This article is about the modern Salafi jihadist organisation. For the concept of a state based on Islamic law, see Islamic state. For other uses, see Islamic state (disambiguation).
Note: Iraq and Syria contain large desert areas with sparse populations. These areas are mapped as under the control of forces holding roads and towns within them.
The Islamic State (IS),[a]also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and by its Arabic acronym Daesh,[b] is a transnational Salafi jihadist group.
IS gained global prominence in 2014, when its militants conquered large territories in northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, taking advantage of the ongoing civil war in Syria and the disintegrating local military forces of Iraq. By the end of 2015, its self-declared caliphate ruled an area with a population of about 12 million,[116][117][162] where they enforced their extremist interpretation of Islamic law, managed an annual budget exceeding US$1billion, and commanded more than 30,000 fighters.[163] After a grinding conflict with American, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces, IS lost control of all its Middle Eastern territories by 2019, subsequently reverting to insurgency from remote hideouts while continuing its propaganda efforts. These efforts have garnered a significant following in northern and Sahelian Africa,[164][165] where IS still controls a significant territory.[166][167]
After 2015, the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces pushed back IS and degraded its financial and military infrastructure,[175] assisted by advisors, weapons, training, supplies, and airstrikes by the American-led coalition,[176] and later by Russian airstrikes, bombings, cruise missile attacks, and scorched-earth tactics across Syria, which focused mostly on razing Syrian opposition strongholds rather than IS bases.[177] By March 2019, IS lost the last of its territories in West Asia, although its affiliates maintained a significant territorial presence in Africa as of 2024.[166][167]
The Islamic State, abbreviated IS,[178] is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL /ˈaɪsɪl/), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS /ˈaɪsɪs/),[179][180] and by its Arabic acronym Da'ish[181][182] or Daesh (داعش, Dāʿish, IPA:[ˈdaːʕɪʃ]),[183] and also as Dawlat al-Islam (Arabic: دولة الإسلام).[184] In April 2013, having expanded into Syria, the group adopted the name ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām (الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام). As al-Shām is a region often compared with the Levant or the region of Syria, the group's name has been variously translated as "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham",[185] "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" (both abbreviated as ISIS),[186] or "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (abbreviated as ISIL).[180] In 2014, Dar al-Ifta al-Misriyyah dubbed ISIS as QSIS for "al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria", arguing that ISIL does not represent the vast majority of Muslims.[187]
While the use of either one or the other acronym has been the subject of debate,[180] the distinction between the two and its relevance has been considered less important.[180] Of greater relevance is the name Daesh, which is an acronym of ISIL's Arabic name ad-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī l-ʻIrāq wa-sh-Shām.Dāʿish (داعش), or Daesh. This name has been widely used by ISIL's Arabic-speaking detractors,[185][188] for example when referring to the group whilst speaking amongst themselves, although—and to a certain extent because—it is considered derogatory, as it resembles the Arabic words Daes ("one who crushes, or tramples down, something underfoot") and Dāhis (loosely translated as "one who sows discord").[183][189] Within areas under its control, ISIL considers use of the name Daesh punishable by flogging.[190]
In late June 2014, the group renamed itself ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah (lit.'Islamic State' or IS), declaring itself a worldwide caliphate.[171] The name "Islamic State" and the group's claim to be a caliphate have been widely rejected, with the UN, various governments, and mainstream Muslim groups refusing to use the new name.[191] The group's declaration of a new caliphate in June 2014 and its adoption of the name "Islamic State" have been criticised and ridiculed by Muslim scholars and rival Islamists both inside and outside the territory it controls.[192]
In a speech in September 2014, United States President Barack Obama said that ISIL was neither Islamic (on the basis that no religion condones the killing of innocents) nor a state (in that no government recognises the group as a state),[193] while many object to using the name Islamic State owing to the far-reaching religious and political claims to authority which that name implies. The United Nations Security Council,[194] the United States,[193] Canada,[195] Turkey,[196] Australia,[197] the United Kingdom,[198] and other countries generally call the group ISIL, while much of the Arab world uses the Arabic acronym Dāʻish or Daesh. France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said: "This is a terrorist group and not a state. I do not recommend using the term Islamic State because it blurs the lines between Islam, Muslims, and Islamists. The Arabs call it 'Daesh' and I will be calling them the 'Daesh cutthroats'."[199] Retired general John Allen, the U.S. envoy appointed to co-ordinate the coalition; U.S. Army Lieutenant General James Terry, head of operations against the group; and Secretary of StateJohn Kerry had all shifted towards use of the term Daesh by December 2014,[200] which nonetheless remained a pejorative in 2021.[201]
According to Robert Manne, there is a "general consensus" that the ideology of the Islamic State is "primarily based upon the writings of the radical Egyptian theoretician Sayyid Qutb".[205][206] The Muslim Brotherhood began the trend of political Islamism in the 20th century, seeking gradual establishment of a new Caliphate, a comprehensive Islamic society ruled by sharia law. Qutb's doctrines of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), hakimiyya (divine sovereignty), and takfir of entire societies formed a radicalized vision of the Muslim Brotherhood's political Islam project. Qutbism became the precursor to all jihadist thought, from Abdullah Azzam to Zawahiri and to Daesh.[207] Alongside Sayyid Qutb, the most invoked ideological figures of IS include Ibn Taymiyya, Abdullah Azzam, and Abu Bakr Naji.[208]
Although IS claims to adhere to the Salafi theology of Ibn Taymiyyah, it rejects traditional Salafi interpretations as well as the four Sunni schools of law, and anathematizes the majority of Salafis as heretics. IS ideologues rarely uphold adherence to Islamic scholarship and law manuals for reference, mostly preferring to derive rulings based on self-interpretation of the Qur'an and Muslim traditions.[209][210][47]
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the first Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, was radicalised as a Muslim Brotherhood member during his youth.[211] Motaz Al-Khateeb states that religious texts and Islamic jurisprudence "alone cannot explain the emergence" of Daesh since the Muslim Brotherhood and Daesh "draw on the same Islamic jurisprudence" but "are diametrically opposite" in strategy and behavior.[212] Through the official statement of beliefs originally released by al-Baghdadi in 2007 and subsequently updated since June 2014, ISIL defined its creed as "a middle way between the extremist Kharijites and the lax Murji'ites".[51]:38 ISIL's ideology represents radical Jihadi-Salafi Islam, a strict, puritanical form of Sunni Islam.[213] Muslim organisations like Islamic Networks Group (ING) in America have argued against this interpretation of Islam.[214] ISIL promotes religious violence, and regards Muslims who do not agree with its interpretations as infidels or apostates.[215]
According to Hayder al Khoei, IS's philosophy is represented by the symbolism in the Black Standard variant of the legendary battle flag of Muhammad that it has adopted: the flag shows the Seal of Muhammad within a white circle, with the phrase above it, "There is no god but Allah".[216] This symbolism is said to symbolize IS's belief that it represents the restoration of the caliphate of early Islam, with all the political, religious and eschatological ramifications that this would imply.[217]
Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, an Egyptian Jihadist theoretician and ideologue is considered as the key inspiration for early figures of IS.[218][219][220] Al-Muhajir's legal manual on violence, Fiqh ad-Dima (The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood),[221][218][219][220][222] was adopted by IS as its standard reference for justifying its extraordinary acts of violence.[221][218][219][220] The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalising and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants."[220] His theological and legal justifications influenced IS,[218][219][220] al-Qaeda,[218] and Boko Haram,[219] as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups.[218] Numerous media outlets have compared his reference manual to Abu Bakr Naji's Management of Savagery,[223][224][225][226] widely read among IS's commanders and fighters.[227]
IS adheres to global jihadist principles and follows the hard-line ideology of al-Qaeda and many other modern-day jihadist groups.[25][215]
For their guiding principles, the leaders of the Islamic State ... are open and clear about their almost exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam. The group circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in the schools it controls. Videos from the group's territory have shown Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of an official missionary van.
