This article is about the issue of politics in the religion of Islam. For the movement "Political Islam", see Political Islam. For the movement "Islamism", see Islamism.
Political aspects of the religion of Islam are derived from its religious scripture (the Quran holy book, ḥadīth literature of accounts of the sayings and living habits attributed to the Islamic prophetMuhammad, and sunnah),[1][2] as well as elements of political movements and tendencies followed by Muslims or Islamic states throughout its history.[3] Shortly after its founding, Islam's prophet Muhammad became a ruler of a state.[4] The intertwining of religion and state in Islam (and the idea that "politics is central" to Islam)[5] as compared to its related neighboring religion Christianity (where adherents are urged to "render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God",[5] has been both celebrated[5] and belittled.[6]
Traditional political concepts in Islam which form an idealized model for Islamic rule, are based on the rule of Muhammad in Mecca (629–632 CE) and his elected or selected successors, known as rāshidūn ("rightly-guided") caliphs in Sunnī Islam and Imams in Shīʿa Islam. Concepts include obedience to the Islamic law (sharīʿa); pledging of obedience by the ruled to rulers (al-Bayʿah), with a corresponding duty of rulers to rule justly and seek consultation (shūrā) before making decisions;[7] and the importance of rebuking unjust rulers,[8] and the supremacy of unity, solidarity and community, over individual rights and diversity.[9] Classical Islamic thought (according to Olivier Roy,[a] is "overflowing with treatises on governing, advice to sovereigns, and didactic tales", but has little or nothing to say that reflects "on the nature of politics" in general.[10]
Early Islam arose within the historical, social, political, economic, and religious context of Late Antiquity in the Middle East,[24] in the life and times of the Islamic prophetMuhammad and his successors.[25][b] According to the traditional account,[30][31] the Islamic prophetMuhammad was born in Mecca around the year 570 CE.[32] His family belonged to the Arab clan of Quraysh, which was the chief tribe of Mecca and a dominant force in western Arabia.[31][33] To counter the effects of anarchy, they upheld the institution of "sacred months" when all violence was forbidden and travel was safe.[34] The polytheistic Kaaba shrine in Mecca and the surrounding area was a popular pilgrimage destination, which had significant economic consequences for the city.[34][35]
While Muhammad's region had tribes, it did not have a state.[36] Unlike its neighboring major religion, Christianity, (whose adherents were a minority in their region and subject "to suspicion and often to persecution" among Israelites and Romans until the conversion of Emperor Constantine), Islam formed a state very early.[37]Daniel Pipes argues that it had little choice.
Muhammad founded a religious community ex nihilo. He lived in western Arabia, a stateless region where tribal affiliations dominated all of public life. A tribe protected its members (by threatening to take revenge for them), and it provided social bonds, economic opportunities, as well as political enfranchisement. An individual lacking tribal ties had no standing; he (she) could be robbed, raped, and killed with impunity. If Muhammad was to attract tribesmen to join his religious movement, he had to provide them with an affiliation no less powerful than the tribe they had left behind. Thus did Muslim leaders offer a range of services resembling those of tribal chiefs, protecting their followers, organizing them for wars of booty, dispensing justice, and so forth.[38]
The real intentions of Muhammad regarding the spread of Islam, its political undertone, and his missionary activity (da’wah) during his lifetime are a contentious matter of debate, which has been extensively discussed both among Muslim scholars and non-Muslim scholars within the academic field of Islamic studies.[39] Various authors, Islamic activists, and historians of Islam have proposed several understandings of Muhammad's intent and ambitions regarding his religio-political mission in the context of the pre-Islamic Arabian society and the founding of his own religion. Larry Poston asks,[39]
Was it in Muhammad's mind to produce a world religion or did his interests lie mainly within the confines of his homeland? Was he solely an Arabnationalist—a political genius intent upon uniting the proliferation of tribal clans under the banner of a new religion—or was his vision a truly international one, encompassing a desire to produce a reformed humanity in the midst of a new world order? These questions are not without significance, for a number of the proponents of contemporary da’wah activity in the West trace their inspiration to the prophet himself, claiming that he initiated a worldwide missionary program in which they are the most recent participants. [...] Despite the claims of these and other writers, it is difficult to prove that Muhammad intended to found a world-encompassing faith superseding the religions of Christianity and Judaism. His original aim appears to have been the establishment of a succinctly Arab brand of monotheism, as indicated by his many references to the Qurʾān as an Arab book and by his accommodations to other monotheistic traditions.[39]
Journalist historian Thomas W. Lippman also points out the emphasis in the Quran on the "Arabness" of Muhammad's mission and of Muhammad's "professed intension" to bring a (holy) book to people who had none — "that is, to the Arabs".[40]
Most likely Muhammad was "intimately aware of Jewish belief and practices", and acquainted with the Ḥanīf.[29][41] Like the Ḥanīf, Muhammad practiced Taḥannuth, spending time in seclusion at Mount Hira and "turning away from paganism."[42][43] When he was about 40 years old, he began receiving at mount Hira' what Muslims regard as divine revelations delivered through the angelGabriel, which would later form the Quran. These inspirations urged him to proclaim a strict monotheistic faith, as the final expression of Biblical prophetism earlier codified in the sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity; to warn his compatriots of the impending Judgement Day; and to castigate social injustices of his city.[c] Muhammad's message won over a handful of followers (the ṣaḥāba) and was met with increasing opposition from Meccan notables.[45][d] In 622 CE, a few years after losing protection with the death of his influential uncle ʾAbū Ṭālib ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, Muhammad migrated to the city of Yathrib (subsequently called Medina) where he was joined by his followers.[46] Later generations would count this event, known as the hijra, as the start of the Islamic era.[47]
