Ahmed al-Sharaa

Last updated

Latifa al-Droubi
(m. 2012)
Ahmed al-Sharaa
أحمد الشرع
Ahmed al-Sharaa in November 2025.jpg
Al-Sharaa in 2025
President of Syria
Assumed office
29 January 2025
Children3
Parent Hussein al-Sharaa (father)
Relatives
(brothers) [4]
Education Damascus University (dropped out; no degree)
Signature Ahmed al-Sharaa signature 2.svg
NicknameAbu Mohammad al-Julani
Military service
Allegiance
Formerly
Years of service2003–2024 [e]
Battles/wars
See list

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa [f] (born 29 October 1982), also known by his nom de guerre [g] Abu Mohammad al-Julani, [h] is a Syrian politician and former rebel commander who has served as the president of Syria since 2025. He previously served as the emir of Al-Nusra Front from 2012 to 2017, the emir of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from 2017 to 2025 and was the de facto leader of Syria from December 2024 until his appointment as president in January 2025.

Contents

Born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a Syrian Sunni Muslim family from Daraa and the Golan Heights, he grew up in Syria's capital, Damascus. Al-Sharaa joined al-Qaeda in Iraq shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq and fought for three years in the Iraqi insurgency. American forces captured and imprisoned him from 2006 to 2011. His release coincided with the Syrian revolution against the Ba'athist dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad. Al-Sharaa created Al-Nusra Front in 2012 with the support of al-Qaeda to topple the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. As the emir of al-Nusra Front, al-Sharaa built a stronghold in the northwestern Idlib Governorate. He resisted Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's attempts to merge al-Nusra Front with the Islamic State, leading to armed conflict between the two groups. In 2016, al-Sharaa cut al-Nusra's ties with al-Qaeda and launched a crackdown on its loyalists. Since breaking with al-Qaeda, he has sought international legitimacy by presenting a more moderate view of himself, renouncing transnational jihadism against Western nations, and focusing on governance in Syria while vowing to protect Syria's minorities.

Al-Sharaa merged al-Nusra with other organizations to form HTS in 2017 and served as its emir from 2017 to 2025. HTS established a technocratic administration known as the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in the territory it controlled in Idlib Governorate. The SSG collected taxes, provided public services, and issued identity cards to residents, though it faced protests and criticism within Idlib for authoritarian tactics and suppressing dissent. Al-Sharaa launched an 11-day offensive against the Assad regime in November 2024 which saw swift victories in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus; Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia as his government collapsed.

Al-Sharaa became Syria's de facto leader, heading the post-revolutionary caretaker government from 8 December 2024 until 29 January 2025, when he was appointed president of Syria at the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference held in the People's Palace. As president, he focused on consolidating power, rebuilding state institutions, integrating military factions, and restoring Syria's international relations, including with the United States, Russia, and regional powers. Domestically, al-Sharaa pursued economic recovery, security stabilization, the return of Syrian refugees to their homes, and minority reconciliation, including signing an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate their military and civil institutions into the state, though negotiations on the integration remained inconclusive throughout 2025. In 2026, after clashes in Aleppo between the transitional government and SDF forces, he signed a decree stating that Syrian Kurds are an essential part of the Syrian people and recognized the Kurdish language. His government launched an offensive against the SDF, initially in the eastern Aleppo Governorate around Deir Hafir and Maskanah, before expanding to Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Al-Hasakah.

Al-Sharaa's first year as president saw massacres targeting Syrian Alawites and clashes in southern Syria, both involving government-affiliated troops, which led to criticism. After breaking the 1974 agreement, Israel intensified its limited invasion of southwestern Syria from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Al-Sharaa reaffirmed Syria's commitment to the 1974 deal and has opposed renewed conflict with Israel. He has condemned Iranian influence and plans to hold elections. Al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration establishing a five-year transition period and announced the formation of a transitional government.

Early life and military career

Youth in Syria

Al-Sharaa as a teenager, c. 1996 Ahmed al-Sharaa as a teenager.png
Al-Sharaa as a teenager, c.1996

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa was born on 29 October 1982 in Riyadh to a middle-class family, [6] [7] [8] of four brothers and two sisters. [9] According to family tradition, the family traced their ancestry back to the Islamic prophet Muhammad. [10] According to The New York Times , the family discussed politics at home but had no record of involvement in Islamic extremism. [11]

His father, Hussein al-Sharaa, worked as an oil engineer at the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, and his mother was a geography teacher. [12] The family returned to Syria in 1989, settling in the affluent Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus, where his father opened a real estate office. [13] [14] Whilst living in an apartment block in the Mezzeh neighbourhood in the west of the city, [9] al-Sharaa worked part-time as a child in a grocery store owned by his father. He frequented the Shafi'i mosque in his neighbourhood, and at the age of seventeen, he became religious, [15] habitually wearing a long austere tunic and a knitted cap. [16]

According to Hussam Jazmati, who wrote a biography of him, al-Sharaa's classmates remembered him as a studious but unremarkable boy who wore thick glasses and avoided attention. [12] During his youth, he was described as "bookish", [16] "quiet" and "shy", [6] "manipulatively intelligent" but "socially introverted", and was noted for his "good looks" and a romance with an Alawite girl which both families opposed. [17]

Al-Sharaa said that, while he largely disagreed with his father ideologically, they both shared a commitment to defending the Palestinians. Besides the displacement of his grandfather and his family from the Golan Heights, al-Sharaa said that the Second Intifada in 2000 had an impact on his life choices. [18] [19] According to an interview with Frontline in 2021, al-Sharaa stated he was radicalized by the Palestinian Second Intifada in "the early 2000s." [20] He said: "I started thinking about how I could fulfil my duties, defending a people who are oppressed by occupiers and invaders." [21] In a 2024 interview, when about his reaction to the September 11 attacks, al-Sharaa stated that "anyone who lived in the Islamic or Arab world at the time who tells you he wasn't happy about it would be lying", but added that he understood "regret" about the killing of innocent people. [18]

Al-Sharaa enrolled at Damascus University, studying media studies and enrolling in the Faculty of Medicine for two years. Whilst being a university student, he travelled from Damascus to Aleppo on Fridays to attend the sermons of Mahmoud Gul Aghasi (Abu al-Qaqaa) there. [19] [13] After studying for two years, he moved to Iraq in 2003 [6] [12] [13] [14] without telling his family. [16]

Iraq war

Mug shot of al-Sharaa in 2006, after his capture by U.S. forces in Iraq Mugshot of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.jpg
Mug shot of al-Sharaa in 2006, after his capture by U.S. forces in Iraq

Al-Sharaa traveled from Damascus to Baghdad by bus just weeks before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. [21] In 2003, he was detained and questioned by the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate for his illegal departure from Syria to Iraq, but was released after denying affiliation with any political parties or extremist groups. [14] After arriving in Iraq, al-Sharaa quickly rose through the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). [21] The Times of Israel claimed in 2013 that al-Sharaa was a close associate of AQI leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. [22] In later years, al-Sharaa denied ever meeting al-Zarqawi and asserted that he served only as a regular foot-soldier under al-Qaeda against the American occupation. [23] In 2004, Iraqi intelligence believed al-Sharaa was Zarqawi's deputy, according to The Economist . [24]