According to The Economist, Saudi practices followed by the group include the establishment of religious police to root out "vice" and enforce attendance at Salah prayers, the widespread use of capital punishment, and the destruction or re-purposing of any non-Sunni religious buildings.[229]Bernard Haykel has described IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's creed as "a kind of untamed Wahhabism".[228] Senior Saudi religious leaders have issued statements condemning IS,[230] and attempting to distance the group from official Saudi religious beliefs.[231] What connection, if any, there is between Salafi-Jihadism of IS and Wahhabism and Salafism proper is disputed. IS borrowed two elements of Qutbism and 20th century Islamism into its version of Wahhabi worldview. While Wahhabism shuns violent rebellion against earthly rulers, IS embraces political call to revolutions. While historically Wahhabis were not champion activists of a Caliphate, IS borrowed the idea of restoration of a global Caliphate.[232]
Although the religious character of IS is mostly Wahhabi, it departs from the Wahhabi tradition in four critical aspects: dynastic alliance, call to establish a global caliphate, sheer violence, and apocalyptism.[233] IS did not follow the pattern of the first three Saudi states in allying the religious mission of the Najdi ulema with the Al Saud family, rather they consider them apostates. The call for a global caliphate is another departure from Wahhabism. The caliphate, understood in Islamic law as the ideal Islamic polity uniting all Muslim territories, does not figure much in traditional Najdi writings. Ironically, Wahhabism emerged as an anti-caliphate movement.[234]
Although violence was not absent in the First Saudi State, Islamic State's displays of beheading, immolation, and other forms of violence aimed at inspiring fear are not in imitation of early Saudi practices. They were introduced by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, former leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who took inspiration from the Egyptian Jihadi scholar, Abu Abdallah Al Muhajir. It is the latter's legal manual on violence, popularly known as Fiqh ad-Dima (The Jurisprudence of Blood), that is the Islamic State's standard reference for justifying its acts of violence.[234] The Islamic State's apocalyptic dimension also lacks a mainstream Wahhabi precedent.[234]
IS aims to return to the early days of Islam, rejecting all innovations in the religion, which it believes corrupts its original spirit. It condemns later caliphates and the Ottoman Empire for deviating from what it calls pure Islam and seeks to revive the original Qutbist project of the restoration of a global caliphate that is governed by a strict Salafi-Jihadi doctrine. Following Salafi-Jihadi doctrines, IS condemns the followers of secular law as disbelievers, putting the current Saudi Arabian government in that category.[55]
IS believes that only a legitimate authority can undertake the leadership of jihad and that the first priority over other areas of combat, such as fighting non-Muslim countries, is the purification of Islamic society. For example, IS regards the Palestinian Sunni group Hamas as apostates who have no legitimate authority to lead jihad and see fighting Hamas as the first step towards confrontation by IS with Israel.[228][235]
The Islamic State was drafted by Sayyid Qutb, taught by Abdullah Azzam, globalized by Osama bin Laden, transferred to reality by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and implemented by al-Baghdadis: Abu Omar and Abu Bakr.
—Hassan Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context.[236]
The Islamic State added a focus on sectarianism to a layer of radical views. In particular, it linked itself to the Salafi-jihadi movement that evolved out of the Afghan jihad.
—Hassan Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context.[236]
One difference between IS and other Islamist and jihadist movements, including al-Qaeda, is the group's emphasis on eschatology and apocalypticism – that is, a belief in a final Day of Judgment by God. IS believes that it will defeat the army of "Rome" at the town of Dabiq.[53]
The noted scholar of militant Islamism Will McCants writes:
References to the End Times fill Islamic State propaganda. It's a big selling point with foreign fighters, who want to travel to the lands where the final battles of the apocalypse will take place. The civil wars raging in those countries today [Iraq and Syria] lend credibility to the prophecies. The Islamic State has stoked the apocalyptic fire. ... For Bin Laden's generation, the apocalypse wasn't a great recruiting pitch. Governments in the Middle East two decades ago were more stable, and sectarianism was more subdued. It was better to recruit by calling to arms against corruption and tyranny than against the Antichrist. Today, though, the apocalyptic recruiting pitch makes more sense than before.
—William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State[237]
Goals
Since at latest 2004, a significant goal of the group has been the foundation of a Sunni Islamic state.[238] Specifically, ISIL has sought to establish itself as a caliphate, an Islamic state led by a group of religious authorities under a supreme leader – the caliph – who is believed to be the successor to Muhammad.[239] In June 2014, ISIL published a document in which it claimed to have traced the lineage of its leader al-Baghdadi back to Muhammad,[239] and upon proclaiming a new caliphate on 29 June, the group appointed al-Baghdadi as its caliph. As caliph, he demanded the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide according to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).[240]
ISIL has detailed its goals in its Dabiq magazine, saying it will continue to seize land and take over the entire Earth until its:
Blessed flag...covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of jahiliyyah [state of ignorance], even if America and its coalition despise such.
—5th edition of Dabiq, the Islamic State's English-language magazine[241]
According to German journalist Jürgen Todenhöfer, who spent ten days embedded with ISIL in Mosul, the view he kept hearing was that ISIL wants to "conquer the world", and that all who do not believe in the group's interpretation of the Quran will be killed. Todenhöfer was struck by the ISIL fighters' belief that "all religions who agree with democracy have to die",[242] and by their "incredible enthusiasm" – including enthusiasm for killing "hundreds of millions" of people.[243]
When the caliphate was proclaimed, ISIL stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and the arrival of its troops to their areas."[239] This was a rejection of the political divisions in Southwestern Asia that were established by the UK and France during World War I in the Sykes–Picot Agreement.[244]
All non-Muslim areas would be targeted for conquest after the Muslim lands were dealt with, according to the Islamist manual Management of Savagery.[245]
Documents found after the death of Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi, a former colonel in the intelligence service of the Iraqi Air Force before the US invasion who had been described as "the strategic head" of ISIL, detailed planning for the ISIL takeover of northern Syria which made possible "the group's later advances into Iraq". Al-Khlifawi called for the infiltration of areas to be conquered with spies who would find out "as much as possible about the target towns: Who lived there, who was in charge, which families were religious, which Islamic school of religious jurisprudence they belonged to, how many mosques there were, who the imam was, how many wives and children he had and how old they were". Following this surveillance and espionage would come murder and kidnapping – "the elimination of every person who might have been a potential leader or opponent". In Raqqa, after rebel forces drove out the Bashar al-Assad regime and ISIL infiltrated the town, "first dozens and then hundreds of people disappeared".[246]
Security and intelligence expert Martin Reardon has described IS's purpose as being to psychologically "break" those under its control, "so as to ensure their absolute allegiance through fear and intimidation", while generating "outright hate and vengeance" among its enemies.[247]Jason Burke, a journalist writing on Salafi jihadism, has written that IS's goal is to "terrorize, mobilize [and] polarize".[248] Its efforts to terrorise are intended to intimidate civilian populations and force governments of the target enemy "to make rash decisions that they otherwise would not choose". It aims to mobilise its supporters by motivating them with, for example, spectacular deadly attacks deep in Western territory (such as the November 2015 Paris attacks), to polarise by driving Muslim populations – particularly in the West – away from their governments, thus increasing the appeal of IS's self-proclaimed caliphate among them, and to: "Eliminate neutral parties through either absorption or elimination".[248][249] Journalist Rukmini Maria Callimachi also emphasises IS's interest in polarisation or in eliminating what it calls the "grey zone" between the black (non-Muslims) and white (IS). "The gray is moderate Muslims who are living in the West and are happy and feel engaged in the society here."[250]
A work published online in 2004 entitled Management of Savagery[251] (Idarat at Tawahoush), described by several media outlets as influential on IS[252] and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamic caliphate,[253] recommended a strategy of attack outside its territory in which fighters would "Diversify and widen the vexation strikes against the Crusader-Zionist enemy in every place in the Islamic world, and even outside of it if possible, so as to disperse the efforts of the alliance of the enemy and thus drain it to the greatest extent possible."[254]
IS has been described as a terrorist group adhering to Salafi jihadism.[52][51][53][54][56][256]Raqqa in Syria was under IS control from 2013 and in 2014 it became the group's de facto capital city.[257] On 17 October 2017, following a lengthy battle that saw massive destruction to the city, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the full capture of Raqqa from IS.
