The directorate is reputedly Russia's largest foreign-intelligence agency,[2] and is distinguished among its counterparts for its willingness to execute riskier "complicated, high stakes operations".[3][4] According to unverified statements by Stanislav Lunev, a defector from the GRU, in 1997 the agency deployed six times as many agents in foreign countries as the SVR, and commanded some 25,000 Spetsnaz troops.[5]
GRU Official emblem (until 2009) with motto engraved: "Greatness of the Motherland in your glorious deeds"
The first Russian body for military intelligence dates from 1810, in the context of the Napoleonic Wars raging across Europe, when War MinisterMichael Andreas Barclay de Tolly proposed to Emperor Alexander I of Russia the formation of the Expedition for Secret Affairs under the War Ministry (Russian: Экспедиция секретных дел при военном министерстве); two years later, it was renamed the Special Bureau (Russian: Особая канцелярия).
In 1815, the Bureau became the First Department under the General Chief of Staff. In 1836, the intelligence functions were transferred to the Second Department under the General Chief of Staff. After many name-changes through the years, in April 1906, the Military intelligence was carried out by the Fifth Department under the General Chief of Staff of the War Ministry.
The GRU's first predecessor in Soviet Russia was established by the secret order signed on 5 November 1918 by Jukums Vācietis, the first commander-in-chief of the Red Army (RKKA), and by Ephraim Sklyansky, deputy to Leon Trotsky, the civilian leader of the Red Army.[6][7] (Since 2006, the Russian Federation has officially observed the date of 5 November as the professional holiday of military intelligence in Russia.)[8][note 4] The military human intelligence service thus established was originally known as the Registration Agency (Registrupravlenie, or Registrupr; Russian:Региструпр) of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic; Simon Aralov was its first head.[6] Its early history was marked by a series of reorganisations influenced by the Soviet-Polish War, the consolidation and restablisation of the Soviet Union, and the general reorganisation of the Red Army; this included changes to its name, status, and responsibilities.
Throughout most of the interwar period, the men and women who worked for Red Army Intelligence called it either the Fourth Department, the Intelligence Service, the Razvedupr, or the RU. […] As a result of the re-organisation [in 1926], carried out in part to break up Trotsky's hold on the army, the Fourth Department seems to have been placed directly under the control of the State Defense Council (Gosudarstvennaia komissiia oborony, or GKO), the successor of the RVSR. Thereafter its analysis and reports went directly to the GKO and the Politburo, apparently even bypassing the Red Army Staff.
The first head of the Fourth Directorate was Yan Karlovich Berzin, who remained in the post from March 1924 until April 1935 (in 1938, he was arrested and executed as a Trotskyite during the Stalinist purges). Military intelligence was known for its fierce independence from the rival "internal intelligence organizations", such as the NKVD, and later KGB; however, public statements of Soviet military intelligence veterans state the Fourth Directorate, and later GRU, had always been operationally subordinate to the KGB.[10] Military intelligence was headquartered in a small and nondescript complex west of the Kremlin, whereas the NKVD was in the very centre of Moscow, next to the building that housed People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at the bottom of Kuznetsky Most.[11] Consequently, Soviet military intelligence came to be known in Soviet diplomats' cant as distant neighbours (Russian:дальние соседи) as opposed to the near neighbours of the NKVD/KGB.[10][12]
Cold War
The GRU was created under its current name and form by Joseph Stalin in February 1942, less than a year after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. From April 1943 the GRU handled human intelligence exclusively outside the USSR.[13][14] In addition to operations against the Axis powers, GRU is credited with having infiltrated the British nuclear weapon programme and up to 70 American government and scientific institutions.[11]
During the Cold War, the GRU, like many of its Western rivals, maintained rezidenturas, or resident spies, worldwide; these included both "legal" agents, based at Soviet embassies with official diplomatic cover, and "illegal" officers without cover. It also maintained a signals intelligence (SIGINT) station in Lourdes, Cuba and other Soviet-bloc countries. Though less well known than the KGB, with which it shared a fierce rivalry, GRU is known to have been involved in several high-profile episodes; this included opening backchannel negotiations with the U.S. government during the Cuban Missile Crisis and contributing to the Profumo scandal that partly contributed to the fall of a British administration.[11] GRU was distinguished for its "closer ties with revolutionary movements and terrorist groups, greater experience with weapons and explosives, and even tougher training for recruits"; new recruits were allegedly shown footage of a traitorous officer being fed into a crematorium alive.[11]
The existence of the GRU was not publicized during the Soviet era, though it was mentioned in the 1931 memoirs of the first OGPU defector, Georges Agabekov, and described in detail in the 1939 autobiography, I Was Stalin's Agent, by Walter Krivitsky, the most senior Red Army intelligence officer ever to defect.[15] GRU became widely known in Russia, and outside narrow confines of the Western intelligence community, during perestroika, due partly to the writings of "Viktor Suvorov" (Vladimir Rezun), a GRU officer who defected to Great Britain in 1978 and wrote about his experiences in the Soviet military and intelligence services. According to Suvorov, even the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the country's de facto leader, needed to undergo a security screening to enter GRU headquarters.