In Yathrib, where he was accepted as an arbitrator among the different communities of the city under the terms of the Constitution of Medina, Muhammad began to lay the foundations of the new Islamic society, with the help of new Quranic verses which provided guidance on matters of law and religious observance.[47] The surahs of this period emphasized his place among the long line of Biblical prophets, but also differentiated the message of the Quran from the sacred texts of Christianity and Judaism.[47] Armed conflict with the Arab Meccans and Jewish tribes of the Yathrib area soon broke out.[48] After a series of military confrontations and political manoeuvres, Muhammad was able to secure control of Mecca and allegiance of the Quraysh in 629 CE.[47] In the time remaining until his death in 632 CE, tribal chiefs across the Arabian peninsula entered into various agreements with him, some under terms of alliance, others acknowledging his claims of prophethood and agreeing to follow Islamic practices, including paying the alms levy to his government, which consisted of a number of deputies, an army of believers, and a public treasury.[47]
In Islam, "the Qurʾān is conceived by Muslims to be the word of God spoken to Muḥammad and then passed on to humanity in exactly the same form as it was received".[50] Some commands did not extend past the life of Muhammad, such as ones to refer quarrels to Allah and Muhammad or not to shout at or raise your voice when talking to Muhammad.[51] Out of the approximately 6000 verses of the Quran, 250–300 deal with legal aspects of "civil, criminal, moral, community, family and personal affairs",[52] and of these verses only a relatively small number concern issues of a "political nature".[53] Also limiting its political relevance is the fact that the Quran doesn't mention "any formal and continuing structure of authority", only orders to obey Muhammad,[51] and that its themes were of limited use when the success of Islam meant governance of "a vast territory populate mainly peasants, and dominate by cities and states" alien to nomadic life in the desert.[54] Historian Thomas W. Lippman finds only the verse enjoying men to "conduct their affairs by mutual consent" as a general advice in the Quran on leading a community.[55]
While the Quran doesn't dwell on politics, it does make mention of concepts such as "the oppressed" (mustad'afeen), "emigration" (hijra), the "Muslim community" (Ummah), and "fighting" or "struggling" in the way of God (jihād), that can have political implications.[56] A number of Quranic verses (such as 4:98) talk about the mustad'afeen, which can be translated as "those deemed weak", "underdogs", or "the oppressed", how they are put upon by people such as the pharaoh, how God wishes them to be treated justly, and how they should emigrate from the land where they are oppressed (4:99). Abraham was an "emigrant unto my Lord" (29:25). War against "unbelievers" (kuffār) is commanded and divine aid promised, although some verses state this may be when unbelievers start the war and treaties may end the war. The Quran also devotes some verses to the proper division of spoils captured in war among the victors. War against internal enemies or "hypocrites" (munāfiḳūn) is also commanded.[56]
In 622 CE, in recognition of his claims to prophethood, Muhammad was invited to rule the city of Medina. At the time the local Arab tribes of Aus and Khazraj dominated the town, and were in constant conflict. Medinans considered Muhammad as an impartial outsider who could resolve the conflict. Muhammad and his followers thus moved to Medina, where about the same year as his arrival,[e][f][g][h] Muhammad drafted a document often called the Constitution of Medina. It constituted a formal agreement between Muhammad and all of the significant tribes and families of Yathrib (later known as Medina), including Muslims, Jews, Christians,[63] and Arab Pagans.[64][65][66] and dealt with tribal affairs during Muhammad's time in Medina[67]
The document was drawn up with the explicit concern of bringing to an end the bitter intertribal fighting between the clans of the Aws (Aus and Khazraj) within Medina. To this effect it instituted a number of rights and responsibilities for the Muslim, Jewish, Christian, and Pagan communities of Medina, bringing them within the fold of one community: the Ummah.[68] It formed the basis of the First Islamic State, a multi-religious polity under his leadership.[69][70][71][72] Many tribal groups are mentioned, including the Banu Najjar and Quraysh, as well as many tribal institutions, like vengeance, blood money, ransom, alliance, and clientage.[73] The laws Muhammad established during his rule, based on the Quran and his own doing, are considered by Muslims to be sharīʿa or Islamic law, which Islamic movements seek to re-establish in the present day. Muhammad gained a widespread following and an army, and his rule expanded first to the city of Mecca and then spread across the Arabian peninsula through a combination of diplomacy and military conquests.[25]
Alongside the growth of the Umayyad Caliphate, the major political development within early Islam in this period was the sectarian split and political divide between Sunnī, Shīʿa, and KharijiteMuslims; this had its roots in a dispute over the succession for the role of caliph.[30][75] Sunnīs believed the caliph was elective and any Muslim from the Arab clan of Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, might serve as one.[76] Shīʿītes, on the other hand, believed the proper leadership of the Muslim community (known as Imams) should be hereditary in the bloodline of Muhammad,[77] and thus all the caliphs (from the Shīʿa perspective), with the exceptions of Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and his firstborn son Ḥasan, were actually illegitimate usurpers.[76] However, the Sunnī sect emerged as triumphant in most regions of the Muslim world, with the exceptions of Iran and Oman; thus, most modern Islamic political ideologies and movements are founded in Sunnī thought. Muhammad's closest companions (ṣaḥāba), the four "rightly-guided" caliphs who succeeded him, continued to expand the Islamic empire to encompass Jerusalem, Ctesiphon, and Damascus, and sending Arab Muslim armies as far as the Sindh region.[78] The early Islamic empire stretched from al-Andalus (in modern day Spain) to the Punjab region (in modern day Pakistan) under the reign of the Umayyad dynasty.
