A war in the Sahel region of West Africa has been ongoing since the 2011 Arab Spring. In particular, the intensive conflict in the three countries of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso has been referred to as the Sahel War.
The conflict is generally seen to have begun during the early stages of the Mali War, which itself was seen as a spillover conflict of the Insurgency in the Maghreb. As Islamist Tuareg rebels overran Mali in 2012, a concurrent insurgency in Nigeria, led by Boko Haram, began to spread to nearby countries. By 2015, the Mali war had spread to Burkina Faso and Niger, which led to heavy fighting and humanitarian crises in both countries.
The conflict in Nigeria also reached a climax before a 2015 coalition offensive forced insurgents into remission. By 2019, the effects of the region-wide conflict began to accelerate due to resentment within the populace and due to alleged inability to handle the conflict. These views led to a series of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, Chad and Guinea, which led to the region being labeled a 'coup belt'.
In 2025, insurgents affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State moved south and west toward Ivory Coast and other areas bordering the Atlantic Ocean. [33] The UN's counterterrorism head, Vladimir Voronkov, warned they might take over "a vast territory stretching from northern Nigeria to Mali". [33]
Amid the Algerian Civil War in the late 1990s, militants from the radical Islamist Armed Islamic Group (GIA) established connections with drug traffickers in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and southern Algeria in order to establish supply lines and logistical support. [34] [35] However, the GIA didn't establish themselves as a militant group in the Sahel until 2003. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the commander of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in southern Algeria, the GIA's successor, was on the losing side of an Algerian army offensive in the early 2000s. In December 2002, after an ambush near In Salah that killed several of his men, Belmokhtar crossed the Algerian border and settled in Mali. [36] He reached Lerneb, near the Mauritanian border, and formed an alliance with the Berabich by marrying a daughter of the influential Hamaha family of the Oulad Idriss chiefdom. Belmokhtar enriched his in-laws through raids and preaching, and his in-laws protected him and gave him a local base. Other jihadists like Nabil Abou Alqama followed Belmokhtar's example. The Malian government didn't react to these developments to not anger the jihadists. [36] [37]
The first kidnappings of Western nationals began in 2003. In February and March that year, 32 tourists, mostly Germans and Austrians, were kidnapped by Abderreza El Para, who had fled to Mali. Some hostages were freed by Algerian forces, but the remainder were under Belmokhtar's control. [36] Malian officials sent two notables, Iyad Ag Ghaly and Baba Ould Cheikh, to negotiate for the hostages. The hostages were released on August 18 for a ransom of 5 million euros. [36] Para was arrested by Chadian authorities shortly after the hostage-taking. [38]
On June 4, 2005, in response to a series of arrests of jihadists and Mauritanian Islamists by Mauritanian officials and the announced participation of Mauritanian troops in American army exercises in the Sahel, the GSPC attacked Mauritanian troops at Lemgheity, killing 17 soldiers and taking 35 prisoner. [39] While the attack was the start of the GSPC insurgency in Mauritania, it was more notable for the comment made by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi congratulating the Maghrebi mujahideen. [36] This led to a warming of relations between Al-Qaeda and the GSPC, with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb being formed in January 2007.
In the summer of 2007, Abdelmalek Droukdel, head of the GSPC/AQIM, deemed Belmokhtar as too independent and removed him as "emir of the Sahara", a position he gave to Yahia Djouadi. [40] Droukdel split the Sahara zone in two; the first, comprising southwest Algeria and northern Mali and Mauritania fell under Belmokhtar's control. The second, comprising northeastern Mali, Niger, and western Chad, went to Abou Zeid. [41] Belmokhtar opposed this decision and formed a new katiba, starting a rivalry between him and Abou Zeid. [41]
Meanwhile, clashes between Mauritanian forces and AQIM continued through 2008. The killing of five French tourists near Aleg, Mauritania in late December 2007 led to the cancellation of the 2008 Dakar Rally. Twelve Mauritanian soldiers were also found decapitated by AQIM near Tourine. [42] The accession of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2009 changed the situation; utilizing French and American support, the Mauritanian military was overhauled and restructured, forming a locally-driven counter-insurgency strategy. [43] Under Abdel Aziz, Mauritanian forces curbed AQIM attacks and even entered Malian territory to ambush the jihadists. By the end of 2011, Mauritania and AQIM were under a non-aggression pact. [44]
Tuareg leaders, in the 1990s and 2000s, began forming connections with prominent Arab drug traffickers in central Mali, particularly around the cities of Gao and Timbuktu. [45] [46] The first drug trafficked through Mali was hashish, but expanded to cocaine by the 2000s. [45] Tuareg youth would join the organized crime routes as smugglers and handlers, and in return receive good payment, a rarity in the impoverished north. [47] The Air Cocaine scandal in 2009 broadcast media attention on the crisis, after a plane filled with 11 tons of cocaine crashed in the Malian desert. [48]