Evidencing its growing strategic profile, in 2006 the GRU moved to a new headquarters complex at Khoroshovskoye Shosse[ru], which cost 9.5 billion rubles to build and incorporates 70,000 square meters.[17][18] In April 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev fired then-GRU head Valentin Korabelnikov, who had headed the GRU since 1997, reportedly over Korabelnikov's objections to proposed reforms.[16][19] Pursuant to these reforms, the following year, the official name of the unit was changed from "GRU" to the "Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff", or "G.U."; however, "GRU" continues to be commonly used in media.[1][20] The GRU underwent severe reductions in funding and personnel following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, during which it failed to discover the more advanced anti-aircraft weapons obtained by Georgia. However, it continued to play a key role in several Russian operations, including in Russia's intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and the subsequent annexation of Crimea.[11] GRU agents were also implicated in numerous cyberwarfare operations across the West, including in the U.S., France, and Germany.[11] Many of its successes took place during the tenure of Igor Sergun, who headed the service from late 2011 until his death in early January 2016.[21] Sergun's sudden death shortly after the restoration of the GRU's influence led to speculations of foul play by Russian adversaries.[22][23]
The tenure of Sergun's successor, Igor Korobov, was marked by what some news media[24] construed as multiple high-profile setbacks, such as the thwarted 2016 coup d'état attempt in Montenegro, the failed 2018 Salisbury poisoning, and an unprecedented number of disclosed GRU agents.[25] Korobov died on 21 November 2018, "after a serious and prolonged illness", according to the official Defence Ministry statement.[26][27] His death provoked speculations and unverified reports of him having fallen ill in October that year following a harsh dressing-down from President Vladimir Putin.[25][28][29] However, former CIA station-chief Daniel Hoffman cautioned in 2017 that some of the Russian intelligence's recent operations that appeared to be botched might have been intended for discovery.[30][31] Similarly, in 2019, Eerik-Niiles Kross, a former Estonian intelligence official, opined that GRU's apparent sloppiness "has become part of the psychological warfare. It's not that they have become that much more aggressive. They want to be felt. It's part of the game."[32]
On 2 November 2018, while marking the GU's 100th anniversary, President Putin proposed restoring the agency's former name: Главное разведывательное управление (GRU).[33]
Organizational structure
1997 organization
The GRU is organized into numerous directorates, directions, and sections.[34] According to the data available in open sources in 1997, the structure of the Main Directorate consists of at least 12 known directorates and several other auxiliary departments.
The First Directorate is responsible for intelligence in Europe.
The Second Directorate is geographically responsible for the Western Hemisphere.
The Third Directorate is geographically responsible for Asia.
The Fourth Directorate is geographically responsible for Africa and the Middle East.
The Fifth Directorate is responsible for military operations intelligence, including naval and air force intelligence.
The Sixth Directorate is responsible for signals intelligence (SIGINT) and space intelligence.[35] It uses over 20 different types of aircraft, a fleet of 60 SIGINT collection vessels, satellites, and ground stations to collect signals intelligence. Together with FAPSI, the GRU operates SIGINT collection facilities in over 60 diplomatically protected facilities throughout the world. These agencies also operate ground collection facilities within former Soviet states' territory.
The Seventh Directorate is responsible specifically for NATO.
The Eighth Directorate deals with special purpose administration.
The Ninth Directorate is responsible for military technology.
The Tenth Directorate is the department of war economics.
The Eleventh Directorate is the department of strategic doctrines and arms.
The American Congressional Research Service, based on interviews with various experts, gives the following organization of the GRU, although it acknowledges that the organization's true structure is "a closely guarded secret."[36]
Unit 54777, alternately called the 72nd Special Service Center,[36] is one of the GRU's primary psychological warfare capabilities.[46] Unit 54777 retains several front organizations, including InfoRos and the Institute of the Russian Diaspora.[46] The unit originated from Soviet GLAVPUR (Glavnoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie, or the Main Political Department) and was created in early 1990s and notably employed colonel Aleksandr Viktorovich Golyev, whose memoirs were published in 2020 along with other GRU documents. In the 1990s, the unit focused on pro-Soviet disinformation in newly split republics such as Lithuania and Chechnya. In later years the unit covered a broad range of activities from running NGOs targeting Russian expatriates in Western countries (InfoRos, Institute of the Russian Diaspora, World Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad, Foundation for Supporting and Protecting the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad) and manipulating public opinion in Russia and abroad in preparation for armed conflicts such as in Georgia, Donbas or Syria.[47]
According to a Western assessment of the GRU seen by Reuters in the autumn of 2018, the GRU had a long-running program to run "illegal" spies, i.e. those who work without diplomatic cover and who live under an assumed identity in foreign countries for years.[1] The assessment said: "It plays an increasingly important role in Russia's development of Information Warfare (both defensive and offensive). It is an aggressive and well-funded organization which has the direct support of–and access to–President Vladimir Putin, allowing freedom in its activities and leniency with regards to diplomatic and legislative scrutiny."[1]
The United States alleges that the GRU, as well as the SVR (its civilian foreign intelligence counterpart), makes use of both legal (intelligence officers with diplomatic protection/official government roles) and illegal operatives.[36]
The "Havana syndrome," which affected U.S. diplomats and spies worldwide, was possibly linked to GRU’s Unit 29155, as reported by the Insider. Symptoms included migraines and dizziness. Investigations suggested incidents might have occurred as early as 2016, with potential prior events in Frankfurt, Germany. The U.S. Congress passed the Havana Act in 2021 to provide aid to affected personnel and families.[52]
Commonly known as the Spetsnaz GRU, it was formed in 1949. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Spetsnaz GRU remained intact as part of the Russian GRU until 2010, when it was reassigned to other agencies. In 2013, however, the decision was reversed and Spetsnaz GRU units were reassigned to GRU divisions and placed under GRU authority again.[53]
Education
GRU officers train at a Ministry of Defence military academy at 50 Narodnoe Opolchenie Street, with intelligence agents receiving additional training at the Cherepovets Higher Military School of Radio Electronics.[20] The A.F. Mozhaysky Military-Space Academy has also been used to train GRU officers.[20]
Activities by country
According to the Federation of American Scientists: "Though sometimes compared to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, [the GRU's] activities encompass those performed by nearly all joint US military intelligence agencies as well as other national US organizations. The GRU gathers human intelligence through military attaches and foreign agents. It also maintains significant signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery reconnaissance (IMINT) and satellite imagery capabilities."[54] Soviet GRU Space Intelligence Directorate had put more than 130 SIGINT satellites into orbit. GRU and KGB SIGINT network employed about 350,000 specialists.[55]
