Ahmed al-Sharaa

Last updated

Formerly
His Excellency
Ahmed al-Sharaa
أحمد الشرع
Ahmed al-Sharaa 2024 Infobox crop.jpg
Al-Sharaa in 2024
20th President of Syria
Transitional
Assumed office
29 January 2025
Years of service2003–present
Rank Commander-in-chief (HTS)
Battles / wars
See list

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa [c] (born 29 October 1982), also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, [d] is a Syrian revolutionary, military commander and politician who has served as the 20th president of Syria since 29 January 2025. [7] [8] As the emir of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from 2017 to 2025, he played a key role in the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives, which led to the downfall of the Assad regime and the establishment of the Syrian transitional government. Al-Sharaa subsequently served as the country's de facto leader until his appointment as president. [9]

Contents

Al-Sharaa was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a Syrian Sunni Muslim family from the Golan Heights, and grew up in the capital, Damascus. Shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he joined al-Qaeda in Iraq and fought for three years in the Iraqi insurgency. American forces captured and imprisoned him from 2006 to 2011. His release coincided with the Syrian Revolution, and he created the al-Nusra Front in 2012 with the support of al-Qaeda to take part in the Syrian civil war against the Ba'athist government of Bashar al-Assad. As emir of the al-Nusra Front, al-Sharaa built a stronghold in the northwestern Idlib Governorate. He resisted Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's attempts to merge al-Nusra with the Islamic State, leading to war between the two groups.

The U.S. State Department listed al-Sharaa as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" in May 2013, [10] and four years later announced a $10 million reward for information leading to his capture. [11] The reward offer was rescinded in December 2024 after al-Sharaa met with an American delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara A. Leaf.

In 2016, al-Sharaa cut al-Nusra's ties with al-Qaeda, merging it with other organisations to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham the following year. Since breaking with al-Qaeda, he has sought international legitimacy by focusing on governance in Syria rather than transnational jihadism. HTS established a technocratic administration in the territory it controlled, collecting taxes, providing public services, and issuing identity cards to residents, though it faced criticism for authoritarian tactics and suppressing dissent. [12] In recent years, he has presented a more moderate view of himself, suggesting he has no urge to wage war against Western nations, and has vowed to protect Syria's minorities. [13] [14] [15]

Early life and military career

Family background

Al-Sharaa's father, Hussein al-Sharaa, pictured in 1992 Hussein al-Sharaa.jpg
Al-Sharaa's father, Hussein al-Sharaa, pictured in 1992

Al-Sharaa's family came from the Golan Heights in Syria, and were displaced in 1967 after the Israeli occupation during the Six-Day War. [16] The nisba "al-Julani" in his nom de guerre is a reference to the Golan Heights. [17]

Al-Sharaa's father, Hussein Ali al-Sharaa, was an Arab nationalist student activist for the Nasserists in Syria who studied economics at the University of Baghdad before becoming an oil engineer. [16] [18] He has published numerous books on regional economic development. [18] Al-Sharaa's father, Hussein, is the cousin of Farouk al-Sharaa, vice president of Syria from 2006 to 2016. [19] [20] [21] Also, his uncle is married to Farouk's aunt. [22]

His paternal grandfather, Ali Mohammed al-Sharaa, was a large landowner and tradesman in the city of Fiq. [23] His great-grandfather, Mohammed Khalid al-Sharaa (1899–1932), played a significant role in the Great Syrian Revolt against the French occupation of Syria. He was sentenced to death in absentia for his involvement in the revolt, though the sentence was never carried out. [23]

Youth in Syria

al-Sharaa as a teenager, c. 1996 Ahmed al-Sharaa as a teenager.png
al-Sharaa as a teenager, c. 1996

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa was born on 29 October 1982 in Riyadh to a middle-class family. [24] [25] [26] His father worked there as an oil engineer, and his mother was a geography teacher. [27] The family returned to Syria in 1989, settling in the affluent Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus, where his father opened a real estate office. [28] [29]

According to Hussam Jazmati, who produced his most definitive biography, classmates remember al-Sharaa as a studious but unremarkable boy who wore thick glasses and avoided attention. [27] During his youth, he was described as "quiet" and "shy", [24] "manipulatively intelligent" but "socially introverted," and was noted for his "good looks" and a romance with an Alawite girl which both families opposed. [18]

He enrolled at Damascus University, studying media studies and enrolling in the Faculty of Medicine for two years before moving to Iraq in 2003. [24] [27] [28] [29]

Iraq war

Mugshot of al-Sharaa in 2006, after his capture by U.S. forces in Iraq Mugshot of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.jpg
Mugshot of al-Sharaa in 2006, after his capture by U.S. forces in Iraq

According to an interview with Frontline in 2021, al-Sharaa stated he was radicalized by the Palestinian Second Intifada in 2000 when he was 17 or 18 years old. He said: "I started thinking about how I could fulfil my duties, defending a people who are oppressed by occupiers and invaders." [30] [31]

Appreciative of the 9/11 attacks, [18] al-Sharaa traveled from Damascus to Baghdad by bus just weeks before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, where he quickly rose through the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). [30] The Times of Israel newspaper claimed in 2013 that al-Sharaa was a close associate of AQI leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. [5] In his 2021 interview with Frontline, al-Sharaa denied ever meeting al-Zarqawi and asserted that he served only as a regular foot-soldier under al-Qaeda against American occupation. [32]

In 2003, al-Sharaa was detained and questioned by the Military Intelligence Directorate for his illegal departure from Syria to Iraq, he was released after denying any affiliation to any political parties or extremist groups. [29]

Before the eruption of the Iraqi civil war in 2006, al-Sharaa was arrested by American forces and imprisoned for over five years in various detention centres, including Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper and Camp Taji prisons. [33] [34] [35] [36]