Expansion of the Caliphate
The era of Muhammad's rule from Medina and the rule of his companions (the Rashidun Caliphate) was the era that Sunni Muslims look to as a model for Muslims to follow, but was also an era when Islam began its rapid expansion over a vast geographical area -- conquered the collapsing Sasanian Persian Empire and most of the Byzantine Empire.[25][30][74][31] In the centuries of islamic history to come this expansion was slowed (and even reversed in the era of Western colonization), nonetheless it was this era of military success that colored many rules of fiqh/sharia in governance and relations with foreign non-Muslins lands (division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, how to treat slaves captured from conquered people, how to divide up spoils from raids on the enemy, etc.).[79]
Selecting a leader
Election, shura
Western scholar of Islam, Fred Donner,[80][pageneeded] argues that the standard Arabian practice during the early caliphates was for the prominent men of a kinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death and elect a political leader from amongst themselves, although there was no specified procedure for this consultation or consultative assembly (shūrā).[80] Candidates were usually from the same lineage as the deceased leader but they were not necessarily his sons.[80] Capable men who would lead well were preferred over an ineffectual direct heir, as there was no basis in the majority Sunnī view that the head of state or governor should be chosen based on lineage alone.[80][pageneeded]
An important Islamic concept concerning the structure of ruling is the consultation (shūrā) with people regarding their affairs, which is the duty of rulers mentioned in two Quranic verses:
"...those who answer the call of their Lord and establish the prayer, and who conduct their affairs by Shura. [are loved by God]"[42:38]
"...consult them (the people) in their affairs. Then when you have taken a decision (from them), put your trust in Allah"[3:159] (3:153)[81]
In Sunnī Islam, the ideal selection process for the caliphs — who were successors of Muhammad in political authority and heads of the caliphate -- was to follow the "doctrine of elective succession", whereby the political representatives of the people, engaging in consultation (shūrā), choose the new caliph.[82] The model for this was the rāshidūn ("rightly-guided") caliphs — Abū Bakr (632–634), ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (644–656), and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (656–661)[83] — who were elected, (at least in the parlance of Sunni jurists).[84] According to Bernard Lewis, the case for consultation as opposed to "arbitrary personal rule", is supported "by a considerable body of material" in Muslim literature - "by traditionist ... by commentators ... and by numerous later writers in Arabic, Persian and Turkish". But despite all this recommendation, the doctrine of consultation only reaches the level of recommended (Mustahabb) not commanded (farḍ/wājib) in Islamic fiqh, and arbitrary rule is only condemned (Makruh), not forbidden (ḥarām/maḥzūr).[85]
Traditional Sunnī Muslim jurists agree that the shura, loosely translated as "consultation", is a function of the Islamic caliphate. The phrase used to denote those qualified to appoint or depose a caliph or another ruler on behalf of the Ummah, was Ahl al-Ḥall wa’l-‘Aḳd (Arabic: أهل الحلّ والعقد, lit.'those who are qualified to unbind and to bind' or sometimes 'the people of the solution and the contract').[87] Deliberations in the politics of the early caliphates, most notably the Rāshidūn Caliphate, were not "democratic" in the modern sense of the term; rather, decision-making power laid with a council (Majlis ash-Shura) of notable and trusted companions of Muhammad (ṣaḥāba) and representatives of different Arab tribes (most of them selected or elected within their tribes).[88]
The Majlis-ash-Shura advises the caliph. Al-Mawardi wrote that members of the majlis should satisfy three conditions: they must be just, they must have enough knowledge to distinguish a good caliph from a bad one, and must have sufficient wisdom and judgment to select the best caliph. Al-Mawardi also stated that in case of emergencies when there is no caliphate and no majlis, the people themselves should institute a council of majlis, select a list of candidates for the role of caliph, then the majlis should select from the list of candidates.[86][unreliable source?]
Real world governance
After the "Islamic Golden Age" of the Rashidun, selection increasingly took the form of the ruler/caliph (as the representative of the community), nominating his successor, often leading to a caliphal dynasty.[89] As the caliphate moved away from its ideal, caliphs were often times not only not elected but not in charge, becoming figureheads.[90]
One type of ruler not part of the Islamic ideal was the king, which was disparaged in the Quranic mentions of the Pharaoh, "the prototype of the unjust and tyrannical ruler" (18:70, 18:79) and elsewhere (28:34).[81]
Practically, for hundreds of years after the fall of the Rāshidūn Caliphate (7th century CE) and until the twentieth century, Islamic states tended to follow a system of government based on the coexistence of sultan and ulama following the rules of the sharia. This system has been compared (by Noah Feldman) to Western governments that possess an unwritten constitution (like the United Kingdom), and that possess separate, countervailing branches of government (like the United States) — which provided Separation of powers in governance. Unlike the three branches of government of the United States (and some other systems of government) — executive, legislative and judicial — Islamic states had two — the sultan and the ulama.[91] Feldman believes a symbol of the success of this system is the current popularity of the Islamist movement which seeks to restore the Islamist state.[91]
Olivier Roy also talks about a de facto separation of religious and non-religious "political power" in Islamic states, though he designates the caliph, not ulama, as the religious power center and the sultans and emirs as the "political power". This division was "created and institutionalized ... as early as the end of the first century of the hegira." No positive law was developed outside of sharia. The sovereign's religious function was to defend the Muslim community against its enemies, institute the sharia, ensure the public good (maslaha). The state was instrument to enable Muslims to live as good Muslims and Muslims were to obey the sultan if he did so. The legitimacy of the ruler was "symbolized by the right to coin money and to have the Friday prayer (Jumu'ahkhutba) said in his name."[92]
The legislative power of the caliph (or later, the sultan) was always restricted by the scholarly class, the ulama, a group regarded as the guardians of Islamic law. Since the sharia law was established and regulated by the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, this prevented the caliph from dictating legal results. Sharia-compliant rulings were established as authoritative based on the ijma (consensus) of legal Muslim scholars, who theoretically acted as representatives of the entire Ummah (Muslim community).[93] After law colleges (madrasa) became widespread beginning with the 11th and 12th century CE, students of Islamic jurisprudence often had to obtain an ijaza-t al-tadris wa-l-ifta ("license to teach and issue legal opinions") in order to issue valid legal rulings.[94] In many ways, classical Islamic law functioned like a constitutional law.[93]
British lawyer and journalist Sadakat Kadri argues that rather than countering the power of the rulers, a large "degree of deference" was shown to them by the ulama and this was at least at times "counterproductive". During much of the Abbasid caliphate, caliphs were figureheads serving at the mercy of the Sultans, who the ulama also feared:
When Caliph Al-Mutawakkil had been killed in 861, jurists had retroactively validated his murder with a fatwa. Eight years later, they had testified to the lawful abdication of a successor, after he had been dragged from a toilet, beaten unconscious, and thrown into a vault to die. By the middle of the tenth century, judges were solemnly confirming that the onset of blindness had disqualified a caliph, without mentioning that they had just been assembled to witness the gouging of his eyes.[90]
According to Noah Feldman, the Muslim legal scholars and jurists eventually lost their control over Islamic law due to the codification of sharia by the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century:[95]
How the scholars lost their exalted status as keepers of the law is a complex story, but it can be summed up in the adage that partial reforms are sometimes worse than none at all. In the early 19th century, the Ottoman empire responded to military setbacks with an internal reform movement. The most important reform was the attempt to codify Shariah. This Westernizing process, foreign to the Islamic legal tradition, sought to transform Shariah from a body of doctrines and principles to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars into a set of rules that could be looked up in a book. [...] Once the law existed in codified form, however, the law itself was able to replace the scholars as the source of authority. Codification took from the scholars their all-important claim to have the final say over the content of the law and transferred that power to the state.