On 9 November 2018 Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz said that a 70-year-old retired army colonel, identified only as "Martin M." was believed to have spied for Russia for years. The officer in question, whose name was not disclosed and who might have been approached under a false flag, was reported to have been engaged in selling official secrets to his GRU handlers from 1992 until September 2018.[56][57][58][59] In July 2019, Austria's Ministry of the Interior confirmed that the colonel's handler was a Moscow-born GRU officer Igor Egorovich Zaytsev, a Russian national, for whom an international arrest warrant had been issued.[60][61][62]
Bulgaria
An investigation by Bellingcat and Capital identified GRU officer Denis Vyacheslavovich Sergeev (using the alias Sergey Vyacheslavovich Fedotov) as a suspect in the 2015 poisoning of Bulgarian arms dealer Emiliyan Gebrev (Емилиян Гебрев) in Sofia, following an attack that mirrored the techniques used in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal.[63][64][65][66] That attack has been specifically tied to Unit 29155.[40] Three individuals were charged in absentia by the Bulgarians in January 2020.[67]
In March 2021, six Bulgarian nationals alleged to be members of a GRU spy ring operating in Bulgaria were arrested in Sofia.[68][69]
In December 2020, Migración Colombia confirmed the expulsion of two Russian diplomats accused of espionage.[72] One of the assailants was identified as Aleksandr Nikolayevich Belousov who, according to the National Intelligence Directorate of Colombia, is a GRU officer that had been credited by the Russian Embassy in Bogotá as a secretary.[73] Nikolayevich, along with an SVR officer, had reportedly tried to gather intelligence on the country's electricity infrastructure on behalf of Venezuela's Maduro government.[74]
On 17 April 2021, the Czech Republic announced its intelligence agencies had concluded that GRU officers, namely members of Russian military intelligence GRU's unit 29155, were involved in two massive ammunition depot explosions in Vrbetice (part of Vlachovice), near the Czech-Slovak border, in October 2014.[75] The explosions killed two persons and "inflicted immense material damage, seriously endangered and disrupted the lives of many local residents", according to the Czech prime minister.[75]
Estonia
In 2007, Deniss Metsavas, a Lasnamäe-born member of the Estonian Land Forces, was targeted with a honey trapping operation while visiting Smolensk. He was subsequently blackmailed into providing information to GRU handlers. His father, Pjotr Volin, was also recruited by GRU agents as leverage against Deniss, and would serve as a courier for classified information.[76]
In May 2017, Russian citizen Artem Zinchenko was convicted of spying on Estonia for the GRU.[77][78] In 2018, Zinchenko was traded back to Russia in exchange for Raivo Susi, an Estonian imprisoned for espionage. In 2022, Zinchenko fled Russia to seek asylum in Estonia, citing personal opposition to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[79][80]
On 5 September 2018, Major Deniss Metsavas and Pjotr Volin were charged with giving classified information to the GRU[81][82] The two were convicted in February 2019.[76]
Finland
In September 2018, Finnish police ran a large scale operation against numerous sites owned by Airiston Helmi Oy company that over years accumulated land plots and buildings close to nationally significant key straits, ports, oil refineries and other strategic locations as well as two Finnish Navy vessels. The security operation was run in parallel in multiple locations, involving Finnish National Bureau of Investigation, local police, Tax Administration, Border Guard, and Finnish Defence Forces. During the operation, a no-fly zone was declared over Turku Archipelago where key objects were located. While official cause given for the raid was multi-million euro money laundering and tax fraud, media speculated that the company had been a cover for GRU preparing infrastructure for a surprise attack on Finnish locations in case of a conflict situation.[83][84]
France
Viktor Ilyushin, a GRU operative working as an Air Force deputy attaché, was expelled from France in 2014 for attempted espionage of the staff of François Hollande.[20]
In December 2019, Le Monde reported that the joint effort by British, Swiss, French and U.S. intelligence agencies had discovered an apparent "rear base" of GRU in southeastern France, which was presumably used by GRU for the clandestine operations carried out throughout Europe. Investigators had identified 15 agents – all of them members of GRU's Unit 29155 – who visited Haute-Savoie in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, region of France from 2014 to 2018, including Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, who are believed to be behind the poisoning of the former GRU colonel and British double agent Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018.[87][88]
Georgia
During the 2006 Georgian–Russian espionage controversy, four officers working for the GRU Alexander Savva, Dmitry Kazantsev, Aleksey Zavgorodny and Alexander Baranov were arrested by the Counter-Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and were accused of espionage and sabotage. This spy network was managed from Armenia by GRU Colonel Anatoly Sinitsin. A few days later the arrested officers were handed over to Russia through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[89][90]
The 2015 Bundestag hack was attributed by German intelligence to the GRU.[92] In 2020, Germany issued an arrest warrant for Dmitry Badin, a GRU officer and Unit 26165/Fancy Bear member also accused of involvement in the 2015–2016 DNC hacks in the United States, alleging he played a leading role in the Bundestag hack.[93]
In 2018, German officials reported a key data network used by the Chancellery, ministries, and Parliament had been breached. German media attributed the attack to a Russian Government-sponsored hacking group, either Snake/Ouroborus or Fancy Bear.[94]
In February 2021, Germany charged German citizen Jens F., a worker whose company maintained Bundestag electrical equipment, with espionage, accusing him of providing the building's floor plans to GRU operatives in the Russian embassy in 2017. The suspect was a former army officer allegedly linked to the Stasi in the 1980s.[95]
In September 2021, the German foreign ministry warned Russia against the continuation of a pre-election cyberattack campaign targeting German legislators, claiming it had "reliable information" linking the Ghostwriter group behind the attacks to the GRU. The prosecutor general later opened an investigation into the affair.[92]
Japan
In 1980, Yukihisa Miyanaga was arrested for providing military secrets from the Defense Agency to Colonel Yuriy N. Koslov, stationed at the Soviet Embassy.[96] 1st Lt. Eiichi Kashii and Warrant Officer Tsunetoshi Oshima were also arrested for passing secrets to Miyanaga.[97]
In September 2000, Japan expelled Captain Viktor Bogatenkov, a military attaché at the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, on allegations of espionage.[98] Bogatenkov was a GRU agent who received classified information from Shigehiro Hagisaki (萩嵜 繁博), a researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies.[98][99]
Latvia
In early 2018, an investigation by Russian opposition site Mbk.media alleged then-first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Latvia Roman Tatarka was a GRU operative and former classmate of Anatoly Chepiga.[100]
In October 2018, Latvia's Constitution Protection Bureau accused Russia of conducting a years-long phishing campaign targeting "state institutions, including the foreign and defense sectors."[101]