Iraqi officials have stated that after Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, al-Sharaa left Iraq and briefly stayed in Lebanon, where he provided logistical support to the Jund al-Sham jihadist militant group. [22] Before the beginning of the Iraqi civil war in 2006, al-Sharaa returned to Iraq to continue fighting. [25] However, he was arrested by American forces while planting explosives [24] and imprisoned for over five years in various detention centres, [26] including Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper and Camp Taji prisons. [27] [28] Al-Sharaa convinced the Iraqi authorities holding him that he was a local Iraqi, not a foreign fighter, [24] by speaking in Iraqi-accented Arabic and using a pseudonym, Amjad Mudhafar. [16] It is said that during this time, al-Sharaa taught classical Arabic to other prisoners, increasing his popularity. [22]

Syrian civil war

Syrian uprising and foundation of al-Nusra

During a routine detention review, Iraqi authorities, finding no charges against al-Sharaa's pseudonym, Amjad Mudhafar, released him on 13 March 2011, days before the beginning of the Syrian Revolution. [16] Al-Sharaa was tasked in August 2011 by al-Qaeda Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda's central command to establish al-Qaeda's mission in Syria. [29] [27] The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, gave him $50,000 (approximately 60 million dinar) to establish a branch of the group in Syria. [16] Alongside senior operatives from al-Qaeda's central command, he formed " Jabhat an-Nuṣrah li-Ahl ash-Shām " ( lit.'Front of the Supporters of the People of the Levant'), also known as the Al-Nusra Front, which was envisioned by al-Zawahiri as a broad coalition of Islamist militant groups led by al-Sharaa in Syria, with direct allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command. [30] During this time, al-Sharaa went under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, which is sometimes transliterated as Joulani, Jolani, and Golani. [22] [31] According to one source, his "al-Julani" nisba referred to the al-Julani neighborhood of Fallujah in Iraq where he had distinguished himself. [32]

Despite tensions with the leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)), who were content with his departure, al-Sharaa proceeded to orchestrate an agreement with al-Baghdadi to expand al-Qaeda's Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. The group maintained this alliance with the ISI until 2013, with an arrangement between al-Sharaa and al-Baghdadi to resolve disputes through mediation by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Over time, al-Sharaa began distancing himself from transnational jihadist ideology, increasingly framing his faction within the context of a nationalist Syrian struggle. [21] ISI initially provided al-Sharaa with fighters, weapons, and funding to establish the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Al-Sharaa implemented these plans alongside ISI leaders after his release from prison. [33]

Sources differ on whether Sharaa was the one who came up with the idea of forming Jabhat al-Nusra or another leader in the Islamic State of Iraq; however, what is certain is that al-Sharaa became the "general emir" of al-Nusra when it was officially announced in January 2012. By December of that year, the US Department of State designated Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, identifying it as an alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq. [34] The US State Department listed al-Sharaa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in May 2013. [35] Under al-Sharaa's leadership, al-Nusra Front emerged as one of Syria's most powerful rebel groups. [22] Its stronghold was centered on the Idlib Governorate in northwestern Syria, [36] where they attacked both Ba'athist Syrian government forces and US-supported opposition groups. [16]

War crimes of al-Nusra (2012–2016)

Under al-Sharaa's leadership, al-Nusra Front and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham perpetrated a series of war crimes, suicide bombings, forced conversions and sectarian massacres against Syria's Christian, Alawite, Shia and Druze minorities. These included the January 2012 al-Midan bombing, which killed 26 people and wounded 63. [37] In 2015, al-Nusra fighters killed Druze villagers during the Qalb Loze massacre. [38] [39] [40] The Saudi state-owned Al Arabiya news network claimed that al-Nusra's leadership denounced the attack, asserting that the actions of the attackers were in contradiction to the organization's policy. [41] Al-Nusra was also suspected of carrying out the 10 May 2012 Damascus bombings killing 55 people and injuring over 400, [42] and the February 2013 Damascus bombings which killed 83 people, most of them civilians and children, and were condemned by the Syrian opposition. [43]

In June 2013, al-Nusra Front claimed the "storming and cleansing of Hatla" during which 30 to 60 Shia civilians were killed as part of a wider campaign of sectarian cleansing in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate. [44] On 12 May 2016, rebel militants led by al-Nusra Front massacred 42 civilians and seven NDF militiamen while kidnapping up to 70 people after taking control of the Alawite village of Zara'a in Southern Hama. [45] [46]

Al-Nusra was also behind suicide bombings in Lebanon directed against Alawites and Shia populations, including the 2015 Tripoli bombings [47] (for which the group claimed responsibility). It was suspected of carrying out the July 2013 Beirut bombing and the 2013 Iranian embassy bombing in Beirut. [48] [49]

Conflict with ISIS

He is a cunning person; two-faced; adores himself; does not care about the religion of his soldiers; is willing to sacrifice their blood in order to make a name for himself in the media; glows when he hears his name mentioned on satellite channels.

Abu Ali al-Anbari,describing al-Sharaa per New Lines Magazine [50]

As al-Sharaa carved out a fiefdom in Syria between 2012 and 2013, the Iraqi leadership of ISI grew suspicious of him. [50] Al-Nusra became increasingly popular for providing social services and cooperating with other Syrian rebel groups against the Assad regime, and al-Sharaa ignored al-Baghdadi's orders to begin fighting these groups and assassinate opposition activists. [51] Al-Baghdadi's top aide, Abu Ali al-Anbari, travelled to Syria to investigate al-Sharaa, concluding that he was a "cunning person; two-faced; [...] [who] glows when he hears his name mentioned on satellite channels". [50]

Concerned about al-Nusra's popularity and al-Sharaa's perceived insubordination, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced that al-Nusra would merge into ISI to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2013. [51] [52] The proposed merger would have eliminated al-Nusra's autonomy and allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command by placing all its leaders, decisions, and operations under al-Baghdadi's direct control. [53] To preserve al-Nusra's independence, al-Sharaa publicly pledged allegiance ( bay'ah ) directly to al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who issued a declaration that confirmed al-Nusra's independence from ISI, [54] [55] [56] proclaiming that Syria was the "spatial state" of al-Nusra Front and that ISI's rule was restricted to Iraq.

