Islamic State الدولة الإسلامية ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah | |
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Motto: لا إله إلا الله، محمد رسول الله " Lā ʾilāha ʾillā llāh, Muhammadun rasūlu llāh " "There is no god but God; Muhammad is the messenger of God" [1] دولة الإسلام باقية وتتمدد Dawlat al Islam Baqiyah wa Tatamaddad "The Islamic State remains and expands" [1] خلافة على منهاج النبوة Khilafah ala Minhaj an-Nubuwwah "Caliphate Upon the Prophetic Methodology" [2] [3] | |
Anthem:
| |
Seal: [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] | |
Status | Unrecognized proto-state Designated as a terrorist organization |
Capital | Raqqa (2013–2017) [1] Mayadin (2017) [11] Hajin (2017–18) [12] Unknown (2018–present) |
Official languages | Arabic |
Religion | Sunni Islam (Salafism) |
Government | Unitary Islamic theocratic self-proclaimed caliphate under a totalitarian dictatorship |
• Caliph | Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi |
• Head of the Shura Council | Abu Arkan al-Ameri |
Legislature | Shura |
Establishment | War on Terror |
• Established under the name of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad | 1999 |
• Joined al-Qaeda | October 2004 |
• Declaration of an Islamic State in Iraq | 13 October 2006 |
• Claim of territory in the Levant | 8 April 2013 |
• Separated from al-Qaeda | 3 February 2014 |
• Declaration of caliphate | 29 June 2014 |
10 July 2017 | |
19 March 2019 | |
27 October 2019 | |
3 February 2022 | |
Population | |
• 2015 estimate | (near max extent): 8–12 million [13] [14] |
Currency |
The Islamic State (IS) had its core in Iraq and Syria from 2013 to 2017 and 2019 respectively, where the proto-state controlled significant swathes of urban, rural, and desert territory, mainly in the Mesopotamian region. [14] Today the group controls scattered pockets of land in the area, as well as territory or insurgent cells [14] [16] in other areas, notably Afghanistan, West Africa, the Sahara, Somalia, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. [17] As of 2023, large swathes of Mali have fallen under IS control. [18]
In early 2017, IS controlled approximately 45,377 square kilometers (17,520 square miles) of territory in Iraq and Syria and 7,323 km2 of territory elsewhere, for a total of 52,700 square kilometres (20,300 sq mi). [14] This represents a substantial decline from the group's territorial peak in late 2014, when it controlled between 100,000 and 110,000 square kilometres (39,000 and 42,000 sq mi) [14] [19] of territory in total. [14] [20] IS territory has declined substantially in almost every country since 2014, a result of the group's unpopularity and the military action taken against it. [14] By late March 2019, IS territory in Syria was reduced to only the besieged 4,000 km2 (1,550 sq mi) Syrian Desert pocket. [21] The enclave was surrounded by Syrian government forces and its allies. [22] [23] [21] The Syrian military conducted combing operations and airstrikes against the pocket, but with limited success. [24] [25] IS propaganda claims a peak territorial extent of 282,485 km2. [26]
The majority of the Islamic State's territory, population, revenue, and prestige came from the territory it once held in Iraq and Syria. [14] In Afghanistan, IS mostly controls territory near the Pakistan border and has lost 87% of its territory since spring 2015. [14] In Lebanon, IS also controlled some areas on its border at the height of the Syrian war. In Libya, the group operates mostly as a moving insurgent force, occupying places before abandoning them again. [27] In Egypt, the group controls 910 km2 of land centered on the small city of Sheikh Zuweid, which represents less than 1% of Egypt's territory. [14] In Nigeria, Boko Haram (at the time an IS affiliate) controlled 6,041 km2 of territory at its maximum extent in 2014, though most of this area was lost amid military reversals and a split within Boko Haram between pro- and anti-IS factions. [14] By late 2019, however, IS's African forces had once again seized large areas in Nigeria; [28] as of 2021, IS's African forces still run their own administrations in territories they control. [29] [30] As of 2022, most of IS's territory is confined to northeastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique, alongside large swathes of eastern Mali. [18]
The fifth edition of the Islamic State's Dabiq magazine explained the group's process for establishing new provinces. Jihadist groups in a given area must consolidate into a unified body and publicly declare their allegiance to the caliph. The group must nominate a Wāli (Governor), a Shura Council (religious leadership), and formulate a military strategy to consolidate territorial control and implement Sharia law. Once formally accepted, IS considers the group to be one of its provinces and gives it support. [31] Dabiq has acknowledged support in regions including East Turkestan, Indonesia and the Philippines, and claimed that IS would eventually establish wilayat in these areas after forming direct relationships with its supporters there. [31]
IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani said "the legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas." [32] IS thus rejects the political divisions established by Western powers during World War I in the Sykes–Picot Agreement as it absorbs territory in Syria and Iraq. [33] [34] [35] The Long War Journal writes that the logical implication is that the group will consider preexisting militant groups like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) illegitimate if they do not nullify themselves and submit to IS's authority. [36]