Lithuania
In 2012, GRU officer Sergey Moiseyenko recruited Lithuanian Air Force officer Sergej Pusin to conduct espionage on Lithuanian and NATO military operations. Pusin additionally passed personal files on various military officers. Moiseyenko was arrested in 2014 and sentenced to 10.5 years in prison, but was pardoned and returned to Russia by President Nausėda as part of a trilateral prisoner exchange with Norway and Russia in 2019.[102][103]
Mexico
In March 2022, General Glen VanHerck of United States Northern Command testified that "the largest portion of the GRU members is in Mexico right now" seeking "opportunities to...influence [and access the] U.S." Mexican President López Obrador downplayed the allegation, emphasizing Mexican sovereignty and stating his country "[did not] get involved in [espionage]."[104][105]
The two Russian nationals indicted by Montenegrin prosecution as the organisers of the attempted coup d'état in Montenegro in October 2016 are believed to be GRU officers.[108][109][110][111] One of them, Eduard Vadimovich Shishmakov ("Shirokov") had been officially identified as GRU in October 2014, when Shishmakov, who then held the position of a deputy military attaché at the Russian embassy in Poland, was declared persona non grata by the Polish government.[108][112][113]
The Netherlands and Switzerland
In mid-September 2018 the Swiss press reported that two men allegedly working for the GRU had been arrested in The Hague, the Netherlands in the spring that year, after the Salisbury poisoning incident, for planning to hack the computer systems of the Spiez Laboratory, a Swiss institute analyzing chemical weapon attacks for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).[114][115] In early October 2018, the government of the Netherlands announced they had arrested four GRU operatives on 13 April: Aleksei Morenets, Evgenii Serebriakov, Oleg Sotnikov, and Aleksey Minin.[116] The Russians allegedly attempted to launch a major "close access" cyberattack[117] against the headquarters of the OPCW in the Hague and also intended to travel onwards to the Spiez laboratory in Switzerland, which was testing Novichok samples from Salisbury at the time.[118][119] Investigation conducted by open-source intelligence outlets in the aftermath of the Dutch government's revelations that used Russian road police databases led to identification of further 305 GRU officers whose private cars were registered at GRU headquarters in Moscow.[120] GRU officer Denis Vyacheslavovich Sergeev has also been documented as operating in Geneva and Lausanne.[121]
Alleged attempt to infiltrate International Criminal Court
In June 2022, the Dutch AIVD stated that GRU intelligence officer Sergey Vladimirovich Cherkasov, under the alias of Viktor Muller Ferreira, was denied entry to the Netherlands after arriving for an internship with the International Criminal Court. The AIVD described Cherkasov as a deep-cover illegal, publishing a document he is alleged to have written in 2010 reminding himself of his cover identity. As Ferreira, Cherkasov is alleged to have attended university in the United States and Republic of Ireland, building a cover identity for years as a Brazilian national with an interest in international affairs. AIVD head Erik Akerboom[nl] described the attempted infiltration as a "long-term, multi-year GRU operation that cost a lot of time, energy and money," calling it a "high-level threat."[122][123]
Norway
In December 2020, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) stated that hackers linked to Fancy Bear and the GRU's 85th Special Services Center (GTsSS) were likely responsible for a breach of the Storting's email system earlier in the year. The Russian Embassy in Norway denied the claims.[124]
In October 2022, the PST arrested and charged Russian citizen Mikhail Valerievich Mikushin with "illegal espionage against state secrets." Mikushin had posed as a Brazilian academic named Jose Assis Giammaria and was, at the time of his arrest, researching Norwegian Arctic policy and hybrid threats at the University of Tromsø. Bellingcat investigator Christo Grozev identified Mikushin as a GRU colonel while the Russian embassy in Norway denied any knowledge of Mikushin, calling his arrest a part of "spy mania."[125][126]
Poland
In June 2014, Poland expelled Russian deputy military attaché Eduard Shishmakov (alias Eduard Shirokov) and three other Russian citizens accused of spying over a 2014 wiretap scandal involving the publication of wiretapped conversations between senior Polish officials. Shishmakov, an accused GRU operative, later became a key suspect in the 2016 Montenegrin coup allegations.[127]
In October 2014, Poland arrested two alleged GRU spies. Polish Lt. Col. Zbigniew J. worked for the GRU for "several years" feeding information on unit morale and troop movements while lawyer-lobbyist Stanisław Szypowski influenced governmental circles and sought a job in the Economy Ministry while providing information on the energy sector. Both met with GRU operatives under official cover in Warsaw and were monitored by Polish counterintelligence.[128]
In July 2019, a Warsaw court sentenced former Economy Ministry employee Marek W. to three years in prison for passing classified information on the energy sector to the GRU from 2015 to 2016.[129]
In May 2020, Polish journalists, supported by former intelligence officials, accused the GRU of conducting a 700-email bomb threat campaign against Polish schools as part of a hybrid warfare strategy. Polish and Russian intelligence services did not comment on the accusations.[130]
In March 2022, the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) arrested reporter Pablo Gonzalez, whom they identified as "an agent of the [GRU]," as he planned to cross the Polish-Ukrainian border. Gonzalez, a Spanish citizen of Russian origin, was found with two passports of different names and detained on suspicion of espionage. The ABW accused Gonzalez of "[carrying] out activities for Russia using his journalistic status" and traveling to worldwide zones of conflict and political instability.[131][132]
In January 2023, Warsaw authorities arrested a Russian and a Belarusian national. The SKW, Poland's military counterintelligence agency, accused the pair of spying on Polish military facilities for the GRU since 2017.[133][134]
Qatar
On 13 February 2004, in Doha, two Russian men assassinated Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, an exiled leader of Chechen rebels and former President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, in a car-bombing. Yandarbiyev's son was also killed.[36][135] Anatoly V. Belashkov and Vasily A. Bogachyov, thought to be GRU members, were found guilty of the murder by a Qatari criminal court, which said the men had acted under direct orders from the Russian leadership.[135][136][137] A third suspected GRU agent, posted as first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Qatar, was arrested but released to his diplomatic immunity. Those sentenced were sent to Russia to serve their sentences but disappeared shortly after.[36]
GRU officers have also been accused of creating criminal death squads.[141]
Slovakia
In early 2022, Slovakia arrested four Slovak nationals described as a "Russian spying network [seeking] information about NATO and Ukraine." Two were charged with spying and bribery, with Slovak authorities alleging undercover GRU officers at the Russian Embassy paid tens of thousands of euros for the "highly sensitive" information about Slovakia, the Slovak military, and NATO.[142] The men charged were a Slovak military academy rector and disinformation blogger; the other two were released without charge.[143]
Slovenia
In January 2023, the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency arrested and charged two individuals in Ljubljana with espionage on behalf of the GRU and using false documents. Both were reportedly operating under assumed identities with ties to Argentina. Media variously described those charged as either a husband and wife[144][145] or two men.[146][147]
