Insurgency in Cabo Delgado | |||||||||
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Part of the war against the Islamic State, Islamic terrorism in Africa and the war on terror [1] | |||||||||
Situation as of August 2024 | |||||||||
| |||||||||
Belligerents | |||||||||
Mozambique Contents | Ansar al-Sunna Bandits [11] | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Filipe Nyusi Atanasio M'tumuke Bernadino Rafael [12] Cyril Ramaphosa John Magufuli (2020–21) Samia Suluhu (since 2021) Brig. Gen. Nuno Lemos Pires (Since 2021) | Abu Yasir Hassan [13] [14] Abdala Likongo [15] Ibn Omar † [16] [17] Abu Dardai Jongo [16] Abdul Rahmin Faizal (POW) [17] [12] Abdul Remane [17] Abdul Raim [17] "Muhamudu" † [16] Nuno Remane [17] "Salimo" [17] Abdul Aziz [12] Rajab Awadhi Ndanjile † [18] Twahili Mwidini † [19] | ||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
Mozambican security forces
Private Military Contractors
Special Air Service special forces [25] 60 Commandos (Portugal) and Portuguese Marine Corps (training support) [26] Green Berets (training support) [27] | Various Ansar al-Sunna cells
ISIL | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
11,200 [30] 1,495 [31] 1,000 [3] 304 [32] 296 [5] 60 [33] 20 [9] 12 [34] 200 Wagner personnel [35] | 250–350 (2024) [36] | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Hundreds killed and hundreds wounded 12 Wagner personnel killed [35] [37] 2 killed [38] 2 killed [39] 4+ killed, several wounded [39] 1 killed [40] 1 death (non-combat) [41] | Hundreds killed and hundreds wounded 470+ arrested [a] [37] | ||||||||
Total: 4,849 killed including 2,078 civilians [42] 400,000 displaced [43] [44] | |||||||||
The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is an ongoing Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, mainly fought between militant Islamists and jihadists attempting to establish an Islamic state in the region, and Mozambican security forces. [1] Civilians have been the main targets of terrorist attacks by Islamist militants. [46] The main insurgent faction is Ansar al-Sunna, a native extremist faction with tenuous international connections. From mid-2018, the Islamic State's Central Africa Province has allegedly become active in northern Mozambique as well, [10] and claimed its first attack against Mozambican security forces in June 2019. [29] In addition, bandits have exploited the rebellion to carry out raids. [11] As of 2020, the insurgency intensified, as in the first half of 2020 there were nearly as many attacks carried out as in the whole of 2019. [47]
Ansar al-Sunna (English: "Supporters of the Tradition") is similar to the name of an Iraqi Sunni insurgent group that fought against U.S. troops between 2003 and 2007. They are known locally as al-Shabaab but they are not formally related to the better known Somali al-Shabaab. [48] Some of the militants are known to speak Portuguese, the official language of Mozambique, however others speak Kimwane, the local language, and Swahili, the lingua franca language spoken north of that area in the Great Lakes region. Reports also state that members are allegedly mostly Mozambicans from Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, and Macomia districts, but also include foreign nationals from Tanzania and Somalia. [49]
Ansar al-Sunna, also known by its original name Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (translated: "adepts of the prophetic tradition"), was initially an Islamic religious movement in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado [28] which first appeared around 2015. It was formed by followers of the radical Kenyan cleric Aboud Rogo, who was killed in 2012. Thereafter, some members of his movement settled down in Kibiti, Tanzania, before moving into Mozambique. [50]
Ansar al-Sunna claims that Islam as practised in Mozambique has been corrupted and no longer follows the teachings of Muhammad. The movement's members consequently entered traditional mosques with weapons in order to threaten others to follow their own radical beliefs. [28] The movement is also anti-Christian, [51] anti-Animist, and anti-Western, and has tried to prevent people from attending hospitals or schools which it considers secular and anti-Islamic. [52] [53] This behavior alienated much of the local population instead of converting them to Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo, so that the movement's members broke away and formed their own places of worship. [53] Over time, the group became increasingly violent: it called an extreme form of Sharia to be implemented in the country, [52] no longer recognized the Mozambican government, and started to form hidden camps in Macomia District, Mocímboa da Praia District, and Montepuez District. There, Ansar al-Sunna militants were trained by ex-policemen, and ex-frontier guards who had been fired and held grudges against the government. The movement also contacted other Islamist militants in East Africa, and reportedly hired trainers from Somalia, Tanzania, and Kenya. [28] Some of the Ansar al-Sunna militants have also journeyed abroad to receive direct training by other militant groups. [53]
The militants are not unified, but split into different cells which do not appear to coordinate their actions. [53] By August 2018, the Mozambican police had identified six men as leaders of the militants in Cabo Delgado: Abdul Faizal, Abdul Raim, Abdul Remane, Ibn Omar, "Salimo", and Nuno Remane. [17] Ansar al-Sunna funds itself through drug trafficking (primarily heroin), contraband, and ivory trade. [52]
While religion does play a fundamental role in the conflict, analysts believe the most important factors in the insurgency are widespread social, economic, and political problems in Mozambique. Unemployment and especially youth unemployment are considered the main causes for locals to join the Islamist rebels. Increasing inequalities have led many young people to be easily attracted by such a radical movement, [54] [28] [53] [50] as Ansar al-Sunna promises that its form of Islam will act as "antidote" to the existing "corrupt, elitist rule". [17] Most rebels belong to the Mwani and Makwa ethnic groups that are native to Cabo Delgado; civilians belonging to these peoples have expressed sympathy for the insurgents. In general, the province lacks infrastructure and the state is underrepresented, easing the spread of the insurgency. [24]
