and statesman (247–183/181 BC)

Hannibal was a Carthaginian general and statesman who commanded the forces of Carthage in their battle against the Roman Republic during the Second Punic War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Punic Wars</span> Wars between Rome and Carthage, 264 to 146 BC

The Punic Wars were a series of wars between 264 and 146 BC fought between Rome and Carthage. Three conflicts between these states took place on both land and sea across the western Mediterranean region and involved a total of forty-three years of warfare. The Punic Wars are also considered to include the four-year-long revolt against Carthage which started in 241 BC. Each war involved immense materiel and human losses on both sides.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Second Punic War</span> War between Rome and Carthage, 218 to 202 BC

The Second Punic War was the second of three wars fought between Carthage and Rome, the two main powers of the western Mediterranean in the 3rd century BC. For 17 years the two states struggled for supremacy, primarily in Italy and Iberia, but also on the islands of Sicily and Sardinia and, towards the end of the war, in North Africa. After immense materiel and human losses on both sides, the Carthaginians were once again defeated. Macedonia, Syracuse and several Numidian kingdoms were drawn into the fighting, and Iberian and Gallic forces fought on both sides. There were three main military theatres during the war: Italy, where Hannibal defeated the Roman legions repeatedly, with occasional subsidiary campaigns in Sicily, Sardinia and Greece; Iberia, where Hasdrubal, a younger brother of Hannibal, defended the Carthaginian colonial cities with mixed success before moving into Italy; and Africa, where Rome finally won the war.

This article concerns the period 219 BC – 210 BC.

Year 203 BC was a year of the pre-Julian Roman calendar. At the time it was known as the Year of the Consulship of Caepio and Geminus. The denomination 203 BC for this year has been used since the early medieval period, when the Anno Domini calendar era became the prevalent method in Europe for naming years.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">217 BC</span> Calendar year

Year 217 BC was a year of the pre-Julian Roman calendar. At the time it was known as the Year of the Consulship of Geminus and Flaminius/Regulus. The denomination 217 BC for this year has been used since the early medieval period, when the Anno Domini calendar era became the prevalent method in Europe for naming years.

Hamilcar Barca or Barcas was a Carthaginian general and statesman, leader of the Barcid family, and father of Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago. He was also father-in-law to Hasdrubal the Fair.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Marcus Claudius Marcellus</span> Roman general and statesman (c.270–208 BC)

Marcus Claudius Marcellus, five times elected as consul of the Roman Republic, was an important Roman military leader during the Gallic War of 225 BC and the Second Punic War. Marcellus gained the most prestigious award a Roman general could earn, the spolia opima, for killing the Gallic military leader and king Viridomarus in single combat in 222 BC at the Battle of Clastidium. Furthermore, he is noted for having conquered the fortified city of Syracuse in a protracted siege during which Archimedes, the famous mathematician, scientist, and inventor, was killed, despite Marcellus ordering the soldiers under his command not to harm him. Marcus Claudius Marcellus died in battle in 208 BC, leaving behind a legacy of military conquests and a reinvigorated Roman legend of the spolia opima.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Cannae</span> Major battle of the Second Punic War (216 BC)

The Battle of Cannae was a key engagement of the Second Punic War between the Roman Republic and Carthage, fought on 2 August 216 BC near the ancient village of Cannae in Apulia, southeast Italy. The Carthaginians and their allies, led by Hannibal, surrounded and practically annihilated a larger Roman and Italian army under the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history and one of the worst defeats in Roman history, and it cemented Hannibal Barca's reputation as one of antiquity's greatest tacticians.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of the Trebia</span> First major battle of the Second Punic War

The battle of the Trebia was the first major battle of the Second Punic War, fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and a Roman army under Sempronius Longus on 22 or 23 December 218 BC. Each army had a strength of about 40,000 men; the Carthaginians were stronger in cavalry, the Romans in infantry. The battle took place on the flood plain of the west bank of the lower Trebia River, not far from the settlement of Placentia, and resulted in a heavy defeat for the Romans.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Lake Trasimene</span> 217 BC battle of the Second Punic War

The Battle of Lake Trasimene was fought when a Carthaginian force under Hannibal ambushed a Roman army commanded by Gaius Flaminius on 21 June 217 BC, during the Second Punic War. The battle took place on the north shore of Lake Trasimene, to the south of Cortona, and resulted in a heavy defeat for the Romans.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Ibera</span> Battle of the Second Punic War, fought in Spain

The Battle of Ibera, also known as the Battle of Dertosa, was fought in the spring of 215 BC on the south bank of the Ebro River near the town of Ibera and was part of the Second Punic War. A Roman army, under the command of the brothers Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, defeated a similarly sized Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal Barca. The Romans, under Gnaeus Scipio, had invaded Iberia in late 218 BC and established a foothold after winning the Battle of Cissa. This lodgement, on the north-east Iberian coast, between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, blocked the route of any reinforcements from Iberia for the army of Hannibal, who had invaded Italy from Iberia earlier in the year. Hasdrubal attempted to evict the Romans in 217 BC, but this ended in defeat when the Carthaginian naval contingent was mauled at the Battle of Ebro River.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Ager Falernus</span> Military clash between Rome and Carthage