Syrian civil war

Syrian uprising and foundation of al-Nusra

Upon his release from prison coinciding with the Syrian Revolution, Ahmed al-Sharaa was tasked in August 2011 by Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda's central command to establish al-Qaeda's mission in Syria. [37] [35] Al-Shara'a crossed into Syria with significant funding and a mandate to establish al-Qaeda's presence. [33] [36] Alongside senior operatives from al-Qaeda's central command, he formed " Jabhat al-Nusra ", also known as the Al-Nusra Front, which was envisioned by al-Zawahiri as a broad coalition of Islamist militant groups led by al-Shara'a in Syria, with direct allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command. [38]

Despite tensions with then al-Qaeda-allied leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), who were content with his departure, al-Sharaa proceeded to orchestrate an agreement with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to expand al-Qaeda's Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. The group maintained this alliance with ISI the until 2013, with an arrangement between al-Sharaa and al-Baghdadi to resolve disputes through mediation by al-Qaeda Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. Over time, al-Sharaa began distancing himself from transnational jihadist ideology, increasingly framing his faction within the context of a nationalist Syrian struggle. [30]

ISI initially provided al-Sharaa with fighters, weapons, and funding to establish the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Al-Sharaa implemented these plans alongside ISI leaders after his release from prison. [16]

Al-Sharaa became the "general emir" of al-Nusra when it was officially announced in January 2012. By December of that year, the US Department of State designated Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, identifying it as an alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq). [39] Under al-Sharaa's leadership, al-Nusra emerged as one of Syria's most powerful groups. [5] Its stronghold was centered on the Idlib Governorate in northwestern Syria. [40]

Conflict with ISIS

As al-Sharaa carved out a fiefdom in Syria between 2012 and 2013, the Iraqi leadership of ISI grew suspicious of him. [41] Al-Nusra became increasingly popular for providing social services and cooperating with other Syrian rebel groups against the Assad regime, and al-Sharaa ignored al-Baghdadi's orders to begin fighting these groups and assassinate opposition activists. [42] Al-Baghdadi's top aide, Abu Ali al-Anbari, travelled to Syria to investigate al-Sharaa, concluding that he was a "cunning person; two-faced; [...] [who] glows when he hears his name mentioned on satellite channels". [41]

Concerned about al-Nusra's popularity and al-Sharaa's perceived insubordination, al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced that al-Nusra would merge into ISI to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2013. [42] [43] The proposed merger would have eliminated al-Nusra's autonomy and allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command by placing all its leaders, decisions, and operations under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's direct control. [44] To preserve al-Nusra's independence, al-Sharaa publicly pledged allegiance ( bay'ah ) directly to al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who issued a declaration that confirmed al-Nusra's independence from ISI, [45] [46] [47] proclaiming that Syria was the "spatial state" of al-Nusra Front and that ISIL's rule was restricted to Iraq. Al-Zawahiri repudiated al-Baghdadi's merger move which was announced without consulting or informing al-Qaeda's central command, and appointed Abu Khalid al-Suri as his emissary to mediate between the two groups and supervise the implementation of the accords. [46] [48]

In late 2013, al-Zawahiri ordered al-Baghdadi to accept the annulment of the merger, who refused and attempted to proceed with it. [43] By February 2014, efforts to end the dispute between ISIS and al-Nusra had failed, leading to al-Qaeda formally severing its ties with ISIS on February 2014 and leaving al-Nusra as the sole representative of al-Qaeda in Syria. [49] [45] After the assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri on 23 February, al-Sharaa denounced ISIS and likened them to the Iraqi "sahawat" who fought against al-Qaeda alongside the U.S., accusing them of undermining the fight against Assad by fighting rebels. [50] Open warfare between ISIS and al-Nusra ensued; al-Sharaa warned that the fighting risked giving a reprieve to Assad. [51] [5] Over the following months, ISIS captured much of the territory controlled by al-Nusra and the Syrian opposition, [50] leaving an estimated four thousand fighters on both sides dead by February 2015. [43] In June 2015, al-Sharaa told Al Jazeera that no resolution to the conflict was forthcoming, and that unless ISIS "repent to God and return to their senses", there would be "nothing but fighting between us”. [52]

Threats against the United States

After the start of Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led coalition's airstrike campaign against the Islamic State in Syria, al-Sharaa, in a rare public declaration, described the airstrikes as an assault on Islam, and warned the Western public: "This is what will take the battle to the heart of your land, for the Muslims will not stand as spectators watching their sons bombed and killed in their lands, while you stay safe in your lands." In his audio message, released five days after the U.S. strikes, al-Sharaa said: "Do not let the West and America take advantage of the injustice of the Islamic State upon you … Those who are unable to repulse the Islamic State or others, then let them do so without being a partner with the crusader alliance." Al-Sharaa also warned that al-Nusra will fight any group which takes American cash and weapons, condemning "the traitorous factions that were bought by the West with some money and ammunition so as to be a pawn in its hands." [53] In an audio statement released on 28 September 2014, al-Sharaa stated that he would fight the "United States and its allies" and urged his fighters not to accept help from the West in their battle against the Islamic State. [54]

Resurgence of al-Nusra

In late May 2015, al-Sharaa was interviewed by Ahmed Mansour on Qatari news broadcaster Al Jazeera, hiding his face. He described the Geneva peace conference as a farce and claimed that the Western-backed Syrian National Coalition did not represent the Syrian people and had no ground presence in Syria. Al-Sharaa mentioned that al-Nusra have no plans for attacking Western targets, and that their priority is focused on fighting the al-Assad Syrian government, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Al-Sharaa told al-Jazeera in 2015, "Nusra Front doesn't have any plans or directives to target the West. We received clear orders from Ayman al-Zawahiri not to use Syria as a launching pad to attack the U.S. or Europe in order to not sabotage the true mission against the regime. Maybe Al-Qaeda does that but not here in Syria. Assad forces are fighting us on one end, Hezbollah on another and ISIL on a third front. It is all about their mutual interests". [55] "Our war is not a matter of revenge against the Alawites despite the fact that in Islam, they are considered to be heretics", he added. [55] A commentary on this interview however states that al-Sharaa also added that Alawites would be left alone as long as they abandon elements of their faith which contradict Islam. [56]

In October 2015, the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war prompted al-Sharaa to call for increased attacks on Assad's Alawite strongholds in retaliation for Russian airstrikes on Sunni areas. [57] Al-Sharaa also called for Russian civilians to be attacked by Muslims from the former Soviet Union. [58] [59]

