Some critics accuse Madkhalism of being overly submissive to authority and potentially apolitical to the point of ignoring important social issues.[5]
Originating in Saudi Arabia, the movement lost its support base in the country and has mostly been relegated to other countries,[6] with most Saudi Arabians not taking the edicts of Madkhalists seriously.[7] Political scientist Omar Ashour has described the movement as resembling a cult,[8] and English-language media has referred to the group as such.[7]
In addition to Arab regimes, U.S. policymakers and senior advisors to the U.S. Department of State have also reportedly advised the U.S. government to fund al-Madkhali and his strain of thought.[9]
History
The movement has, in essence, been a reaction against the Muslim Brotherhood, rival Sahwa movement as well as the Qutbi movement;[10]Sayyid Qutb, that movement's figurehead, is considered to be an apostate by Madkhali and his movement.[11] It is strongly backed by the United Arab Emirates.[12]
Rabee al-Madkhali was incredibly influential, most of it through Saudi support, in the early 1990s, during and after the time period the Gulf War was taking place.[citation needed] The Saudi regime attracted great ire from the Sahwa movement, due to their collusion with the US government and the Saudi's allowing US military bases to be set up in the Arabian peninsula. In response, the Saudi government imprisoned the leaders of the movement and strongly promoted al-Madkhali, who supported the regime. [citation needed] Senior US policy makers Will McCants and Jarret Brachman have also advised the US to discreetly fund figures like al-Madkhali to siphon off support for jihadis who advocate for violence against the US military.[9]
At the Madkhalist movement's inception in the early 1990s, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt promoted the group as a counterbalance to more extreme elements of the wider Islamist movement.[3][13][14][15][16] During this time, a number of radical Jihadists converted to Madkhalism, especially in the Salafist stronghold of Buraidah.[17] In Kuwait, the Madkhali movement was nurtured around individuals who would separate from "mainstream" Salafism in 1981 due to many amongst them entering into the political arena.[18]
After high-ranking members of Saudi Arabia's religious establishment denounced the movement in general, and Saudi Grand Mufti and Permanent Committee head Abdulaziz Al Sheikh's criticism of Rabee al-Madkhali specifically, the movement lost its support base within the wider Arab world.[6] The remaining followers of Madkhali within Saudi Arabia tend to be foreign workers of Western origins, Saudis from Rabee al-Madkhali's hometown, and Kuwaitis and Yemenis.[11] Madkhali also retains a national network of disciples to promote his work and monitor the activities of competitor clerics,[19] and although Madkhalists are outnumbered by followers of Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage in Kuwait, they retain an extensive international network in the Middle East, Europe and Southeast Asia.[18] Despite losing its audience in its country of origin, the movement had branched outward by the early 2010s, with Madkhalists gaining followers in western Kazakhstan, where the Government of Kazakhstan views them and other Islamists with suspicion.[20][21] Regardless of these gains, Western analysts have still described the movement as now being relegated to a primarily European phenomenon.[6][22] Analysts have estimated that Madkhalists and their allies comprise just over half of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands.[23]
On Friday, 24 August 2012, Islamists loyal to Muhammad al-Madkhali, demolished Sufi shrines in Zliten in Libya with construction equipment and bulldozers.[24] The act was condemned by twenty-two NGOs, in addition to the post-war Libyan government's top religious official and UNESCO General Director Irina Bokova.[25][26][27] The post-war Libyan government filed a complaint with the Saudi government regarding Muhammad al-Madkhali, who is a professor at the Islamic University of Madinah.[28]
Another break between Madkhalists and the mainstream of purist Salafism has been the reaction to the Arab Spring. While most purist Salafists initially opposed both the Libyan Civil War and the Syrian Civil War, eventually they threw their support behind the opposition in both cases due to the extreme violence on the part of the Gaddafi and Assad regimes; the Madkhalists attacked the mainstream purists for these stances.[18]
As of early 2019, Madkhalists continue to be supported by the Saudi government[29] and have found common cause with Libyan Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who has been described as "Libya's most potent warlord", during the Second Libyan Civil War.[30]