From 2013 to 2019, IS was headed and run by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State's self-styled Caliph. Before their deaths, he had two deputy leaders, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani for Iraq and Abu Ali al-Anbari (also known as Abu Ala al-Afri)[258] for Syria, both ethnic Turkmen. Advising al-Baghdadi were a cabinet of senior leaders, while its operations in Iraq and Syria are controlled by local 'emirs,' who head semi-autonomous groups which the Islamic State refers to as its provinces.[259] Beneath the leaders are councils on finance, leadership, military matters, legal matters (including decisions on executions) foreign fighters' assistance, security, intelligence and media. In addition, a shura council has the task of ensuring that all decisions made by the governors and councils comply with the group's interpretation of sharia.[260] While al-Baghdadi had told followers to "advise me when I err" in sermons, according to observers "any threat, opposition, or even contradiction is instantly eradicated".[261]
According to Iraqis, Syrians, and analysts who study the group, almost all of IS's leaders—including the members of its military and security committees and the majority of its emirs and princes—are former Iraqi military and intelligence officers, specifically former members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath government who lost their jobs and pensions in the de-Ba'athification process after that regime was overthrown.[262][263] The former Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the US State Department, David Kilcullen, has said that "There undeniably would be no Isis if we had not invaded Iraq."[264] It has been reported that Iraqis and Syrians have been given greater precedence over other nationalities within IS because the group needs the loyalties of the local Sunni populations in both Syria and Iraq in order to be sustainable.[265] Other reports, however, have indicated that Syrians are at a disadvantage to foreign members, with some native Syrian fighters resenting "favouritism" allegedly shown towards foreigners over pay and accommodation.[266]
In August 2016, media reports based on briefings by Western intelligence agencies suggested that IS had a multilevel secret service known in Arabic as Emni, established in 2014, that has become a combination of an internal police force and an external operations directorate complete with regional branches. The unit was believed to be under the overall command of IS's most senior Syrian operative, spokesman and propaganda chief Abu Mohammad al-Adnani[267] until his death by airstrike in late August 2016.[21]
On 27 October 2019, the United States conducted a special operation targeting al-Baghdadi's compound in Barisha, Idlib, Northwest Syria. The attack resulted in al-Baghdadi's death; caught by surprise and unable to escape, al-Baghdadi detonated a suicide vest, deliberately killing both himself and two children[ambiguous] who had been living in the compound prior to the assault.[268][269] U.S. President Donald Trump stated in a televised announcement that Baghdadi had, in fact, died during the operation and that American forces used support from helicopters, jets and drones through airspace controlled by Russia and Turkey.[270] He said that "Russia treated us great... Iraq was excellent. We really had great cooperation" and Turkey knew they were going in.[271] He thanked Turkey, Russia, Syria, Iraq and the Syrian Kurdish forces for their support.[271] The Turkish Defence Ministry also confirmed on Sunday that Turkish and U.S. military authorities exchanged and coordinated information ahead of an attack in Syria's Idlib.[272]Fahrettin Altun, a senior aide to Turkish President Tayyib Erdogan, also stated, among other things, that "Turkey was proud to help the United States, our NATO ally, bring a notorious terrorist to justice" and that Turkey "will continue to work closely with the United States and others to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations."[273] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to say if the United States had told Russia about the raid in advance but said that its result if confirmed, represented a serious contribution by the United States to combat terrorism.[274] Russia had previously claimed Baghdadi was killed in May 2019 by their airstrike.[275]
In September 2019, a statement attributed to IS's propaganda arm, the Amaq news agency, claimed that Abdullah Qardash was named as al-Baghdadi's successor.[276] Analysts dismissed this statement as a fabrication, and relatives were reported as saying that Qardash died in 2017.[277]Rita Katz, a terrorism analyst and the co-founder of SITE Intelligence, noted that the alleged statement used a different font when compared to other statements and it was never distributed on Amaq or IS channels.[278]
On 29 October 2019, Trump stated on social media that al-Baghdadi's "number one replacement" had been killed by American forces, without giving a name.[279] A U.S. official later confirmed that Trump was referring to IS spokesman and senior leader Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir,[280] who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Syria two days earlier.[281] On 31 October, IS named Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi as Baghdadi's successor.[282] On 3 February 2022, it was reported by a US official that al-Hashimi killed himself and members of his family by triggering an explosive device during a counter-terrorism raid by the US Joint Special Operations Command.[283] On 30 November 2022, IS announced that their unidentified leader had been killed in battle and named a successor, providing no additional information other than his pseudonym. A spokesman for U.S. Central Command confirmed that IS's leader had been killed in mid-October by anti-government rebels in southern Syria.[284] On 16 February 2023, senior IS leader Hamza al-Homsi blew himself up in a U.S.-led raid in Syria.[285]
In 2014, The Wall Street Journal estimated that eight million people lived in the Islamic State.[286] The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has stated that IS "seeks to subjugate civilians under its control and dominate every aspect of their lives through terror, indoctrination, and the provision of services to those who obey".[287] Civilians, as well as the Islamic State itself, have released footage of some of the human rights abuses.[288]
Social control of civilians was by imposition of IS's reading of sharia law,[289] enforced by morality police forces known as Al-Hisbah and the all-women Al-Khanssaa Brigade, a general police force, courts, and other entities managing recruitment, tribal relations, and education.[287]Al-Hisbah was led by Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi.[290]
In 2015, IS published a penal code including floggings, amputations, crucifixions, etc.[291]
Country origins of foreign IS fighters (500 or more), ICSR estimate, 2018[292]
Country
Fighters
Russia
5,000
Tunisia
4,000
Jordan
3,950
Saudi Arabia
3,244
Turkey
3,000
Uzbekistan
2,500
France
1,910
Morocco
1,699
Tajikistan
1,502
China
1,000
Germany
960
Lebanon
900
Azerbaijan
900
Kyrgyzstan
863
United Kingdom
860
Indonesia
800
Kazakhstan
600
Libya
600
Egypt
500
Turkmenistan
500
Belgium
500
Estimates of the size of IS's military have varied widely, from tens of thousands[293] up to 200,000.[112] In early 2015, journalist Mary Anne Weaver estimated that half of IS fighters were foreigners.[294] A UN report estimated a total of 15,000 fighters from over 80 countries were in IS's ranks in November 2014.[295][bettersourceneeded] US intelligence estimated an increase to around 20,000 foreign fighters in February 2015, including 3,400 from the Western world.[296] In September 2015, the CIA estimated that 30,000 foreign fighters had joined IS.[297]
According to Abu Hajjar, a former senior leader of IS, foreign fighters receive food, petrol and housing, but unlike native Iraqi or Syrian fighters, they do not receive payment in wages.[298] Since 2012, more than 3,000 people from the central Asian countries have gone to Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan to join the Islamic State or Jabhat al Nusra.[299]
The group uses truck and car bombs, suicide bombers and IEDs, and has used chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria.[304] IS captured nuclear materials from Mosul University in July 2014, but is unlikely to be able to convert them into weapons.[305] In September 2015 a US official stated that IS was manufacturing and using mustard agent in Syria and Iraq, and had an active chemical weapons research team.[306] IS has also used water as a weapon of war. The group closed the gates of the smaller Nuaimiyah dam in Fallujah in April 2014, flooding the surrounding regions, while cutting the water supply to the Shia-dominated south. Around 12,000 families lost their homes and 200 square kilometres (77sqmi) of villages and fields were either flooded or dried up. The economy of the region also suffered with destruction of cropland and electricity shortages.[307] During the Battle of Mosul, commercially available quadcopters and drones were being used by IS as surveillance and weapons delivery platforms using improvised cradles to drop grenades and other explosives.[308] One IS drone base was struck and destroyed by two Royal Air Force Tornado using two Paveway IV guided bombs.[309]
IS publishes material directed at women, with media groups encouraging them to play supportive roles within IS, such as providing first aid, cooking, nursing and sewing skills, in order to become "good wives of jihad".[310] In 2015, it was estimated that western women made up over 550, or 10%, of IS's western foreign fighters.[311]
Until 2016, women were generally confined to a "women's house" upon arrival which they were forbidden to leave. These houses were often small, dirty and infested with vermin and food supply was scarce. There they remained until they either had found a husband, or the husband they arrived with had completed his training. After being allowed to leave the confinement, women still generally spent most of their days indoors where their lives are devoted to caring for their husbands and the vast majority of women in the conflict area have children. Mothers play an important role passing on IS ideology to their children. Widows are encouraged to remarry.[312]
In a document entitled Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case Study released by the media wing of IS's all-female Al-Khanssaa Brigade, emphasis is given to the paramount importance of marriage and motherhood (as early as nine years old). Women should live a life of "sedentariness", fulfilling her "divine duty of motherhood" at home, with a few exceptions like teachers and doctors.[313][314] Equality for women is opposed, as is education on non-religious subjects, the "worthless worldly sciences".[314]
fundraising through modern communication networks[316]
Since 2012, IS has produced annual reports giving numerical information on its operations, somewhat in the style of corporate reports, seemingly in a bid to encourage potential donors.[317][318]
In 2014, the RAND Corporation analysed IS's funding sources from documents captured between 2005 and 2010.[319] It found that outside donations amounted to only 5% of the group's operating budgets,[319] and that cells inside Iraq were required to send up to 20% of the income generated from kidnapping, extortion rackets and other activities to the next level of the group's leadership, which would then redistribute the funds to provincial or local cells that were in difficulties or needed money to conduct attacks.[319] In 2016, RAND estimated that IS finances from its largest source of income — oil revenues and the taxes it extracts from people under its control — had fallen from about US$1.9billion in 2014 to US$870million in 2016.[320]
In mid-2014, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service obtained information that IS had assets worth US$2billion,[321] making it the richest jihadist group in the world.[322][bettersourceneeded] About three-quarters of this sum was said to looted from Mosul's central bank and commercial banks in the city.[323] However, doubt was later cast on whether IS was able to retrieve anywhere near that sum from the central bank,[324] and even on whether the looting had actually occurred.[325]
In 2022 the company Lafarge was found guilty in paying IS for the operation of its facilities. "In 2013-2014 the company transferred $6,000,000 to ISIL so they could continue company operations. This allowed the company to earn $70 million in sales revenue from a plant it operated in northern Syria, prosecutors said." Lafarge, which merged with Holcim in 2015, agreed to pay $778 million in forfeiture and fines as part of a plea agreement not to be convicted and sentenced to prison for providing material support to a terrorist organization. No Lafarge executives were charged in the United States, while French authorities arrested some of the executives involved but didn't provide names. The U.S. court lists six unnamed Lafarge executives. Lafarge evacuated the cement plant in September 2014, Afterwards IS took possession of the remaining cement and sold it for an estimated $3.21 million. SIX Swiss Exchange trading suspended trading for Holcim shares before the news became public. After trading resumed shares rose by 3.2%.[326]
Monetary system
IS attempted to create a modern gold dinar by minting gold, silver, and copper coins, based on the coinage used by the Umayyad Caliphate in the seventh century.[327] Despite a propaganda push for the currency, adoption appeared to have been minimal and its internal economy was effectively dollarised, even with regards to its own fines.[328]
Education
The education in IS held territory was organised by the Diwan of Education.[329][330] IS introduced its own curriculum which did not include lessons in history, music, geography or art, but included lectures in Islamic Law, Sharia, and Jihad.[330] The Diwan of Education was often in competition with the Diwan of Outreach and Mosques which organised educational centres focused on the sharia.[329]
Note: Iraq and Syria contain large desert areas with sparse populations. These areas are mapped as under the control of forces holding roads and towns within them.