Split from al-Qaeda

The Russian entrance into the war led to a reversal of fortunes for the Syrian opposition and increased the influence of their foreign backers over them. In January 2016, al-Nusra held unity negotiations with other rebel groups in a bid to pre-empt any foreign attempt to co-opt these groups against it. When the talks collapsed due to concerns over al-Nusra's affiliation with al-Qaeda, the reformist wing of al-Nusra — which may have comprised a third of its overall membership — presented al-Sharaa with an ultimatum: to sever ties with al-Qaeda and merge with other rebel groups, or face a mass defection. [60]

In July 2016, al-Sharaa convened al-Nusra's Shura Council twice to discuss the matter. The first council was inconclusive, while the second council settled on a "middle way" after several meetings: to break ties with al-Qaeda outside of Syria while retaining them inside Syria. [60] As al-Zawahiri could not be contacted, several senior al-Qaeda leaders, including al-Zawahiri's deputy Abu Khayr al-Masri, approved the split contingent on al-Zawahiri later approving it himself. [61] [60] If he did not, the split would have to be reversed. Al-Sharaa agreed to these terms, which were narrowly approved by al-Nusra's Shura Council. [60]

On 28 July 2016, al-Sharaa announced that al-Nusra had severed ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). [62] [63] He added that the new organisation would have "no affiliation to any external entity". [64] Ayman al-Zawahiri was publicly supportive of the split, [62] even though he had rejected the plan when it was presented to him. [61] In protest, several leading al-Qaeda loyalists in al-Nusra, including Abu Julaybib, Abu Khadija al-Urduni and Abu Humam al-Shami, left JFS. [60] In September 2016, al-Zawahiri authored a letter that harshly reprimanded al-Sharaa for his "act of disobedience", and admonished al-Masri for giving it his approval. Due to al-Zawahiri's rejection, al-Masri withdrew his support for the split. Al-Qaeda leaders Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah and Saif al-Adel also opposed the split, and al-Sharaa was expected to reverse his decision. However, he refused to do so. [60]

Formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

After forming JFS, al-Sharaa attempted to arrange a merger with Ahrar al-Sham. [65] However, negotiations collapsed due to al-Sharaa supporting Jund al-Aqsa — a group that he had secretly established to discourage al-Nusra's foreign fighters from defecting to ISIS — in their conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. Ahrar al-Sham's leadership were also concerned that JFS continued to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. [60] Meanwhile, al-Sharaa came under attack from al-Qaeda. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi wrote a critique of the manhaj of JFS, and rumours circulated that al-Qaeda was preparing to launch a new affiliate in Syria named "Taliban al-Sham". [60]

In a last-ditch bid to secure a merger, al-Sharaa led efforts to undermine Ahrar al-Sham's nationalist and anti-merger wing. [60] When Ahrar al-Sham's leadership again refused to merge in December 2017, the pro-merge wing formed a breakaway "sub-faction" named Jaysh al-Ahrar. [65] [60] Shortly afterwards, JFS attacked Free Syrian Army (FSA) positions across Idlib and Aleppo, precipitating a conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. The conflict allowed JFS to defeat CIA-backed FSA groups, which it viewed as a "foreign conspiracy". [60]

On 28 January 2017, al-Sharaa announced that JFS would dissolve and merge with Liwa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunna, Ansar al-Din Front and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), [66] [60] gaining approximately 3,000 to 5,000 more fighters. [60] In an effort to demonstrate the maturity of the new group, al-Sharaa arranged for Jaysh al-Ahrar's leader Abu Jaber Shaykh to serve as the nominal leader of HTS, although leadership was formally transferred back to al-Sharaa by December 2017. [65]

The remaining al-Qaeda loyalists in JFS viewed the formation of HTS as a definitive break from the organisation and refused to join. A number of al-Qaeda veterans publicly criticised al-Sharaa for his moves; Sami al-Oraydi condemned it as insubordination against Ayman al-Zawahiri. As a result, several were arrested by HTS towards the end of 2017, including al-Oraydi. After their release, some were involved in forming Hurras al-Din, the new Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda. [65]

The U.S. government quickly rejected this rebranding, with the U.S. Embassy in Syria stating that "The core of HTS is Nusra, a designated terrorist organisation. This designation applies regardless of what name it uses or what groups merge into it." The Embassy characterized HTS's formation as an attempt to "hijack the Syrian revolution" rather than a move toward moderation. [67]

Despite this stance, under HTS, the group prioritized combating al-Qaeda and ISIS in an effort to improve its standing with Western nations. HTS successfully defeated ISIS, al-Qaeda, and most opposing forces in its territory, establishing control over most of Idlib Governorate, which it administered through the HTS-aligned Syrian Salvation Government. [16] [68]

Idlib governance

Military situation before the opposition offensives in late 2024. Territories held by Tahrir al-Sham (white) and the Syrian government (red). Syrian Civil War map (November 24, 2023).svg
Military situation before the opposition offensives in late 2024.
Territories held by Tahrir al-Sham (white) and the Syrian government (red).

Under al-Sharaa's administration, Idlib had experienced significant development, becoming Syria's fastest-growing region despite being historically its poorest province. The area featured new luxury shopping malls, housing estates, and round-the-clock electricity supply surpassing that of Damascus. Educational facilities included a university with 18,000 segregated students. However, his administration faced criticism for its taxation policies, including customs taxes on goods from Turkey and checkpoint fees on smuggled goods, as well as the economic impact of the Turkish lira's depreciation, which was the main currency in the region. [69]

In March 2024, widespread protests erupted in Idlib Governorate against al-Sharaa's rule, with demonstrators adopting the slogan "Isqat al-Julani" ("Down with Julani"), reminiscent of earlier protests against the Assad regime. For over a month, hundreds and sometimes thousands of protesters marched through Idlib's cities and towns. The protests were triggered by multiple factors, including allegations of brutality, with reports of thousands of critics held in prisons, and economic grievances related to high taxes. [69]

