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In naval warfare, a "fleet in being" is a naval force that extends a controlling influence without ever leaving port. Were the fleet to leave port and face the enemy, it might lose in battle and no longer influence the enemy's actions, but while it remains safely in port, the enemy is forced to continually deploy forces to guard against it. A "fleet in being" can be part of a sea denial doctrine, but not one of sea control.
The term was first used in 1690 when Lord Torrington, commander of the Royal Navy forces in the English Channel, found himself facing a stronger French fleet. He proposed avoiding a sea battle, except under very favourable conditions, until he could be reinforced. By thus keeping his "fleet in being", he could maintain an active threat which would force the enemy to remain in the area and prevent them from taking the initiative elsewhere. [1]
Rudyard Kipling published a series of articles about the British Channel Fleet under the title A Fleet in Being: Notes of Three Trips with the Channel Squadron in 1898, but did not use the term in the sense described here. [2]
The "fleet in being" concept is based on the assumption that the fleet is relatively safe in port, even if near the enemy. While this is not necessarily true in the modern era, for much of human history a fleet that was at harbor was much less exposed to attack and to other hazards such as storms. This made it difficult, or even impossible, for an enemy to damage the fleet without taking disproportionate losses.
The enemy cannot simply ignore the fleet in being because it always has the option to sortie and attack wherever there are favourable terms. However, the blockading force has to be significant enough that the fleet in being cannot realistically attack it themselves. This creates a stalemate that favours the defender because the attacker always must deploy a superior force to counter them, and those units are unable to perform any other duties.
After the Battle of Taranto and the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, it became obvious that air power made a fleet concentrated in a port vulnerable, and a fleet in being became too risky to be practical. A port is a known location for an enemy to focus attacks on and a handful of aircraft or submarines can damage or sink multiple warships, even in the presence of advanced defenses. As a result, it is preferable for modern fleets to be at sea where their position is not fully known, which provides a degree of protection.
This has not made a fleet in being completely irrelevant because there are situations where an enemy is unwilling or unable to attack the fleet in harbour, such as for political reasons.
An example of this is during the Falklands Conflict. After looking at the alternatives, "The strategy that was accepted for the Argentine Navy [in the 1982 Falklands War] was one of a 'fleet in being' concept ... The fleet would not conduct a direct attack; they would only attack when the odds were in their favor. Otherwise, they would remain outside any declared British exclusion zones and wait for a target of opportunity." [3] The Argentines were not able to make any positive use of their "fleet in being", because the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror showed that the World War II-era cruisers and other assets of the Argentine Navy were vulnerable to attack from contemporary submarines.[ citation needed ]
The idea of a "fleet in being" can be generalised to forces other than naval. A fortress under siege is essentially an "army in being", which ties up enemy forces without taking the risk of fighting a battle.
While less developed there are a few similar cases for air forces. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used his air force with an operational doctrine analogous to "fleet in being". [4] The mere presence of the Iraqi Air Force in hardened bunkers forced the coalition attacking Iraq to act cautiously and to escort its bomber sorties, until the aircraft shelters were found to be vulnerable.[ citation needed ]
In all cases the principle is the same. As long as a smaller force exists and has the choice to engage or not, the larger force is only able to conduct operations in sufficient strength to destroy the complete smaller force. This limits the enemy options significantly, and may even deny actions entirely. The closer that the smaller force is to the larger in strength, the more significant the effect will be.
The first modern example was the stand-off between the Imperial Russian Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Russia possessed three battle-fleets: one in the Baltic Sea, the second in the Black Sea, and the third in the Far East. The Pacific squadron in the Far East was stationed at Vladivostok and Port Arthur. With the latter being closer to the land war, Port Arthur became strategically more important.
The IJN possessed only one battle-fleet to the Russian Navy's three; therefore it was imperative that the IJN not have to fight all three of them simultaneously. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 effectively eliminated the Black Sea fleet by keeping it blocked in the Black Sea, lest they risk war with Britain. However, the Baltic Fleet (later renamed the 2nd Pacific Squadron) had orders to reinforce the Port Arthur squadron sometime in 1905. [5] It would be the IJN's mission to preempt that move. [6]
Only after Port Arthur's "fleet in being" was eliminated could the Baltic Fleet and Japanese fleet square off; and this would happen the following year, during the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905.