In late 2021, Swedish authorities arrested brothers Peyman and Payam Kia for aggravated espionage on behalf of the GRU. Peyman had worked with the Swedish Security Service and Swedish Armed Forces; both brothers were jailed in January 2023.[149][150]
In late 2022, elite police arrested Russian-born Swedish citizen Sergey Skvortsov, accusing him of nearly 10 years of "gross illegal intelligence activities against Sweden and against a foreign power" (later identified as the United States) on behalf of the GRU. Skvortsov reportedly worked to illegally transfer Western technology to Russia.[151][152]
In 2015 GRU special forces soldiers have reportedly appeared in Aleppo and Homs.[157][158] GRU officials have also visited Qamishli, near the border with Turkey.[159]
Turkey
In 2018 the Turkish government published CCTV videos from assassination of a Chechen commander Abdulvahid Edelgiriev, who was killed in 2015 in Istanbul,[160] claiming the perpetrator was the same person as Anatoliy Chepiga ("Ruslan Boshirov") from Skripal assassination in UK.[161]
In September 2018 the Crown Prosecution Service formally named two Russian nationals, Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov (the names used by the men when entering the UK), as suspected perpetrators of the assassination attempt of the former GRU officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter in March 2018.[163] As part of the charge announcement Scotland Yard released a detailed track of the individuals' 48 hours in the UK. This covered their arrival in the UK at Gatwick Airport, trip to Salisbury the day before the attack, trip to Salisbury on the day of the attack and return to Moscow via Heathrow Airport.[164] The two men stayed both nights in the City Stay Hotel on Bow Road, East London and Novichok agent was found in their room after police sealed it off on 4 May 2018.[165][166] British Prime Minister Theresa May told the Commons the same day that the suspects were part of the G.U. intelligence service (formerly known as GRU) and the assassination attempt was not a rogue operation and was "almost certainly" approved at a senior level of the Russian state.[163][167]
As a side effect of the Skripal poisoning investigation, Russian and Western media reported conclusions made by open-source intelligence outlets that claimed that GRU operatives were issued Russian foreign travel passports with certain characteristics that would allow their tentative identification.[168] Through further research, in the autumn of 2018, "Boshirov" was publicly exposed as Anatoliy Chepiga, a decorated GRU officer,[169][170][171] and "Petrov" as Alexander Mishkin.[172][173]
United States
GRU officer Stanislav Lunev, who defected to the U.S. in 1992 while he was posted in Washington under the cover of a TASS news agency correspondent, in the 1990s publicized his claims that small nuclear weapons that could be fit into a knapsack or a briefcase or suitcase had been secretly pre-positioned in the U.S. and other countries around the world to be used for sabotage by Russia's agents in the event of war.[174]U.S. CongressmanCurt Weldon pursued these claims publicly while admitting that they had been found largely spurious by the FBI.[175] Searches of the areas identified by Lunev – who admitted he had never planted any weapons in the US – have been conducted, "but law-enforcement officials have never found such weapons caches, with or without portable nuclear weapons".[176]
United States Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announcing in 2018 a grand jury indictment of 12 Russian intelligence officers for hacking offenses related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election
On 29 December 2016 the White House sanctioned the nine entities and individuals, including the GRU as well as the FSB, for their alleged activities to disrupt and spread disinformation during the 2016 US presidential election.[177] In addition, the United States State Department also declared 35 Russian diplomats and officials persona non grata and denied Russian government officials access to two Russian-owned installations in Maryland and New York.[177] On 13 July 2018, an indictment to several GRU Staffers was issued.[178] GRU Unit 26165 and Unit 74455 are alleged to be behind the DCLeaks website, and were indicted for obtaining access and distributing information from data about 500,000 voters from a state election board website as well as the email accounts of John Podesta, Hillary Clinton, and volunteers and employees of the United States Presidential Campaign of Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and the Democratic National Committee (DNC).[179][180] According to information leaked by Reality Winner, the GRU attempted to hack the voting machine manufacturer VR Systems, as well as local election officials.[181]
In July 2018 Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein released an indictment returned by a grand jury charging twelve GRU officers with conspiring to interfere in the 2016 elections.[182][183][184]
According to Microsoft VP Tom Burt, a GRU-run group dubbed Strontium (alternatively known as APT28, Sofacy, and Pawn Storm, and Fancy Bear)[185] has been engaged in spear phishing attacks against at least three campaigns in the 2018 midterm elections.[186]
On 19 November 2021, the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in the United States (CCORC) or (KCOPC) closed and on 9 March 2022 Elena Branson was accused of working as a foreign agent by the FBI.[187][188][189][190][191]
Spetsnaz are special forces in many post-Soviet states. Historically, this term referred to the Soviet Union's Spetsnaz GRU, special operations units of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU). Today it refers to special forces branches and task forces subordinate to ministries including defence, internal affairs, or emergency situations in countries that have inherited their special purpose units from the now-defunct Soviet security agencies.
The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation is the principal security agency of Russia and the main successor agency to the Soviet Union's KGB; its immediate predecessor was the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) which was reorganized into the FSB in 1995. The three major structural successor components of the former KGB that remain administratively independent of the FSB are the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Protective Service (FSO), and the Main Directorate of Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP).
The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation or FIS RF is Russia's external intelligence agency, focusing mainly on civilian affairs. The SVR RF succeeded the First Chief Directorate (PGU) of the KGB in December 1991. The SVR has its headquarters in the Yasenevo District of Moscow with its director reporting directly to the President of the Russian Federation.
Directorate "V" of the FSB Special Purpose Center, often referred to as Spetsgruppa "V"Vympel, but also known as KGB Directorate "V", Vega Group, is one of the two tier one spetsnaz units of the FSB under the command of the FSB.
Sergei Viktorovich Skripal is a former Russian military intelligence officer who acted as a double agent for the United Kingdom's intelligence services during the 1990s and early 2000s. In December 2004, he was arrested by Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) and later tried, convicted of high treason, and sentenced to 13 years in prison. He settled in the United Kingdom in 2010 following the Illegals Programme spy swap. He holds both Russian and British citizenship.
Russian espionage in the United States has occurred since at least the Cold War, and likely well before. According to the United States government, by 2007 it had reached Cold War levels.