While branches in Libya and Egypt have been very active and attempted to exercise territorial control, branches in other countries like Algeria and Saudi Arabia have been less active and do not seem to have a strong presence. [37] [38]
Since 2022, there have been no further provinces officially announced by IS. This is despite the group receiving public pledges of allegiance from militants in countries like Somalia, Bangladesh and the Philippines, and subsequently releasing statements and videos from those regions through its official media channels. [39] [40] [41] Analyst Charlie Winter speculates that this is due to the lackluster performance of many of IS's existing provinces, and that IS's leadership seems to be identifying new affiliates as simply "soldiers of the caliphate." [42]
Loss of "caliphate" territory led IS to conduct more terrorist attacks abroad. [43]
The Islamic State primarily claimed territory in Syria and Iraq, subdividing each country into multiple wilayah (provinces), largely based on preexisting governance boundaries. [44] [45] The first territorial claims by the group outside of Syria and Iraq were announced by its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, on 13 November 2014, when he announced new wilayats, or provinces, in Libya (Wilayah Barqah, Wilayah Tarabulus, and Wilayah Fazan), Algeria (Wilayah al-Jazair), Sinai, Egypt (Wilayah Sinai), Yemen (Wilayah al-Yaman), and Saudi Arabia (Wilayah al-Haramayn). [46] [47] In 2015, new provinces were also announced in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border (Wilayah Khurasan), [37] Northern Nigeria (Wilayah Gharb Ifriqiyyah), [48] the North Caucasus (Wilayah al-Qawqaz), [49] and the Sahel (Sahil). [50]
In November 2014, the Islamic State released a video in which two of its militants stated that IS will make a province for Kurdistan if they capture it. [51]
When the Iraq-based insurgent group Mujahideen Shura Council announced it was establishing an Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006, it claimed authority over seven Iraqi provinces: Baghdad, Al Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Saladin, Nineveh, and parts of Babil. [53]
When the group changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and expanded into Syria in April 2013, it claimed nine Syrian provinces, covering most of the country and lying largely along existing provincial boundaries: Al Barakah (al-Hasakah Governorate), Al Khayr (Deir ez-Zor Governorate), Raqqa, Homs, Halab, Idlib, Hamah, Damascus, and Latakia. [54] It later subdivided the territory under its control to create the new provinces of al-Furat, [45] [55] [56] Fallujah, Dijlah, and al-Jazirah. [57] [58] On 9 December 2017 Iraqi military forces announced the war against IS in Iraq had been won and that they no longer controlled territory in Iraq. In June 2017 IS affiliate Khalid ibn al-Walid Army started referring to themselves as "Wilayat Hawran", one month later IS media started referring to all its claims in Syria as "Wilayat al-Sham". [59]
Since mid-2018, IS has referred to its territory in the Levant simply as Wilayat al-Sham and has done the same with Iraq calling it Wilayat al-Iraq, but still continues to acknowledge and use references to specific regions in those territories, this has also been done with its claims in Yemen and Libya. [60]
As of 2022, the group seems to have increased its efforts in Syria compared to Iraq, [61] and has been reduced to several pockets in the Syrian desert, with local tribesmen acting as informants for the U.S. and other coalition forces. Despite this, the group managed to orchestrate a major prison break in January 2022. [17] [62]
On 29 January 2015, Hafiz Saeed Khan, Abdul Rauf and other militants in the region swore an oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Khan was subsequently named as the Wāli (Governor) of a new branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan called Khurasan Province, named after the historical Khorasan region. [63] [64] [65]
IS attempted to establish themselves in Southern Afghanistan, especially in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, but were resisted by Taliban forces. [66] [67] [68] They were able to establish a foothold in parts of Nangarhar, and recruited disaffected members of the Taliban. [69] In August 2015, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader, Usman Ghazi, swore allegiance to IS and announced that the group should be considered part of Wilayah Khorasan. [70]
The group suffered reversals in 2016, losing control of some territory in the wake of attacks from US Forces, the Afghan Government [71] and the Taliban. [72] Hafiz Saeed Khan was reportedly killed in a US drone strike in eastern Afghanistan on 25 July 2016. [73]
In 2019, the group announced a new Pakistan province (Wilayah Pakistan). [74] Despite this, as of 2022, the Khorasan province continues to operate in the country, also operating against neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where some members have suggested that a Movarounnahr (or Transoxiana) province is established. [75] In July 2022, a Tajik-language magazine called Al-Azaim Tajiki was endorsed by the group, named after Yusuf al-Tajiki, a propagandist for the group killed by the Taliban. [76]