Military situation in Libya in early 2016: Ansar al-Sharia IS
As a self-proclaimed worldwide caliphate, IS claims religious, political and military authority over all Muslims worldwide,[173] and that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organisations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas".[239]
In Iraq and Syria, IS used many of those countries' existing governorate boundaries to subdivide territory it conquered and claimed; it called these divisions wilayah or provinces.[339] By June 2015, IS had also established official "provinces" in Libya, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula), Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Afghanistan,[340] Pakistan, Nigeria and the North Caucasus.[341] IS received pledges of allegiance and published media releases via groups in Somalia,[342] Bangladesh,[343] Indonesia, Myanmar,[344] Thailand[345] and the Philippines,[346] but it has not announced any further official branches, instead identifying new affiliates as simply "soldiers of the caliphate".[347]
IS's capital Raqqa suffered extensive damage during the battle of Raqqa in June–October 2017
At its peak, IS was sometimes described as a quasi-state.[348] By March 2019, IS had lost most of its territory in its former core areas in Syria and Iraq, and was reduced to a desert pocket as well as insurgent cells.[349] Through late 2020 and early 2021, IS African affiliates had once again seized territory and settlements in conflicts such as the Boko Haram insurgency, in Nigeria and the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado, in Mozambique. Notable takeovers by IS include Mocímboa da Praia and the Sambisa Forest.[350][351] On 17 November 2021, IS supporters urged establishment of "New Provinces" in Indonesia.[352] In October 2022, IS's Sahel province captured the rural committee and town of Ansongo in Mali.[353] In 2023/2024, IS still holds a large territory in Africa.[166][167]
International reaction
International criticism
The group has attracted widespread criticism internationally for its extremism, from governments and international bodies such as the United Nations and Amnesty International. On 24 September 2014, United Nations Secretary-GeneralBan Ki-moon stated: "As Muslim leaders around the world have said, groups like ISIL – or Da'ish – have nothing to do with Islam, and they certainly do not represent a state. They should more fittingly be called the 'Un-Islamic Non-State'."[354] ISIL has been classified a terrorist organisation by the United Nations, the European Union and its member states, the United States, Russia, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and many other countries. Over 60 countries are directly or indirectly waging war against ISIL (see §Countries and groups at war with IS). The group was described as a cult in a Huffington Post column by notable cult authority Steven Hassan.[355]
Twitter has removed many accounts used to spread IS propaganda, and Google developed a "Redirect Method" which identifies individuals searching for IS-related material and redirects them to content which challenges IS narratives.[356]
The group's declaration of a caliphate has been criticised and its legitimacy has been disputed by Middle Eastern governments, by Sunni Muslim theologians and historians as well as other jihadist groups.[357]
Around the world, Islamic religious leaders have overwhelmingly condemned ISIL's ideology and actions, arguing that the group has strayed from the path of true Islam and that its actions do not reflect the religion's real teachings or virtues.[358]
Extremism within Islam goes back to the seventh century, to the Khawarijes. From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines which set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims. They were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfir, whereby they declared other Muslims to be unbelievers and therefore deemed worthy of death.[359][360] Other scholars have also described the group not as Sunnis, but as Khawarij.[360][361] Sunni critics, including Salafi and jihadist muftis such as Adnan al-Aroor and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, say that ISIL and related terrorist groups are not Sunnis, but are instead modern-day Kharijites (Muslims who have stepped outside the mainstream of Islam) serving an imperial anti-Islamic agenda.[362]
ISIS has been excommunicated from Islam by a number of scholars. Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi enumerated in his book, Refuting ISIS, that their form of Kharijism has removed them from Islam and fighting them is a religious duty, stating: "ISIS' leaders are people of unbelief and misguidance, and Muslims should not be lured by their jihad or deceived by their propaganda, as their actions speak louder than their words."[363]Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, also stated that Kharijites are not Muslims, saying: "the majority are of the opinion that they are disobedient and misguided innovators, though they do not deem them unbelievers. However, the correct opinion is that they are unbelievers."[364]
In late August 2014, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdullah Al ash-Sheikh, condemned ISIL and al-Qaeda saying, "Extremist and militant ideas and terrorism which spread decay on Earth, destroying human civilization, are not in any way part of Islam, but are enemy number one of Islam, and Muslims are their first victims".[365] In late September 2014, 126 Sunni imams and Islamic scholars—primarily Sufi[366]—from around the Muslim world signed an open letter to the Islamic State's leader al-Baghdadi, explicitly rejecting and refuting his group's interpretations of Islamic scriptures, the Quran and hadith, which it used in order to justify its actions.[367] "[You] have misinterpreted Islam into a religion of harshness, brutality, torture and murder ... this is a great wrong and an offence to Islam, to Muslims and to the entire world", the letter states.[368] It rebukes the Islamic State for its killing of prisoners, describing the killings as "heinous war crimes" and its persecution of the Yazidis of Iraq as "abominable". Referring to the "self-described 'Islamic State'", the letter censures the group for carrying out killings and acts of brutality under the guise of jihad—holy struggle—saying that its "sacrifice" without legitimate cause, goals and intention "is not jihad at all, but rather, warmongering and criminality".[368][369] It also accuses the group of instigating fitna—sedition—by instituting slavery under its rule in contravention of the anti-slavery consensus of the Islamic scholarly community.[368] The group's persecution of Shia Muslims has also been condemned.[30][370][371]
Pro-YPG demonstration against ISIL in Vienna, Austria, 10 October 2014
The current Grand Imam of al-Azhar and former president of al-Azhar University, Ahmed el-Tayeb, has strongly condemned the Islamic State, stating that it is acting "under the guise of this holy religion and have given themselves the name 'Islamic State' in an attempt to export their false Islam".[372] Citing the Quran, he stated: "The punishment for those who wage war against God and his Prophet and who strive to sow corruption on earth is death, crucifixion, the severing of hands and feet on opposite sides or banishment from the land. This is the disgrace for them in this world and in the hereafter, they will receive grievous torment." Although el-Tayeb has been criticised for not expressly stating that the Islamic State is heretical,[373] the Ash'ari school of Islamic theology, to which el-Tayeb belongs, does not allow calling a person who follows the shahada an apostate.[373] El-Tayeb has strongly come out against the practice of takfirism (declaring a Muslim an apostate) which is used by the Islamic State to "judge and accuse anyone who doesn't tow their line with apostasy and outside the realm of the faith" declaring "Jihad on peaceful Muslims" using "flawed interpretations of some Qur'anic texts, the prophet's Sunna, and the Imams' views believing incorrectly, that they are leaders of Muslim armies fighting infidel peoples, in unbelieving lands".[374]
In late December 2015, nearly 70,000 Indian Muslim clerics associated with the Indian Barelvi movement issued a fatwa condemning ISIL and similar organisations, saying they are "not Islamic organisations". Approximately 1.5 million Sunni Muslim followers of this movement have formally decried violent extremists.[375]
Whether Sunni or Shia, Salafi or Sufi, conservative or liberal, Muslims – and Muslim leaders – have almost unanimously condemned and denounced ISIL not merely as un-Islamic but actively anti-Islamic.[358]
Hassan Hassan, an analyst at the Delma Institute, wrote in The Guardian that because the Islamic State "bases its teachings on religious texts that mainstream Muslim clerics do not want to deal with head on, new recruits leave the camp feeling that they have stumbled on the true message of Islam".[256]
Theologian and Qatar-based TV broadcaster Yusuf al-Qaradawi stated: "[The] declaration issued by the Islamic State is void under sharia and has dangerous consequences for the Sunnis in Iraq and for the revolt in Syria", adding that the title of caliph can "only be given by the entire Muslim nation", not by a single group.[376] He also stated on his official website "United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the leaders of Daesh (ISIS/ISIL) terrorist group are from one species and they are two sides of the same coin".[377] In a similar vein, the Syrian Islamic scholarMuhammad al-Yaqoubi says, "[t]he followers of ISIS do not want to adhere to Islamic law but rather they want to twist Islamic law to conform to their fantasies. To this end, they pick and choose the evidences that corroborate their misguidance, despite being weak or abrogated."[378]