Al-Zawahiri repudiated al-Baghdadi's merger move, which was announced without consulting or informing al-Qaeda's central command, and appointed Abu Khalid al-Suri as his emissary to mediate between the two groups and supervise the implementation of the accords. [55] [57] In late 2013, al-Zawahiri ordered al-Baghdadi to accept the annulment of the merger, who refused and attempted to proceed with it. [52] By February 2014, efforts to end the dispute between ISIS and al-Nusra had failed, leading to al-Qaeda formally severing its ties with ISIS in February 2014 and leaving al-Nusra as the sole representative of al-Qaeda in Syria. [58] [54]

After the assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri on 23 February 2014, al-Sharaa denounced ISIS and likened them to the Iraqi "sahawat" who fought against al-Qaeda alongside the U.S., accusing them of undermining the fight against Assad by fighting rebels. [59] Open warfare between ISIS and al-Nusra ensued; al-Sharaa warned that the fighting risked giving a reprieve to Assad. [60] [22] Over the following months, ISIS captured much of the territory controlled by al-Nusra and the Syrian opposition, [59] leaving an estimated four thousand fighters on both sides dead by February 2015. [52] In June 2015, al-Sharaa told Al Jazeera that no resolution to the conflict was forthcoming, and that unless ISIS "repent to God and return to their senses", there would be "nothing but fighting between us". [61]

In July 2014, an audio recording of a major rally of fighters in Syria was leaked, including al-Sharaa, al-Nusra Front spokesman and former Osama bin Laden aide Abu Firas al-Suri, and al-Nusra deputy Emir and former Egyptian Islamic Jihad commander Ahmad Salama Mabruk. In it, al-Suri could be heard introducing al-Sharaa as "Abu Mohammad al-Julani", al-Nusra's emir, who then spoke of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria. In a video released by al-Nusra on 8 August 2014, al-Suri said al-Nusra would declare an emirate in Syria only after consulting with other factions. [62]

International and domestic threats

After the start of Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led coalition's airstrike campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Sharaa, in a rare public declaration, described the airstrikes as an assault on Islam, and warned the Western public: "This is what will take the battle to the heart of your land, for the Muslims will not stand as spectators watching their sons bombed and killed in their lands, while you stay safe in your lands." Al-Sharaa also warned that al-Nusra will fight any group which takes American cash and weapons, condemning "traitorous factions that were bought by the West with some money and ammunition so as to be a pawn in its hands." [63] In an audio statement released on 28 September 2014, al-Sharaa stated that he would fight the "United States and its allies" and urged his fighters not to accept help from the West in their battle against the Islamic State. [64]

By October 2015, the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war prompted al-Sharaa to call for increased attacks on Assad strongholds in Alawite villages in retaliation for Russian airstrikes on Sunni areas, saying, "There is no choice but to escalate the battle and target Alawite towns and villages in Latakia." [65] He also called on Muslims from the former Soviet Union to attack Russian civilians if Russia continued attacking Syrian civilians. [66] [67]

Also in 2015, al-Sharaa described the Geneva peace conference as a farce and claimed that the Western-backed Syrian National Coalition did not represent the Syrian people and had no ground presence in Syria. Al-Sharaa mentioned that al-Nusra had no plans for attacking Western targets and was focused on fighting the Ba'athist Syrian government, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. [68] When asked about Nusra's plans for post-war Syria, al-Sharaa initially stated that all factions in the country will be consulted before anyone thinks about "establishing an Islamic state," referring to Baghdadi. He also stated that Nusra would not target the country's Alawite minority despite its support for the Assad regime. He continued: "Our war is not a matter of revenge against the Alawites despite the fact that in Islam, they are considered to be heretics", he added. [68] A commentary on this interview, however, states that al-Sharaa also added that Alawites would be left alone as long as they abandon elements of their faith which contradict Islam. [69]

Split from al-Qaeda

The Russian entrance into the war led to military setbacks for the Syrian opposition, causing their foreign backers to exert a greater level of influence over them. In January 2016, al-Nusra held unity negotiations with other rebel groups in a bid to pre-empt any foreign attempt to co-opt these groups against it. When the talks collapsed due to concerns over al-Nusra's affiliation with al-Qaeda, the reformist wing of al-Nusra—which may have comprised a third of its overall membership—presented al-Sharaa with an ultimatum: to sever ties with al-Qaeda and merge with other rebel groups, or face a mass defection. [70]

In July 2016, al-Sharaa convened al-Nusra's Shura Council twice to discuss the matter. The first council was inconclusive, while the second council settled on a "middle way" after several meetings: to break ties with al-Qaeda outside of Syria while retaining them inside Syria. [70] As al-Zawahiri could not be contacted, several senior al-Qaeda leaders, including al-Zawahiri's deputy Abu Khayr al-Masri, approved the split contingent on al-Zawahiri later approving it himself. [71] [70] If he did not, the split would have to be reversed. Al-Sharaa agreed to these terms, which al-Nusra's Shura Council narrowly approved. [70]

On 28 July 2016, al-Sharaa announced that al-Nusra had severed ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). [72] [73] He added that the new organisation would have "no affiliation to any external entity". [74] Ayman al-Zawahiri was publicly supportive of the split, [72] even though he had rejected the plan when it was presented to him. [71] In protest, several leading al-Qaeda loyalists in al-Nusra left JFS. [70]

Formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

After forming JFS, al-Sharaa attempted to arrange a merger with Ahrar al-Sham. [75] However, negotiations collapsed due to al-Sharaa supporting Jund al-Aqsa—a group that he had secretly established to discourage al-Nusra's foreign fighters from defecting to ISIS—in their conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. Ahrar al-Sham's leadership was also concerned that JFS continued to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. [70] Meanwhile, al-Sharaa came under attack from al-Qaeda. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi wrote a critique of the manhaj of JFS, and rumours circulated that al-Qaeda was preparing to launch a new affiliate in Syria named "Taliban al-Sham". [70]

In a last-ditch bid to secure a merger, al-Sharaa led efforts to undermine Ahrar al-Sham's nationalist and anti-merger wing. [70] When Ahrar al-Sham's leadership again refused to merge in December 2017, the pro-merge wing formed a breakaway "sub-faction" named Jaysh al-Ahrar. [75] [70] Shortly afterwards, JFS attacked Free Syrian Army (FSA) positions across Idlib and Aleppo, precipitating a conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. The conflict allowed JFS to defeat CIA-backed FSA groups, which it viewed as a "foreign conspiracy". [70]

On 28 January 2017, al-Sharaa announced that JFS would dissolve and merge with Liwa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunna, Ansar al-Din Front and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), [76] [70] gaining approximately 3,000 to 5,000 more fighters. [70] In an effort to demonstrate the maturity of the new group, al-Sharaa arranged for Jaysh al-Ahrar's leader Abu Jaber Sheikh to serve as the nominal leader of HTS, although leadership was formally transferred back to al-Sharaa by December 2017. [75] The remaining al-Qaeda loyalists in JFS viewed the formation of HTS as a definitive break from the organisation and refused to join. A number of al-Qaeda veterans publicly criticised al-Sharaa for his moves. As a result, several were arrested by HTS towards the end of 2017. After their release, some were involved in forming Hurras al-Din, the new Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda. [75]

The U.S. government quickly rejected this rebranding, with the U.S. Embassy in Syria stating that "The core of HTS is Nusra, a designated terrorist organisation. This designation applies regardless of what name it uses or what groups merge into it." The Embassy characterized HTS's formation as an attempt to "hijack the Syrian revolution" rather than a move toward moderation. [77] In May 2017 the US announced a $10 million reward for information leading to the identification or location of al-Sharaa, who the US State Department said was the leader of a Syrian terror group associated with al-Qaeda. [78] [79] [80] [81]

Under al-Sharaa's leadership, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham prioritized combating al-Qaeda and ISIS in an effort to improve its standing with Western nations. HTS successfully defeated ISIS, al-Qaeda, and most opposing forces in its territory, establishing control over most of Idlib Governorate, which it administered through the HTS-aligned Syrian Salvation Government. [33] [82]

Idlib governance

Military situation before the opposition offensives in late 2024.
Territories held by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (white) and the Syrian government (red). Syrian Civil War map (November 24, 2023).svg
Military situation before the opposition offensives in late 2024.
Territories held by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (white) and the Syrian government (red).