Since the Taliban's 2021 offensive, which ended with the takeover of Kabul and the end of the 20-year war in the country, IS-K have become a new focus for the group, with its funding and numbers increasing as a result of prison breaks of IS fighters during the offensive and subsequent recruiting. [17] Efforts have also increased to recruit fighters from neighboring Uzbekistan. [77]
IS divides Libya into three historical provinces, claiming authority over Cyrenaica in the east, Fezzan in the desert south, and Tripolitania in the west, around the capital of Tripoli. [78] [79]
In 2014, a number of leading IS commanders arrived in the city of Derna, which had been a major source of fighters in the Syrian civil war and Iraqi insurgency. Over a number of months, they united many local militant factions under their leadership and declared war on anyone who opposed them, killing judges, civic leaders, local militants who rejected their authority, and other opponents. On 5 October 2014, the militants, who by then controlled part of the city, gathered to pledge allegiance to the Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. [80] [81] In February 2015, IS forces took over parts of the Libyan city of Sirte. In the following months, they used it as a base to capture neighbouring towns including Harawa, [82] and Nofaliya. [83] IS began governing Sirte and treating it as the capital of their territory. [84]
IS suffered reversals from mid-2015 when they were expelled from much of Derna following clashes with rival militants, [85] following months of intermittent fighting, IS eventually redeployed to other parts of Libya. [86] Its emir Abu Nabil al-Anbari was killed in a U.S. air strike in November 2015. [87] Libya's Interim Government launched a major offensive against IS territory around Sirte in May 2016, [88] [89] capturing the city by December 2016. [90]
The group's current emir is Abu Bara al Sahrawi, who replaced Adnan Abu Walid al Sahrawi after his death in August 2021. [17]
The Egyptian militant group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis swore allegiance to IS in November 2014. After al-Baghdadi's speech on 13 November, the group changed its name to Sinai Province on the Twitter feed claiming to represent the group. [47] The group has carried out attacks in Sinai.
On 1 July 2015, Wilayat Sinai launched a large-scale invasion on the Egyptian city of Sheikh Zuweid with more than 300 IS fighters and attacked more than 15 army and police positions using mortars, RPG's, light and heavy weapons in an attempt to capture the city.
On 29 February 2017, the group announced a new "Misr" province in Egypt in a propaganda video against Coptic Christians. [91]
In 2020, IS in Egypt occupied villages in Bir al-Abd town in North Sinai.
As of 2022, the group continues to attack local infrastructure, but has diminished due to persistent counterterrorism efforts by the Egyptian government and armed forces, who operate with the assistance of local tribesmen. [17] [92]
Al-Baghdadi announced a Wilayah in Saudi Arabia in November 2014, calling for the overthrow of the Saudi Royal Family and criticizing the Kingdom's participation in the US-led coalition against IS. [47] The group has carried out attacks in the country under the names of Najd Province and Hejaz Province. [93]
IS established a Yemeni Wilayah in November 2014. [46] [37] The branch's first attack occurred in March 2015, when it carried out suicide bombings on two Shia Mosques in the Yemeni capital. [94] At least eight IS Wilayat, named after existing provincial boundaries in Yemen, have claimed responsibility for attacks, including 'Adan Abyan Province, Al-Bayda Province, Hadramawt Province, Shabwah Province and Sana'a Province. [48] Following the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War in 2015, IS struggled to establish much of a presence in the country in the face of competition from the larger and more established Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militant group. Many of IS's regional cells in Yemen have not been visibly active since their establishment and the group has not been able to seize control of territory the way they have done in Iraq and Syria. [95] The group has also experienced leadership turmoil and defections from its rank and file. [96]
As of 2022, the group serves a key financial intermediary between Somalia and Khorasan provinces. [17]
Members of a militant group named Jund al-Khilafah swore allegiance to IS in September 2014. [97] IS in Algeria gained notoriety when it beheaded French tourist Hervé Gourdel in September 2014. [37] On 13 November 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced that the group had changed its name to "Wilayah al-Jazair" in accordance to the structure of the rest of groups aligned with IS. [46] [47] Algerian security forces killed the group's leader, Khalid Abu-Sulayman, in December 2014, and five of its six commanders in a May 2015 raid. Since then, the group has not claimed any significant attacks and has largely been silent. [98]