Obedience and opposition
Muhammad's widow, Aisha, battling the fourth caliph Ali
According to scholar Moojan Momen, the verse
"O believers! Obey God and obey the Apostle and those who have been given authority [uulaa al-amr] among you" (Quran4:59),
is "one of the key statements in the Qur'an around which much of the exegesis" on the issue of what Islamic doctrine has to say about who should be in charge is based.
The importance of obedience to rulers has also been emphasized by
hadith quoting the Prophet saying:
"Whoever obeys me has obeyed Allah, and whoever disobeys me has disobeyed Allah; and whoever obeys the leader has obeyed me, and whoever disobeys the leader has disobeyed me";[96][97]
"... He who swears allegiance to a Caliph should give him the pledge of his hand and ... obey him to the best of his capacity. If another man comes forward (as a claimant to Caliphate), disputing his authority, they (the Muslims) should behead the latter. ... ".[98][97]
By scholars such as
Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328): "Better a century of tyranny than one day of chaos."[99][i]
Al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) wrote similarly: "necessity makes legal what would otherwise not be legal", that any ruler is better than chaos, no matter what the origin of his power. that even an unjust ruler should not be deposed if strife would follow and that the qualifications which the jurists regarded as necessary can be waived if otherwise civil strife would result. [101][102]
For Sunnīs, the expression "those who have been given authority" (uulaa al-amr) refers to the rulers (caliphs, sultans, kings), for Shīʿa these are usurpers and the true authorities are the Imams.[103] But there are also Quranic injunction to "enjoin good and forbid evil" (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-n-nahy ʿani-l-munkar, found in Quran3:104, Quran3:110, and other verses). This was the duty of every state functionary with charge over other Muslims, from the caliph to "the schoolmaster in charge of assessing children's handwriting exercises" (Ibn Taymiyya).[104][105]
Commenting on this conflict, British historian and Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis writes that the Quranic obedience verse (Q.4:59) was
elaborated in a number of sayings attributed to Muhammad. But there are also sayings that put strict limits on the duty of obedience. Two dicta attributed to the Prophet and universally accepted as authentic are indicative. One says, "there is no obedience in sin"; in other words, if the ruler orders something contrary to the divine law, not only is there no duty of obedience, but there is a duty of disobedience. This is more than the right of revolution that appears in Western political thought. It is a duty of revolution, or at least of disobedience and opposition to authority. The other pronouncement, "do not obey a creature against his creator," again clearly limits the authority of the ruler, whatever form of ruler that may be.[106]
Ibn Taymiyya (quoted earlier) also interprets "there is no obedience in sin" to mean that Muslims should ignore the order of the ruler if it would disobey the divine law. However, they should not use this as excuse for revolution because violence would mean the spilling of Muslim blood.[100]Ibn Ḥazm (994–1064) also agreed with total obedience unless the Quran or Sunnī population are violated, but asserts that an authority who does violate them should be prevented, punished and if that cannot be done, removed.[107][j]
Quietism and modernism
Outside the mainstream, one Islamic school of thought ("quietism"), holds that politics should be left to rulers alone, while another argues that historical caliphates notwithstanding, governance (like physics, medicine, etc.) is outside the realm of Islam.
Rationales for quietism may differ; they include agreement with the importance of obedience to political rulers, and the belief that it is duty of the Muslim population to practice piety, prayer, religious rituals, and personal virtue, rather than questioning their authority.[109] Alternately, quietism may refer to a temporary opposition to political activism, which will be lifted at the right time in the future, when (depending on the corresponding sect of Muslims) a consensus of Islamic scholars (in Sunnī Islam) or the twelfth Imam (in Twelver Shīʿa Islam) will call for it.[110]
Government in the time of the Prophet was not delegated from heaven in its details; people were left free to manage their affairs as they wish within the limits of fairness and justice. Furthermore, the Quran did not propose, in general terms or in detail, a political system, and the Prophet did not indicate who should be his successor either orally or in written form.[111]
Another author (Jebran Chemiah) notes that the two general comments on shura in the Quran say nothing further than that it is a good practice. The modality of the process, when, where and how shura should be used, whether the advise given must be followed, is not explained. Hadith, where obscure Quranic references are often explained when a theme from the Quran is thought worthy of explaining, say little or nothing. There is no evidence Muhammad held regular shura meetings with companions or ever felt their advice was binding on him when they gave it. [k]
Starting from the late medieval period, Sunni fiqh elaborated the doctrine of siyasa shar'iyya, which literally means governance according to sharia, and is sometimes called the political dimension of Islamic law. Its goal was to harmonize Islamic law with the practical demands of statecraft.[115] The doctrine emphasized the religious purpose of political authority and advocated non-formalist application of Islamic law if required by expedience and utilitarian considerations. It first emerged in response to the difficulties raised by the strict procedural requirements of Islamic law. The law rejected circumstantial evidence and insisted on witness testimony, making criminal convictions difficult to obtain in courts presided over by qadis (sharia judges). In response, Islamic jurists permitted greater procedural latitude in limited circumstances, such as adjudicating grievances against state officials in the mazalim courts administered by the ruler's council and application of "corrective" discretionary punishments for petty offenses. However, under the Mamluk sultanate, non-qadi courts expanded their jurisdiction to commercial and family law, running in parallel with sharia courts and dispensing with some formalities prescribed by fiqh. Further developments of the doctrine attempted to resolve this tension between statecraft and jurisprudence. In later times the doctrine has been employed to justify legal changes made by the state in consideration of public interest, as long as they were deemed not to be contrary to sharia. It was, for example, invoked by the Ottoman rulers who promulgated a body of administrative, criminal, and economic laws known as qanun.[116]
