Russian hybrid warfare

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Russian hybrid warfare are Russian efforts to foster instability in other countries using conventional and unconventional means, while avoiding all-out war. [1] [2]

Contents

2014-2022

Russian soldiers without insignia (″little green men″) assisting in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the proxies used by Russia in eastern Ukraine are often the focus of Western assessments of Russian hybrid warfare. [1] [3] Other Russian hybrid efforts preceding the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that started in 2022 include the broad disinformation campaigns targeting the 2016 US election and the Brexit referendum. [4]

2022-present

In the years following the invasion of Ukraine, there have been several incidents in Europe linked to Russian hybrid warfare. [5] In 2022, Estonia was the target of a Russian hacking campaign, which it fended off. Also in 2022, the Norwegian police arrested several Russian nationals equipped with cameras and drones near oil and gas infrastructure. [4]

Western sources have accused Russia of being responsible for the Nord Stream pipelines sabotage in September 2022. [2]

In April 2024, the UK claimed that Russia was behind an arson attack targeting a Ukraine-linked business warehouse in London. [2]

During summer 2024, German and US intelligence reportedly prevented a Russian plot to assassinate European defense industry executives, including the CEO of Rheinmetall. [4] In May, the foreign ministry of Estonia summoned the Russian embassy chief after a flights by a Finnish airline to eastern Estonia were paused due to GPS disturbances suspected to be caused by Russia. Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, almost all airlines flying over the Baltics have experienced navigation problems. Aside from signal jamming, other forms of Russian hybrid aggression against countries like Finland, Poland and Sweden described are violations of territorial waters and air space, and encouraging or permitting migrants from third countries to arrive at borders in large numbers through Russia and Belarus. [6]

In October 2024, British counter-terror police said that they had been investigating a suspected Russian plot involving hidden incendiary devices on a plane to the UK. The plot may have been a test for a similar attack on Canada and the US. In October the head of MI5 Ken McCallum warned that Russian military intelligence were active in a campaign to ″generate mayhem″ on European and British streets using proxies that ″further reduces the professionalism of their operations″. [4]

In November 2024, amidst intensifying Russian hybrid warfare efforts in Europe, two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea were damaged in another instance of suspected Russian sabotage. The Chinese-flagged ship Yi Peng 3 was allegedly captained by a Russian as it passed the two cables at approximately the same time as each was cut. The deputy head of NATO's Allied Maritime Command had earlier in the year said that Russia and other malicious actors were targeting the vulnerable and extensive piped and underwater cables connecting Europe's energy and communications networks. [5]

The Russian Orthodox Church has been described as one strand in Russian covert operational activity against European states that support Ukraine. In 2024, the Swedish Security Service concluded that a recently consecrated Russian Orthodox church built in Västerås was linked to Russia intelligence operations, adding that the Kremlin uses the Russian Orthodox Church in Sweden as a platform for such operations. The church was located near an airport used for Swedish military exercises and other critical national infrastructure. [5]

In December 2024, an underwater power cable between Estonia and Finland was damaged on Christmas Day in Finnish waters, Finnish authorities placed a tanker ship named Eagle S at the center of its investigation into the incident being sabotage. The Finnish Customs Service said that the ship is part of the Russian shadow fleet. According to MarineTraffic, the ship was on its way to Egypt from Saint Petersburg, but slowed in the vicinity of the underwater cables. The Finnish Border Guard inspected the ship and said that the ship's anchors were missing, the suspicion being that the ship cut the cables by dragging its anchors over them. [7]

International reactions

German intelligence chief Bruno Kahl said in November 2024 that Russia's extensive use of hybrid warfare ″increases the risk that NATO will eventually consider invoking its Article 5 mutual defence clause″. [2]

The Baltic States have been among the biggest advocates in NATO for the alliance taking steps to counter the Russian threat, with many believing that with the increased Russian hybrid attacks, NATO's eastern flank will be the next to be targeted if Russia wins in Ukraine. [6] Following damage to underwater cables between Estonia and Finland in December 2024 suspected to have been caused by a ship part of the Russian shadow fleet, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said that the incident must be regarded as an attack against "vital infrastructure", adding that the shadow fleet is a threat to security in the Baltic. [7]