On 7 March 2015, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to IS via an audio message posted on the organisation's Twitter account. [99] [100] Abu Mohammad al-Adnani welcomed the pledge of allegiance, and described it as an expansion of the group's caliphate to West Africa. [101] IS publications from late March 2015 began referring to members of Boko Haram as part of Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyyah (Islamic State's West Africa Province). [48] Boko Haram suffered significant reversals in the year following the pledge of allegiance, with an offensive by the Nigerian military, assisted by neighboring powers, driving them from much of the territory they had seized in North East Nigeria. [102] Boko Haram suffered a split in 2016, with IS appointing 'Abu Musab al-Barnawi' as the group's new leader, due to disagreements with Abubakar Shekau's leadership. This was rejected by Shekau and his supporters, who continued to operate independently. [103] [104]
On 24 January 2022, the small town of Gudumbali was captured and declared as the province's capital. However, it was recaptured by Nigerian troops on 26 January. [105]
In the summer of 2022, ISWAP made several territorial gains in Nigeria. [106]
As of September 2022, the group continues to maintain its stronghold in northeastern Nigeria, and has again integrated or eclipsed its former competitor Boko Haram, as several fighters have rejoined the group. The group also orchestrated a prison break in July, near Abuja. [17]
In October 2022, the town of Ansongo was captured by IS's Sahel province. [107]
IS militants in Syria issued a threat to Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2014: "we will liberate Chechnya and the entire Caucasus, God willing. Your throne has already teetered, it is under threat and will fall when we come to you because Allah is truly on our side." [108] In early 2015, commanders of the militant Caucasus Emirate group in Chechnya and Dagestan announced their defection and pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. [109] [110] In a June 2015 audio statement posted online, IS spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani accepted the pledges of allegiance and appointed Abu Muhammad al-Qadari (Rustam Asildarov) as Governor of a new Caucasus Province. He called on other militants in the region to join with and follow al-Qadari. [49] [111] The group has carried out occasional, low-level attacks since then. [112] Russian security services killed Rustam Asildarov in December 2016. [113]
In February 2014, the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem declared its support for IS. [114] On 2 April 2015, elements of this group, along with members of the Army of Islam and the Gaza faction of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, [115] [116] formed the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, also known as Islamic State in Gaza, [117] as it predominantly operates in the Gaza Strip.
The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) has been active since 2015, and though it remains a small militia of around 300 fighters, it has been considered possible by experts that ISS controls a number of villages in Puntland's hinterland. [118] Furthermore, the group managed to capture and hold the town of Qandala for over a month in late 2016. At first, ISS did not receive official recognition by the Islamic State, [119] however, this was subsequently granted by December 2017. [120]
As of 2022, the group serves as an intermediary for IS provinces in Africa and the leadership based in Syria and Iraq. It also finances ISKP via Yemen. [17]
Abu Sayyaf is IS's most powerful affiliate in the Philippines; another IS-affiliated group is the Maute group. Both groups worked together with other IS affiliates to seize parts of Marawi City on 23 May 2017, starting the Battle of Marawi. [121]
On 16 October, IS's Emir of Southeast Asia Isnilon Hapilon, along with the Maute group's remaining leader Omar Maute was killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Previously, the Maute group's co-leader and Omar's brother Abdullah Maute, as well as their other five male siblings, had been neutralized by the ongoing counter-offensives. Two days after the leaders' death, the Armed Forces of the Philippines said Malaysian terrorist and senior commander Mahmud Ahmad is also presumed killed in another operation.
The Battle of Marawi was declared over by 23 October by the government, at which point all participating militants have been successfully neutralized, effectively blocking IS's Asian expansion. The government wiped out the Maute group after the battle.
In December 2017, remnants of the Maute group started recruiting new members to form a new group called "Turaifie Group" whose leader, Abu Turaifie, claimed himself to be a successor of former leader Abu Sayyaf Isnilon Hapilon. [122]
As of 2022, only pockets in Indonesia and the Philippines remain, and major attacks have decreased as a result of successful counterterrorism efforts by the governments of both states. [17]
During 2023, IS witnessed a major resurgence in the Philippines (especially from August), with the group claiming more attacks in the country than during the previous 2 years combined, including several significant attacks such as the Mindanao State University bombing in Marawi. [123] [124]
On 22 March 2024, the Philippines announced that Abu Sayyaf had been "fully dismantled", bringing an end to the decades-long jihadist insurgency. [125]
According to the Islamic State Al-Naba newspaper, the group continued to conduct attacks on the Philippine Government and Army and the Moro militias until 11 April, which is yet to be confirmed by official Philippine Government sources.