Under al-Sharaa's administration, Idlib experienced significant economic development, becoming Syria's fastest-growing region despite being historically its poorest province. The area featured new luxury shopping malls, housing estates, and a round-the-clock electricity supply surpassing that of the capital, Damascus. Educational facilities included a university with 18,000 segregated students. However, his government faced criticism for its taxation policies, including customs taxes on goods from Turkey and checkpoint fees on smuggled goods, as well as the economic impact of the Turkish lira's depreciation, which was the main currency in the region. [83] [84]

In a Facebook video posted in August 2018, al-Sharaa said that both HTS's allies and opponents viewed the group as "the greatest defender of Sunnis in Syria." He also cautioned that Turkish positions were uncertain, as political stances could change anytime. He defended the evacuation of the Shia-majority villages of Foua and Kafraya, saying it removed the threat of "sectarian militias" and prevented Iran from having a pretext to attack. [85]

In February 2023, Idlib Governorate, which was under the control of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), was one of the territories hardest hit by the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquakes. [86] The Assad regime's policy of besieging northwestern Syria, blockading the supply of food, medicines and other humanitarian supplies, further worsened the crisis in Idlib. [87] Al-Sharaa criticized aid agencies for neglecting Idlib and urged the international community to step up reconstruction and relief efforts, saying, "The United Nations needs to understand that it is required to help in a crisis." When asked about efforts to rebrand HTS, al-Sharaa said, "We have built a government that meets our people's needs, but much more is still required." [88]

In March 2024, widespread protests erupted in Idlib Governorate against al-Sharaa's rule, with demonstrators adopting the slogan "Isqat al-Julani" ("Down with Julani"), reminiscent of earlier protests against the Assad regime. Hundreds of protesters marched through Idlib's cities and towns for over a month. The protests were triggered by multiple factors, including allegations of brutality, with reports of thousands of critics held in prisons, and economic grievances related to high taxes. [83] In response, al-Sharaa made several concessions. He released hundreds of detainees from a previous summer's security operation, including his former deputy Abu Maria al-Qahtani, who had been arrested along with 300 others in a purge of his movement. He also promised local elections and increased employment opportunities for displaced persons, while warning protesters against what he termed treachery. [83]

Turkey, which had previously helped stabilize the province by connecting it to its electricity grid and allowing building materials to enter freely, had grown concerned about al-Sharaa's expanding influence. In response, it reduced trade through its border crossings with Idlib, affecting HTS's revenue. Reports indicated that al-Sharaa had twice attempted to take over other Turkish-administered areas in northern Syria. [83]

Fall of the Assad regime

Syrian opposition offensives that overthrew Assad's regime in eleven days Syrian Civil War (November - December 2024).svg
Syrian opposition offensives that overthrew Assad's regime in eleven days

In late November 2024, al-Sharaa led HTS in its Deterrence of Aggression offensive against the Ba'athist Syrian regime's armed forces. [20] [89] [90] Near the start of the offensive, it was rumored that al-Sharaa had been killed in a Russian airstrike, but this was soon disproven. [91] [92] During the Battle of Aleppo, al-Sharaa instructed his forces not to "scare children" and HTS channels broadcast footage of Christians in the city continuing their everyday activities. Archbishop Afram Ma'lui stated that services would not be affected by the change in control. After regime forces were expelled from the city, al-Sharaa declared "diversity is a strength". [93]

On 6 December, in a face-to-face interview with CNN, al-Sharaa declared that the offensive's goal was to remove Assad from power. Using his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, he explicitly pledged to protect minority groups and outlined plans for establishing a government grounded in institutions and a "council chosen by the people". [94] [95] He also expressed his intention to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their homes. [96]

De facto leader of Syria (2024–2025)

Formation of caretaker government

Al-Sharaa with Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii Sybiha, 30 December 2024 Ukraine-Syria Bilateral Ties (2024).jpg
Al-Sharaa with Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii Sybiha, 30 December 2024

On 8 December 2024, al-Sharaa stated on Telegram that Syrian public institutions would not be immediately handed over to military forces but would instead remain temporarily under then–Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali until they were officially transferred, while al-Jalali announced in a social media video that he would stay in Damascus, cooperate with the Syrian people, and expressed hope that Syria would become "a normal country" and begin engaging in diplomacy with other nations. [97]

On the same day, al-Jalali announced that the Ba'athist Syrian government would hand over power to a newly elected government following Assad's departure from Damascus, adding that he had been in contact with al-Sharaa prior to the announcement to discuss the transfer of authority. [98] The same day, al-Sharaa delivered a speech at Damascus's Umayyad Mosque, calling the fall of Assad's regime "a new chapter in the history of the region" and condemning Syria's role as "a playground for Iranian ambitions", characterized by sectarianism and corruption. [95] In his victory speech following the fall of Damascus, he condemned Iran as a source of sectarianism and corruption, and framed the triumph as a turning point for Syria. [95]

Al-Sharaa became the country's de facto leader as head of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the new Syrian administration, and on 9 December, HTS released a video showing al-Jalali and Mohammed al-Bashir, the Prime Minister of the Syrian Salvation Government; following the fall of the Assad regime, al-Bashir was tasked with forming a transitional government after meeting with al-Sharaa and al-Jalali to coordinate the transfer of power, and was officially appointed the next day by the General Command of Syria as prime minister of the caretaker government. [99] [100] [101] [1] [102] [103]

Post-Assad governance

Al-Sharaa with European Commissioner Hadja Lahbib in Damascus, 17 January 2025 Hadja Lahbib and Ahmad al-Shara discusses.jpg
Al-Sharaa with European Commissioner Hadja Lahbib in Damascus, 17 January 2025

Only a few days after the fall of Assad's regime, al-Sharaa met with Turkish officials, marking the first diplomatic delegation to Syria since Assad's overthrow. [104]

The United States rescinded a seven-year-old $10 million "reward for justice" bounty on information leading to al-Sharaa's capture after he met with a U.S. delegation—the first formal U.S. diplomatic presence in Syria in over 10 years—with a U.S. envoy stating that the action was a political decision to initiate dialogue with HTS, noting that during the Damascus discussions al-Sharaa committed not to allow ISIS or other terrorist groups to operate within Syria. [105] [106] [107]