Shīʿa Muslims, who believe that ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and his descendants (Imams) should have been the leaders of the Muslim community, evolved from a political party to a religious sect after the massacre of Ali's son Husayn and his followers by an Umayyad force at Karbala in 680 CE. The tragedy of the event, with its themes of "martyrdom and persecution ... sacrifice, guilt and expiation" around the suffering of those killed, wickedness of those who did the killing, the penitence of those who failed save the victims, are commemorated annually by Shia.[117] Along with their status through the centuries as religious minorities under rulers they regard as usurpers, this created a difference not only in outlook but in "political attitudes and behavior" from the Sunni.[117]
While there have been several Shi'i dynasties over the course of Islamic history, with a short exception of Ali's rule, the Shi'i Imam's never ruled. (In the largest Shi'i sect, Twelvers, the last Imam -- Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥujjah -- went into occultation", i.e. disappeared in 878.) Consequently, in Shīʿa Islam, the attitude towards non-Imam rulers (i.e. what Shia considered usurpers) tended towards three approaches — political cooperation with the ruler, political activism challenging the ruler, and aloofness from politics. The "writings of Shi'i ulama through the ages" showed "elements of all three of these attitudes."[118]
Islamic extremism dates back to the early history of Islam with the emergence of the Kharijites in the 7th century CE.[75] The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿa and the Sunnīs during the First Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[75] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be either infidels (kuffār) or false Muslims (munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed them worthy of death for their perceived apostasy (ridda).[75][119][120]
The Islamic tradition traces the origin of the Kharijites to the battle between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya at Siffin in 657 CE. When ʿAlī was faced with a military stalemate and agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration, some of his party withdrew their support from him. "Judgement belongs to God alone" (لاَ حُكْكْ إلَا لِلّهِ) became the slogan of these secessionists.[75] (Kharijites believing the victor in combat would be God's choice.) They also called themselves al-Shurat ("the Vendors"), to reflect their willingness to sell their lives in martyrdom.[121]
The original Kharijites opposed both ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya, and appointed their own leaders. They were decisively defeated by ʿAlī, who was in turn assassinated by a Kharijite. They engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Umayyads, but only became a movement to be reckoned with during the Second Fitna (the second Islamic Civil War) when they at one point controlled more territory than any of their rivals. The Kharijites were, in fact, one of the major threats to ʿAbd Allāh bin al-Zubayr's bid for the caliphate; during this time they controlled the central region of Yamama and most of Southern Arabia, and captured the oasis town of al-Ṭāʾif.[121]
The Azāriḳa, an extremist faction of the Kharijites founded by Nāfiʿ bin al-Azraḳ al-Ḥanafī al-Ḥanẓalī in Basra (683 CE), controlled parts of Western Iran under the Umayyads until they were finally overthrown in 699 CE.[122] According to al-Ashʿarī, their leader Nāfiʿ bin al-Azraḳ was the first to cause disputes among the Kharijites by supporting the thesis according to which all adversaries should be put to death together with their women and children (istiʿrāḍ).[122] Because of their readiness to declare any opponent as apostate, the Kharijite movement was divided and started to fragment into smaller groups, from which the Ibāḍites derived.[122] The more moderate Ibāḍi Kharijites were longer-lived, continuing to wield political power in North and East Africa, and in Eastern Arabia during the Abbasid period, and are the only Kharijite group to survive into modern times.
By the time that Ibn al-Muqaffa' wrote his political treatise early in the Abbasid period, the Kharijites were no longer a significant political threat, at least in the Islamic heartlands. The memory of the menace they had posed to Muslim unity and of the moral challenge generated by their pious idealism still weighed heavily on Muslim political and religious thought, however. Even if the Kharijites could no longer threaten, their ghosts still had to be answered.[121]
In the early modern period between 1453 and 1526, three major states were founded by Muslim dynastic monarchies—in the Mediterranean (Ottoman), Iran (Safavid), and South Asia (Mughal). They were known as the Gunpowder empires[123][124] for their use and development of the newly invented firearms, especially cannon and small arms, which allow them to expand and centralize their empires. By the early 17th century, the descendants of their founders controlled much of the Muslim world, stretching from the Balkans and North Africa to the Bay of Bengal, with a combined population estimated at between 130 and 160 million.[125][126]
In addition to military advances, the economic development and worldwide colonization and exploration of Europeans and westerners meant their merchants had a vast array of products and commodities from across the world to sell to Muslims—including products (sugar, coffee, paper) that had originally been Muslim export products but that Westerners could now grow more cheaply in their colonies.[146] Furthermore, the middlemen handling and profiting from the new western imports were usually not Muslims but foreigners or religious minorities (usually Christians), “seen and treated” as marginal.[147] After World War II, colonies in Africa and Asia were freed but the new decolonized states were fragmented, no longer empires, and Western economic influence remained, and went well beyond commodities.[citation needed]
Reaction to European colonialism
The fight for Islamic resurgence against Western encroachment might be divided into two contrasting approaches: meeting the enemy on its own terms and fighting "him with his own weapons",[148] on the battlefield, in politics and in general by "modernizing".[149] Or alternately with religious revival, since Islam is by definition superior to all faiths, failures and defeats in the temporal world must mean that those defeated Muslims are practicing authentic Islam and their states are not authentic Islamic states. Muslims must then return to the pure authentic Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, discarding innovations and accretions to achieve victory over disbelievers.[150]
The first Muslim reaction to European colonization was of "peasant and religious", not urban origin. "Charismatic leaders", generally members of the ulama or leaders of religious orders, launched the call for jihad and formed tribal coalitions. Islamic law (sharīʿa), in defiance of local common law, was imposed to unify tribes. Examples include Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, Muhammad Ahmad in Sudan, Shamil in the Caucasus, the Senussi in Libya and Chad, Mullah-i Lang in Afghanistan, the Akhund of Swat in India, and later, Abd al-Karim in Morocco. Despite "spectacular victories" such as the annihilation of the British army in Afghanistan in 1842 and the taking of Kharoum in 1885, all these movements eventually failed [151]