In response to the unrest, al-Sharaa made several concessions. He released hundreds of detainees from a previous summer's security operation, including his former deputy Abu Maria al-Qahtani, who had been arrested along with 300 others in a purge of his movement. He also promised local elections and increased employment opportunities for displaced persons, while warning protesters against what he termed treachery. [69]

Turkey, which had previously helped stabilize the province by connecting it to its electricity grid and allowing building materials to enter freely, had grown concerned about al-Sharaa's expanding influence. In response, it reduced trade through its border crossings with Idlib, affecting HTS's revenue. Reports indicated that al-Sharaa had twice attempted to take over other Turkish-administered areas in northern Syria. [69]

2024 rebel takeover

Syrian opposition offensives that overthrew Assad's regime in 11 days Syrian Civil War (November - December 2024).svg
Syrian opposition offensives that overthrew Assad's regime in 11 days

In late November 2024, al-Sharaa led HTS in its Deterrence of Aggression offensive against the pro-Assad Syrian Arab Army. [70] [71] [72] [73]

During the capture of Aleppo, al-Sharaa instructed his forces not to "scare children" and HTS channels broadcast footage of Christians in the city continuing their normal activities. Archbishop Afram Ma'lui stated that services would not be affected by the change in control. After regime forces were expelled from the city, al-Sharaa declared "diversity is a strength". HTS quickly established administrative bodies to restore basic services, including garbage collection, electricity, and water. The group's General Zakat Commission began distributing emergency bread supplies, while its General Organization for Grain Trade and Processing provided fuel to local bakeries. The Ministry of Development and Humanitarian Affairs reported delivering 65,000 loaves of bread under a campaign called "Together We Return". [74]

On 6 December, in a face-to-face interview with CNN, al-Sharaa declared that the offensive's goal was to remove Assad from power. Using his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, he explicitly pledged to protect minority groups, [13] and outlined plans for establishing a government grounded in institutions and a "council chosen by the people". [75] According to Dareen Khalifa of the International Crisis Group, al-Sharaa has considered dissolving HTS to strengthen civilian and military governance structures. [76] He also expressed his intention to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their homes. [77] In his victory speech following the fall of Damascus, he condemned Iran as a source of sectarianism and corruption, and framed the triumph as a turning point for the region. [75]

On 20 December 2024, following meetings between HTS officials and U.S. diplomats in Damascus, the United States rescinded a $10 million reward it had previously offered for the arrest of al-Sharaa. [78]

Governance following fall of Assad government

Meeting between delegations led by Andrii Sybiha of Ukraine and al-Sharaa, held in Damascus on 30 December 2024, to discuss the restoration of bilateral relations. Ukraine-Syria Bilateral Ties (2024).jpg
Meeting between delegations led by Andrii Sybiha of Ukraine and al-Sharaa, held in Damascus on 30 December 2024, to discuss the restoration of bilateral relations.

On 8 December, Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali announced that the Syrian government would hand over power to a new elected government following the departure of al-Assad from Damascus, and al-Sharaa announced further that al-Jalali will "supervise state institutions until they are handed over". Al-Jalali later noted to Al Arabiya that al-Sharaa had been in contact with himself prior to the announcement to discuss the handover. [79] On the same day, he delivered a speech at Damascus's Umayyad Mosque, calling the fall of Assad's regime "a new chapter in the history of the region" and condemning Syria's role as "a playground for Iranian ambitions", characterized by sectarianism and corruption. [75] On 9 December, HTS released a video of al-Sharaa, al-Jalali and Mohammed al-Bashir, the head of the de facto government in Idlib. [80] On 12 December, al-Sharaa met with Turkish officials, which marked the first diplomatic delegation since Assad's overthrow. [81]

On 24 December, al-Sharaa announced the dissolution and merger of multiple rebel factions, including the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, into the interim government's Ministry of Defense. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces were excluded from this consolidation due to ongoing conflicts with Turkish-backed rebels in northeastern Syria. The reorganization coincided with al-Sharaa's efforts to establish new state institutions, including law enforcement and security forces, amid reports of revenge killings and highway banditry. The administration established processing centers for former regime soldiers and initiated police force recruitment. [82]

In an interview with al-Arabiya on 29 December, al-Sharaa said that he expected the process of writing a new constitution of Syria to take two or three years, with elections expected after four years. [83]

On 3 January 2025, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot became the first top diplomats from European Union member states to travel to Damascus since the fall of Assad, [84] meeting with al-Sharaa to discuss a new political beginning between Europe and Syria. [85]

Views on Israel

In an interview with the Syria TV news channel regarding the ongoing Israeli airstrikes on Syria, al-Sharaa said that after the fall of the Assad regime, Israel no longer has "any excuses" for attacking Syrian territory. He also spoke of "diplomatic solutions" as the only way to ensure security instead of "ill-considered military adventures". [86] [87] Al-Sharaa reportedly told a group of journalists that HTS would continue to uphold the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement that ended the Yom Kippur War. [88]

Documentary

On 1 June 2021 PBS Frontline released a documentary, The Jihadist, investigating al-Sharaa's past in the context of the ongoing Syrian civil war. [89] In the interview, reflecting on his past affiliation with al-Qaeda, on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Palestinian cause, al-Sharaa commented in the interview:

The history of the region and what it went through over the past 20 or 30 years needs to be taken into consideration... We are talking about a region ruled by tyrants, by people who rule with iron fists and their security apparatuses. At the same time, this region is surrounded by numerous conflicts and wars... We can't take a segment of this history and say so-and-so joined Al Qaeda. There are thousands of people who joined Al Qaeda, but let us ask what was the reason behind these people joining Al Qaeda? That's the question. Are the U.S. policies after World War II toward the region partially responsibility for driving people towards Al Qaeda organization? And are the European policies in the region responsible for the reactions of people who sympathize with the Palestinian cause or with the way the Zionist regime deals with the Palestinians?.. are the broken and oppressed peoples who had to endure what happened in Iraq, for example, or in Afghanistan, are they responsible..?.. our involvement with Al Qaeda in the past was an era, and it ended, and even at that time when we were with Al Qaeda, we were against external attacks, and it's completely against our policies to carry out external operations from Syria to target European or American people. This was not part of our calculations at all, and we did not do it at all. [16]