On 24 December, al-Sharaa announced the dissolution and merger of multiple rebel factions, including the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, into the caretaker government's Ministry of Defense, while excluding the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces due to conflicts with Turkish-backed rebels in northeastern Syria. This reorganization coincided with his efforts to establish new state institutions, including law enforcement and security forces, amid reports of revenge killings and highway banditry, and included the creation of processing centers for former regime soldiers and the initiation of police force recruitment. [108] In an interview with al-Arabiya on 29 December, al-Sharaa said that he expected the process of writing a new constitution of Syria to take two or three years, with elections expected after four years. [109] [110] [111]

On 3 January 2025, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot became the first top diplomats from European Union member states to visit Damascus since the fall of Assad, meeting with al-Sharaa to discuss a new political beginning between Europe and Syria, and on 29 January, a Russian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov also visited Damascus to meet al-Sharaa, reaffirming Moscow's support for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity following the regime's collapse. [112] [113] [114]

Presidency (2025–present)

Appointment

Presidential styles of
Ahmed al-Sharaa
Emblem of Syria (2025-present).svg
Reference style His Excellency
Spoken stylePresident of the Syrian Arab Republic
Alternative styleMr. President
Al-Sharaa with Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, 12 July 2025 Ilham Aliyev had expanded meeting with President of Syria, July 2025 (5).jpg
Al-Sharaa with Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, 12 July 2025

On 29 January 2025, during the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference, Hassan Abdul Ghani, spokesman for the rebels' Military Operations Command, stated that al-Sharaa had been appointed president of Syria by the Syrian General Command and would govern the country during the transitional period, assume the duties of the president, and represent the nation on the international stage. [115] [116] [2] After his appointment as president, al-Sharaa gave a brief speech outlining the government's immediate priorities—filling the power vacuum, maintaining civil peace, building state institutions, developing the economy, and restoring Syria's international and regional standing—and received congratulations from leaders of many countries, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Canada, Mauritania, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. [117] [118] [119]

Early actions

A day after al-Sharaa's appointment as president, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani became the first head of state to visit Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime to discuss post-conflict reconstruction and other topics, and on 12 February 2025, al-Sharaa held his first contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin since Assad's overthrow via a phone call, while also meeting representatives of the Syrian National Coalition and the Syrian Negotiation Commission, including their presidents Hadi al-Bahra and Bader Jamous, with both organizations announced to dissolve under the new authorities. [120] [121] [122] [123]

Al-Sharaa with Kosovan president Vjosa Osmani, 11 April 2025 Vjosa Osmani met with Ahmed al-Sharaa, April 2025 (cropped).png
Al-Sharaa with Kosovan president Vjosa Osmani, 11 April 2025

In mid-February, al-Sharaa made his first official trip to the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus, former strongholds of the ousted president Bashar al-Assad, and on 21 February, he met with China's ambassador to Damascus, Shi Hongwei, marking the first official interaction between the two nations since Assad's overthrow, while in early June, he visited Daraa Governorate for the first time since the fall of the Assad regime, coinciding with Eid al-Adha, in the city widely known as the "cradle of the revolution" for being the site of the first protests against Assad. [124] [125] [126] [127]

On 13 March 2025, he signed the declaration, which set a five-year transitional period, established a presidential system with executive power vested in the president who appoints ministers, and eliminated the position of prime minister. It also enshrined Islamic law as the main source of jurisprudence while preserving freedom of opinion and expression, and established the People's Assembly to serve as the parliament during the transition and oversee the drafting of a new permanent constitution. [128] [129]

Al-Sharaa with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa, 9 January 2026 President Ahmed al-Sharaa met European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa in January 2026 (3).jpg
Al-Sharaa with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa, 9 January 2026

By 6 March 2025, clashes had broken out in western Syria between Assad loyalists and the armed forces of the Syrian caretaker government, marking the worst violence since rebels toppled the Assad regime. Al-Sharaa urged fighters in the pro-government forces to "avoid any abuses" following reports of massacres of Alawite civilians in Latakia, and on 9 March, he announced the formation of an independent national committee of seven judges to investigate the events and violations in the Syrian coastal areas, emphasizing that the committee must submit its findings to the president within 30 days and describing the coastal violence as part of the "expected challenges." [130] [131] [132] [133] The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that 1,614 civilians were killed by armed militias aligned with the Syrian caretaker government during clashes between 6 and 12 March 2025, and on 12 March, the caretaker government announced the formation of a National Security Council to be chaired by al-Sharaa. [134] [135] [136]

On 10 March 2025, al-Sharaa signed an agreement with Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to integrate the group into state institutions and bring northeastern Syria under central government control, but negotiations remained inconclusive throughout 2025. [137] [138] [139] [140] [141] In 2026, after clashes in Aleppo, he recognised Syrian Kurds as part of the nation, declaring Kurdish a national language and Newroz a national holiday. His administration launched a military campaign in January 2026 against the SDF in eastern Aleppo Governorate, later expanding to Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Al-Hasakah, while announcing ceasefires on 20 and 30 January 2026, including plans to integrate the SDF into the government. [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] [147]

In July 2025, armed clashes broke out between Syrian Druze and Bedouin in Suwayda, prompting the Syrian Army to intervene and clash with some militants; shortly after the ceasefire took effect, al-Sharaa addressed the nation, criticizing Israel for its attacks on government forces and civilians and expressing gratitude to American, Turkish, and Arab mediators for helping de-escalate the conflict. [148]

Administration and cabinet

Al-Sharaa with Russian president Vladimir Putin, 28 January 2026 Vladimir Putin and Ahmed al-Sharaa (2026-01-28).jpg
Al-Sharaa with Russian president Vladimir Putin, 28 January 2026

On 29 March 2025, al-Sharaa announced the formation of the Syrian transitional government during a ceremony at the People's Palace in Damascus, where the newly appointed ministers took their oaths and presented their plans, replacing the Syrian caretaker government established after the fall of the Assad regime. The government included four ministers from minority groups—Yaarub Bader, an Alawite; Amjad Badr, a Druze; Hind Kabawat, a Christian; and Mohammad Abdul Rahman Tarkou, a Kurd—as well as figures from different former opposition groups, such as Mohammed Abu al-Khair Shukri, former member of the Syrian National Coalition and new Minister of Endowments, and Raed al-Saleh, former Director of the White Helmets and new Minister of Disaster Management and Emergency Response, and was described by some observers as technocratic, with ministers chosen according to their competences, according to al-Sharaa. [149] [150] [151] [152] [153] [154]

Foreign relations

U.S. President Donald Trump with al-Sharaa in the Oval Office on 10 November 2025. The visit marked the first time a Syrian president had visited the White House since Syria gained independence in 1946. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa with U.S. President Donald Trump, November 2025.jpg
U.S. President Donald Trump with al-Sharaa in the Oval Office on 10 November 2025. The visit marked the first time a Syrian president had visited the White House since Syria gained independence in 1946.