Academics Robyn Creswell and Bernard Haykel of The New Yorker have criticised ISIL's execution of Muslims for breach of traditional sharia law while violating it simultaneously themselves (encouraging women to emigrate to its territory, travelling without a Wali—male guardian—and in violation of his wishes).[379] as well as its love of archaic imagery (horsemen and swords) while engaging in bid'ah (religious innovation) in establishing female religious police (known as Al-Khansaa Brigade).[380]
Two days after the beheading of Hervé Gourdel, hundreds of Muslims gathered in the Grand Mosque of Paris to show solidarity against the beheading. The protest was led by the leader of the French Council of the Muslim Faith, Dalil Boubakeur, and was joined by thousands of other Muslims around the country under the slogan "Not in my name".[381][bettersourceneeded] French president François Hollande said Gourdel's beheading was "cowardly" and "cruel", and confirmed that airstrikes would continue against ISIL in Iraq. Hollande also called for three days of national mourning, with flags flown at half-mast throughout the country and said that security would be increased throughout Paris.[381][bettersourceneeded]
Other jihadist groups
According to The New York Times, "All of the most influential jihadist theorists are criticising the Islamic State as deviant, calling its self-proclaimed caliphate null and void" and they have denounced it for its beheadings of journalists[382] and aid workers.[228] ISIL is widely denounced by a broad range of Islamic clerics, including Saudi and al-Qaeda-oriented clerics.[54][228]Muhammad al-Yaqoubi states, "It is enough of a proof of the extreme ideology of ISIS that the top leaders of Salafi-Jihadism have disclaimed it."[383] Other critics of ISIL's brand of Sunni Islam include Salafists who previously publicly supported jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda: for example, the Saudi government official Saleh Al-Fawzan, known for his extremist views, who claims that ISIL is a creation of "Zionists, Crusaders and Safavids", and the Jordanian-Palestinian writer Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the former spiritual mentor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was released from prison in Jordan in June 2014 and accused ISIL of driving a wedge between Muslims.[362]
An Islamic Frontsharia court judge in Aleppo, Mohamed Najeeb Bannan, stated: "The legal reference is the Islamic Sharia. The cases are different, from robberies to drug use, to moral crimes. It's our duty to look at any crime that comes to us... After the regime has fallen, we believe that the Muslim majority in Syria will ask for an Islamic state. Of course, it's very important to point out that some say the Islamic Sharia will cut off people's hands and heads, but it only applies to criminals. And to start off by killing, crucifying etc. That is not correct at all." In response to being asked what the difference between the Islamic Front's and ISIL's version of sharia would be, he said, "One of their mistakes is before the regime has fallen, and before they've established what in Sharia is called Tamkeen [having a stable state], they started applying Sharia, thinking God gave them permission to control the land and establish a Caliphate. This goes against the beliefs of religious scholars around the world. This is what [IS] did wrong. This is going to cause a lot of trouble. Anyone who opposes [IS] will be considered against Sharia and will be severely punished."[384]
Al-Qaeda and al-Nusra have been trying to take advantage of ISIL's rise, by attempting to present themselves as "moderate" compared to "extremist" ISIL, although they have the same aim of establishing sharia and a caliphate, but doing so in a more gradual manner.[385] Al-Nusra has criticised the way in which ISIL fully and immediately institutes sharia in the areas that fall under its control, since it alienates people too much. It supports the gradual, slower approach favoured by al-Qaeda, preparing society to accept sharia and indoctrinating people through education before implementing the hudud aspects in sharia, which they believe supports punishments such as throwing homosexuals from the top of buildings, chopping limbs off, and public stoning.[241] Al-Nusra and ISIL are both hostile towards the Druze. However, while al-Nusra has typically destroyed Druze shrines and pressured them to convert to Sunni Islam, ISIL regards the entire Druze community as a valid target for violence, as it does the Yazidis.[386][387]
In February 2014, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda, announced that his group Al-Qaeda had cut ties with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and denounced ISIL after being unable to reconcile a conflict between them and the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Front.[388]
In September 2015, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, called for consultation (shura) within the "prophetic method" to be used when establishing the caliphate, criticising al-Baghdadi for not following the required steps. Al-Zawahiri has called upon ISIL members to close ranks and join al-Qaeda in fighting against Assad, the Shia, Russia, Europe, and America and to stop the infighting between jihadist groups. He called upon jihadists to establish Islamic entities in Egypt and the Levant, slowly implementing sharia before establishing a caliphate, and has called for violent assaults against America and the West.[389]
The Jaysh al-Islam group within the Islamic Front criticised ISIL, saying: "They killed the people of Islam and leave the idol worshippers ... They use the verses talking about the disbelievers and implement it on the Muslims".[390] The main criticism of defectors from ISIL has been that the group is fighting and killing other Sunni Muslims,[391] as opposed to just non-Sunnis being brutalised.[392] In one case, a supposed defector from ISIL executed two activists of a Syrian opposition group in Turkey who had sheltered them.[393]
Other commentaries
Scholar Ian Almond criticised the media commentators, the lack of balance in reporting, and the "way we are learning to talk about ISIS." While there was talk about 'radical evil' and 'radical Islam', Almond found it striking because "some of the most revered and oft-quoted figures in our Western political tradition have been capable of the most vicious acts of savagery – and yet all we ever hear about is how much the Middle East has to learn from us." Almond goes on to cite how Winston Churchill "wanted to gas women and children", how Ronald Reagan's Central American policies "disembowelled more children than ISIS," how President Barack Obama's "planes and drones have dropped bombs on as many schoolchildren as ISIS," how former secretary of state Madeleine Albright commented on the deaths of Iraqi children killed by sanctions, how Henry Kissinger and Margaret Thatcher "assisted in the torture and disappearance of thousands of Chilean students and labour activists... For anyone familiar with the history of both U.S. and European torture and murder over the past 150 years, it might not be all that hyperbolic to say that in ISIS, what we see more than anything else is a more expansive, explicit version of our own cruelties. In bombing ISIS and its would-be imperialism, we are really bombing a version of ourselves."[394]
Author and commentator Tom Engelhardt attributed the rise of ISIL and the destruction that followed to what he dubbed as America's drive to establish its own caliphate in the region.[395]
A leader article in the New Scientist magazine contextualised ISIL within the nation state construct. Although the group is described as medieval in the pejorative sense, "it is also hyper-modern, interested in few of the trappings of a conventional state apart from its own brutal brand of law enforcement. In fact, it is more of a network than a nation, having made canny use of social media to exert influence far beyond its geographical base."[396]
Many world leaders and government spokespeople have called ISIL a terrorist group or banned it, without their countries having formally designated it as such. The following are examples:
The Government of Germany banned ISIL in September 2014. Activities banned include donations to the group, recruiting fighters, holding ISIL meetings and distributing its propaganda, flying ISIL flags,[434] wearing ISIL symbols and all ISIL activities. "The terror organisation Islamic State is a threat to public safety in Germany as well", said German politician Thomas de Maizière. He added, "Today's ban is directed solely against terrorists who abuse religion for their criminal goals."[435] Being a member of ISIL is also illegal in accordance with §129a and §129b of the German criminal code.[436]
In October 2014, Switzerland banned ISIL's activities in the country, including propaganda and financial support of the fighters, with prison sentences as potential penalties.[437]
In mid-December 2014, India banned ISIL after the arrest of an operator of a pro-ISIL Twitter account.[438][bettersourceneeded]
Pakistan designated ISIL as a banned organisation in late August 2015, under which all elements expressing sympathy for the group would be blacklisted and sanctioned.[420]
Following the D-ISIS Ministerial in June 2023, Minister Belkin announced Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rufay’i and Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Mainuki, as terrorists under Executive Order 13224.[440]
Militia, cult, territorial authority, and other classifications
By 2014, ISIL was increasingly being viewed as a militia in addition to a terrorist group and a cult.[441] As major Iraqi cities fell to ISIL in June 2014, Jessica Lewis, a former US Army intelligence officer at the Institute for the Study of War, described ISIL at that time as
not a terrorism problem anymore, [but rather] an army on the move in Iraq and Syria, and they are taking terrain. They have shadow governments in and around Baghdad, and they have an aspirational goal to govern. I don't know whether they want to control Baghdad, or if they want to destroy the functions of the Iraqi state, but either way the outcome will be disastrous for Iraq.[441]