The Spiez Laboratory is the Swiss institute for the protection of the population against nuclear, biological and chemical threats and dangers. It is part of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS) and is located in Spiez. The Spiez Laboratory is one of the five labs in the world permanently certified by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Bellingcat is a Netherlands-based investigative journalism group that specialises in fact-checking and open-source intelligence (OSINT). It was founded by British citizen journalist and former blogger Eliot Higgins in July 2014. Bellingcat publishes the findings of both professional and citizen journalist investigations into war zones, human rights abuses, and the criminal underworld. The site's contributors also publish guides to their techniques, as well as case studies.
The poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, also known as the Salisbury Poisonings, was a botched assassination attempt to poison Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the British intelligence agencies in the city of Salisbury, England on 4 March 2018. Sergei and his daughter, Yulia Skripal, were poisoned by means of a Novichok nerve agent. Both spent several weeks in hospital in a critical condition, before being discharged. A police officer, Nick Bailey, was also taken into intensive care after attending the incident, and was later discharged.
Anatoly Vladimirovich Chepiga is a colonel in the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate, the military intelligence service of the Russian Federation. He is reported to have served in the Second Chechen War and the Russo-Ukrainian War. He is known to have operated under the cover names "Ruslan Tabarov" and "Ruslan Boshirov".
Alexander Yevgenyevich Mishkin is a doctor in the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate, the military intelligence service of the Russian Federation.
Unit 29155 is a Russian military intelligence (GRU) unit associated with foreign assassinations and other activities apparently aimed at destabilizing European countries. The unit is thought to have operated in secret since at least 2008, though its existence only became publicly known in 2019.
Denis Vyacheslavovich Sergeev, in Europe alias Sergej Fedotov is a Russian officer of military intelligence service GRU. He is suspected to be the local coordinator of the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal 2018 in the UK and the 2015 poisoning of Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev in Sofia.
Dmitri Sergeyevich Badin is a Russian intelligence officer and hacker. He is said to have penetrated computer systems of several governments and international organizations on behalf of the Russian state military intelligence service GRU. Badin is wanted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and the German federal prosecutor Generalbundesanwalt. He is suspected of being a member of the Sofacy Group.
The Insider is an online publication specializing in investigative journalism, fact-checking, and exposing fake news. It was founded by independent Russian journalist Roman Dobrokhotov. The publication operates websites in both Russian and English, along with a Telegram channel, an Instagram account, two TikTok accounts, and two YouTube channels: one for on-air programs and another for edited video content.
Christo Grozev is a Bulgarian investigative journalist and author. He is the head of investigations with The Insider and former lead Russia investigator with Bellingcat. His investigations into the identity of the suspects involved in the 2018 poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal earned him and his team the European Press Prize for Investigative Journalism.
In 2014, two explosions of ammunition depots occurred in Vrbětice, Vlachovice, in the Zlín District of the Czech Republic. The first explosion occurred on 16 October, and the second on 3 December. Two people were killed in the first explosion. The cleanup of unexploded ammunition left by the blasts was finished on 13 October 2020. According to the Security Information Service and the Police of the Czech Republic, two agents from GRU Unit 29155 were involved in the explosions, with the motivation of disrupting weapons supplies to Ukraine. On April 29th, 2024, Czech president Petr Pavel declared the investigations and information available to him confirm the event to be a Russian attack on Czech soil.
There has for years been a controversial relationship between Austria and Russian intelligence. Due to domestic policies and a history of neutrality, Austria has for decades been a center for intelligence activities in Europe. Together with Belgium, it has been considered a hub for Russian intelligence.
In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, in the time leading up to and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a number of citizens of the Russian Federation and of other nationalities working for Russia have been identified publicly as spies or agents of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Russia's foreign intelligence service (SVR) or the third intelligence arm, the military intelligence service (GRU). Each arm having their own remits.
Vladimir Stepanovich Alekseyev is a Russian lieutenant general who has served as first deputy head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) since 2011. He was awarded the title Hero of the Russian Federation for his involvement in the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war. Alekjsevey is known to have intelligence connections to paramilitary groups around the world. He was also involved in corruption in 2020 United States Presidential Elections.
↑ Lunev, Stanislav (12 September 1997). "Changes may be on the way for the Russian security services". Prism. 3 (14). Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 25 November 2006. The GRU is Russia's largest security service. It deploys six times more officers in foreign countries than the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which is the successor of the First Main Directorate of the KGB. Moreover, 25,000 spetsnaz troops are directly subordinated to the GRU, whereas the KGB's various successor-organizations have been deprived of their own military formations since 1991.
↑ Leonard, Secret Soldiers of the Revolution, p.xiv.
1 2 Solovyov, Dmitry (24 April 2009). "Russia's Medvedev sacks military spy chief". Reuters. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. Retrieved 15 November 2014. President Dmitry Medvedev sacked Russia's most powerful intelligence chief Friday in a move that underscores strained ties with some of the military top brass over a Kremlin-backed reform of the armed forces. The Kremlin said Medvedev had signed a decree to dismiss General Valentin Korabelnikov, who has directed Russia's military intelligence service since 1997.
↑ "Putin Arrives in Style at Military Spy Base". The Moscow Times. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. Unlike its predecessor, a drab, redbrick monolith nicknamed the Aquarium, the new GRU complex is a futuristic glass-clad and bulletproof structure that bears more than a passing resemblance to the London headquarters of Britain's MI6 [...] The complex, whose construction began in 2003, cost 9.5 billion rubles ($357 million) to build, and incorporates an area of 70,000 square meters.
↑ "Russia military spy boss 'sacked'". BBC News. 24 April 2009. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. Gen Korabelnikov had been the head of military intelligence for 12 years and was a four-star general. Analysts say the 63-year-old was one of the main opponents of the planned military reforms, which could see the Russian armed forces shrink from 1.3 million serving men and women to one million. The majority of those cuts would come from the officer corps, which could see the loss of around 200,000 posts, including many generals. Some of the proposed reforms were said to have included the disbanding of several GRU-controlled army special forces (Spetsnaz) brigades and the redistribution of the command of some GRU structures to the SVR. Gen Korabelnikov is reported to have submitted his resignation in protest last November.
↑ Путин предложил вернуть военной разведке название ГРУ[Putin has proposed returning to the military intellegence agency the title GRU] (in Russian). Interfax. 2 November 2018. Retrieved 29 January 2020. 'Непонятно, куда исчезло слово "разведывательное" – Главное разведывательное управление, надо бы восстановить', – добавил Путин [...]