After taking office as president, al-Sharaa made a trip abroad, visiting Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Qatar, Turkey, the United States, [156] [157] [158] [159] and the United Arab Emirates. [160] [161] [162] He attended the emergency summit of the Arab League, the fourth Antalya Diplomacy Forum, and the 2025 Arab–Islamic extraordinary summit. [163] [164] [165]

On 2 February 2025, al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani visited Saudi Arabia and met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, marking al-Sharaa's first foreign visit since the fall of the Assad regime. [166] [167] On 7 May 2025, he met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on his first official visit to Europe since becoming president of Syria, and on 14 May, he met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Saudi Arabia—the first meeting between American and Syrian presidents since Bill Clinton and Hafez al-Assad met in Geneva in 2000—during which Trump urged him to join the Abraham Accords. [168] [169] [170] [171] On 28 January 2026, al-Sharaa met with Putin in Moscow for the second time to discuss Russia's military presence in Syria, during which Putin reaffirmed Moscow's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity, congratulated Damascus on recent political developments, and expressed hope that the return of the al-Jazira region would advance the full restoration of Syrian sovereignty, while both sides also emphasised continued economic and reconstruction cooperation. [172] [173]

Easing sanctions in Syria

Since 2011, several countries and international bodies have imposed sanctions on Syria under Bashar al-Assad's rule, mainly due to the regime's violent crackdown on civilians during the civil war. [174] [175] In an interview with The New York Times in April 2025, al-Sharaa stated that the sanctions should be permanently lifted, as they were imposed on the Assad regime. He noted that the sanctions were damaging his government and slowing economic recovery. [176]

In November 2025, with the support of the United States and other countries, the UN Security Council removed al-Sharaa from the sanctions list of the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and on 7 November, the United States also delisted him from its Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) sanctions list, while the United Kingdom announced his removal from its consolidated sanctions list and said that he was no longer subject to asset freezes. [177] [178] [179]

Political positions

Views on Bashar al-Assad's handover to Syria

In an interview with The New York Times in April 2025, al-Sharaa said that Syrian officials requested Russia to extradite Assad as a condition for allowing their military presence in Syria, but Russia refused. [180] In a September 2025 interview with 60 Minutes , al-Sharaa said he still intended to pursue justice against Bashar al-Assad through legal means. [181]

In a Fox News interview on 10 November 2025, al-Sharaa said that Russia had a different view on sending wanted individuals back to Syria, but he stressed that justice must be carried out through a transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for all perpetrators, including Assad. [182] In a November 2025 interview with The Washington Post , al-Sharaa said that the issue of Bashar al-Assad remained sensitive for Russia, with Syria's relationship with Moscow still in its early stages and emphasized that "Syria will preserve its right to demand Assad's trial." [183]

Views on Syria

Al-Sharaa with U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, and U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, August 2025 U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson, U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (2025).jpg
Al‑Sharaa with U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, and U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, August 2025

In an interview with Al Arabiya , al-Sharaa spoke about his ambitions for Syria's economic development. Al-Sharaa said that Syria needs "experts who know the country's assets and try to benefit from all the experiences of the world, so as to come up with something that suits the nature of the society." He said that after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, there are "major investment and economic opportunities", and that Saudi Arabia has a very large role in Syria's economic development. He also pointed to a major investment opportunity for all neighbouring countries that can implement joint economic projects with the new Syrian administration. Regarding the sanctions imposed on Syria, al-Sharaa said he had hoped the incoming U.S. administration, led by then-president-elect Donald Trump, would lift them. [184] He said one of his top priorities is to rebuild the economy by issuing a new currency after the value of the current currency is stabilised. [185]

On 14 December, al-Sharaa stressed in his statements after the fall of the Assad regime that the next phase will be an opportunity to serve the Syrians and build the future. He explained that there is no justification for any foreign intervention after the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria, considering that the "Iranian project" was harmful, and that the victory in Syria is a victory over this project. He also stressed that what happened in Syria was not a coincidence but the result of long preparations. He stated that Russia had become frustrated with the Assad regime and that the change in leadership represented an opportunity for Russia to build a new relationship with Syria. Regarding the Syrian leadership, he pointed out the need to move away from the mentality of revolution and move towards a state of law and institutions. [186] [187] Al-Sharaa stated to Al Jazeera Arabic that the choices of governance will be discussed among a group of experts; then, public elections would be held to make the final choice. [188]

In an interview with the BBC , al-Sharaa discussed his plans and said that Syria is not like the Taliban. He said that their way of leading the country is different because Afghanistan has a tribal system, while the people and way of thinking in Syria are not the same. He also stated that the Syrian government will follow its own history and culture in its governance. [189]

In his first interview as president on 9 February 2025, al-Sharaa told The Economist that he opposed a federal system in Syria. He also mentioned that Turkey was planning a full-scale operation in the north against Kurdish forces but had asked them to wait to allow for negotiations. In response to a question about whether sharia law could be implemented, he stated, "That decision rests with the experts. If they approve it, my duty is to enforce it; if they reject it, my duty is to uphold their decision as well." When asked if Syria would become a democracy, he responded, "In our region, there are various definitions of democracy. If democracy means that the people decide who will rule them and who represents them in parliament, then yes, Syria is moving in that direction." [190]

In an interview with The New York Times in April 2025, al-Sharaa stated that his government was considering granting citizenship to foreign fighters who had lived in Syria for many years and supported the revolution. Furthermore, he said that his government was negotiating with Turkey and Russia regarding their military presence in Syria and suggested that both countries might eventually provide military support to the Syrian government. [176]

On 27 May 2025, during the "Aleppo, the Key to Victory" event celebrating the Syrian revolution and the liberation of Aleppo, al-Sharaa exhorted the Syrian people to help reconstruct the country: "Our war against tyrants has ended, and our battle against poverty has begun." [191]

In a September 2025 interview with 60 Minutes , al-Sharaa said elections would be held once Syria's infrastructure and citizens' records are restored. He stated that he wants Syria to be a place where every person can vote. [192] He added that rebuilding Syria is a top state priority and emphasized the need for international support. [193] He said Syria has reshaped its political identity after years of isolation and is now pursuing balanced relations with the West, the U.S., and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, adding that its calm and stable ties with Russia and China, built on shared strategic interests, align rather than conflict with its relations with Western nations. [194]

In a November 2025 interview with The Washington Post , al-Sharaa said Syria is emerging from a long war and decades of dictatorship and is in a transitional phase. He compared the country's rebuilding to the long recovery after the U.S. Civil War. He also said that some groups push their own interests and seek autonomy by claiming threats to their sect or creed, adding, "In Syria, we have been living in coexistence with different groups and different religious communities for 1,400 years. We're still here, and we still have that diversity." [183]

On 6 December 2025, at the Doha Forum, al-Sharaa told Christiane Amanpour, CNN's Chief International Anchor, that Syria was moving towards stability and economic recovery following the revolution and the transition to a new system of governance. He noted that his government was working with the United States to lift the Caesar Act and explained that the national dialogue conference held after the liberation had resulted in a temporary constitutional declaration granting him a five-year mandate to pass new laws and draft a new constitution ahead of elections scheduled in four years. He also spoke about civil rights, stating that Syria had closed oppressive prisons such as Sednaya Prison and was committed to women's empowerment, with women fully participating in society, government, and the People's Assembly. [195] He spoke about engaging with Alawites, Druze, and other minority communities, stressing that every sector of Syrian society had suffered under the Assad regime and that all of them took part in the revolution that brought it down. Al-Sharaa also highlighted the need to uphold the rule of law in Syria, saying it is "the way to guarantee everybody's rights, including the rights of all minorities". [196]