In 2011, Northern Mozambique gained much international attention when large offshore gas fields containing up to 425 billion cubic meters of gas, were discovered. [223] With the goal of becoming a major international player in the energy sector, Mozambique's government has prioritized the region's economic attractiveness and has sent its army to ensure the safety of planned investments. [224] [225] Foreign activities include a $30 billion investment of US-based company Exxon Mobil and expected $20 billion of Total Energies. [226] While Total Energies has stated that they will pause their investment to reassess the security situation in Northern Mozambique, the EU's planned reduction in Russian gas imports has made the project more likely. [227]
Terrorist activity is viewed as a risk to international LNG investment, with concerns raised about the kidnapping of foreign workers. [228] However, indigenous coastal communities and maritime facilities are also targets of violent activity: in 2021, the port town of Palma was attacked, killing dozens of civilians. [229] Maritime infrastructure has also been targeted, with the key port of Mocimboa da Praia being seized. [230]
Attacks on maritime infrastructure can be attributed to rising social inequality. [231] The exploitation of the region's natural resources, including the offshore gas fields, puts the native population at risk, as they face displacement and very little profit returns to the region due to high levels of corruption. Finding its root in the precarious economic situation and the political marginalization of the native population, local conflicts have been used to radicalize young men. [231] [232]
Given the increase in extreme violent activities and simultaneously in military personnel, tensions are likely to rise as the region's economic exploitation continues. This also endangers the region's maritime environment. Conflicts on the land spill over to the sea, creating an unsafe environment for offshore investments. [233] Because Northern Mozambique is a major transnational drug trafficking hub, contested governance on land and sea facilitates maritime heroin smuggling. [234]
The deteriorating security situation has led to various international efforts in order to support Mozambique’s maritime capabilities and ensure safety along the coast. Russia has deployed the Wagner Group, a private security organization heavily linked to the Russian government [235] in Northern Mozambique but failed its mission to support counter-insurgency activities and withdrew in 2020. [236] Wagner Group was allegedly aided by the Russian fleet, though this has not been officially proven. [237] Mozambique has formed an arrangement with Italy to train its navy, [238] while Portugal, the former colonial power, has donated speedboats to the country. [239] Furthermore, Mozambique and India are cooperating on marine security issues, with India assisting in the development of the country's naval infrastructure and the training of personnel. [240] In addition, South Africa has dispatched naval patrol vessels, and Rwanda has increased its presence along the coast. [241] Currently, the UNODC is assisting Mozambique's naval capabilities by training the country's Navy, Maritime Authority, and maritime law enforcement officers, thereby improving domain awareness and port security. [242] However, mere capability training for law enforcement authorities is controversial, as corruption, power abuse and involvement in illicit economies is high in Mozambique’s state authorities. [243] [244]
There is a lack of access to reliable information in the region due to journalists being intimidated by government and military personnel. On 5 January 2019, Mozambican authorities unlawfully detained journalist Amade Abubacar, who had reported on the insurgency. He was subsequently subjected to torture, and only released on bail after 107 days in detention. [245]
The rebels have committed extensive war crimes, targeting and murdering civilians on many occasions during the insurgency. [246]
In addition, Mozambican security forces were reportedly filmed as they tortured and murdered captured rebel fighters. Amnesty International said that the videos were genuine, while Mozambique's defense ministry spokesperson Omar Saranga argued that they were probably produced by the rebels themselves, using captured uniforms to produce propaganda against the government. [247]
Cabo Delgado is the northernmost province of Mozambique. It has an area of 82,625 km2 (31,902 sq mi) and a population of 2,320,261 (2017). As well as bordering Mtwara Region in the neighboring country of Tanzania, it borders the provinces of Nampula and Niassa. The region is an ethnic stronghold of the Makonde tribe, with the Makua and Mwani as leading ethnic minorities.
Palma is a town on the northeast coast of Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province. Less than 32 kilometres (20 mi) away is the border with Mtwara Region of Tanzania to the north and north-west.
Mocímboa da Praia is a port town in northern Mozambique, lying on the Indian Ocean coast, in Cabo Delgado Province. It is used as a border post for travel to and from Tanzania even though it is 127 km from the border by road. It is the seat of Mocímboa da Praia District.
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Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) is a private military company based in Velddrif, South Africa, founded in 2012 by Lionel Dyck, an ex-military colonel who had served in the Rhodesian Security Forces and then the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. He fought as part of the Zimbabwean intervention force that assisted the Mozambican government against RENAMO during the Mozambican Civil War. At the time, he forged good relations in the Mozambican governing party FRELIMO and with later Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Following the Mozambican Civil War, he remained in the country.