The second Muslim reaction to European encroachment later in the century and early 20th century was not violent resistance but the adoption of some Western political, social, cultural and technological ways. Members of the urban elite, particularly in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey, advocated and practiced "Westernization".[152] The failure of the attempts at political Westernization, according to some, was exemplified by the Tanzimat reorganization of the Ottoman state. Islamic law (sharīʿa) was codified into civil law (which was called the Mecelle) and an elected legislature was established to make law. These steps took away the ulama's role of "discovering" the law and the formerly powerful scholar class weakened and withered into religious functionaries, while the legislature was suspended less than a year after its inauguration and never recovered to replace the ulama as a separate "branch" of government providing separation of powers.[152] The "paradigm of the executive as a force unchecked by either the sharia of the scholars or the popular authority of an elected legislature became the dominant paradigm in most of the Sunni Muslim world in the 20th century."[153]
Pan-Islamism (in the sense of "Islamic unity or at least cooperation")[154] was promoted in the Ottoman Empire during the last quarter of the 19th century by the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II[155] for the purpose of preventing secession movements of the Muslim peoples within the empire's territories and mobilizing Muslim opinion in support of "the faltering Ottoman state".[154]
Early movement leaders
The major leaders of the Pan-Islamist movement were the triad of Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Sayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935). All were active in anti-colonial efforts to confront European penetration of Muslim lands, believed Islamic unity to be the strongest force to mobilize Muslims against imperial domination.[156]
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (who was actually from Iran, not Afghanistan, and brought up Shīʿa, not Sunnī)[157][158] was an Islamic political activist who travelled throughout the Muslim world during the late 19th century urging pan-Islamic unity in colonial India against the British Empire.[159][160] Al-Afghani's ideology has been described as a welding of "traditional" religious antipathy toward non-Muslims "to a modern critique of Western imperialism and an appeal for the unity of Islam", urging the adoption of Western sciences and institutions that might strengthen Islam.[161] He was thought to not have any deep faith in Islam,[162] nor in a constitutional government—which he doubted was a viable political alternative in the Islamic world[163]—but was very interested in the overthrow of any Muslim rulers he saw as lax and/or subservient and their replacement with ones who were strong and patriotic.[164]
Muhammad Abduh
Muhammad Abduh, an EgyptianIslamic scholar,[165]judge,[165] and Grand Mufti of Egypt,[166][1][167][168] was a central figure of the Arab Nahḍa (awakening), and Islamic Modernism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[11][169] Twice exiled by the British, he was a devoted follower of Al-Afghani,[170] he helped publish a newspaper in Paris with him calling for a return to the original principles and ideals of Islam, and greater unity among Islamic peoples. As a qāḍī in Egypt, he was involved in many decisions, some of which were considered quite liberal, such as calling for Muslims to accept interest on loans and meat butchered by non-Muslims.[171] He promoted both religious and scientific education.[172]
Islamic jurist Muhammad Rashid Rida—a student of Abduh and Afghani—positioned himself as the successor to those two pan-Islamists and anti colonialists. He called for a unified Islam based on revival of the Islamic caliphate led by Arabs and the reformation of Muslims.[173] Inspired by stories of the purity of the early eras of Muhammad and the Rashidun, he was more interested in Wahhabism than modernism, and preached for a puritanical Islam where Islamic law (sharīʿa) was implemented. According to Rida, the state-sponsored scholars neglected the revival of early Islamic traditions in the Muslim community (Ummah). His influential Islamic journal Al-Manār promoted anti-British revolt, as well as Islamic revivalism based on the tenets of Salafism (Salafiyya).
Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif and Emir of Mecca from 1908-1924,[175] enthroned himself as King of the Hejaz after proclaiming the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire,[11] and continued to hold both of the offices of Sharif and King from 1916 to 1924.[175] At the end of his reign he also briefly laid claim to the office of Sharifian Caliph; he was a 37th-generation direct descendant of Muhammad, as he belongs to the Hashemite family.[175] In 1916, with the promise of British support for Arab independence, he proclaimed the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, accusing the Committee of Union and Progress of violating tenets of Islam and limiting the power of the sultan-caliph. Shortly after the outbreak of the revolt, Hussein declared himself "King of the Arab Countries". However, his pan-Arab aspirations were not accepted by the Allies, who recognized him only as King of the Hejaz. In the aftermath of World War I, Hussein refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, in protest at the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of British and French mandates in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. He later refused to sign the Anglo-Hashemite Treaty and thus deprived himself of British support when his kingdom was attacked by Ibn Saud. After the Kingdom of Hejaz was invaded by the Al Saud-Wahhabi armies of the Ikhwan, on 23 December 1925 King Hussein bin Ali surrendered to the Saudis, bringing both the Kingdom of Hejaz and the Sharifate of Mecca to an end.[176]
Al-Banna emphasised that "Islam considers the government one of its pillars and relies on enforcement as much as on persuasion. ... The Prophet made 'government' one of the essential bonds of Islam and it is viewed in our books of jurisprudence as a part of the doctrine osul (fundamental) and not as a subsidiary foru. Islam consists of rule and execution, as well as of legislation and preaching. Neither part can be separated from the other."[178] Qutb and Maududi followed the rejectionist Islamic view of Muhammad Rashid Rida, condemning imitation of foreign ideas, including Western democracy, which they distinguished from the Islamic doctrine of shura (consultation between ruler and ruled). This perspective, which stresses comprehensive implementation of sharia, was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s among various movements seeking to establish an Islamic state, but its popularity has diminished in recent years.
Nostalgia for the days of successful Islamic empires simmering under later Western colonialism[177] played a major role in the Islamist political ideal of the Islamic state, a state in which Islamic law is preeminent.[179] The Islamist political program generally begins by re-shaping the governments of existing Muslim nation-states; but the means of doing this varies greatly across movements and circumstances. Many political Islamist movements, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood, focus on vote-getting and coalition-building with other political parties.