In October 2017, a video emerged on pro-IS channels that showed a small number of militants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who declared to be part of the "City of Monotheism and Monotheists" (MTM) group. The leader of the group went on to say that "this is Dar al-Islam of the Islamic State in Central Africa" and called upon other like-minded individuals to travel to MTM territory in order to join the war against the government. The Long War Journal noted that though this pro-IS group in Congo appeared to be very small, its emergence had gained a notable amount of attention from IS sympathizers. [126] On 24 July 2019, a video was released referring to IS's presence in the country as the Central African Wilayat showing fighters pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. [127]
As of 2022, the group has doubled its territory and increased its numbers as a result of orchestrated prison breaks, with 2,000 prisoners freed since 2020. [17]
After taking control of the Mozambican town of Mocímboa da Praia during an offensive in August 2020, local IS insurgents declared it the capital of their province. The militants consequently expanded further by capturing several islands in the Indian Ocean, with Vamizi Island being the most prominent. [128]
In May 2022, the province was separated from Central Africa Province and became known as the Mozambique Province (ISM). [17]
The Islamic State operated in India and the Kashmir region through its Islamic State Jammu & Kashmir (ISJK) branch, which had begun in February 2016. [129] The Islamic State – Khorasan Province declared Wilayah [Wilayat] al-Hind (India Province) for IS on 11 May 2019 after clashes in Jammu and Kashmir in which ISJK leader Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi was killed. [130]
Shafi Armar, a former member of the Indian Mujahideen, was formerly the chief of operations for the IS in India. [131] He and his brother Sultan Armar founded the Indian IS affiliates Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (transl. Supporters of Monotheism in the Land of India) and Janood-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind (transl. Caliph's Army of India). [132] [133] Both he and his brother were killed in action during Syrian Civil War in 2015, which was only confirmed in 2019 because his online account was controlled by other militants in the group which added to the confusion. [134] Janood-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind has published the pro-IS propaganda magazine Sawt al-Hind (transl. Voice of India) since February 2020. [135]
On 20 March 2024, the special forces arrested the IS India chief, Haris Farooqi and one of his associates while they were trying to cross to India from neighbouring Bangladesh. Police explained that the suspects had planned many sabotage activities and IED attacks inside India. [136]
Islamic State – Bengal Province (Wilayat al-Bengal) is the province of IS in Bangladesh, it operates through the group Islamic State Bangladesh (ISB) and has claimed attacks in the country since October 2015. Neo-Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, an offshoot of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, also operates as its branch. [137] [138]
The first emir of Wilayat al-Bengal, Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif, is believed to be Mohammad Saifullah Ozaki (born as Sajit Chandra Debnath, 1982) a Bangladeshi Japanese economist who went to Syria in 2015 and joined IS. A Hindu convert to Islam, he reportedly lead the 2016 Dhaka attack. He was detained in Iraq in 2019 and Abu Muhammed al-Bengali was announced as the new emir of the province. [139] [138]
On 2 July 2019, as part of a series of videos showing supporters and fighters of IS around the world renewing their pledge of allegiance to IS, a video was published from Azerbaijan featuring three fighters armed with Kalashnikov style rifles pledging their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The video was formally released by IS. [140]
4 months later, after al-Baghdadi's death on 27 October 2019, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi received pledges of allegiance (bayah) from various provinces and regions, with photos of fighters from Azerbaijan pledging allegiance to him, on 29 November. [141]
On 19 September, 2024, the Islamic State claimed its first-ever attack in Azerbaijan, via its weekly Al-Naba newsletter, claiming to have killed 7 Azeri security personnel and wounded 1 in a clash in Qusar district, northern Azerbaijan, five days prior. [142]
Wilayat Turkiya was formally declared in July 2019 when a video was published by IS featuring Turkish jihadists giving their bay'ah to the group's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Reference was also made to the Wilayat prior to its formal introduction, in April 2019 in a video featuring the group's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in his second ever video appearance, and first appearance in five years, he was seen holding dossiers from various Wilayats the group claims one of which was labeled as Wilayat Turkey, which was the first known such usage as a reference to the Turkish Wilayat. [143] [144] [145]
The Islamic State's main base of operations was in their territory of Ar-Raqqah in Syria, until 2017, where it was recaptured by the Syrian Democratic Forces. From there, orders were given to affiliate groups, called wilayat , spread across the Levant, Asia and Africa. Few of these wilayat have declared their capital cities, with the exception of al-Sham with Ar-Raqqah, [1] al-Iraq with Mosul, and Central Africa with Mocímboa da Praia. [146] It also had claims on the entirety of the Muslim world, including Central Asia, the former Ottoman Balkans, South East Asia, and the northern part of Africa. [147] [148] Other times, however, it expressed also a desire for world domination, with labels on certain areas of the old world as well as the new world. [149] [150]
In addition to its territorial administration, the group also established dāwāwīn (ministries) for the political administration of the quasi-state under al-Baghdadi's administration, [164] [165] [166] modelled after Abu Ayyub al-Masri's infrastructure for the Islamic State of Iraq. [167]
Dīwān / Ministry | Date of creation | Function |
---|---|---|
Education and Teaching [h] Diwan al-Tarbiyya wa al-Ta’lim | July 2014 | Responsible for education in a regular and extremist context. [168] Its first minister was Reda Seyam. |