Bibliography

On Jihadist online forums, there are essays and articles attributed to al-Sharaa under the name "Abdullah Bin Muhammad", including The Strategy of the Regional War. [90]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Vacant from 8 December 2024 to 28 January 2025.
  2. ↑ Renamed "Jabhat Fateh al-Sham" from 28 July 2016.
  3. ↑ Arabic: أحمَد حُسين الشرع, romanized: ʾAḥmad Ḥusayn al-Sharaʿ
  4. ↑ Arabic: أبو محمد الجولاني, romanized: ʾAbū Muḥammad al-Jawlānī; also transliterated as Joulani, Jolani, and Golani [5] [6]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Al-Nusra Front</span> Salafi jihadist organization in the Syrian civil war (2012–2017)

Al-Nusra Front, also known as Front for the Conquest of the Levant, was a Salafi-jihadist organization that fought against Ba'athist regime forces in the Syrian Civil War. Its aim was to overthrow president Bashar al-Assad and establish an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law in Syria.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ahrar al-Sham</span> Syrian Islamist military and political organization

Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, commonly referred to as Ahrar al-Sham, is a coalition of multiple Islamist units that coalesced into a single brigade and later a division in order to fight against the Syrian Government led by Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian Civil War. Ahrar al-Sham was led by Hassan Aboud until his death in 2014. In July 2013, Ahrar al-Sham had 10,000 to 20,000 fighters, which at the time made it the second most powerful unit fighting against al-Assad, after the Free Syrian Army. It was the principal organization operating under the umbrella of the Syrian Islamic Front and was a major component of the Islamic Front. With an estimated 20,000 fighters in 2015, Ahrar al-Sham became the largest rebel group in Syria after the Free Syrian Army became less powerful. Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam are the main rebel groups supported by Turkey. On 18 February 2018, Ahrar al-Sham merged with the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement to form the Syrian Liberation Front.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation al-Shabah</span> Military operation

Operation al-Shabah was launched in May 2013 by the Iraqi Army, with the stated aim of severing contact between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the al-Nusra Front in Syria by clearing militants from the border area with Syria and Jordan.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islamic State of Iraq</span> Militant Salafist jihadist group in Iraq (2006–2013)

The Islamic State of Iraq was a Salafi jihadist militant organization that fought the forces of the U.S.-led coalition during the Iraqi insurgency. The organization aimed to overthrow the Iraqi federal government and establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Iraq.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Jund al-Aqsa</span> Islamist militia in Syria

Jund al-Aqsa, later known as Liwa al-Aqsa after 7 February 2017, was a Salafist jihadist organization that was active during the Syrian Civil War. Formerly known as Sarayat al-Quds, the group was founded by Abu Abdul 'Aziz al-Qatari as a subunit within the al-Nusra Front. The group later became independent, because al-Nusra was growing too rapidly for its resources and had suffered from fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. On 20 September 2016 the U.S. Department of State designated Jund al-Aqsa as a terrorist organization. The group rejoined al-Nusra Front, by then renamed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), in October 2016. However, on 23 January 2017, JFS declared that Jund Al-Aqsa was no longer part of Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham. In early February 2017, some of Jund al-Aqsa's units joined the newly formed Tahrir al-Sham, while the others refused and formed a new splinter group called Liwa al-Aqsa, and captured many towns in northern Hama and southern Idlib from other rebel groups. Following these attacks, Tahrir al-Sham launched a military operation against Liwa al-Aqsa, accusing them of being an ISIL affiliate. Following intense clashes with Tahrir al-Sham, up to 2,100 Liwa al-Aqsa militants left Idlib Province to join ISIL in Raqqa Province, by 22 February 2017.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Abu Firas al-Suri</span> Syrian Islamist militant

Radwan Nammous, better known by his nom-de-guerre Abu Firas al-Suri, was a Syrian militant and former military officer who was a senior official in Al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate Al-Nusra Front, serving as the group's spokesman.

Abu Khalid al-Suri, also known as Mohamed al-Bahaiya or Abu Umayr al-Shami, was a Syrian Islamist insurgent who was often affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Osama Bin Laden and the Syrian Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham. Al-Suri is also said to be a veteran, having participated in fighting in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq. He was believed to be assassinated by an ISIL suicide attack in 2014, however ISIL denied involvement in the attack or regarded it as friendly fire.

Muhammad Yusuf Uthman Abd al Salam (2014–1956) was the founder of Jund al-Aqsa, a Salafist jihadist group active in the Syrian Civil War. He is also commonly referred to by his nom de guerre Abu Abdulaziz al-Qatari. He was a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin who lived in Qatar.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Idlib Governorate clashes (January–March 2017)</span> Military confrontations

The Idlib Governorate clashes , were military confrontations between Syrian rebel factions led by Ahrar al-Sham and their allies on one side and the al-Qaeda-aligned Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and their allies on the other. After 7 February, the clashes also included Jund al-Aqsa as a third belligerent, which had re-branded itself as Liwa al-Aqsa and was attacking the other combatants. The battles were fought in the Idlib Governorate and the western countryside of the Aleppo Governorate.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham</span> Syrian Islamist military and political organisation

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), also referred to as Tahrir al-Sham, was a Sunni Islamist political organisation and former militia involved in the Syrian civil war. It was formed on 28 January 2017 as a merger between several armed groups: Jaysh al-Ahrar, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haqq, and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement. The unification process was held under the initiative of Abu Jaber Shaykh, an Islamist militant commander who had been the second emir of Ahrar al-Sham. HTS, along with other Syrian opposition groups, launched an offensive that led to fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024.