On 10 January 2026, al-Sharaa said in an interview with Shams TV that the government is engaging with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) through dialogue to avoid bloodshed. He said the 10 March agreement protects Kurdish rights and culture, strengthens state authority across Syria, and has wide regional and international support. Al-Sharaa stressed that the Kurdish community should be protected through integration into the Syrian state, not through armed groups, with rights guaranteed by the constitution and participation based on ability. He reaffirmed Syria's commitment to the agreement and called on the SDF to integrate, saying that unity and the rule of law are essential for Syria's stability. [197] Al-Sharaa said that in their first meeting, held less than two months after his arrival in Damascus, he told Mazloum Abdi that if the goal was to secure Kurdish rights, there was no need for bloodshed, as those rights would be guaranteed by the constitution. [197] He said that North and East Syria holds most of Syria's main resources, including oil, gas, water, agriculture, and energy. He added that SDF control has blocked the state from accessing these resources, damaging the economy and slowing reconstruction, despite the urgent need to improve living conditions. [197]

Views on Israel and Gaza

Al-Sharaa in the Oval Office with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, and U.S. President Donald Trump, 10 November 2025 U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, U.S Vice President JD Vance, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (2025).jpg
Al-Sharaa in the Oval Office with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, and U.S. President Donald Trump, 10 November 2025

Al-Sharaa has stated that he believes in a commitment to defending the Palestinians, and that the displacement of his family from the Golan Heights as well as the Second Intifada in 2000 had a strong impact on his life choices. [18] [20] During a speech to exhort HTS fighters in January 2018, he declared: "If Allah wills it, we will reach not only Damascus, but Jerusalem awaits us as well." [198] [199] [200]

In an interview with Syria TV regarding the ongoing Israeli invasion of Syria, al-Sharaa said that after the fall of the Assad regime, Israel no longer has "any excuses" for attacking Syrian territory. He emphasized that diplomacy was the only way to ensure security and cautioned against "ill-considered military adventures". [201] [202] Al-Sharaa reportedly told a group of journalists that HTS would continue to uphold the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement that ended the Yom Kippur War between Syria and Israel. [203] In an interview with The New York Times in December 2024, he reaffirmed Syria's commitment to the Agreement. [204] He stated, "Israel intended to enter Syria under the pretext of the Iranian presence, and its pretext has now ended." [205]

On 14 December 2024, al-Sharaa clarified that his administration was not interested in engaging in a new conflict with Israel, emphasizing that Syria's priority was rebuilding after years of war. He noted that the country's deteriorating situation did not permit further hostilities and that maintaining state stability was paramount. Al-Sharaa stressed that diplomatic solutions were the only viable path to ensuring security and long-term stability in the region. [206]

On 11 February 2025, al-Sharaa stated in an interview with The Rest Is Politics that Trump's proposed United States takeover of the Gaza Strip would not succeed, asserting that no power can drive people from their land. He noted that many countries had tried and failed, especially during the recent war in Gaza. [207] His statement came after a joint press conference in which Trump declared that the U.S. would "take over the Gaza Strip; we'll own it." [208]

On 4 March 2025, at the extraordinary Arab League summit on Gaza, al-Sharaa condemned calls for the forced displacement of Palestinians, calling them a threat to all Arabs. [209] On 26 August 2025, al-Sharaa said his country would not join the Abraham Accords, stressing that its dispute with Israel is very different from the conflicts experienced by other Arab nations. [210]

"Israel occupied the Golan Heights in order to protect Israel, and now they are imposing conditions in the south of Syria in order to protect the Golan Heights. So after a few years, maybe they will occupy the center of Syria in order to protect the south of Syria. They will reach Munich on that pathway[...]"

— Ahmed al-Sharaa (11 November 2025) [211]

In a September 2025 interview with 60 Minutes , al-Sharaa said Syria poses no threat and called Israeli strikes on the People's palace "a declaration of war". He warned that Israel's provocations could drag Syria into war and push U.S. allies to seek alternatives. He urged Israel to withdraw from areas seized after 8 December 2024, and said Syria has made no provocations or threats toward Israel. He added that "the current Israeli government is extremist and guided by expansionist doctrines," believing that "Israel has the right to establish a larger state than it is now and seeks to expand into Gaza and the West Bank, then north and south." He also said Israel refuses to allow the return of UN forces to the 1974 disengagement lines and is trying to impose "a new format for the security arrangement." He emphasized that Syria seeks a peaceful solution protecting its territorial integrity and rightful claim to the occupied Golan heights, warning that Israel's expansionist ambitions could impact Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, and reshape regional alliances. [193] [212]

In a Fox News interview on 10 November 2025, al-Sharaa said that Syria's situation is different from other signatories because it borders Israel, which has occupied the Golan Heights since 1967. He added that the Trump administration could help Syria make a security agreement with Israel or return to the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. [213] [214] In a November 2025 Washington Post interview, al-Sharaa said that Syria is negotiating directly with Israel and has made good progress, but a final agreement requires Israel to return to its pre–8 December borders. He added that the United States and many other international parties, including Trump, support Syria's position while working to reach a solution quickly. [211]

On 6 December 2025, al-Sharaa told the Doha Forum that any deal with Israel must protect Syria's interests. He accused Israel of using its situation to avoid responsibility for the Gaza massacres and said Syria is working with major powers to pressure Israel to withdraw from areas taken after 8 December 2024. He stressed the need for Israel to adhere to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and added that the demand for a demilitarized zone raises many questions, including who would protect it if the Syrian army is not allowed to be present. He also confirmed that there are talks with Israel involving the United States. [215]

Views on Iran

Since the fall of the Assad regime, Ahmed al-Sharaa has made several statements regarding Iran's involvement in Syria. For many years, Syria and Iran maintained a strategic alliance, Damascus serving as a key component of the 'Axis of Resistance'. [216] In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat published 20 December 2024, al-Sharaa asserted that under Bashar al-Assad, Syria became a platform for Iran to exert influence over major Arab capitals, expand conflicts, and destabilize Gulf nations through activities such as drug trafficking, including the distribution of Captagon. He described Iran's regional ambitions as detrimental and framed the developments in Syria as a setback for Iran's influence in the region. "What we have done and achieved with the least possible damage and losses," he stated, adding that "the Iranian project in the region has been set back 40 years." [217] In February 2025, al-Sharaa condemned Iran and its Axis of Resistance as a "strategic threat to the entire region". [218]

Public image

In 2025, Time 100 listed him as one of the world's most influential people, [219] and Agence France-Presse noted that he made global headlines that year. [220] In the same year, The Economist awarded its country of the year title to Syria, under al-Sharaa's rule, noting that he had generated a "series of positive surprises". [221]