At the start of the Mali War in 2012, these drug kingpins began collaborating with Tuareg arms smugglers to funnel the rebels' and jihadists' efforts to capture territory. [49] This included AQIM and it's allies, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, with civilians and soldiers alike reporting that the jihadist groups had copious access to cocaine and other drugs, along with the jihadist groups escorting drug convoys across the desert. [46]
In early 2011, as part of the Arab Spring, Libyan protesters rose up against the dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who responded with brutal suppression of the protests. Many protesters took up guns and following a several-month long civil war, overthrew Gaddafi's government and killed him. [50] Many Malian and Nigerien soldiers of Gaddafi's former Islamic Legion fought with pro-Gaddafi forces during the civil war, but fled to their home countries following the rebels' victory. These soldiers were predominantly Tuareg or Sahelien Arab groups like Bella, all minorities in their home countries. [51] [52]
In returning to their home countries, the former soldiers came back to a shaky peace in Kidal Region and Ménaka Region, where Malian Tuaregs held positions of local authority in the army as part of peace deals following the Tuareg rebellion of 2007-2009. Despite low-level violence occurring by Tuareg separatist militias continuing until 2011, the majority of battle-hardened Tuareg leaders like Iyad Ag Ghaly had defected to the Malian Army in exchange for authority and promises of economic development in the rural Kidal Region. [53]
With Libya having given these Tuareg rebels a safe haven prior to their civil war, many rebels and Islamic Legion soldiers alike held an allegiance to a Tuareg identity over a Malian one, even if they were in the Malian army. [54] Coming back to a region in 2011 that the Malian government had continued to neglect, along with new pipelines to weapons and supply chains from the former Libyan government, many Tuaregs were ready to revolt again. [52]
In late 2011, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, an irredentist Tuareg militia leader who was one of the last hold-outs of the 2006-2009 war, founded the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which drew a support base from all Tuareg clans. [55] The MNLA sought independence for a Tuareg state named Azawad located in northern Mali. This state, in practice, would include many non-Tuareg groups like the Songhai, Fulani, Bella, Arabs, and different clans of Tuareg. [55] Many of these groups had collaborated with the Tuaregs or the Malian government depending on what was more advantageous for their community, with the Songhai most notably forming the self-defense militias Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso to fight alongside the government during the 1990s Tuareg rebellion. [55] Bahanga's goal with the MNLA was to unite all Tuaregs under one organization in order to avoid fragmentation as had happened before. [55]
Bahanga largely succeeded with his unification until 2012, when Ansar Dine was formed by Iyad Ag Ghaly. Ghaly's goal was to form a state in Mali under a strict interpretation of sharia law. Ansar Dine immediately sapped many Ifoghas Tuaregs, the dominant clan in Kidal Region and Ghaly's clan, from the MNLA. [56] [55] Ansar Dine received support from AQIM and another jihadist group, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), that had split off from AQIM in late 2011. [56]
The MNLA and jihadist alliance overran many cities and Malian bases in a surprise offensive in January 2012. By the end of January, the cities of Tessalit, Aguelhok, Andéramboukane, Léré, and Ménaka had been captured by the rebel alliance. In the first week of February, the MNLA captured Tinzaouaten and began fighting for Kidal. [57] Discontent grew in Bamako by March, when the towns of Diré, Goundam, and Niafunké came under MNLA control, often without fighting. [58] Jeremy Keenan said in 2012 regarding the MNLA-jihadist alliance, "What seems to happen is that when they move into a town, the MNLA take out the military base – not that there's much resistance – and Iyad [ag Aghaly] goes into town and puts up his flag and starts bossing everyone around about sharia law." [59]
On March 21, Malian soldiers overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré due to his lackluster response to the rebellion, with Amadou Sanogo taking over in a junta. Sanogo later passed power peacefully to Dioncounda Traoré. [60]
Despite the coup, Kidal fell on March 30 and Gao one day later. [61] The fall of Gao was the start of public disputes between the MNLA and the jihadist groups, as there were conflicting reports of who actually controlled the town. As with other cities, the MNLA entered both cities but jihadist groups took up the administrative control. In Kidal, that was Ansar Dine; in Gao, it was both MUJAO and Ansar Dine. [62]
Timbuktu and Douentza fell in the first week of April, and the MNLA declared Azawadi independence on April 6. [63] With the seizure of Douentza, the MNLA ceased fighting and said that all of Azawadi territory was liberated. [64] This directly contradicted Ansar Dine's goals, with the group seeking to spread Sharia across all of Mali and past it's borders. [56] [65] Immediately after the declaration of Azawadi independence, several Tuareg groups sprung up against the MNLA, with the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) forming a pro-government and pro-rebel faction on April 8. [66]