Madkhalis have often found themselves supporting opposing political factions in Libya. This is due to the apparently contradictory fatwas issued by Rabee al-Madkhali, Muhammad bin Hadi al-Madkhali and other Salafi scholars.[citation needed]
Madkhalism is often compared to Wahhabism, sharing a number of tenets with the wider movement.[3][16] Media analysts have warned against generalizing such Islamists movements despite their differences, however.[20] Madkhali has borrowed heavily from elder Salafist scholar Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani; Madkhali adopted more extreme positions than Albani in his teaching according to Qutbi clerics, however, and Madkhalists were dismayed when Albani praised clerics Safar Al-Hawali and Salman al-Ouda.[19]
A cornerstone of Madkhalist discourse is unquestioning loyalty to governments in public, even those that use extreme and unjustified violence against their subjects.[18] Unlike other Islamist groups which often oppose totalitarian, mostly secular governments in the Middle East, the Madkhalist movement is openly supportive of such regimes.[8][31][32][33] Madkhalists argue that the governments of Arab countries are not to be revolted even if they are oppressive. They hold that God has given the highest Muslim authority this right due to the 59th quranic verse in Surah An-Nisa, which translates as:
“O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. ”
Relations with governments of countries which are Muslim but not Arab have not always been as smooth. Both Madkhali brothers actively encouraged Muslims inside and outside of Indonesia to join the armed Maluku sectarian conflict which continued from the late 1990s until the early 2000s.[34][35] In the year 2000, Muhammad al-Madkhali went so far as to declare the prohibition of jihad by then Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, himself an internationally recognized Islamic scholar, as being contrary to sharia law.[36]
Though often lumped together with all other Salafists and Islamists, the Madkhalists have been noted for their opposition to and mutual rivalry with Salafist jihadism.[20] The Madkhalist movement has been described as politically quietist, eschewing the organized political efforts of the mainstream of Salafism and even going as far as to declare religious clerics who participate in modern political system to be heretics or even apostates.[37][38] Such politically active Salafists are often described by followers of Madkhalism as part of an international conspiracy against "true Salafism."[39] On the other hand, Western intelligence agencies have identified Madkhalists as a group which can be supported and funded discreetly by the US, in comparison to the rest of the groups seen under the wider Salafi movement.[40]
Interaction with non-Muslim societies, where most Madkhalists reside, also distinguishes the movement. While most Salafi Muslims in the Western world are noted for adjusting their religious lifestyles for pragmatic participation in the wider society, Madkhalists in particular are noted for minimizing contact with non-Muslims.[41] Also unlike the wider Islamist movement, Madkhalists don't seem to focus on converting Western societies to Islam due to giving most concern in persuading Muslims to adopt a more orthodox Muslim lifestyle and preferring to simply accept and defend their rights as a minority community.[42]
The polemics of the Madkhalists are markedly different from other Salafist groups as well. A noted feature of Madkhalism during Muslim dogmatic exchanges is clarifying the opponent sect instead of only discourse regarding the topic of discussion.[32] The person of the movement's leader, Rabee al-Madkhali, also carries a heavy focus uncharacteristic of rival movements such as Qutbism. Madkhalists have been described as obsessed with defense of the movement's leader by the Muslim brotherhood who accuse them of often dramatising or exaggerating praise given by Salafist scholars and attempting to stifle or intimidate Salafists with opposing views to those of Madkhali and Madkhalists.[43]
Citations
↑ Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Trends in Salafism." Taken from Islamist Radicalisation: The Challenge for Euro-Mediterranean Relations, pg. 74. Eds. Michael Emerson, Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009. ISBN9789290798651
1 2 3 Roel Meijer, "Politicizing al-jarh wa-l-ta'dil: Rabi b. Hadi al-Madkhali and the transnational battle for religious authority." Taken from The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki, eds. Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh and Joas Wagemakers, pg. 382. Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2011.