Hashim al-Shaykh, also known by his nom de guerreAbu Jaber Shaykh is a Syrian rebel commander and senior leader of Tahrir al-Sham. Previously a senior commander in Ahrar al-Sham, he directed its merger with other islamist groups to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. Abu Jaber is a Salafi Muslim with a jihadist ideology.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Syrian Salvation Government</span> Party of the Syrian Civil War

The Syrian Salvation Government was a de facto unrecognized quasi-state in Syria formed in November 2017 by Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other Syrian opposition groups during the Syrian civil war. It controlled much of northwest Syria, and had an estimated population of over 4,000,000 in 2023. Its de facto capital was Idlib.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Abu Maria al-Qahtani</span> Iraqi Islamic militant (1976–2024)

Maysar Ali Musa Abdullah al-Juburi, also known as Abu Maria al-Qahtani, was an Iraqi Islamic militant who fought in the Iraqi insurgency and then in the Syrian Civil War. He was a commander and Shura Council member in Jabhat al-Nusra.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hurras al-Din</span> Syrian Salafi jihadist militant group

Tanzim Hurras al-Din, sometimes referred to as Al-Qaeda in Syria, was a Salafi Jihadist organization that fought in the Syrian civil war. The group's former head, Abu Humam al-Shami, was the general military commander of the defunct Al-Nusra Front, and had fought for Al-Qaeda during the Third Afghan Civil War and the Iraqi insurgency. Hurras al-Din was established by the leaders of the AQ-affiliated Khorasan group and Al-Qaeda loyalists of Al-Nusra Front who opposed Al-Nusra's dissolution and merger with other Islamic groups to form Tahrir al-Sham. Al-Shami announced the formation of Hurras al-Din on 27 February 2018.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Jaysh al-Ahrar</span> Salafi Islamist rebel group in Syria

Jaysh al-Ahrar, is an armed Salafi Islamist rebel group in northwestern Syria that originated as a clique composed of 16 units in Ahrar al-Sham that opposed involvement in Operation Euphrates Shield, after a fatwa was released by religious clerics in Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, which led to the group's separation from Ahrar al-Sham.

Ali Aswad al-Jiburi, better known by his nom de guerre as Abu Ayman al-Iraqi, was an ISIL commander and Shura council member killed on 18 May 2016 by an airstrike in northern Iraq.

The origins of the Islamic State group can be traced back to three main organizations. Earliest of these was the "Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād" organization, founded by the Jihadist leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Jordan in 1999. Although the other two predecessor organizations emerged during the Iraqi insurgency against the U.S. occupation forces which included the "Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah" group founded by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2004 and the "Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jama’ah" group founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his associates in the same year, the modern iteration of the Islamic State was formed after the U.S. occupational forces outlawed the Iraqi branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party putting the Sunni soldiers and bureaucrats out of work.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chechen mujahideen in Syria</span> Foreign fighters in Syria

Chechen mujahideen in Syria are ethnic Chechen members of Sunni Islamist armed groups. They are organized into military factions, and take part in the civil war in Syria to fight against the government of Bashar al-Assad on the side of the Syrian opposition and Tahrir al-Sham, also on the side of the Islamic State.

The Al-Qaeda–Islamic State conflict is an ongoing conflict between Al-Qaeda and its allied groups, and the Islamic State.

Anas Hasan Khattab is the current head of the General Intelligence Service in Syria, a position he was appointed to on 26 December 2024 as part of wider reallocation of positions after the fall of the Assad regime. He is also the deputy commander of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham under Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the head of the General Security Apparatus within the group.