After failed negotiations between the MNLA and Ansar Dine in May, anti-MNLA protests began in Gao supported by MOJWA and Ansar Dine. Clashes broke out between the two groups, and the jihadist alliance seized power after a short battle. [67] By August, the MNLA was forced out of every major city they had taken, and Ghaly was declared emir of the new Azawadi Islamic state. [68]
The jihadist alliance began imposing strict interpretations of Sharia in the territories it controlled, destroying many mausolea of the World Heritage Site of Timbuktu and meting out harsh punishments like public executions to people who defied Sharia. [69] [70] The imposition of brutal punishments and Sharia law was considered by analysts a reason for the subsequent collapse of the Islamic Azawadi state - Droukdel even admitted his own commanders' rushed implementation was the reason for their collapse. [71]
By January 2013, Islamist forces advanced to 600 km from the capital and were closing in to capture the major town of Mopti. [72] [22] The MNLA began peace talks to realign with the Malian government while the French military launched Opération Serval on January 11, intervening in the conflict. [73] The furthest that the jihadist coalition was able to advance was Konna, being defeated at the Battle of Konna, one of the most significant events of the war. [74]
The new Malian government under Dioncounda Traoré requested the French support to repel the jihadist invasion, and additionally allowed in the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and the UN-led African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). [75] Within a week of the French intervention that began on January 11, the jihadist offensive had been halted and reversed. French air raids wiped out jihadist strongholds in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains, and helped Malian troops recapture every major northern city. [76]
Another part of the reason why the jihadist alliance collapsed so quickly was because of Belmokhtar's failed hostage crisis at an oil facility in In Amenas in southern Algeria in January 2013, where 800 people were taken hostage by AQIM. [71] The expansion of the conflict to Algeria, combined with the southward offensive occurring at the same time, provoked France and international governments to respond quickly. [71]
Targeted airstrikes wiped out jihadist leadership throughout 2013 and 2014. Abou Zeid was killed in February 2014, and smaller local commanders like Haroun Ag Said, Omar Ould Hamaha, Abu Bakr al-Nasr, Ahmed al-Tilemsi, and Abdallah al-Chinguetti were all targeted and assassinated. [71] In 2013, French, Malian Tuareg, and Chadian troops launched an operation in the Ifoghas mountains, destroying the last AQIM base and effectively ending their permanent territorial control. [76] Operation Serval ended in July 2014, with the French government beginning Operation Barkhane and the United Nations founding MINUSMA to ensure long-term stability in the Sahel. [77] [78]
Despite being effectively defeated with over a third of their manpower killed across all groups, jihadist organizations - particularlarly MUJAO in Gao - made great advances in recruiting from the Fulani and Songhai community in the area, with MUJAO sympathizers launching attacks on the city after Mali regained control in 2013 and 2014. [76] [71] Hardline Islamist survivors of Operation Serval fled to Libya to aid the Islamic State – Libya Province and the various al-Qaeda-aligned Libyan rebel groups like Ansar al-Sharia in their own conquests. [71] Islamist militants from places like Niger and Burkina Faso found it easy to flee across the porous borders into their home countries, with Ibrahim Malam Dicko notably using his war experience in Ansar Dine to later expand jihadism into Burkina Faso. [79]
The MNLA, on the other hand, offered a hesitant hand to Malian and French authorities in the aftermath of Serval. [71] Many Tuaregs had flocked from Ansar Dine to the MNLA and other secular Tuareg organizations in the hope of maintaining autonomy for northern Mali. [76] France prevented southern Malian troops from taking part in the recapture of Tuareg cities like Menaka and Kidal, and left that to the pro-government Tuareg commander El Hadj Ag Gamou, the MNLA (in Kidal), and Chadians. [76]
While negotiations and agreements were put in place for Tuareg autonomy with the 2015 Algiers Accords, these agreements were not upheld and neither side wanted to risk a new war with one another. As such, Kidal remained de facto in MNLA hands until 2023, and secular Tuareg movements and the Malian government did not explicitly clash until that same year. [80] [81]
The transition to Operation Barkhane from Serval included French ultimata for the Malian government to democratize and hold elections. These elections, held in 2013, launched Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta to the presidency and initially, relations were good between Tuaregs and the Malian government, France and Mali, and Mali and other nations. [76] Serval also expanded to Burkina Faso and Niger, with troop deployments increasing in those countries. [82] The Takuba Task Force and American troops also participated in regional security operations against jihadists. [83]
Since before the start of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, the Malian borders with Niger and Burkina Faso were extremely porous. Communities that lived along the border often treated it like it didn't exist. [84] No Sahelian country had the manpower and resources to adequately control their borders outside of a few major border towns. [84] Tuareg rebel leaders often fled back and forth between the Malian and Nigerien borders to evade capture during the 2006-2009 rebellions. [85] During the Malian retreat from the north in the initial stages of the 2012 rebellion, Malian colonel El Hadj Ag Gamou and his troops fled towards Niamey across the Malian-Nigerien border. [86]