In order to permanently eliminate Port Arthur's battle-squadron, the IJN initiated three operations. The first was a surprise destroyer torpedo attack inside the harbor in early February 1904. [7] This was quickly followed up with an attempt to block the harbor's entrance by sinking old steam ships (block ships) in the channel. [8] The third and final attempt of permanently bottling up the fleet was the mining of the waters surrounding the harbor's entrance. [9] Although this last attempt also failed, it had the unintended consequence of robbing the Russian Navy of one of its most brilliant naval officers, Admiral Stepan Makarov. When his flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk, struck one of those mines she sank almost immediately, drowning Makarov with the crew.
The "fleet in being" remained so, until under the new command of Admiral Vilgelm Vitgeft, the Port Arthur squadron was ordered to break out and steam for Vladivostok on 10 August 1904. Vitgeft's exit from Port Arthur resulted in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, [10] an excessively long-ranged gun duel that resulted in no capital warships being sunk on either side, but finally eliminated [6] Port Arthur's "fleet in being", as its warships became dispersed to neutral ports (where they were interned), and the survivors were so heavily damaged that they were no longer serviceable.
A later example is the stand-off between the German High Seas Fleet and the British Grand Fleet during World War I. Germany largely preferred to keep its fleet intact rather than taking the risk of losing a major engagement with the larger Royal Navy, particularly after the Battle of Jutland. [11]
In World War II, actions of the Italian Regia Marina in 1940 also demonstrate the idea of a "fleet in being". After a number of minor battles against the Royal Navy that were mostly inconclusive, the bulk of Italian fleet was left in Taranto from where it could sortie very quickly against any British attempt to reach Malta, exerting a "disproportionate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition". Even after the great tactical success of the British aircraft carrier attack on Taranto in November 1940, the British failure to deliver a decisive blow to the Italian fleet resulted in the Royal Navy tying up substantial naval forces in the Mediterranean for the next three years. [12]
Even more so than other surface vessels in Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine (navy), the German battleship Tirpitz served her entire career as a "fleet in being" in her own right. Although she never fired a shot at an enemy ship, her mere presence in the Norwegian fiords forced the Royal Navy and their allies to allocate powerful warships in defending Arctic convoys, and caused a major convoy (PQ 17) to scatter, suffering huge losses, mainly to U-boats and aircraft. A 1943 midget submarine attack and successive airstrikes launched by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm removed the threat by November 1944, when the Tirpitz was sunk at Tromsø. [13]
The Battle of Tsushima, also known as the Battle of Tsushima Strait and in Japan as the Battle of the Sea of Japan, was the final naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War, fought on 27–28 May 1905 in the Tsushima Strait. A devastating defeat for the Imperial Russian Navy, the battle was the only decisive engagement ever fought between modern steel battleship fleets and the first in which wireless telegraphy (radio) played a critically important role. The battle was described by Sir George Clarke as "by far the greatest and the most important naval event since Trafalgar".
The Combined Fleet was the main sea-going component of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Until 1933, the Combined Fleet was not a permanent organization, but a temporary force formed for the duration of a conflict or major naval maneuvers from various units normally under separate commands in peacetime.
Alfred Thayer Mahan was a United States naval officer and historian, whom John Keegan called "the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century." His book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (1890) won immediate recognition, especially in Europe, and with its successor, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812 (1892), made him world-famous and perhaps the most influential American author of the nineteenth century.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was the navy of the Empire of Japan from 1868 to 1945, when it was dissolved following Japan's surrender in World War II. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was formed between 1952 and 1954 after the dissolution of the IJN.
The Battle of Taranto took place on the night of 11–12 November 1940 during the Second World War between British naval forces, under Admiral Andrew Cunningham, and Italian naval forces, under Admiral Inigo Campioni. The Royal Navy launched the first all-aircraft ship-to-ship naval attack in history, employing 21 Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers from the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious in the Mediterranean Sea.
Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky was an admiral of the Imperial Russian Navy. He was in command of the Second Pacific Squadron in the Battle of Tsushima, during the Russo-Japanese War.
The Battle of the Yellow Sea was a major naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War, fought on 10 August 1904. In the Russian Navy, it was referred to as the Battle of 10 August. The battle foiled an attempt by the Russian fleet at Port Arthur to break out and form up with the Vladivostok squadron, forcing them to return to port. Four days later, the Battle off Ulsan similarly ended the Vladivostok group's sortie, forcing both fleets to remain at anchor.
A ship is scuttled when its crew deliberately sinks it, typically by deliberately opening holes in its hull.