Services Diwan al-Khidamat | June 2014 | Responsible for the administration of public spaces, such as parks and roads. One example of the latter was the construction of "Caliphate Way", a highway built in the industrial area of Mosul, which reduced congestion in the area. [169] |
Rikaz [i] Diwan al-Rikaz | ? | Responsible for handling and exploitation of profitable resources. Its two known divisions handle fossil fuels (e.g. petroleum) and antiquities. |
Da'wah and Masajid (and Awqaf) Diwan al-Da’wah wa al-Masajid (wa al-Awqaf) | ? | Responsible for Dawah and mosque and religious staff administration. |
Health Diwan al-Sihha | June 2014 | Responsible for health services and hospitals. An "Islamic State Health Service" was established in 2015, featuring a logo modelled after the one used by the British National Health Service. [170] All medical schools served under this ministry rather than the Ministry of Education. |
Tribal Relations Diwan al-Asha'ir | ? | Responsible for dealing with nomadic tribes in the core region of IS. While the group committed atrocities against tribes such as Al-Shaitat and documents obtained after the group's loss of territory reflect a harsh tone against the nomadic groups, other documents show organized deliveries of supplies to the same groups. This dīwān was also known as an Office. |
Diwan al-Amn (Islamic State Intelligence) | ? | Responsible for public security and anti-espionage operations. |
Zakah Diwan al-Zakah | June 2014 | Responsible for the collection and distribution of the Zakah . |
Treasury Diwan Bayt al-mal | ? | Responsible for the finances of the group and the dinar. Its Diwan al-Musadara is responsible for expropriations and is based on medieval Islam. [171] |
Hisbah Diwan al-Hisbah | ? | The Hisbah (religious police) served this ministry, being in charge of enforcing the group's version of Islamic jurisprudence (sharia law) in public. |
Judgement and Grievances Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim | ? | Responsible for enforcing and clarifying judicial matters (e.g. Islamic court) and family and marriage-related issues. Also based in medieval Islam.[ clarification needed ] |
Public Relations Diwan al-Alaqat al-Amma | ? | Public relations (PR) department. |
Agriculture Diwan al-Zira'a | June 2014 | Responsible for the regulation of agriculture and livestock. A RAND study revealed that harvests in IS territory were relatively normal, with commercial vehicle traffic increasing under the new administration. Only with the loss of territory and access to resources such as electricity did harvests begin to decay around 2016. [172] |
Fatwa and Investigation Diwan al-Ifta' wa al-Buhuth | ? | Responsible for issuing and clarifying fatwas. It also wrote and published text media used in training camps through its publishing body Maktabat al-Himma. |
Soldiery Diwan al-Jund | ? | Responsible for the Army of the Islamic State and its management, training and distribution. It is sometimes referred to as the "Soldiers Department". [171] |
Media [j] Diwan al-I'lam al-Markazi [173] | ? | Responsible for the publishing bodies of IS, such as AlHayat Media Center, al-Furqan Media Foundation, Al-Bayan radio, Ajnad Foundation, Al-Naba, and Maktabat al-Himma. It is also in charge of the publication of magazines Dabiq , Dar al-Islam , Konstantiniyye , Istok , and later on Rumiyah . Additionally, it's the ministry in charge of translations. |
Fay' and Ghana'im [k] Diwan al-Fay' wa al-Ghana'im | ? | Responsible for administering and distributing war spoils that come from battles. |
Real Estate Diwan al-'Aqarat wa al-Kharaj | ? | Responsible for real estate seized from non-Muslims or abandoned by its original owners in order to accommodate regular and new fighters or civilians. [174] |
This section contains a list that has not been properly sorted. See MOS:LISTSORT for more information.(March 2023) |
Islamic State had created various regional offices during the period (2017–2019) to organize & direct its human and other resources & reviving its external operational capability. [175] [176] [177]
The “most vigorous and best-established” of IS's offices set up at the centre to oversee the wilayats are:
Al-Siddiq office in Afghanistan, which “covers South Asia and, according to some UN Member States, Central Asia”;
Al-Karrar office in Somalia, which also covers Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and
Al-Furqan office in the Lake Chad basin, where the borders of Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria converge. The Furqan office covers these states in North Africa and the broader western Sahel, overseeing ISGS/ISSP.
IS's other “three regional offices are low-functioning or moribund”, says the Monitoring Team, and these are:
Al-Anfal office in Libya, which covered “parts of northern Africa and the Sahel”;
The Umm al-Qura office “based in Yemen and … responsible for the Arabian Peninsula”; and
The Zu al-Nurayn office in the Sinai Peninsula “responsible for Egypt and the Sudan”. [175] [178] [177] [176]
The condition of human rights in the territory controlled by the Islamic State is considered to be among the worst in the world. [179] [180] [181] [182] In the areas they controlled the Islamic State would commit several genocides against local ethnic groups between 2014 and 2017. [183] [184] [185] The Yazidi genocide was characterized by massacres, genocidal rape, and forced conversions to Islam. The Yazidis are a Kurdish-speaking people [186] who are indigenous to Kurdistan who practice Yazidism, a monotheistic Iranian ethnoreligion derived from the Indo-Iranian tradition. [187] the Iraqi Turkmen genocide began when ISIS captured Iraqi Turkmen lands in 2014 and it continued until ISIS lost all of their land in Iraq. In 2017, ISIS's persecution of Iraqi Turkmen was officially recognized as a genocide by the Parliament of Iraq, [188] [189] and in 2018, the sexual slavery of Iraqi Turkmen girls and women was recognized by the United Nations. [190] [191]
The Islamic State would persecute Christians in its territory in ways which involves the systematic mass murder [192] [193] [194] Persecution of Christian minorities climaxed following the Syrian civil war and later by its spillover but has since intensified further. [195] [196] [18] Christians have been subjected to massacres, forced conversions, rape, sexual slavery, and the systematic destruction of their historical sites, churches and other places of worship.