References

  1. ↑ "State Department amends terror designation for al Nusrah Front | FDD's Long War Journal". June 2018. Archived from the original on 26 February 2021. Retrieved 14 March 2021.
  2. ↑ "What to Know About the Man Who Toppled Assad".
  3. ↑ "What to Know About the Man Who Toppled Assad | the Washington Institute".
  4. ↑ "Search results".
  5. 1 2 3 4 "Elusive Al-Qaeda leader in Syria stays in shadows". Times of Israel . 4 November 2013. Archived from the original on 24 December 2018.
  6. ↑ "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of Syria's shock insurgency?". AP News. 4 December 2024. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
  7. ↑ "الشرع رئيسا لسوريا وحل الفصائل وحزب البعث وتعطيل الدستور" [Sharaa as President of Syria, dissolving factions and the Baath Party, and suspending the constitution]. Al Jazeera Arabic (in Arabic). 29 January 2025. Retrieved 29 January 2025.
  8. ↑ "Syria's Sharaa declared president for transitional period, state news agency says". Reuters . 29 January 2025. Retrieved 29 January 2025.
  9. ↑
  10. ↑ "Terrorist Designations of Al-Nusrah Front Leader Muhammad Al-Jawlani". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 22 August 2019. Retrieved 24 June 2017.
  11. ↑ Cone, Allen (10 May 2017). "U.S. offers $10M reward for information on al-Nusra leader". United Press International . Archived from the original on 11 May 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2024.
  12. ↑ Rasgon, Adam; Abdulrahim, Raja (8 December 2024). "Who Is the Leader of Syria's Rebel Offensive?". The New York Times . Archived from the original on 8 December 2024. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  13. 1 2 Karadsheh, Jomana; Tuysuz, Gul; Laine, Brice; Kent, Lauren; Kourdi, Eyad (6 December 2024). "Syrian rebel leader says goal is to 'overthrow' Assad regime". CNN . Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  14. ↑ Taylor, Adam (6 December 2024). "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the Islamist rebel leading the Syrian advance?". The Washington Post .
  15. ↑ Abdulrahim, Raja (6 December 2024). "Leader of Syria's Resurgent Rebels Lays Out Strategy to Oust Assad". The New York Times .
  16. 1 2 3 4 5 "The Jihadist". PBS . Archived from the original on 7 June 2021. Retrieved 7 June 2021.
  17. ↑ Abouzeid, Rania (26 July 2012). "Meet the Islamist militants fighting alongside Syria's rebels". Time . Archived from the original on 1 September 2019.
  18. 1 2 3 4 Almustafa, Hamzah Almustafa; Jazmati, Hossam (22 June 2021). "Syria war: Inside the world of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". Middle East Eye . Archived from the original on 6 December 2024.
  19. ↑ "مصادر: الجولاني قريب فاروق الشرع.. درس الفقه على يد عالم دمشقي في المزة" [Sources: Al-Julani is a relative of Farouk al-Sharaa. He studied jurisprudence at the hands of a Damascene scholar in Mezzeh.]. Enab Baladi (in Arabic). 28 July 2016. Retrieved 16 December 2024.
  20. ↑ "صديق طفولة الجولاني يروي ما يعرفه عنه" [Al-Joulani's childhood friend tells what he knows about him.] (in Arabic). Wattan. 30 July 2016. Retrieved 16 December 2024.
  21. ↑ "أسرار "الجولاني" كشفت بعد انكشاف وجهه: ما علاقته بفاروق الشرع؟" [Jolani's secrets revealed after his face was exposed: What is his relationship with Farouk al-Sharaa?] (in Arabic). Janoubia. 30 July 2016. Retrieved 16 December 2024.
  22. ↑ al-Akhirah, Jumada (22 December 2024). "قائد الإدارة الجديدة في سوريا التقى فاروق الشرع ودعاه لحوار وطني" [The leader of the new administration in Syria met with Farouk Al-Sharaa and invited him to a national dialogue]. aawsat.com (in Arabic). Retrieved 25 December 2024.
  23. 1 2 جزماتي, حسام (10 September 2024). "سيرة والد الجولاني بقلمه". الجمهورية.نت (in Arabic). Retrieved 13 December 2024.
  24. 1 2 3 Al-Atrush, Samer; Spencer, Richard (11 December 2024). "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani? 'Polite' Syrian leader heads home". The Times . Archived from the original on 18 December 2024. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  25. ↑
  26. ↑ "Ahmad al-Sharaa reveals his true date of birth" (in Arabic). An-Nahar. 30 December 2024. Retrieved 30 December 2024.
  27. 1 2 3 Hassan, Hassan (8 December 2024). "Profile: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". The Sunday Telegraph .
  28. 1 2 "بعد شهور.. الجولاني يكشف عن أسرار حياته لمارتن سميث". Al Alam TV. 5 June 2021. Archived from the original on 7 June 2021. Retrieved 7 June 2021.
  29. 1 2 3 Elamin, Hazem; Nasreddine, Hala (26 December 2024). "Al-Joulani's File at the Palestine Branch in Syria: A Cunning Personality Evades The Regime's Intelligence". Daraj. Retrieved 23 January 2025.
  30. 1 2 3 Raya Jalabi (7 December 2024). "Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the Syrian rebel leader hoping to overthrow Assad". Financial Times . Archived from the original on 6 December 2024.
  31. ↑ Salem, Mostafa (6 December 2024). "How Syria's rebel leader went from radical jihadist to a blazer-wearing 'revolutionary'". CNN News .
  32. ↑ "Interview-Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". PBS Frontline. 2 April 2021. Most of the information available on the internet is false... No, I didn't meet Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was mostly present in Fallujah and Ramadi and around this region, and I was in Mosul during that time. I was a regular soldier. I wasn't involved in any major operations that I would meet al-Zarqawi.
  33. 1 2 Klausen, Jytte (2021). "11: The ISIS Effect". Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN   978-0-19-887079-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  34. ↑ "Interview-Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". PBS Frontline. 2 April 2021.
  35. 1 2 "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of HTS in Syria?". Al Jazeera. 4 December 2024. Archived from the original on 14 December 2024.
  36. 1 2 Jalabi, Raya (8 December 2024). "Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the Syrian rebel leader". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 12 December 2024.
  37. ↑ Klausen, Jytte (2021). "11: The ISIS Effect". Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN   978-0-19-887079-1. In August 2011, the new emir of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden's old second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al Qaeda's central command sent Abu Mohammad al-Julani to set up a mission in Syria.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  38. ↑ Klausen, Jytte (2021). "11: The ISIS Effect". Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN   978-0-19-887079-1. Al-Julani and a cadre of experienced operatives from the Al Qaeda high command set up Jabhat al-Nusra, also known in English as the Nusra Front , which was supposed to function as a united front organization for the various jihadist fighter groups. ... The Nusra Front was, following al-Zawahiri's vision, supposed to work as a broad front organization and high command for aligned fighter groups in the area... In other words, al-Julani was the boss directly answering to al-Zawahiri's HQ{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  39. ↑ "Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 30 January 2017. Retrieved 13 January 2017.
  40. ↑ "An internal struggle: Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate is grappling with its identity". Brookings Institution. 31 May 2015. Retrieved 1 June 2015.
  41. 1 2 Hassan, Hassan; Weiss, Michael (2 December 2024). "The Backstory Behind the Fall of Aleppo". New Lines Magazine. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  42. 1 2 Zelin 2022, p. 16