The Battle of Ager Falernus was a skirmish during the Second Punic War between the armies of Rome and Carthage. After winning the Battle of Lake Trasimene in Italy in 217 BC, the army commanded by Hannibal marched south and reached Campania. The Carthaginians ultimately moved into the district of Falernum, a fertile river valley surrounded by mountains.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Geronium</span> Battle of the Second Punic War

The Battle of Geronium was a full-scale battle in the summer and autumn months of 217 BC, respectively. This battle happened during the Second Punic War. The event has been regarded as a pivotal moment in the war, as it involved the armies of the incredibly influential civilizations, Rome and Carthage. It resulted in a decisive victory for the Carthaginian forces led by the legendary general Hannibal Barca.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Beneventum (214 BC)</span>

The Battle of Beneventum was fought in 214 BC near modern Benevento during the Second Punic War. Roman legions under Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus defeated Hanno's Carthaginian forces, denying Hannibal reinforcements. Livy gives a brief description of the battle, which was part of the Roman campaign to subdue the southern Italian city-states that had joined Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Canusium</span>

The Battle of Canusium also known as the Battle of Asculum was a three-day engagement between the forces of Rome and Carthage. It took place in Apulia during the spring of 209 BC, the tenth year of the Second Punic War. A larger Roman offensive, of which it was a part, aimed to subjugate and to punish cities and tribes that had abandoned the alliance with Rome after the Battle of Cannae, and to narrow the base of the Carthaginian leader, Hannibal, in southern Italy.

Marcus Minucius Rufus was a Roman consul in 221 BC. He was also Magister Equitum during the dictatorship of Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus known as Cunctator.

References

  1. ↑ Alvin Ang, "How To Use The “Fabian Strategy” To Slow-Boil Your Way To Success", Mind Cafe, Feb. 6, 2021; accessed 2023.06.21.
  2. ↑ "Fabian Strategy". George Washington's Mount Vernon. Retrieved 2019-05-03.
  3. 1 2 "Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus | Roman statesman and commander". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2019-05-03.
  4. ↑ Ball, Philip (2016-04-03). "The truth about Hannibal's route across the Alps". The Observer. ISSN   0029-7712 . Retrieved 2019-05-03.
  5. ↑ "Battle of the Trebbia River | Roman-Carthaginian history". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2019-05-03.
  6. ↑ "Battle of Trasimene | Roman-Carthaginian history". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2019-05-03.
  7. ↑ Erdkamp, Paul (1992). "Polybius, Livy and the 'Fabian Strategy'". Ancient Society. 23: 127–147. doi:10.2143/AS.23.0.2005877. ISSN   0066-1619. JSTOR   44079478.
  8. ↑ Daly, Gregory (2005-08-18). Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War. Routledge. p. 16. ISBN   9781134507122.
  9. ↑ Gabriel, Richard A. (2011-02-28). Hannibal: The Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy. Potomac Books, Inc. p. 91. ISBN   9781597976862.
  10. ↑ Fronda, Michael P. (2010-06-10). Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy during the Second Punic War. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37, 39–40. ISBN   9781139488624.
  11. ↑ Prevas, John (2017-09-26). Hannibal's Oath: The Life and Wars of Rome's Greatest Enemy. Hachette Books. ISBN   9780306824258.
  12. ↑ Gabriel, Richard A. (2011). Hannibal: The Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy. Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN   9781597977661.
  13. ↑ Clare, Israel Smith (1893). Ancient Greece and Rome. Werner Company. p. 923.
  14. ↑ Strauss, Barry (2013). Masters of Command: Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and the Genius of Leadership. Simon and Schuster. p. 88. ISBN   9781439164495.
  15. ↑ Livy (1872). The History of Rome. Bell. p. 781.
  16. ↑ Kettenhofen, Erich (19 April 2012). "Julian". Encyclopaedia Iranica . Retrieved 11 February 2020.
  17. ↑ Joseph J. Ellis (2004). His Excellency. Vintage Books. pp. 92–109. ISBN   978-1400032532.
  18. ↑ Adams, Charles Francis (1875). Familiar Letters of John Adams and His Wife Abigail Adams, During the Revolution: With a Memoir of Mrs. Adams. Hurd and Houghton. p. 305. ISBN   9780836953183.
  19. ↑ Bettwy, Samuel William (2014). "Comparing Uses of the Strategic Defense (Fabian Strategy) by General Washington (1776-78) and Russian Generals (1904-05)". doi:10.2139/ssrn.2544985.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  20. ↑ J.C. Smuts, Jan Christiaan Smuts (Cape Town: Cassell & Company LTD, 1952), 170.
  21. ↑ "Fabianism | socialist movement". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2019-05-11.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.