↑ Aid, Matthew (29 July 2012). "Russia's Andreyevka SIGINT Station". Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. The station is located in the Maritime Province of the Russian Far East near the tiny village of Andreyevka (Google Earth transliterates the name as Andreevka) at the following geographic coordinates: 44-30-30N 133-28-28E. [...] Built during the mid-1970s by the Soviets, a former senior NSA official mentioned it to me in the late 1980s as being "the biggest and baddest of the Sov's SIGINT stations". At the station's peak during the Cold War, it was jointly manned by several hundred KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence) SIGINTers. Today, the station is owned and operated solely by the GRU, and it would appear that the station has not been upgraded with new equipment in quite some time.
↑ Aid, Matthew (12 May 2012). "Soviet Eavesdropping Station Identified". Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. Andreyevka SATCOM Station: 44-30-30N 133-28-28E Some of these stations are still apparently active (the largest of which is the Andreyevka station near Vladivostok), although to what degree they are still working COMSAT targets cannot be determined from imagery available on Google Maps.
↑ Fitsanakis, Joseph. "Austrian court finds unnamed retired Army colonel guilty of spying for Russia". intelNews. Martin M. reportedly served in peacekeeping missions in the Golan Heights and Cyprus before being posted at one of the Austrian Armed Forces' two headquarters, located in the western city of Salzburg. It was around that time, say prosecutors, that the unnamed man began spying for Russia. Starting in 1992, he was in regular contact with his Russian handler, who was known to him only as "Yuri".
↑ Fitsanakis, Joseph (22 March 2021). "Bulgaria confirms arrest of six-member spy-ring allegedly working for Russia". intelNews. On Friday, 19 March, the Bulgarian government confirmed the BNT report, saying that six Bulgarian citizens had been charged with espionage on behalf of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, known commonly as GRU. The GRU is Russia's foremost military intelligence agency. The six alleged spies reportedly gave Moscow secrets about Bulgarian military affairs, as well as information concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).
↑ Chase, Steven; Moore, Oliver; Baluja, Tamara (6 September 2012). "Ottawa expels Russian diplomats in wake of charges against Canadian". The Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. The Harper government has expelled staff at Russia's embassy in the wake of charges filed against a Canadian military intelligence officer for allegedly passing secrets to a foreign power, The Globe and Mail has learned. [...] A Russian embassy official acknowledged the following three staffers have recently left Canada, saying, however, that all departures were routine: Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry V. Fedorchatenko, assistant defence attaché. Konstantin Kolpakov, attaché. Mikhail Nikiforov, with the administrative and technical staff. The embassy did not provide a clear explanation for the fourth name now gone from Canada's official list of diplomatic, consular and foreign government representatives: Tatiana Steklova, who had been described as "administrative and technical staff".
↑ Payton, Laura (20 January 2012). "Spying mystery deepens with lack of information". CBC News. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. Initial media reports said up to four Russian Embassy staff had been removed from a list of embassy and diplomatic staff recognized by Canada. CBC News has confirmed that two have had their credentials revoked since news broke of the naval officer's arrest, while two diplomats left the country a month or more before the arrest this week of Canadian Sub.-Lt. Jeffrey Paul Delisle.
↑ "Estonia Sentences Russian Spy to Five Years in Prison". The Moscow Times. 8 May 2017. Archived from the original on 13 May 2017. Retrieved 13 May 2017. Zinchenko has lived in Estonia on a residence permit since 2013. The Estonian court determined that he was recruited by Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) in 2009, and spent the next four years collecting information about troop movements in Estonia, and about objects of national importance. [...] Zinchenko reportedly passed sensitive information to members of the GRU on multiple occasions, both by means of special communication and in person, on visits to Saint Petersburg.
↑ Jones, Bruce (9 May 2017). "Tallinn jails GRU agent spying on Estonian and NATO forces". Jane's Information Group. Retrieved 13 May 2017. Artem Zinchenko, a Russian citizen legally resident in Estonia since 2013, was convicted on 8 May of espionage for Russia's GRU military intelligence organisation. Recruited in 2009 and arrested in January 2017, Zinchenko was sentenced to five years for spying on locations, equipment, and manoeuvres of Estonian and NATO forces and critical infrastructure.
↑ Petriashvili, Diana (28 September 2006). "Tbilisi Claims Russian Troop Movements in Response to Spy Dispute". EurasiaNet. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. A Tbilisi city court 29 September ordered two Russian officers arrested in the Georgian capital, Dmitri Kazantsyev and Alexander Savva, and seven Georgian citizens to be held in pre-trial detention. The Russian consul in Georgia, Valeri Vasiliyev, told Rustavi-2 television that a lawyer for the officers had not been allowed into the courtroom. The Georgian Interior Ministry did not immediately comment on the allegation. The court also passed the same ruling for Konstantin Pichugin, who has been accused of espionage, but who is believed to be inside Russia's regional military headquarters, which remained surrounded by police for a second day. Moscow has refused to surrender Pichugin.
↑ "Georgia Arrests Russian "Intelligence Operatives"". Civil Georgia. 27 September 2006. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. Georgia's counter-intelligence service arrested four Russian military intelligence (GRU – Glavnoye Razvedovatelnoye Upravlenie) officers and eleven citizens of Georgia who were cooperating with Russian intelligence services, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili said on 27 September [...] He said that two Russian intelligence operatives were arrested in Tbilisi – GRU colonel Alexander Sava, who was allegedly the chief of the group operating in Georgia, and Dimitri Kazantsev. Two others – Alexander Zavgorodny and Alexander Baranov – were arrested in Batumi, the Georgian Interior Minister said.
↑ "Officer admits giving secrets to Russian spy". The Japan Times. 28 November 2000. Archived from the original on 5 April 2023. Hagisaki told the Tokyo District Court that he handed the MSDF documents to Viktor Bogatenkov, 44, in violation of the SDF Law. Bogatenkov, who reportedly is an agent of the Russian intelligence agency GRU, was with Hagisaki when he was arrested but refused to submit to questioning and returned to Moscow two days later.