Additionally, a large number of foreign fighters from across the Sahel flocked to join the Islamist half of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 and 2013. The most notable group was a small group of Boko Haram and Ansaru militants that fought alongside MUJAO in Gao. [87] When Operation Serval decimated the rebellion, these foreign fighters fled back home with their war experience, like Dicko. Between 2013 and 2017, several attacks occurred across West Africa by small cells of al-Qaeda-aligned militants, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire and Ouagadougou in 2016. [88]
In the wake of the French intervention, an ethnic Fulani preacher named Amadou Koufa began growing in followers for his oratory skills and calls for revolution among the Fulani caste system. [89] The Fulani are a nomadic and staunchly conservative ethnic group in southern and central Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and other parts of West Africa. The Massina Empire, based in what is now central Mali, was an Islamic caliphate ruled by Fulani for over 400 years. [90] In the decolonization period, many Fulani were marginalized and oppressed by West African nations due to their nomadic lifestyle, with their widespread populace making them a minority almost everywhere. [91] Koufa rose to power through his radio and in-person sermons preaching hardline interpretations aligned with al-Qaeda theology. [89] He mixed this with calls for a revolution against both the Malian state and the upper echelons of the Fulani social hierarchy, attracting many young Fulani across the Sahel. [92]
Niger faces jihadist insurgencies both in its western regions (as a result of the spill-over of the Mali War) and in its southeastern region (as a result of the spill-over of the Islamic insurgency in Nigeria). The insurgency in the west of the country began with incursions in 2015 and intensified from 2017 onwards. Since 2021, attacks were carried out with greater frequency in the country. [93] [94] [95]
The insurgency in the Sahel spread to Burkina Faso in 2015, beginning with an attack on a gendarme by alleged Boko Haram members. [96] [97] In 2016, the amount of attacks spiked after a new group, Ansarul Islam, was founded by imam Ibrahim Malam Dicko. [98] [99]
Since 2021, the insurgency in Burkina Faso has begun to spread to neighboring countries of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin and Togo. On 8 February 2022, insurgents attacked the W National Park in Benin, killing nine people. On 11 May 2022, militants crossed the border into Togo and killed eight soldiers. [100]
Beginning in the early 2020s, numerous coups were staged in the Sahel, in Mali in 2020 and 2021, [101] Chad, [102] two in Burkina Faso in January and September 2022, [103] [104] and in Niger in 2023. [105]
In 2024 Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali formed a confederation called the Alliance of Sahel States. [106] On 21 January 2025, they decided to create a joint armed force of 5,000 soldiers to fight regional jihadism in the Sahel. [107]
Having cooperated and trained alongside AQIM in the Sahel since 2006, the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram began expanding into Chad and Niger in 2014 after successfully seizing territory in the insurgency in Nigeria. [108] By then controlling a significant area around Lake Chad, a coalition of Western African countries launched an offensive against the group in January 2015. [109] The group eventually ended its alliance with al-Qaeda, pledging allegiance to ISIL in March 2015. By the end of 2015 Boko Haram had been largely pushed to retreat into the Sambisa Forest in Nigeria, although attacks have continued including in Niger. [110] [111]
As a result of the insurgency, the affected countries have been severely destabilized, with the emergence of the coup belt following several coup d'états within the region due to perceived inability to handle the conflict. In Mali and Burkina Faso, both countries lost significant control of their territory to the Islamists. The conflict has also seen a political shift in the region, with many military juntas, many having recently overthrown US- and Chinese-backed governments, allying themselves with the Russian government and the Wagner Group. [483]
In particular, Mali has seen significant activity of the Wagner Group as the government moved closer to Turkey and Russia. Niger saw its government being overthrown in 2023 due to poor management of the conflict. In particular, the M62 Movement, a pro-Russian group, supported the coup. Burkina Faso also saw its government being overthrown twice within a year, with coups occurring in January and September, both of which caused by poor management of the conflict against Islamists. As a result of Russian expansion, Ukraine had funded opposition groups. [483]
Although not affected as much, countries nearby like Ghana, Benin, Guinea, Togo and the Ivory Coast have been under constant threat of either full-on insurgency or severe destabilization internally. Guinea has already seen a coup d'état while the Gambia has seen turmoil internally. Northern Benin has seen an increase in terrorism attributed to Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State, with 28 incidents attributed to the groups between 1 November 2021 and 14 September 2022, including the W National Park massacre. [484]
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