Supporters of the Turkish Labour Party protesting in London following the 2015 Ankara bombings
Lewis has called ISIL:
An advanced military leadership. They have incredible command and control and they have a sophisticated reporting mechanism from the field that can relay tactics and directives up and down the line. They are well-financed, and they have big sources of manpower, not just the foreign fighters, but also prisoner escapees.[441]
Former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel saw an "imminent threat to every interest we have", but former top counter-terrorism adviser Daniel Benjamin derided such talk as a "farce" that panics the public.[442]
Writing for The Guardian, Pankaj Mishra rejects the idea that the group is a resurgence of medieval Islam, saying instead:
In actuality, ISIS is the canniest of all traders in the flourishing international economy of disaffection: the most resourceful among all those who offer the security of collective identity to isolated and fearful individuals. It promises, along with others who retail racial, national and religious supremacy, to release the anxiety and frustrations of the private life into the violence of the global.[443]
On 28 January 2017, then U.S. President Donald Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum which called for a comprehensive plan to destroy ISIL to be formulated by the Defense Department within 30 days.[444]
A United Nations report from May 2015[update] showed that 25,000 "foreign terrorist fighters" from 100 countries had joined "Islamist" groups, many of them working for IS or al-Qaeda.[445]
According to a June 2015 Reuters report that cited "jihadist ideologues" as a source, 90% of IS's fighters in Iraq were Iraqi, and 70% of its fighters in Syria were Syrian. The article stated that the group had 40,000 fighters and 60,000 supporters across its two primary strongholds in Iraq and Syria.[114] According to scholar Fawaz Gerges writing in ISIS: A History, some "30 percent of the senior figures" in IS's military command were former army and police officers from the disbanded Iraqi security forces, turned towards Sunni Islamism and drawn to IS by the US de-Ba'athification policy following the US invasion of Iraq.[261]
A 2014 analysis of 2,195,000 Arabic-language social media posts cited by The Guardian had 47% of the postings from Qatar, 35% from Pakistan, 31% from Belgium and almost 24% from the UK classified as supportive of IS.[446] According to a 2015 poll by Pew Research Center, Muslim populations of various Muslim-majority countries have overwhelmingly negative views of IS, with the highest percentage of those expressing favorable views not exceeding 14%.[447] In most of these countries, concerns about Islamic extremism have been growing.[448]
IS's claims to territory have brought it into armed conflict with many governments, militias and other armed groups. International rejection of IS as a terrorist entity and rejection of its claim to even exist have placed it in conflict with countries around the world.
Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
The Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also referred to as the Counter-ISIL Coalition or Counter-DAESH Coalition,[449] is a US-led group of nations and non-state actors that have committed to "work together under a common, multifaceted, and long-term strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL/Daesh". According to a joint statement issued by 59 national governments and the European Union on 3 December 2014, participants in the Counter-ISIL Coalition are focused on multiple lines of effort:[450]
Supporting military operations, capacity building, and training;
Stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters;
Cutting off ISIL/Daesh's access to financing and funding;
Addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises; and
Operation Inherent Resolve is the operational name given by the US to military operations against ISIL and Syrian al-Qaeda affiliates. Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR) is co-ordinating the military portion of the response. The Arab League, European Union, NATO, and GCC are part of the Counter-ISIL Coalition:[450] According to the Pentagon, by December 2017 over 80,000 ISIL fighters had been killed in Iraq and Syria by CJTF-OIR airstrikes.[176] By then the coalition had flown over 170,000 sorties,[451] 75–80% of combat sorties were conducted by the military of the United States, with the other 20–25% by Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.[452] According to the UK-based monitoring group Airwars, the air strikes and artillery of US-led coalition killed as many as 6,000 civilians in Iraq and Syria by the end of 2017.[453]
Lebanon, which the U.S. considers part of the Global Coalition, fought off several incursions by ISIL, with the largest engagements taking place from June 2014 to August 2017, when several thousand ISIL fighters invaded from Syria and occupied Lebanese territory. The U.S. and UK-backed Lebanese Army succeeded in repulsing this invasion, killing or capturing over 1,200 ISIL fighters in the process.[454]
On 21 December 2019, over 33 Islamist militants were killed in Mali by French forces using attack helicopters, drones and ground troops, alongside the border with Mauritania where an Al-Qaeda-linked group operates.[455]
Other state opponents not part of the Counter-ISIL Coalition
Iran[456] – military advisors, training, ground troops in Iraq and Syria, and air power in Syria, beside Iranian borders (see Iranian intervention in Iraq)
Al-Nusra Front is a branch of al-Qaeda operating in Syria. Al-Nusra has launched many attacks and bombings, mostly against targets affiliated with or supportive of the Syrian government.[486] There have been media reports that many of al-Nusra's foreign fighters have left to join al-Baghdadi's ISIL.[487]
In February 2014, after continued tensions, al-Qaeda publicly disavowed any relations with ISIL.[488] However, ISIL and al-Nusra Front still cooperate with each other occasionally when they fight against the Syrian government.[489]
The two groups [ISIL and al-Nusra] share a nihilistic worldview, a loathing for modernity, and for the West. They subscribe to the same perverted interpretations of Islam. Other common traits include a penchant for suicide attacks, and sophisticated exploitation of the internet and social media. Like ISIL, several Al Qaeda franchises are interested in taking and holding territory; AQAP has been much less successful at it. The main differences between Al Qaeda and ISIL are largely political—and personal. Over the past decade, Al Qaeda has twice embraced ISIL (and its previous manifestations) as brothers-in-arms.
—Bobby Ghosh, "ISIL and Al Qaeda: Terror's frenemies", Quartz[490]
Military Situation in Iraq in May 2020
On 10 September 2015, an audio message was released by al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri criticising ISIL's self-proclaimed caliphate and accusing it of "sedition". This was described by some media outlets as a "declaration of war".[491] However, although al-Zawahiri denied ISIL's legitimacy, he suggested that there was still room for cooperation against common enemies, and said that if he were in Iraq, he would fight alongside ISIL.[492]
The Islamic State has been widely condemned for crimes against humanity.[493][494] In July 2014, the BBC reported the United Nations' chief investigator as stating: "Fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) may be added to a list of war crimes suspects in Syria."[495] By June 2014, according to United Nations reports, ISIL had killed hundreds of prisoners of war.[496]
In November 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria said that ISIL was committing crimes against humanity.[494][497] A report by Human Rights Watch in November 2014 accused ISIL groups in control of Derna, Libya of war crimes and human rights abuses and of terrorising residents. Human Rights Watch documented three apparent summary executions and at least ten public floggings by the Islamic Youth Shura Council, which joined ISIL in November. It also documented the beheading of three Derna residents and dozens of seemingly politically motivated assassinations of judges, public officials, members of the security forces and others. Sarah Leah Watson, Director of HRW Middle East and North Africa, said: "Commanders should understand that they may face domestic or international prosecution for the grave rights abuses their forces are committing."[498] ISIL members were also reported to perform human sacrifices,[499] despite the act being forbidden in Islam.[500]
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has stated that the group "seeks to subjugate civilians under its control and dominate every aspect of their lives through terror, indoctrination, and the provision of services to those who obey".[287] ISIL and Al-Qaeda were both reported for exploiting Turkey-Syria earthquake event for their propaganda.[501]
According to the Iraq Body Count project, the Islamic State's fighters killed a minimum of 25,645 Iraqi civilians from 2014 to 2016.[502]
↑ Fairfield, Hannah; Wallace, Tim; Watkins, Derek (21 May 2015). "How ISIS Expands". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 May 2015. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
↑ Caldwell, Dan (2016). Seeking Security in an Insecure World. Rowman & Littlefield. p.195. It is a theocratic state that considers itself unbound by the Westphalian principle of sovereignty with its corollaries of nonaggression and nonintervention
1 2 Poljarevic, Emin (2021). "Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)". In Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, Muhammad Afzal (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion 21. Boston; Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishers. pp.485–512. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_026. ISBN978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN1874-6691.