Russia's view on hybrid warfare

According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russia defines the concept of hybrid wars precisely as a type of war, rather than a set of means to conduct state policy. The Russian Armed Forces openly discuss ongoing conflicts as hybrid wars, and Russia sees hybrid wars as the future of military development. [1]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Electronic warfare</span> Combat involving electronics and directed energy

Electromagnetic warfare or electronic warfare (EW) is warfare involving the use of the electromagnetic spectrum or directed energy to control the spectrum, attack an enemy, or impede enemy operations. The purpose of electromagnetic warfare is to deny the opponent the advantage of—and ensure friendly unimpeded access to—the EM spectrum. Electromagnetic warfare can be applied from air, sea, land, or space by crewed and uncrewed systems, and can target communication, radar, or other military and civilian assets.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">GRU (Russian Federation)</span> Russian military intelligence agency

The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, formerly the Main Intelligence Directorate, and still commonly known by its previous abbreviation GRU, is the foreign military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The GRU controls the military intelligence service and maintains its own special forces units.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Baltic Fleet</span> Russian Navy fleet

The Baltic Fleet is the fleet of the Russian Navy in the Baltic Sea.

Estlink is a set of HVDC submarine power cables between Estonia and Finland. Estlink 1 was the first interconnection between the Baltic and Nordic electricity markets followed by Estlink 2 in 2014. The main purpose of the Estlink connection is to secure power supply in both regions to integrate the Baltic and Nordic energy markets.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russian commando frogmen</span> Tactical scuba diving unit

The Russian commando frogmen, informally called "commando frogmen" in civilian media, are a Russian Naval Spetsnaz unit under operational subordination to the GRU that specialized in amphibious reconnaissance to prepare for amphibious warfare operations, clandestine operation, defense against swimmer incursions, direct action against important strategic or tactical goals, irregular warfare, ISTAR, maritime counterterrorism and hostage rescue, and naval special warfare. It is the special forces unit of the Russian Naval Infantry and is composed of highly trained and elite marines within the Naval Infantry. By virtue of belonging to the Russian Naval Infantry, frogmen fall under the Coastal Troops of the Russian Navy service arm. The Russian Navy proper does not field any special forces or special operations forces. Russian FSB special forces Alpha Group and Vympel also have frogman units in their respective naval components.

Nord Stream is a pair of offshore natural gas pipelines in Europe that run under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. It consists of the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline running from Vyborg in northwestern Russia, near Finland, and the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline running from Ust-Luga in northwestern Russia near Estonia. Both pipelines run to Lubmin in the northeastern German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Each pipeline contains two pipes, denoted A and B; each of the four pipes is approximately 1,200 kilometres (750 mi) long and with approximate diameters of 1,220 millimetres (48 in). The combined capacity of the four pipes is 110 billion cubic metres per annum of natural gas.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russia–European Union relations</span> Bilateral relations

Russia–European Union relations are the international relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia. Russia borders five EU member states: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland; the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad is surrounded by EU members. Until the radical breakdown of relations following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU was Russia's largest trading partner and Russia had a significant role in the European energy sector. Due to the invasion, relations became very tense after the European Union imposed sanctions against Russia. Russia placed all member states of the European Union on a list of "unfriendly countries", along with NATO members, Switzerland, Ukraine, and several Asia-Pacific countries.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Estonian Navy</span> Maritime warfare branch of Estonias military

The Estonian Navy are the unified naval forces among the Estonian Defence Forces.

Balticconnector is a bi-directional natural gas pipeline between Ingå, Finland and Paldiski, Estonia operated by Gasgrid Finland and Elering. It connects the Estonian and Finnish gas grids, and provides Finland with access to the Inčukalns underground gas storage facility in Latvia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Šventoji, Lithuania</span> Place in Samogitia, Lithuania

Šventoji is a resort town on the coast of the Baltic Sea in Lithuania. Administratively it is part of Palanga City Municipality. The total population of Šventoji as of 2012 was 2631. The town is located about 12 km north of Palanga center and close to the border with Latvia. Further north of the town is Būtingė and its oil terminal. Šventoji River flows into the Baltic sea at the town. The town also has a famous lighthouse, which is located 780 meters from the sea. Its height is 39 meters. The town is a popular summer resort for families, during summer it has many cafes, restaurants and various attractions for the visitors.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Russia–Sweden relations</span> Bilateral relations