↑ Notes, Whatever Happened to the Islamists?: Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam, pg. 291. Eds. Amel Boubekeur and Olivier Roy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. ISBN9780231154260
↑ Samir Amghar, "Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims." Taken from European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society, pg. 44. Eds. Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michaël Emerson. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2007. ISBN9789290797104
↑ Martijn de Koning, "The 'Other' Political Islam: Understanding Salafi Politics." Taken from Whatever Happened to the Islamists?: Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam, pg. 159. Eds. Amel Boubekeur and Olivier Roy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. ISBN9780231154260
↑ Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: global network of terror, pg. 201. Volume 3 of the University of St Andrews' Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence series. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002.
↑ Robert W. Hefner, "Civil Pluralism Denied?" Taken from New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, pg. 170. Eds. Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. ISBN9780253342522
↑ Martijn de Koning, pg. 166. "Other examples can be found on the Internet and in meetings where books are sold explaining... the ‘Islamic’ aspects of the relationship between men and women and how to be a Muslim in Western society... Since Salafi Muslims have to function in the secular Dutch state and therefore have to adjust in a particular way, this does not necessarily go against participation in society with regard to education and labor, ..(in particular in the Madkhali Selefie network) choose to interact with the broader society in a very minimal way."
Islamism is a range of religious and political ideological movements that believe that Islam should influence political systems. Its proponents believe Islam is innately political, and that Islam as a political system is superior to communism, liberal democracy, capitalism, and other alternatives in achieving a just, successful society. Islamism is generally considered anti-Zionist, anti-capitalist, anti-colonialist and anti-communist; Islamists support family values, sharia, the reformation of interest-based finance, and the broad Quranic command of 'enjoining goodness and forbidding evil.'
Wahhabism is a religious revivalist movement within Sunni Islam named after the 18th-century Hanbali scholar Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. It was initially established in the central Arabian region of Najd and later spread to other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, and is today followed primarily in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
The Salafi movement or Salafism is a revival movement within Sunni Islam, founded in the late 19th century and influential in the Islamic world to this day. The name "Salafiyya" is a self-designation, to call for a return to the traditions of the "pious predecessors", the first three generations of Muslims, who are believed to exemplify the pure form of Islam. In practice, Salafis claim that they rely on the Qur'an, the Sunnah and the Ijma (consensus) of the salaf, giving these writings precedence over what they claim as "later religious interpretations". The Salafi movement aimed to achieve a renewal of Muslim life, and had a major influence on many Muslim thinkers and movements across the Islamic world.
Qutbism is an exonym that refers to the Sunni Islamist beliefs and ideology of Sayyid Qutb, a leading Islamist revolutionary of the Muslim Brotherhood who was executed by the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966. Influenced by the doctrines of earlier Islamists like Hasan al-Banna and Maududi, Qutbism advocates Islamic extremist violence in order to establish an Islamic government, in addition to promoting offensive Jihad. Qutbism has been characterized as an Islamofascist and Islamic terrorist ideology.
Muhammad Nasir al-Din also known as Al-Albani, was an Albanian Shaykh known for being a leading hadith scholar in the 20th-century. A major figure in Islamic history, he began his journey in Syria, where his family had moved prior and where he was educated as a child.
Muhammad Rashīd Rida was an Islamic scholar, reformer, theologian and revivalist. An early Salafist, Rida called for the revival of hadith studies and, as a theoretician of an Islamic state, condemned the rising currents of secularism and nationalism across the Islamic world following the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate. He championed a global pan-Islamist program aimed at re-establishing an Islamic caliphate.
Jihadism is a neologism for modern armed militant Islamic movements that seek to establish states based on Islamic principles. In a narrower sense, it refers to the belief that armed confrontation is a theologically legitimate method of socio-political change towards an Islamic system of governance.
Islamic extremism refers to extremist beliefs, behaviors and ideologies adhered to by some Muslims within Islam. The term 'Islamic extremism' is contentious, encompassing a spectrum of definitions, ranging from academic interpretations of Islamic supremacy to the notion that all ideologies other than Islam have failed and are inferior.