The depopulation of Christians from the Middle East by the Islamic State as well as other organisations and governments has been formally recognised as an ongoing genocide by the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom. Christians remain the most persecuted religious group in the Middle East, and Christians in Iraq are “close to extinction”. [197] [198] [199] According to estimates by the US State Department, the number of Christians in Iraq has fallen from 1.2 million 2011 to 120,000 in 2024, and the number in Syria from 1.5 million to 300,000, falls driven by persecution by Islamic terrorists. [18]
Shia Muslims were also persecuted, since 2014. Persecutions have taken place in Iraq, Syria, and other parts of the world.
Shia Muslims have been killed and otherwise persecuted by IS. On 12 June 2014, the Islamic State killed 1,700 unarmed Shia Iraqi Army cadet recruits in the Camp Speicher massacre. [200] [201] [202] IS has also targeted Shia prisoners. [203] According to witnesses, after the militant group took the city of Mosul, they divided the Sunni prisoners from the Shia prisoners. [203] Up to 670 [204] Shia prisoners were then taken to another location and executed. [203] Kurdish officials in Erbil reported on the incident of Sunni and Shia prisoners being separated and Shia prisoners being killed after the Mosul prison fell to IS. [203]
In a special report released on 2 September 2014, Amnesty International described how IS had "systematically targeted non-Sunni Muslim communities, killing or abducting hundreds, possibly thousands, of individuals and forcing more than tens of thousands of Shias, Sunnis, along with other minorities to flee the areas it has captured since 10 June 2014". The most targeted Shia groups in Nineveh Governorate were Shia Turkmens and Shabaks. [114]
Since 2014, the Islamic State has destroyed cultural heritage on an unprecedented scale, primarily in Iraq and Syria, but also in Libya. These attacks and demolitions targeted a variety of ancient and medieval artifacts, museums, libraries, and places of worship, among other sites of importance to human history. Between June 2014 and February 2015, the Islamic State's Salafi jihadists plundered and destroyed at least 28 historic religious buildings in Mosul alone, with the most notable event being the 2014 destruction of Mosul Museum artifacts. [205] Many of the valuables that were looted during these demolitions were used to bolster the economy of the Islamic State. [205]
Along with antique Mesopotamian sites of significance, the Islamic State inflicted particularly cataclysmic levels of damage upon Iraqi Christian heritage. It also destroyed Islamic sites that it declared to be in contradiction of that which is permissible in the Islamic State ideology, thus culminating in the destruction of Shia Islamic sites and non-compliant Sunni Islamic sites.
Abubakar Mohammed Shekau was a Nigerian militant who was the leader of Boko Haram, an Islamist extremist organization based in northeastern Nigeria, from 2009 to 2021. He served as deputy leader to the group's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, until Yusuf's execution in 2009.
Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, better known as Abu Ali al-Anbari, was the governor for territories held by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria. Considered the ISIL second-in-command, he was viewed as a potential successor of ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
The Military of the Islamic State is the fighting force of the Islamic State (IS). The total force size at its peak was estimated from tens of thousands to over 200,000. IS's armed forces grew quickly during its territorial expansion in 2014. The IS military, including groups incorporated into it in 2014, openly operates and controls territory in multiple cities in Libya and Nigeria. In October 2016, it conquered the city of Qandala in Puntland, Somalia. It conquered much of eastern Syria and western Iraq in 2014, territory it lost finally only in 2019. It also has had border clashes with and made incursions into Lebanon, Iran, and Jordan. IS-linked groups operate in Algeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and in West Africa. In January 2015, IS was also confirmed to have a military presence in Afghanistan and in Yemen.
Mohammed Abdullah, also known as Abu al-Baraa el-Azdi, is a Yemeni militant and member of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Both names are noms de guerre. He was reported to originally be a preacher who joined ISIL in Syria.
The Islamic State – Libya Province is a militant Islamist group active in Libya under three branches: Fezzan Province in the desert south, Cyrenaica Province in the east, and Tripolitania Province in the west around Tripoli, Libya's capital city. The branches were formed on 13 November 2014, following pledges of allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by militants in Libya.
The Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), officially Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā, meaning "West African Province", is a militant group and administrative division of the Islamic State (IS), a Salafi jihadist militant group and unrecognised quasi-state. ISWAP is primarily active in the Chad Basin, and fights an extensive insurgency against the states of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Turkey. It is an offshoot of Boko Haram with which it has a violent rivalry; Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau killed himself in battle with ISWAP in 2021. Until March 2022, ISWAP acted as an umbrella organization for all IS factions in West Africa including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS), although the actual ties between ISWAP and IS-GS were limited.
The Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, also known as Islamic State in Gaza, was an Islamist militant group affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant that was reportedly active in the Gaza Strip around 2015. Its goals have consistently matched those of the Islamic State, in that it seeks to establish the al-Sham caliphate. As such, it opposes all forms of Palestinian nationalism while also supporting the elimination of all Jews and other ethno-religious 'infidels' from the region.
The Islamic State – Caucasus Province(IS-CP) is a branch of the militant Islamist group Islamic State (IS), that is active in the North Caucasus region of Russia. IS announced the group's formation on 23 June 2015 and appointed Rustam Asildarov as its leader. Although it was defeated militarily as an organized force by 2017, some lone wolves still act on behalf of the Islamic State.
The Islamic State – Khorasan Province is a regional branch of the Salafi jihadist group Islamic State (IS) active in South-Central Asia, primarily Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIS–K seeks to destabilize and replace current governments within the historic Khorasan region with the goal of establishing a caliphate across South and Central Asia, governed under a strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law, which they plan to expand beyond the region.
Wissam Najm Abd Zayd al-Zubaydi, better known by his noms de guerre Abu Nabil al-Anbari, Abul Mughirah al-Qahtani or Abu Yazan al-Humairi was a commander in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the leader of its Libyan branch. Al-Anbari was killed by a US military airstrike on 13 November 2015.
This article contains a timeline of events from January 2015 to December 2015 related to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS). This article contains information about events committed by or on behalf of the Islamic State, as well as events performed by groups who oppose them.
The Islamic State – Yemen Province is a branch of the militant Islamist group Islamic State (IS), active in Yemen. IS announced the group's formation on 13 November 2014.
Al-Barakah is a Syrian administrative district of the Islamic State (IS), a Salafi jihadist militant group and unrecognised proto-state. Originally set up as al-Barakah Province to govern IS territories in al-Hasakah Governorate, the province shifted south after 2016 due to the territorial losses to the YPG/YPJ. Having been demoted from province to district in 2018, al-Barakah administered a small strip of land along the Euphrates in Deir ez-Zor Governorate until the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani; since then the "territory" has turned into an insurgency.
The origins of the Islamic State group can be traced back to three main organizations. Earliest of these was the "Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād" organization, founded by the Jihadist leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Jordan in 1999. The other two predecessor organizations emerged during the Iraqi insurgency against the U.S. occupation forces. These included the "Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah" group founded by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2004 and the "Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jama’ah" group founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his associates in the same year.
Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was an Iraqi militant and the second caliph of the Islamic State. His appointment by a shura council was announced by the Islamic State media on 31 October 2019, less than a week after the death of previous leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
In May 2021, the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) launched an invasion of the Sambisa Forest in Borno State, Nigeria, which was serving as the main base of Boko Haram, a rival jihadist rebel group. Following heavy fighting, ISWAP overran the Boko Haram troops, cornering their leader Abubakar Shekau. The two sides entered negotiations about Boko Haram's surrender during which Shekau committed suicide, possibly detonating himself with a suicide vest. Shekau's death was regarded as a major event by outside observers, as he had been one of the main driving forces in the Islamist insurgency in Nigeria and neighboring countries since 2009.
Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, probably born Nour Karim al-Mutni Al-Obaidi Al-Rifai, was an Iraqi militant and the third caliph of the Islamic State. He was named as caliph on 10 March 2022, in an audio message by the new spokesperson of IS, Abu Umar al-Muhajir, whose announcement came more than a month after the death of his predecessor Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. The message said that Abu al-Hassan was given a pledge of allegiance in response to the will of the former caliph. The Turkish government claimed that he was arrested in Istanbul on 26 May 2022. Later, Islamic State sources denied news reports of his arrest in the 347th issue of their weekly newsletter Al-Naba.
The Islamic State – Saudi Arabia Province, referred to by the Islamic State as its Province of the Two Holy Mosques and self-described as Najd Province, was a branch of the militant Islamist group Islamic State (IS), active in Saudi Arabia. The group, formed on 13 November 2014, conducted a number of attacks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between November 2014 and March 2017. The group was generally considered less active than other established affiliates of the Islamic State, notably the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS–K). As of 2024 the group appears to be inactive.
The Al-Qaeda–Islamic State conflict is an ongoing conflict between Al-Qaeda and its allied groups, and the Islamic State.
We announce to you the expansion of the Islamic State to new countries, to the countries of the Haramayn, Yemen, Egypt, Libya [and] Algeria
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