↑ Manne, Robert (2017). Mind of the Islamic state: ISIS and the ideology of the caliphate. Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Prometheus Books. p.12. ISBN978-1-63388-371-0. ...several scholars have termed the ideology that provided the foundation of the Islamic State 'Qutbism'.
↑ Poljarevic, Emin (2021). "Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)". In Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, Muhammad Afzal (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion 21. Boston; Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishers. pp.485–512. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_026. ISBN978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN1874-6691.
1 2 Gerges, Fawaz (2016). "Introduction". ISIS: A History. Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540: Princeton University Press. p.17. ISBN978-0-691-17000-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
↑ "Islamic State claims Pakistan bombing that kills 56 at Shiite mosque". ABC News. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. The Islamic State affiliate in the region known as Islamic State in Khorasan province and headquartered in Afghanistan claimed Friday's devastating attack in a statement translated by the SITE Intelligence group. The statement was posted on the group's Amaq News Agency. The statement identified the attacker as Afghan, posted his picture and said 'Islamic State fighters are constantly targeting Shi'ites living in Pakistan and Afghanistan despite the intense security measures adopted by the Taliban militia and the Pakistani police to secure Shi'a temples and centers.'
↑ "Daesh Lay Claim To Target Killing Of Christian, Sikh Men In Peshawar". Voice PK. Pakistan. 3 April 2023. Dayal Singh, a Sikh trader, and Kashif Masih, a Christian sanitary worker, were gunned down in different incidents on March 31 and April 1 respectively. Separately, a Hindu ophthalmologist and former senior director of health at the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), Dr. Birbal Genani was also shot dead by unknown assailants along the Lyari Expressway in Karachi on March 30.
↑ "ISIS Suicide Bombers at Brussels Airport 'Targeted U.S. Airline, Jews'". Newsweek. 24 January 2017. The suicide bombers who attacked Brussels airport last year, killing 16 people, were targeting an American airline, its passengers and Jewish people, according to a report citing sources close to the investigation. Another source said that Laachraoui was standing among dozens of students before changing tack and following two Hasidic Jews, usually recognizable by their long beards, sidecurls known as peyot and dark overclothes. 'The attacker seemed to rush towards two Orthodox Jews,' the source said. 'He really, clearly wanted to kill a Jew.'
1 2 3 Zelin, Aaron Y. (June 2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement(PDF). Research Notes (Report). Vol.20. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Archived from the original(PDF) on 20 February 2015. Retrieved 9 February 2023. In early 2006, Zarqawi brought together a number of other Iraqi insurgent factions and established the Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin (MSM)... This process was further consolidated after Zarqawi's death on June 7, 2006. On October 15, a statement titled 'Announcing the Establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq' was released by Muharib al-Juburi, ISI's new information minister. And on November 10, AQI's replacement for Zarqawi, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, pledged baya to the newly appointed leader of ISI, Abu Omar al Baghdadi. While Muhajir had called bin Ladin emir in his first audio release on June 13, 2006, he never actually officially pledged baya. ... Therefore, Zarqawi's death invalidated MSM's implied pledge to bin Ladin. This means that, in effect, the group and its subsequent incarnations have not technically been subordinate to al-Qaeda in eight years.
↑ Birke, Sarah (5 February 2017). "How ISIS Rules". The New York Review of Books.
↑ Gerges, Fawaz (2016). ISIS: A History. United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 L 1TW: Princeton University Press. pp.217–218. ISBN978-0-691-17000-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
↑ Manne, Robert (3 November 2016). "The mind of Islamic State: more coherent and consistent than Nazism". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 28 January 2017. There exists a more or less general consensus that the ideology of the Islamic State is founded upon the prison writings of the revolutionary Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb
↑ Poljarevic, Emin (2021). "Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)". In Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, Muhammad Afzal (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion 21. Boston; Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishers. pp.485–512. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_026. ISBN978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN1874-6691.
↑ Al-Khateeb, Motaz (3 December 2014). "Daesh's Intellectual Origins: From Jurisprudence to Reality". Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. While the Muslim Brotherhood and Daesh are diametrically opposite, they both draw on the same Islamic jurisprudence. In other words, religious texts and jurisprudence, in and of themselves, cannot explain the emergence of phenomena like Daesh, particularly given that the texts are centuries old as opposed to these new jihadi-political groups who use them to legitimise their existence
↑ Teti, Isabella Frances (6 November 2016). "The 'ISIS Phenomenon'". PennState Presidential Leadership Academy. Pennsylvania State University.
↑ D. Kirkpatrick, David (24 September 2014). "ISIS' Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed". The New York Times. The Islamic State's founder, Mr. Baghdadi, grafted two elements onto his Wahhabi foundations borrowed from the broader, 20th-century Islamist movements that began with the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately produced Al Qaeda. Where Wahhabi scholars preach obedience to earthly rulers, Mr. Baghdadi adopted the call to political action against foreign domination of the Arab world that has animated the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda and other 20th-century Islamist movements.Mr. Baghdadi also borrowed the idea of a restored caliphate. Where Wahhabism first flourished alongside the Ottoman Caliphate, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded shortly after that caliphate's dissolution, in 1924 — an event seen across the world as a marker of Western ascent and Eastern decline. The movement's founders took up the call for a revived caliphate as a goal of its broader anti-Western project.
↑ Bunzel, Cole (18 February 2016). "The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 10 September 2018. The religious character of the Islamic State is, without doubt, overwhelmingly Wahhabi, but the group does depart from Wahhabi tradition in four critical respects: dynastic alliance, the caliphate, violence, and apocalyptic fervor
↑ Greyvenstein, Hester Maria (15 January 2015). "Q&A: German journalist on surviving ISIL". Al Jazeera English. Retrieved 4 October 2015. Something that I don't understand at all is the enthusiasm in their plan of religious cleansing, planning to kill the non-believers... They also will kill Muslim democrats because they believe that non-ISIL-Muslims put the laws of human beings above the commandments of God. These were very difficult discussions, especially when they were talking about the number of people who they are willing to kill. They were talking about hundreds of millions. They were enthusiastic about it, and I just cannot understand that.
1 2 Hubbard, Ben; Schmitt, Eric (27 August 2014). "Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 August 2014. •Sly, Liz (5 April 2015). "How Saddam Hussein's former military officers and spies are controlling Isis". The Independent. London. Retrieved 21 April 2015. But American officials didn't anticipate that they would become not only adjuncts to al-Qaeda, but core members of the jihadist group. They were instrumental in the group's rebirth from the defeats inflicted on insurgents by the US military, which is now back in Iraq bombing many of the same men it had already fought twice before.
↑ Sarhan, Arme. "CIA: 30,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS". Iraq News. 29 September 2015.
↑ "World's Richest Terror Army". BBC. 24 April 2015. p.25:06 – within a 59 minute programme. excerpt from, interview with Abu Hajjar, a former "senior leader of IS": "How much money would a foreign fighter receive as a wage?" "A foreigner? They aren't given a salary. They are given food and housing, not money."
↑ Perešin, Anita (2015). "Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS". Perspectives on Terrorism. 9 (3): 22. ISSN2334-3745. JSTOR26297379. The exact number of Muslim women from the West who joined ISIS is still not officially confirmed. It is estimated that their number exceeds 550, or that they represent 10 percent of the number of all ISIS' Western foreign fighters.
↑ "Zarqawi Letter". 2001-2009.state.gov. Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. 12 February 2004. Retrieved 19 August 2022.
↑ C. Tucker, Spencer; G. Pierpaoli Jr., Paul (2016). "Syria". U.S Conflicts in The 21st Centiry (Volume 1). Santa Barbara, California, US: ABC-CLIO. p.834. ISBN978-1-4408-3878-1.
↑ Fairfield, Hannah; Wallace, Tim; Watkins, Derek (21 May 2015). "How ISIS Expands". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 May 2015. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
↑ Caris, Charles C.; Reynolds, Samuel (July 2014). "ISIS Governance in Syria"(PDF). Institute for the Study of War.
1 2 Hasan, Mehdi (10 March 2015). "Mehdi Hasan: How Islamic is Islamic State?". New Statesman. Retrieved 7 July 2015. Consider the various statements of Muslim groups such as the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation, representing 57 countries (Isis has "nothing to do with Islam"); the Islamic Society of North America (Isis's actions are "in no way representative of what Islam actually teaches"); al-Azhar University in Cairo, the most prestigious seat of learning in the Sunni Muslim world (Isis is acting "under the guise of this holy religion ... in an attempt to export their false Islam"); and even Saudi Arabia's Salafist Grand Mufti, Abdul Aziz al ash-Sheikh (Isis is "the number-one enemy of Islam").