Public opinion

An opinion poll conducted by the Council for a Secure America showed largely favorable views of al-Sharaa's presidency, with 69% of respondents rating his performance as "good," 12% rating it poorly, and 19% saying they were undecided. [222]

Personal life

Not much is known about al-Sharaa's personal life, which he is careful not to share with the media. In 2012, Time reported that in one of the meetings of prominent armed groups attended by the leaders of Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, and other brigades, al-Sharaa wore a mask, refusing to reveal his identity, and was introduced to the attendees by al-Nusra Front's emirs in Aleppo and Idlib. [223]

Al-Sharaa met his wife Latifa al-Droubi while they were both studying at Damascus University. [224] They were married in 2012 and have three children. [225] [226] Al-Sharaa plays chess, basketball, pool, and goes horse riding, [227] [228] [229] [230] while he reportedly played football in his childhood. [231] In a November 2025 interview with The Washington Post , al-Sharaa said he admired Michael Jordan and the National Basketball Association, preferred baseball to football, and was skilled at playing pool. [232]

Assassination attempts and death threats

The U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, warned of a possible assassination attempt against al-Sharaa due to his efforts to build ties with the West and promote inclusive governance. [233] On 12 June 2025, L'Orient–Le Jour reported that al-Sharaa escaped two assassination attempts by jihadist groups for rejecting their ideology. [234] On 27 June 2025, al-Sharaa was the target of a Hezbollah and ISIS-backed assassination attempt. It was planned to be carried out in the Daraa Governorate, but was foiled before it could be executed. [235] However, the government denied reports of the assassination that was planned to be carried out in Daraa. [236] On 16 July 2025, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel's Minister of National Security, publicly urged for al-Sharaa's assassination, referring to al-Sharaa as the "head of the snake" and stating that "the only thing that can be done is to eliminate al-Julani." [237]

On 10 November 2025, Syria thwarted two attempts on al-Sharaa's life by the Islamic State. [238] [239]

On 5 January 2026, the Israel Defense Forces claimed that Iran, along with "hostile elements", was planning to assassinate al-Sharaa. [240]

On 12 February 2026, the United Nations and its secretary-general, António Guterres, said that al-Sharaa, along with Anas Khattab and Asaad al-Shaibani, were the targets of five foiled ISIL and Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah assassination attempts within the previous year on their lives. [241] [242] [243] On 6 March 2026, Reuters reported that Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization had asked Britain’s MI6 the previous month to take a larger role in protecting al-Sharaa following recent assassination plots, highlighting foreign allies’ efforts to support a country shaken by sporadic violence after the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad. However, Turkey denied that its intelligence organization had made any such request. [244]

Documentary

On 1 June 2021, PBS Frontline released a documentary, The Jihadist, investigating al-Sharaa's past in the context of the ongoing Syrian civil war. [245] In the interview, reflecting on his past affiliation with al-Qaeda, on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Palestinian cause, al-Sharaa commented in the interview:

The history of the region and what it went through over the past 20 or 30 years needs to be taken into consideration... We are talking about a region ruled by tyrants, by people who rule with iron fists and their security apparatuses. At the same time, this region is surrounded by numerous conflicts and wars... We can't take a segment of this history and say so-and-so joined Al Qaeda. There are thousands of people who joined Al Qaeda, but let us ask what was the reason behind these people joining Al Qaeda? That's the question. Are the U.S. policies after World War II toward the region partially responsibility for driving people towards Al Qaeda organization? And are the European policies in the region responsible for the reactions of people who sympathize with the Palestinian cause or with the way the Zionist regime deals with the Palestinians?... Are the broken and oppressed peoples who had to endure what happened in Iraq, for example, or in Afghanistan, are they responsible?... Our involvement with Al Qaeda in the past was an era, and it ended, and even at that time when we were with Al Qaeda, we were against external attacks, and it's completely against our policies to carry out external operations from Syria to target European or American people. This was not part of our calculations at all, and we did not do it at all. [33]

Bibliography

On Salafi jihadist online forums, there are essays and articles attributed to al-Sharaa under the pseudonym "Abdullah Bin Muhammad", including The Strategy of the Regional War. [246]

Notes

  1. From 10 December 2024 to 29 March 2025, Mohammed al-Bashir served as the Prime Minister of Syria under the Syrian caretaker government until al-Sharaa announced the formation of the Syrian transitional government, after which the position of Prime Minister was abolished.
  2. Following the fall of the Assad regime, al-Sharaa served as Syria's de facto leader as the emir of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, general commander and head of the new Syrian administration until 29 January 2025, when he was appointed President of Syria by the Syrian General Command. [1] [2] [3]
  3. Acting: 8 – 10 December 2024
  4. Renamed "Jabhat Fateh al-Sham" from 28 July 2016
  5. As President, he remains active as the Commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces.
  6. Arabic: أحمَد حُسين الشرع, romanized: ʾAḥmad Ḥusayn ash-Sharaʿ, pronounced [ˈʔaħmadħuˈsajnaʃˈʃaraʕ] . Also transliterated as Ahmad al-Sharaa.
  7. The term nom de guerre is used by multiple reliable sources:
    • Abouzeid, Rania (25 December 2012). "Interview with Official of Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria's Islamist Militia Group". Time . Archived from the original on 27 December 2012. Jabhat al-Nusra is headed by a man who uses the nom de guerre of Abu Mohammad al-Golani
    • Szybala, Valerie (1 August 2013). "Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colors in Syria". Institute for the Study of War. Archived from the original on 6 August 2013. Among them was JN's leader, who goes by the nom de guerre of Abu Mohammad al-Julani.
    • Abdul-Zahra, Qassim; Karam, Zeina (4 November 2013). "Elusive Al-Qaeda leader in Syria stays in shadows". The Times of Israel . Archived from the original on 7 November 2013. Al-Golani is a nom de guerre
    • Al-Lami, Mina (9 December 2024). "From Syrian jihadist leader to rebel politician: How Abu Mohammed al-Jolani reinvented himself". BBC News . Archived from the original on 9 December 2024. Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani has dropped that nom de guerre associated with his jihadist past
    • Nasr, Wassim (17 December 2024). "Exclusive: Syria's de facto new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa calls for lifting of sanctions". France 24 . Archived from the original on 17 December 2024. His nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has been shed
    • Gambrell, Jon (2 February 2025). "Syria's interim president visits Saudi Arabia on first trip abroad, likely a signal to Iran". AP News . Archived from the original on 2 February 2025. first known internationally by the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Golani
    • Zeidan, Adam (2 February 2025). "Ahmed al-Sharaa". Encyclopædia Britannica . Archived from the original on 3 February 2025. Before replacing Assad as the de facto leader of Syria, Sharaa went by the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.
  8. Arabic: أبو محمد الجولاني, romanized: ʾAbū Muḥammad al-Jawlānī, pronounced [ˈʔabuː muˈħammad al.dʒawˈlaːniː] . Also transliterated as Joulani, Jolani, Jawlani, and Golani.

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