Russia–Sweden relations date back to the 10th century; when Vikings called Varangians participated in the founding new states that later evolved into Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Finland–Russia relations</span> Bilateral relations

Relations between Finland and Russia have been conducted over many centuries, from wars between Sweden and Russia in the early 18th century, to the planned and realized creation and annexation of the Grand Duchy of Finland during Napoleonic times in the early 19th century, to the dissolution of the personal union between Russia and Finland after the forced abdication of Russia's last czar in 1917, and subsequent birth of modern Finland. Finland had its own civil war with involvement by Soviet Russia, was later invaded by the USSR, and had its internal politics influenced by it. Relations since then have been both warm and cool, fluctuating with time.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">BALTOPS</span> Annual military exercise

BALTOPS is an annual military exercise, held and sponsored by the Commander, United States Naval Forces Europe, since 1971, in the Baltic Sea and the regions surrounding it.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nord Stream pipelines sabotage</span> Gas pipe explosions in the Nord Stream pipelines

On 26 September 2022, a series of underwater explosions and consequent gas leaks occurred on 3 of 4 Nord Stream pipes, rendering them inoperable. The Nord Stream 1 (NS1) and Nord Stream 2 (NS2) are natural gas pipelines. They are two of 23 gas pipelines between Europe and Russia. The leaks were located in international waters, but within the economic zones of Denmark and Sweden. Both pipelines were built to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, and are majority owned by the Russian majority state-owned gas company, Gazprom.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">European Union submarine internet cables</span> Issues around EU cable infrastructure

Submarine internet cables, also referred to as submarine communications cables or submarine fiber optic cables, connect different locations and data centres to reliably exchange digital information at a high speed.

Events in the year 2024 in Finland.

On 17–18 November 2024, two submarine telecommunication cables, the BCS East-West Interlink and C-Lion1 fibre-optic cables were disrupted in the Baltic Sea. The incidents involving both cables occurred in close proximity of each other and near-simultaneously which prompted accusations from European government officials and NATO member states of hybrid warfare and sabotage as the cause of the damage. Currently, the damage to those undersea cables has not been conclusively attributed to any specific party. Investigations are ongoing and since 19 November, the Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3 is under scrutiny due to its presence near the cables at the time of the incidents. Western intelligence officials believe the ship's anchor may have caused the damage, either accidentally or under the influence of Russian intelligence.

Yi Peng 3 originally named Leda and later Avra is a 2001-built Chinese bulk carrier.

The Russian shadow fleet consists of a fleet of hundreds of illegally operated vessels operated by Russia to evade policing following the enaction of the 2022 Russian crude oil price cap sanctions enacted by the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2024 Estlink 2 incident</span> Failure of Estlink 2 cable

On 25 December 2024 at 12:26 EET, the Estlink 2 submarine power cable had an unplanned failure, reducing the Estonia–Finland cross-border capacity from 1,016 to 358 MW. Concerns about potential sabotage immediately arose due to other recent outages in the Baltic Sea region.

References

  1. 1 2 3 "Russian hybrid warfare". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 4 December 2024.
  2. 1 2 3 4 Shamim, Sarah (29 November 2024). "Could Russian 'hybrid warfare' trigger NATO retaliation?". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 4 December 2024.
  3. ↑ "Back to the future: the persistent problems of hybrid war" . Retrieved 4 December 2024.
  4. 1 2 3 4 Cecco, Leyland (19 November 2024). "What is hybrid warfare, which some fear Russia will use after Ukraine's strike?". The Guardian. Retrieved 4 December 2024.
  5. 1 2 3 "Russia's hybrid war in Europe enters a dangerous new phase". IISS. 26 November 2024. Retrieved 4 December 2024.
  6. 1 2 Cohen, Ariel (24 May 2024). "Russian hybrid warfare tactics: Will NATO's defenses be next?". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
  7. 1 2 Tahir, Tariq (26 December 2024). "Finns suspect Russian shadow fleet tanker sabotaged Baltic power cable". The National. Retrieved 26 December 2024.
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