The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, at the beginning of the Pacific War in December 1941, was the third most powerful navy in the world, and the naval air service was one of the most potent air forces in the world. During the first six months of the war, the Imperial Japanese Navy enjoyed spectacular success inflicting heavy defeats on Allied forces, being undefeated in every battle. The attack on Pearl Harbor crippled the battleships of the US Pacific Fleet, while Allied navies were devastated during Japan's conquest of Southeast Asia. Japanese Navy aircraft operating from land bases were also responsible for the sinkings of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse which was the first time that capital ships were sunk by aerial attack while underway. In April 1942, the Indian Ocean raid drove the Royal Navy from South East Asia. After these successes, the Japanese now concentrated on the elimination and neutralization of strategic points from where the Allies could launch counteroffensives against Japan's conquests. However, at Coral Sea the Japanese were forced to abandon their attempts to isolate Australia while the defeat at Midway saw them forced on the defensive. The campaign in the Solomon Islands, in which the Japanese lost the war of attrition, was the most decisive; they had failed to commit enough forces in sufficient time.
Naval warfare in World War I was mainly characterized by blockade. The Allied Powers, with their larger fleets and surrounding position, largely succeeded in their blockade of Germany and the other Central Powers, whilst the efforts of the Central Powers to break that blockade, or to establish an effective counter blockade with submarines and commerce raiders, were eventually unsuccessful. Major fleet actions were extremely rare and proved less decisive.
Operation Cockpit was an Allied attack against the Japanese-held island of Sabang on 19 April 1944. It was conducted by aircraft flying from British and American aircraft carriers and targeted Japanese shipping and airfields. A small number of Japanese ships and aircraft were destroyed, and one American aircraft was lost. While the attack was successful tactically, it failed to divert Japanese forces from other areas as had been hoped.
Operation Tungsten was a Second World War Royal Navy air raid that targeted the German battleship Tirpitz. The operation sought to damage or destroy Tirpitz at her base in Kaafjord in the far north of Norway before she could become fully operational again following a period of repairs.
Naval strategy is the planning and conduct of war at sea, the naval equivalent of military strategy on land.
Hatsukaze was the seventh vessel to be commissioned in the 19-vessel Kagerō-class destroyers built for the Imperial Japanese Navy in the late-1930s under the Circle Three Supplementary Naval Expansion Program. She survived four major fleet actions against the Allies, but was finally sunk in November 1943 after being damaged through collision with Japanese cruiser Myōkō.
Peresvet was the lead ship of the three Peresvet-class pre-dreadnought battleships built for the Imperial Russian Navy at the end of the nineteenth century. The ship was transferred to the Pacific Squadron upon completion and based at Port Arthur from 1903. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, she participated in the Battle of Port Arthur and was seriously damaged during the Battle of the Yellow Sea and again in the siege of Port Arthur. The ship was scuttled before the Russians surrendered, then salvaged by the Japanese and placed into service with the name Sagami (相模).
The Decisive Battle Doctrine was a naval strategy adopted by the Imperial Japanese Navy prior to the Second World War. The theory was derived from the writings of American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan. In the Decisive Battle Doctrine the Japanese navy would win a war by fighting and winning a single, decisive naval action. The idea gained broad acceptance following the Russo-Japanese War, where a well-trained, smaller Japanese naval force gained a decisive victory in the Sea of Japan at the Battle of Tsushima, defeating the Imperial Russian Navy of their rival the Russian Empire, a western naval power. Operational plans thereafter were influenced by the effective naval gunnery Japan demonstrated at Tsushima.
The High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) was the battle fleet of the German Imperial Navy and saw action during the First World War. The formation was created in February 1907, when the Home Fleet (Heimatflotte) was renamed as the High Seas Fleet. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was the architect of the fleet; he envisioned a force powerful enough to challenge the Royal Navy's predominance. Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, championed the fleet as the instrument by which he would seize overseas possessions and make Germany a global power. By concentrating a powerful battle fleet in the North Sea while the Royal Navy was required to disperse its forces around the British Empire, Tirpitz believed Germany could achieve a balance of force that could seriously damage British naval hegemony. This was the heart of Tirpitz's "Risk Theory", which held that Britain would not challenge Germany if the latter's fleet posed such a significant threat to its own.
At the beginning of World War II, the Royal Navy was the strongest navy in the world, with the largest number of warships built and with naval bases across the globe. It had over 15 battleships and battlecruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers, 164 destroyers and 66 submarines. With a massive merchant navy, about a third of the world total, it also dominated shipping. The Royal Navy fought in every theatre from the Atlantic, Mediterranean, freezing Northern routes to Russia and the Pacific ocean.
Naval historians such as Evan Mawdsley, Richard Overy, and Craig Symonds concluded that World War II's decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea. Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in Europe and North Africa. Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for Russian soldiers to prevail at Stalingrad and Kursk.