Rabeeʿ bin Hādī ʿUmayr al-Madkhalī is a Saudi Muslim scholar who is the eponym of the Madkhali strain of Salafism, which is influenced by his teachings. He was formerly a professor at the Islamic University of Madinah, where he headed the Sunnah Studies Department. He was most active in the 1990s and early 2000s. He was praised by fellow Salafi scholars al-Uthaymin and Ibn Baz. Another Salafi scholar called al-Albani also praised him and described him as the leader of criticism and praise, although he himself later rejected the title. He is reverentially known as ash-Shaykh al-Allāmah among his Salafi followers, and Shaykh Dr. Khalid al-Dhafiri has described him as a Mujaddid.
Muqbil bin Hadi bin Muqbil bin Qa’idah al-Hamdani al-Wadi’i al-Khallali was an Islamic scholar in Yemen. He was the founder of a Madrasa in Dammaj which was known as a centre for Salafi ideology and its multi-national student population. Muqbil was noted for his fierce criticisms of the Egyptian Islamist writer Sayyid Qutb.
Islamic modernism is a movement that has been described as "the first Muslim ideological response to the Western cultural challenge", attempting to reconcile the Islamic faith with values perceived as modern such as democracy, civil rights, rationality, equality, and progress. It featured a "critical reexamination of the classical conceptions and methods of jurisprudence", and a new approach to Islamic theology and Quranic exegesis (Tafsir). A contemporary definition describes it as an "effort to re-read Islam's fundamental sources—the Qur'an and the Sunna, —by placing them in their historical context, and then reinterpreting them, non-literally, in the light of the modern context."
Salafi jihadism, also known as Salafi-jihadism, jihadist Salafism and revolutionary Salafism, is a religiopolitical pro-Sunni Islamist ideology that seeks to establish a global caliphate through armed militant means. In a narrower sense, jihadism refers to the belief that armed confrontation with political rivals is an efficient and theologically legitimate method of socio-political change. The Salafist interpretation of sacred Islamic texts is "in their most literal, traditional sense", which adherents claim will bring about the return to "true Islam".
In the context of political aspects of the religion of Islam, political quietism has been used to refer to the religiously-motivated withdrawal from political affairs or skepticism that mere mortals can establish a true Islamic government. It is the opposite of political Islam, which holds that the Islamic religion and politics are inseparable, and Muslims should be fighting to establish true Islamic government.
Salafism and Sufism are two major scholarly movements which have been influential in Sunni Muslim societies. The debates between Salafi and Sufi schools of thought have dominated the Sunni world since the classical era, splitting their influence across religious communities and cultures, with each school competing for scholarly authority via official and unofficial religious institutions. The relationship between Salafism and Sufism — whose interpretations of Islam differ — is historically diverse and reflects some of the changes and conflicts in the Muslim world.
LIPIA is a Saudi educational institution established in Jakarta, Indonesia. The college is a branch of the Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The main purpose is to teach Arabic and Islam. The college has been accused of promoting a fundamentalist view of Islam, harbouring political Islamists and Salafists.
Sailaifengye or Salafiyah refers to the Chinese Salafi Movement.
Starting in the mid-1970s and 1980s, Salafism and Wahhabism — along with other Sunni interpretations of Islam favored by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies — achieved a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."
Following the embargo by Arab oil exporters during the Israeli-Arab October 1973 War and the vast increase in petroleum export revenue that followed, the international propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism within Sunni Islam favored by the conservative oil-exporting Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies achieved a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam." The Saudi interpretation of Islam not only includes Salafiyya but also Islamist/revivalist Islam, and a "hybrid" of the two interpretations.
The 2016 conference on Sunni Islam in Grozny or shortly Chechnya Conference was convened to define the term "Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah", i.e. who are "the people of Sunnah and majority Muslim community", and oppose Takfiri groups. The conference was held in the Chechen Republic capital of Grozny from 25 to 27 August 2016, sponsored by the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, supported by Vladimir Putin, and attended by approximately 200 Muslim scholars from 30 countries, especially from Russia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, Sudan, Jordan, etc. at the invitation of Yemeni scholar, Ali al-Jifri.
The Battle of Sirte took place on January 6, 2020 during the Second Libyan Civil War. The Libyan National Army of Marshal Khalifa Haftar took the city from the forces of the Fayez el-Sarraj Government.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