↑ Milmo, Cahal (25 September 2014). "Isis is 'an offence to Islam', says international coalition of major Islamic scholars". Independent. London. Retrieved 8 October 2014. More than 120 Sunni imams and academics, including some of the Muslim world's most respected scholars, signed the 18-page document which outlines 24 separate grounds on which the terror group violates the tenets of Islam.
1 2 Maged, Amany (15 January 2015). "In search of 'renewal' – Al-Azhar is at the centre of an escalating controversy". Al Ahram Weekly. Archived from the original on 15 September 2015. Retrieved 6 September 2015. •Fouad, Ahmed. "Al-Azhar refuses to consider the Islamic State an apostate". Al-Monitor. Archived from the original on 6 October 2015. The sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayeb, repeated his rejection of declaring IS apostates on 1 Jan, during a meeting with editors-in-chief of Egyptian newspapers. This sparked criticism from a number of religious, political and media parties, especially since Al-Azhar could have renounced the Nigerian mufti's statement on IS without addressing the issue of whether or not Al-Azhar considers the group apostates
↑ Creswell, Robyn; Haykel, Bernard (8 June 2015). "Battle Lines". The New Yorker. In the most recent issue of Dabiq, ISIS's English-language magazine, a female writer encourages women to emigrate to "the lands of the Islamic State" even if it means travelling without a male companion, a shocking breach of traditional Islamic law. This may be a cynical ploy—a lure for runaways. But it is in keeping with the jihadists' attack on parental authority and its emphasis on individual empowerment, including the power of female believers to renounce families they do not view as authentically Muslim.
↑ Creswell, Robyn; Haykel, Bernard (8 June 2015). "Battle Lines". The New Yorker. It has also created a female morality police, a shadowy group called the al-Khansa' Brigades, who insure proper deportment in ISIS-held towns. ... Al-Khansa' was a female poet of the pre-Islamic era who converted to Islam and became a companion of the Prophet, and her elegies for her male relations are keystones of the genre [of Islamic poetry]. The name therefore suggests an institution with deep roots in the past, and yet there has never been anything like the Brigades in Islamic history, nor do they have an equivalent anywhere else in the Arab world.
1 2 3 Akbarzai, Sahar; Ehsan, Popalzai; Kottasová, Ivana (3 July 2022). "Taliban labels Islamic State affiliate a 'false sect'". CNN. Retrieved 4 July 2022. The Taliban has declared the Islamic State affiliate ISIS-K a corrupt "sect" and forbidden Afghans from contact with it.
↑ https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol30/iss4/1/ (pdf) p. 537: "ISIS is furthermore banned in... Switzerland (since October 2014). Switzerland’s ban prohibits propaganda in favor of, and financial support for, ISIS in Switzerland"
Fishman, Brian (2008). "Using the Mistakes of al Qaeda's Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 618: 46–54. doi:10.1177/0002716208316650. JSTOR40375774. S2CID146236345.
Fraile Ordonez, Siobhan (28 September 2015). "The Non-Islamic Non-State". St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review. Archived from the original on 14 February 2019. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
Morris, Andrea Michelle. "Who Becomes a Foreign Fighter? Characteristics of the Islamic State's Soldiers" Terrorism and Political Violence 35#2 (2023) pp 1–19; DOI:10.1080/09546553.2022.2144730
Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, commonly known by his nom de guerreAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was an Iraqi militant who was the first caliph of the Islamic State (IS) from 2014 until his death in 2019.
The Islamic State of Iraq was a Salafi jihadist militant organization that fought the forces of the U.S.-led coalition during the Iraqi insurgency. The organization aimed to overthrow the Iraqi federal government and establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Iraq.
The International reactions to ISIL has widely been condemnation and declaration as a terrorist group, however, there have been pockets of support for the group shown in opinion polling in July 2014 conducted at the request of the Russian state news agency Rossiya Segodnya by ICM Research in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Further support arises from factions of Al Qaeda, and other radical elements both inside and out of governments.
Fadel Ahmed Abdullah al-Hiyali, better known by his noms de guerre Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, Haji Mutazz, or Abu Mutaz al-Qurashi, was the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) governor for territories held by the organization in Iraq. He was considered the ISIL second-in-command ; he played a political role of overseeing the local councils and a military role that includes directing operations against opponents of ISIL. His names were also spelt Fadhil Ahmad al-Hayali, and Hajji Mutazz.
Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, better known as Abu Ali al-Anbari, was the governor for territories held by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria. Considered the ISIL second-in-command, he was viewed as a potential successor of ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Ahmed Hussein al-Shar’a, known by his nom de guerre as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, is a Syrian militant leader who is the current commander-in-chief of the militant group Tahrir al-Sham.
The Military of the Islamic State is the fighting force of the Islamic State (IS). The total force size at its peak was estimated from tens of thousands to over two hundred thousand. IS's armed forces grew quickly during its territorial expansion in 2014. The IS military, including groups incorporated into it in 2014, openly operates and controls territory in multiple cities in Libya and Nigeria. In October 2016, it conquered the city of Qandala in Puntland, Somalia. It conquered much of eastern Syria and western Iraq in 2014, territory it lost finally only in 2019. It also has had border clashes with and made incursions into Lebanon, Iran, and Jordan. IS-linked groups operate in Algeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and in West Africa. In January 2015, IS was also confirmed to have a military presence in Afghanistan and in Yemen.
Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi, better known by the pseudonym Haji Bakr and sometimes his kunyaAbu Bakr al-Iraqi, was a senior leader of the militant group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), heading its Military Council and leading its operations in Syria, prior to his killing by Syrian rebels in January 2014. Previously a Colonel in the Iraqi Intelligence Service, papers found after his death indicated that al-Khlifawi played a key role in devising the plans ISIL used to conquer and administer territory in Syria and Iraq.
The ideology of the Islamic State has been described as being a blend of Salafism, Salafi jihadism, Sunni Islamist fundamentalism, Wahhabism, and Qutbism. Through its official statement of beliefs originally released by its first leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2007 and subsequently updated since June 2014, the Islamic State defined its creed as "a middle way between the extremist Kharijites and the lax Murji'ites".
The Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, also known as Islamic State in Gaza, was an Islamist militant group affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant that was reportedly active in the Gaza Strip around 2015. Its goals have consistently matched those of the Islamic State, in that it seeks to establish the al-Sham caliphate. As such, it opposes all forms of Palestinian nationalism while also supporting the elimination of all Jews and other ethno-religious 'infidels' from the region.
The Islamic State – Khorasan Province is a regional branch of the Salafi jihadist group Islamic State (IS) active in South-Central Asia, primarily Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIS–K seeks to destabilize and replace current governments within the historic Khorasan region with the goal of establishing a caliphate across South and Central Asia, governed under a strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law, which they plan to expand beyond the region.
Collaboration with the Islamic State refers to the cooperation and assistance given by governments, non-state actors, and private individuals to the Islamic State (IS) during the Syrian Civil War, Iraqi Civil War, and Libyan Civil War.
The origins of the Islamic State group can be traced back to three main organizations. Earliest of these was the "Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād" organization, founded by the Jihadist leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Jordan in 1999. The other two predecessor organizations emerged during the Iraqi insurgency against the U.S. occupation forces. These included the "Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah" group founded by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2004 and the "Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jama’ah" group founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his associates in the same year.
Abdul Nasser Qardash is an Iraqi militant who in 2019 was wrongly reported as the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). He was also nicknamed "The Professor" and "Destroyer". Qardash was a high-ranking and very influential member of ISIL with close connections to its first caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and tipped as a potential candidate for ISIL leadership succession. However days after the death of al-Baghdadi, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was ultimately chosen as the new declared leader of ISIL. Qardash was captured by Iraqi security forces in 2020.
Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was an Iraqi militant and the second caliph of the Islamic State. His appointment by a shura council was announced by the Islamic State media on 31 October 2019, less than a week after the death of previous leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi was the fourth caliph of the Islamic State and allegedly the first Syrian to serve as caliph. He took office on 30 November 2022.
The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS–K) is a regional branch of the Islamic State terrorist group active in South-Central Asia, primarily Afghanistan. ISIS–K seeks to destabilize and overthrow existing governments of the historic Khorasan region to establish an Islamic caliphate under its strict, fundamentalist Islamist rule.
The Al-Qaeda–Islamic State conflict is an ongoing conflict between Al-Qaeda and its allied groups, and the Islamic State.
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