Al-Shabaab, also known as Ansar al-Sunna or Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammah, is an Islamist militant group active in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique. Since October 2017, it has waged an insurgency in the region, seeking to undermine the secular FRELIMO government and establish an Islamic state. It has occasionally captured territory from the government and has been accused of committing atrocities against civilians.
The Central Africa Province is an administrative division of the Islamic State (IS), a Salafi jihadist militant group and unrecognised quasi-state. As a result of a lack of information, the foundation date and territorial extent of the Central Africa Province are difficult to gauge, while the military strength and activities of the province's affiliates are disputed. The Central Africa Province initially covered all IS activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and Uganda. In September 2020, during the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, IS-CAP shifted its strategy from raiding to actually occupying territory, and declared the Mozambican town of Mocímboa da Praia its capital. After this point, however, the Mozambican branch declined and was split off from IS-CAP in 2022, becoming a separate IS province; as a result, this leaves IS-CAP to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.
This article lists events from the year 2020 in Mozambique.
The Mocímboa da Praia offensive was a six day long offensive in northern Mozambique by Islamic State's Central African Province (IS-CAP) to capture the town of 30,000. The offensive, part of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, was a major success for IS-CAP, as they captured Mocímboa da Praia.
Abu Yasir Hassan, also known as "Yaseer Hassan" or as "Abu Qasim", is a Tanzanian national who currently serves as one of the leaders of the Islamic State's Mozambique province. By August 2020, the group had evolved into a proto-state after the group captured Mocímboa da Praia and several other areas of Cabo Delgado Province.
The Battle of Palma or the Battle for Palma was fought during late March and early April 2021 over control of the city of Palma in Mozambique, between the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces, other Mozambican security forces and private military contractors on one side, and Islamist rebels reportedly associated with the Islamic State (IS) on another side. The Islamists invaded the city, killing dozens of people before Mozambique regained control days later. Palma was left destroyed, and a major oil and gas company decided to suspend all operations in the area due to the battle. Researchers have described the battle as an overall success for the insurgents. The rebels also maintained their presence in the town's surroundings, and continued to raid Palma in the following weeks. The battle was part of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, which started in 2017 and has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, mainly local civilians.
From July to November 2021, the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) and Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), and belligerents from Southern African Development Community (SADC) states, conducted offensives in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, against local rebels loyal to the Islamic State's Central Africa Province (IS-CAP). The first offensive succeeded in retaking the important town of Mocímboa da Praia which had previously fallen to rebels as a result of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado.
The Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is an active regional peacekeeping mission operated by the Southern African Development Community in Northern Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province.
The Mwani people are a Bantu ethnic group primarily inhabiting the coastline of the Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique. The Mwani people speak the Kimwani language, also known as the Ibo language, which is a Bantu language belonging to the Niger-Congo language family. They are often considered part of the Swahili cultural world as they have important connections with the East African coast
The Battle of Mucojo was a military engagement between unidentified Anti Islamist militants, Islamic State affiliates, and the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces in the coastal town of Mucojo during the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado. It started on 22 April 2021 when anti-Islamist militants took control of Mucojo and nearby villages including Lumumua. The militants started a killing spree near Mucojo after the Mozambique Army retook many villages near Mucojo.
The Battle of Mbau was a battle by the joint Mozambican-Rwandan armed forces against ISIS and Al-Shabab in their headquarters of Mbau, a town 50 kilometers southwest of Mocimboa da Praia. The attack on the location was part of the 2021 Cabo Delgado offensives. Mbau was known as the headquarters of Al-Shabaab and the Mozambican counteroffensive on the town resulted in the loss of Mbau, Siri 1, and Siri 2.
On April 7, 2020, jihadists from Islamic State – Central Africa Province in Mozambique killed at least fifty-two young civilians in Xitaxi, Muidumbe District, Mozambique after the young men of the village refused to join the group. The massacre was one of the deadliest massacres perpetrated by Mozambique's cell of the Islamic State.
On June 27, 2020, jihadists from al-Shabaab raided the city of Mocímboa da Praia in the Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique. Al-Shabaab fighters attacked the city following brutal crackdowns against civilians by the Mozambican government, and in their attacks, destroyed homes and killed more civilians. A Mozambican counteroffensive aided by South African mercenaries of the Dyck Advisory Group renewed fighting in the city, with the mercenaries being criticized for their indiscriminate shooting of civilians.
On October 15, 2020, militants from Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State – Central Africa Province's branch in Mozambique, launched an incursion into the village of Kitaya in Mtwara Region, Tanzania, the group's first claimed attack in Tanzania. At least twenty civilians were killed in the massacre.
Between November 6 and 8, 2020, jihadist militants from Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammah (ASWJ) executed over fifty civilians in the village of Muatide. The massacre took place four days into the group's occupation of the town, and many of the victims were undergoing male initiation rites. The bodies of residents from other occupied villages were brought to the football field in the town, and ASWJ fighters hunted down remaining civilians that had fled into the bush.
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