  43. 1 2 3 Byman, Daniel L.; Williams, Jennifer R. "ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism's global civil war". Brookings. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  44. ↑ Klausen, Jytte (2021). Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN   978-0-19-887079-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  45. 1 2 Zelin 2022, p. 17
  46. 1 2 "Al-Nusra Commits to al-Qaeda, Deny Iraq Branch 'Merger'". Agence France Presse. 10 April 2013. Archived from the original on 1 April 2019. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
  47. ↑ "Hundreds killed as ISIL insurgents gain ground in east Syria". Reuters. 10 June 2014. Retrieved 12 July 2014.
  48. ↑ "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger". Al Jazeera English. 9 June 2013. Archived from the original on 25 May 2019. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
  49. ↑ Liz Sly (3 February 2014). "Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq". The Washington Post. Retrieved 27 August 2015.
  50. 1 2 Zelin 2022, pp. 53-54
  51. ↑ "ISIS vows to crush rival rebel groups". The Daily Star. 8 January 2014. Archived from the original on 7 January 2014. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
  52. ↑ "Nusra leader: No end to conflict with ISIL in Syria". Al Jazeera . 4 June 2015. Retrieved 19 December 2024.
  53. ↑ "Islamist rivals in Syria find a common enemy in 'crusaders' coalition". 6 October 2014.
  54. ↑ "U.S. and its allies strike ISIS tank, refineries and checkpoints". CNN. 28 September 2014. Archived from the original on 12 December 2018. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
  55. 1 2 "Syria Al-Qaeda leader: Our mission is to defeat regime, not attack West". al-Jazeera. 28 May 2015. Archived from the original on 1 June 2015. Retrieved 30 May 2015.
  56. ↑ Lund, Aron (29 May 2015). ""Abu Mohammed al-Golani's Aljazeera Interview"". Syria Comment . Archived from the original on 26 June 2015. Retrieved 17 June 2015.
  57. ↑ "Syria's Nusra Front leader urges wider attacks on Assad's Alawite areas to avenge Russian bombing". The Daily Telegraph. 13 October 2015. Archived from the original on 26 January 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2018.
  58. ↑ Aji, Albert; Mroue, Bassem (14 October 2015). "Russian Embassy shelled in Syria as insurgents hit back". Associated Press . Archived from the original on 19 October 2015. Retrieved 7 October 2024.
  59. ↑ "Head of al Qaeda's Syrian branch threatens Russia in audio message". The Long War Journal. 13 October 2015. Archived from the original on 13 April 2019. Retrieved 16 October 2015.
  60. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Lister, Charles (15 February 2018). "How al-Qa'ida Lost Control of its Syrian Affiliate: The Inside Story". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point . Retrieved 19 December 2024.
  61. 1 2 Zelin 2022, pp. 17-18
  62. 1 2 "Syrian Nusra Front announces split from al-Qaeda". BBC News . 28 July 2016. Archived from the original on 30 July 2016. Retrieved 28 July 2016.
  63. ↑ "Al-Nusra leader Jolani announces split from al-Qaeda". Al Jazeera. 29 July 2016. Archived from the original on 3 December 2022.
  64. ↑ "Analysis: Al Nusrah Front rebrands itself as Jabhat Fath Al Sham | FDD's Long War Journal". FDD's Long War Journal. 28 July 2016. Archived from the original on 24 March 2019. Retrieved 17 January 2017.
  65. 1 2 3 4 Zelin 2022, pp. 18-19
  66. ↑ Joscelyn, Thomas (28 January 2017). "Al Qaeda and allies announce 'new entity' in Syria". FDD's Long War Journal . Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 29 May 2017.
  67. ↑ "US Stands Firm: HTS and Jolani Still Part of al-Qaeda Network". Times of India. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
  68. ↑ "Julani is a temporary leader of the "Liberation of the Sham" .. This is the fate of its former leader". HuffPost . 2 October 2017. Archived from the original on 2 October 2017. Retrieved 2 October 2017.
  69. 1 2 3 4 "Protests have erupted against another Syrian dictator". The Economist. 4 April 2024. Archived from the original on 4 April 2024. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
  70. ↑ Sakr, Taha (8 December 2024). "From Riyadh to Rebellion: Rise of Syria's Abu Mohammad Al-Golani". Daily News Egypt. Retrieved 8 December 2024.
  71. ↑ Abouzeid, Rania (8 December 2024). "The Fall of Assad's Syria". The New Yorker .
  72. ↑ Salem, Mostafa (6 December 2024). "How Syria's rebel leader went from radical jihadist to a blazer-wearing 'revolutionary'". CNN. Retrieved 12 December 2024.
  73. ↑ "Is the overthrow of Assad good for the Palestinians?". Middle East Monitor. 9 December 2024. Retrieved 12 December 2024.
  74. ↑ Zelin, Aaron Y. (3 December 2024). "How Syria's 'Diversity-Friendly' Jihadists Plan on Building a State". The Washington Institute. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
  75. 1 2 3 Robertson, Nic (8 December 2024). "Syrian rebel leader's victory speech holds a message for Iran – and for Trump and Israel too". CNN. Retrieved 10 December 2024.
  76. ↑ Taylor, Adam (6 December 2024). "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the Islamist rebel leading the Syrian advance?". The Washington Post.
  77. ↑ "Thousands flee as Syrian rebels advance on crossroads city of Homs". The Times of Israel. Reuters. Retrieved 6 December 2024.
  78. ↑ Bateman, Tom (20 December 2024). "US scraps $10m bounty for arrest of Syria's new leader Sharaa". BBC. Retrieved 21 December 2024.
  79. ↑ "Ex-Syrian PM to supervise state bodies until transition". Al Jazeera. 8 December 2024. Retrieved 8 December 2024.
  80. ↑ Saleh, Heba; Jalabi, Raya (9 December 2024). "Syrian rebels seek to consolidate control". Financial Times. Retrieved 9 December 2024.
  81. ↑ Ula, enab10 (12 December 2024). "Turkish delegation meets with Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus". Enab Baladi. Retrieved 13 December 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  82. ↑ Dadouch, Sarah (24 December 2024). "Syria dissolves rebel factions as al-Sharaa consolidates power". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 24 December 2024.
  83. ↑ "Syria's leader says elections could take 4 years: Al Arabiya interview". France 24. 29 December 2024.
  84. ↑ Camut, Nicolas (4 January 2025). "Handshakegate in Syria". Politico.
  85. ↑ Boxerman, Aaron (3 January 2025). "European Ministers Visit Syria to Strengthen Ties With New Government". The New York Times.
  86. ↑ "Syrian rebel leader: Israel has 'no more excuses' to strike, we don't seek conflict". The Times of Israel. 14 December 2024.
  87. ↑ Cornish, Chloe; Shotter, James; Yackley, Ayla Jean; Dadouch, Sarah (15 December 2024). "Syria is not interested in conflict with Israel, rebel leader suggests". Financial Times. Retrieved 22 December 2024.
  88. ↑ "Syria's al-Julani vows adherence to 1974 agreement with Israel". Jewish News Syndicate . 17 December 2024. Retrieved 20 December 2024.
  89. ↑ The Designated Terrorist and the Fight Over the Future of Syria | The Jihadist | FRONTLINE, June 2021, archived from the original on 4 June 2021, retrieved 4 June 2021
  90. ↑ al-Mustapha, Hamza (2014). The Al-Nusra Front: From Formation to Dissension. Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. p. 7. JSTOR   resrep12643. the Jihadist online forums treat the writings of Abdullah Bin Muhammad as the writings of Abu Muhammad al-Julani himself.

Bibliography

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.