As Saudi Arabia became an enormously wealthy petroleum exporter, it used its funds to propagate the Wahhabi school of Islam through the Muslim world, spending over $75 billion from 1982 to 2005 via international organizations such as Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the International Islamic Relief Organization, etc. [l] to establish/build 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1,500 mosques, and 2,000 schools for Muslim children in Muslim and Non-Muslim majority countries.[203][204] Mosque funding was combined with persuasion to propagate the dawah Salafiyya;[17][202] schools were "fundamentalist" in outlook and formed a network "from Sudan to northern Pakistan".[205][206][207] Supporting proselytizing or preaching of Islam[m] has been called "a religious requirement" for Saudi rulers that cannot [or could not] be abandoned "without losing their domestic legitimacy" as protectors and propagators of Islam.[201]
Pan-Islam, Inter-Islamic conferences and religious protest
The first attempt at an inter-Islamic conference began in the later 19th century and "led nowhere". In the post World War II era, an informal bloc of Muslim countries worked together sometimes at the United Nations.[208] In 1954 a conference was convened in Mecca under President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt but was also unsuccessful.[209] A permanent, inter-Islamic body was successfully initiated in 1969, in 1971 the "Organisation of Islamic Cooperation" (now called the Organization of the Islamic Conference) was "first mooted", and in 1974 a summit conference was held at Lahore Pakistan.[208] As of the 1990s it had a permanent headquarters, a secretariat, and a number of subsidiary bodies, and was involved in religious, cultural, and economic matters. But on "politics or even diplomacy" it had "remarkably" little impact.[208]
While international pan-Islamic cooperation has gone much further than anything like it in the Christian world, an example of how the limited its results have been (according to historian Bernard Lewis), was the failure of Muslim states to unite in opposition to the 1979-1989 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite the aggression of the Soviets in crossing an international border into a Muslim country, executing its leader, and causing considerable death and destruction among the civilian population, the best that Muslim states working together could accomplish (thanks to the lobbying by Soviet allies the PLO, Syria, Algeria, Libya, etc.), were mildly worded resolutions passed at international conferences and the United Nations General Assembly, "requesting" that "foreign troops" (the Soviets were never mentioned by name) leave the country.[210] (Individual Muslims Muslim states were more assertive in aiding the Afghan population.)
Lewis argues that the true power of Islamic religiosity is found not in Pan-Islamism but in spontaneous movements within countries, two examples being the resistance to irreligious moves by Muslim state leaders. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba announced in 1960 that the loss of work and production during the month long Ramadān fast was a luxury that an underdeveloped country like Tunisia could not afford. Since fasting is suspended during jihad, he called for a "jihad" (i.e. struggle) to "obtain economic independence by development". Bourguiba was unable to obtain a fatwa from a religious leader for his "jihad", and the overwhelming majority of Tunisians ignored it in favor of the Ramadān fast.[211] Another failure of an Muslim majority state to move pious Muslims away from religion was the reaction to an article in the Syrian official army weekly Jaysh al-Sha'b in April 1967. It called for the formation of a "new Arab Socialist Man" who in the building of the new Arab civilization would dismiss not only capitalism and feudalism but religion and belief in heaven and hell. While prior to this the Syrian population had submitted to the authoritarian government's radical changes and abolition of constitutional rights, the article led to strikes and protests of tens of thousands. Unable to quell the uprising with force, the government felt compelled to confiscate all copies of the journal issue, blame the article on an "American-Israeli" conspiracy, and sentence the author to life in prison.[212]
Competition with nationalism and the political left
Ideologies coming from Europe that had for a time influence in the Muslim world included patriotism and liberalism in the 19th century.[215] In the 1920, when Kemal Ataturk won the first major Muslim victory against a Christian power for centuries, defeating the Greeks and "facing down the mighty British Empire", he went on to secularize his country, converting what was left of the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic, abolishing the caliphate, replacing sharia law, with Swiss Civil Code, Arabic script with the Latin alphabet, and adopting a range of European practices, Westernizing his country.[216] At first Ataturk's victory resounded throughout the Muslim world,[217] though he was later reviled as a traitor.[218]
Arabism as a "common nationality" was first launched in the "late 19th and early 20th centuries".[219] In the 1920s and 30s "nationalist leaders still dominated the political scene" in Muslim countries, and nationalist discourse alone was heard in public debate".[220]
However, with patriotism's fragmentation and liberalism's failure, others replaced them -- fascism in the 1930s, communism from the 1950s to the 1980.[215]
Between the 1950s and the 1960s, the predominant ideology within the Arab world was pan-Arabism, which de-emphasized religion and encouraged the creation of socialist, secular states based on Arab nationalist ideologies such as Nasserism and Baathism rather than Islam,[221][222][223] and called for a unified (very large) Arab state. Increasingly, the borders of these states were seen as artificial colonial creations - which they were, having literally been drawn on a map by European colonial powers.
Coups that overthrew conservative regimes, (usually monarchies), establishing revolutionary republican governments (nationalist and/or leftist) occurred in several Arab countries -- Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), North Yemen (1962) and Libya (1969).
However, governments based on Arab nationalism have found themselves facing economic stagnation and disorder. The quick and decisive defeat of the Arab countries (who had pledged to annihilated Israel) in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, "seriously undermined the ideological edifice" of Arab nationalism. Few years later the Islamist philosophy -- hitherto confined to small circles of Muslim Brothers -- came into this political vacuum.[224]
By the 1990s, the secular ideologies of "liberalism, nationalism, capitalism, socialism, communism" had "failed utterly" to resolve the problems of the Muslim world (according to Bernard Lewis);[225] and in the realm of political dissent in Muslim society, "from Cairo to Tehran, the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated" against colonialism, and imperialism, were now simply anti-Westernism, and marched beneath the green banner of Islam, no longer "the red or national flag" (according to Olivier Roy).[226] Ataturk's secularism was in retreat in Turkey.[227]
Opposition to political Islam
At least one historian (Jebran Chamieh) argues against the Islamist tenet that there is such a thing as "Islamic" state or government, i.e. one whose special rules and structure that can be drawn from studying the preaching and practices of Muhammad and early Muslims, and one that Muslims are obligated to at least strive to establish. While it is true Muhammad exercised the executive power, commanded armies, controlled the finances and revenues, made legal judgements, he created no organized system for these functions.