↑ Osborn, Andrew, ed. (13 June 2017). "Russia Says Report Its Moldova Diplomats Recruited Fighters Is 'Gossip': RIA". The New York Times. Reuters. Retrieved 14 June 2017. Allegations that five Russian diplomats expelled from Moldova last month recruited fighters for the Moscow-backed separatists in Ukraine were "idle gossip", the RIA news agency quoted a deputy Russian foreign minister as saying on Tuesday. Grigory Karasin made the comment shortly after Reuters published an exclusive report citing Moldovan government and diplomatic sources as saying that the five were ejected because of their alleged activities as undercover officers with the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU.
↑ Boffey, Daniel; Wintour, Patrick; Roth, Andrew (14 September 2018). "Dutch expelled Russians over alleged novichok lab hacking plot". The Guardian. The Swiss daily newspaper Tages-Anzeiger reported that the men were carrying equipment that could be used to break into the Spiez laboratory's IT network when they were seized.
↑ Minister of Defense (4 October 2018). "Remarks Minister of Defense, 4 October in The Hague" (Press release). The Hague, Netherlands: defensie.nl. Ministry of Defence. Archived from the original on 14 August 2019. Retrieved 30 May 2020. Aleksei MORENETS. Evgenii SEREBRIAKOV. Note that their passport numbers differ from each other by only one digit. Oleg SOTNIKOV. Aleksey MININ
↑ Walsh, Nick Paton (13 June 2006). "Land of the warlords". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. Sulim Yamadayev: heads 1000 strong East battalion, controlled by the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian military. Dislikes Kadyrov [...] Said Magomed Kakiev: commander of 900-strong "West" battalion, also under GRU control. Dislikes Kadyrov.
↑ "Spies Still Everywhere, GRU Says". The Moscow Times. 17 July 2003. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. GRU commando units operate in the armed forces to provide field intelligence and carry out special operations, such as the penetration and elimination of enemy units. The military actively employs GRU commandoes in Chechnya, where they have proven to be about the most able of all military units. More than 300 commandos, intelligence officers and other GRU personnel have died in fighting in Chechnya, Korabelnikov said.
↑ McGregor, Andrew (26 October 2006). "Chechen Troops Accompany Russian Soldiers in Lebanon". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. In a surprise move, the Russian Defense Ministry assigned security responsibility for its team of military engineers in Lebanon to two detachments of Chechen troops [...] The East and West battalions of Chechen troops are controlled by the Russian military intelligence (GRU) and do not report directly to the Chechen government.
↑ Weiss, Michael (1 September 2016). "Russia Puts Boots on the Ground in Syria". The Daily Caller. Archived from the original on 2 September 2015. In October 2014, the Free Syrian Army sacked a Russian listening post in Tel al-Hara, south of the Quneitra border crossing with Israel. Its location was key. A YouTube video showed a Syrian officer giving the rebels a guided tour of the office building attached to the facility. Documents hanging on the wall, in both Arabic and Russian, including the symbols for Syrian intelligence and 6th Directorate of Russia's military intelligence agency (GRU), and photos showed spies from both countries hard at work deciphering intercepts. Maps displayed rebel positions; they also showed coordinates of Israel Defense Force units.
↑ Fitsanakis, Joseph (9 October 2014). "Secret Russian spy base in Syria seized by Western-backed rebels". intelNews. Archived from the original on 11 October 2014. At some point in the video, the seal of Syrian intelligence is clearly visible, placed next to the seal of the GRU's 6th Directorate, the branch of Russian military intelligence that is tasked with collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT).
↑ Oryx (6 October 2014). "Captured Russian Spy Facility Reveals the Extent of Russian Aid to the Assad Regime". bellingcat. Archived from the original on 9 April 2015. The Russian operator of Center S was the Osnaz GRU, responsible for radio electronic intelligence within Russia's Armed Forces. Although not much is known about this unit, its logos can be seen below. "Части особого назначения" – Osnaz GRU and "Военная радиоэлектронная разведка" – Military Radio Electronic Intelligence.
↑ Matthews, Owen. "Erdogan and Putin: Strongmen in love". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. The electronic intelligence was gathered, according to the report, by a Russian listening station at Hmemim Airport near Latakia, Syria, operated by the Sixth Directorate of GRU military intelligence.
↑ Tsvetkova, Maria (5 November 2015). "New photos suggest Russia's operation in Syria stretches well beyond its air campaign". Business Insider. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. CIT also published screenshots from the Instagram page of Ilya Gorelykh, who it said had served in Russia's GRU special forces in the past [...] In late October 2015, it showed he had uploaded pictures from Aleppo, one of which showed him holding an assault rifle while wearing civilian clothes. Another image of him posing in camouflage with three other armed men was apparently taken in Homs.
↑ "Beyond the airstrikes: Russia's activities on the ground in Syria". 8 November 2015. Archived from the original on 30 December 2016. We believe that Russia's operation in Syria is a "hybrid war", not unlike the one seen in Ukraine. Apart from the airstrikes, Russia provides Assad forces with surface-to-surface rocket systems, combat vehicles, equipment, advisors, artillery support and spotters. More importantly, recently there have been more and more reports of Russian soldiers, vehicles and "volunteers" being spotted close to the frontlines.
↑ Steve Goldstein and Chris Mondics, "Some Weldon-backed allegations unconfirmed; Among them: A plot to crash planes into a reactor, and missing suitcase-size Soviet atomic weapons". Philadelphia Inquirer (15 March 2006) p. A7.
↑ Poulsen, Kevin (20 July 2017). "Putin's Hackers Now Under Attack—From Microsoft". The Daily Beast. Also known as APT28, Sofacy, Pawn Storm and Strontium—Microsoft's preferred moniker—Fancy Bear has been conducting cyber espionage since at least 2007, breaching NATO, Obama's White House, a French television station, the World Anti-Doping Agency and countless NGOs, and militaries and civilian agencies in Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus.
↑ Collier, Kevin (20 July 2018). "The Russians Who Hacked The DNC Have Targeted At Least Three 2018 Campaigns, Microsoft Says". BuzzFeed News. Speaking on a panel at the Aspen Security Forum on Thursday, Tom Burt, Microsoft's vice president for customer security and trust, said that his team had discovered a spear-phishing campaign targeting three candidates running for election in 2018. Analysts traced them to a group Microsoft has nicknamed Strontium, which is closely tracked by every major threat intelligence company and is widely accepted to be run by the GRU, Russia's military intelligence agency.
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