"Moreover, the Prophet had ample time before his death to organize the Moslem community politically. The most pressing measure was to establish a system for the legal transmission of power. He was aware of the rivalry among his followers over the succession and could have delegated his authority to prevent dissensions among them. But he did not. These observations lend credence to those who argue that the Prophet never intended to form a state and that his mission was purely religious."[228]
Chamieh also points out that this practice (or lack thereof) was followed by the Rashidun caliphate, who never established a "police force to keep law and order". When "the rebels attacked Caliph Othman in his house and assassinated him, no security measures were available to protect him. The caliphs did not establish an administration, a fiscal system, or a budget ... In the conquered lands, they retained the previous Byzantine and Persian administrative systems and kept the local employees to administer the country."[229]
Muslih and Browers identify three major Islamic theories on socio-political organization by prominent Islamic thinkers that conform to Islamic values and law. One Islamist view rejects democracy, but at least one other accommodates it:[230]
The moderate Islamist view stresses the concepts of maslaha (public interest), ʿadl (justice), and shura. Islamic leaders are considered to uphold justice if they promote public interest, as defined through shura. In this view, shura provides the basis for representative government institutions that are similar to Western democracy, but reflect Islamic rather than Western liberal values. Hasan al-Turabi, Rashid al-Ghannushi, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi have advocated different forms of this view.
The liberal Islamic view is influenced by Muhammad Abduh's emphasis on the role of reason in understanding religion. It stresses democratic principles based on pluralism and freedom of thought. Authors like Fahmi Huwaidi and Tariq al-Bishri have constructed Islamic justifications for full citizenship of non-Muslims in an Islamic state by drawing on early Islamic texts. Others, like Mohammed Arkoun and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, have justified pluralism and freedom through non-literalist approaches to textual interpretation. Abdolkarim Soroush has argued for a "religious democracy" based on religious thought that is democratic, tolerant, and just. Islamic liberals argue for the necessity of constant reexamination of religious understanding, which can only be done in a democratic context.
Muslim political opinion and theories
As of the late 20th century (1988) scholar Bernard Lewis testifies to the popular power of Islam, which
for the masses in most Muslim countries ... is still the ultimate criterion of group identity and loyalty. It is Islam which distinguishes between self and other, between insider and outsider, between brother and stranger ... Muslims find their basic identity in the religious community; that is to say, in an entity defined by Islam rather than by ethnic origin, language or country. ... For most Muslims, Islam is till the basis of political authority. Legitimacy is derived from Islam rather than from nationalist or patriotic claims, still less from Western notions of national or popular sovereignty.[231][232]
Opinion polls (2012, 2018)
Polls conducted by Gallup and Pew Research Center in Muslim-majority countries indicate that most Muslims see no contradiction between democratic values and religious principles, desiring neither a theocracy, nor a secular democracy, but rather a political model where democratic institutions and values can coexist with the values and principles of sharia.[233][234][235] Opinions in the polls varied by country.
2007 poll by Gallup found strong majorities in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan agreeing with the statement the Shari'a must be the only source of legislation, while majorities in Indonesia and Iran agreed that in should be a "a source but not the only source", and a majority in Turkey thought in should not be a source.[235]
In a 2012 poll, Pew found that strong majorities in Pakistan, Jordan and Egypt believed that laws should strictly follow the teachings of the Quran, while less than a quarter polled agreed in Turkey, Tunisia and Lebanon.[234]
Another Pew poll the following year of Muslims in 37 countries around the world found most supported democracy over a strong leader, and strong support for the toleration of non-Muslims practicing their religion. At the same time, many Muslims agreed that religious leaders should influence political matters and that Islamic political parties were just as good or better than non-Islamic political parties, with more religious respondents more likely to support religious leaders in politics.[236]
Islamic political attitudes
Based on the Pew and Gallup opinion polls, Western scholars John Esposito and Natana J. DeLong-Bas distinguish four attitudes toward sharia and democracy prominent among Muslims, as of 2018:[237]
Advocacy of democratic ideas, often accompanied by a claim that they are compatible with Islam, which can play a public role within a democratic system, as exemplified by many protestors who took part in the Arab Spring uprisings;[237]
Support for democratic procedures such as elections, combined with religious or moral objections toward some aspects of Western democracy seen as incompatible with sharia, as exemplified by Islamic scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi;[237]
Rejection of democracy as a Western import and advocacy of traditional Islamic institutions, such as shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus), as exemplified by supporters of absolute monarchy and radical Islamist movements;[237]
Belief that democracy requires restricting religion to private life, held by a minority in the Muslim world.[237]
With the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the traditional TwelverShia Islamic attitude towards politics (either political cooperation with the ruler, political activism challenging the ruler, or aloofness from politics)[118] shifted strongly towards political activism. (The revolution's leader Ruhollah Khomeini proclaiming "Islam is the religion of politics with its all dimensions. It is very clear for those who have the least knowledge of political, economic and social aspects of Islam.")[238][n]
The largest, wealthiest and most solidly Shi'i country (Iran) had an Islamist revolution and its radical change in ideology affected the rest of the Shi'i world.[15]
The new revolutionary regime was based on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's principle of applying Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilāyat al-Faqīh) towards government. Twelvers believe that in the absence of (what Twelvers believe is) the religious and political leader of Islam—the "infallible Imam", who Shi'a believe will reappear sometime before Judgement Day) -- righteous Shi'i jurists (faqīh),[240] should administer "some" of the "religious and social affairs" of the Shi'i community. In its "absolute" form—the form advanced by the AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini[241] and the basis of government in Islamic Republic of Iran—the state and society are ruled by an Islamic jurist (Ali Khamenei as of 2022).
The theory was a variant of Islamism, holding that since sharia law has everything needed to rule a state (whether ancient or modern),[242] and any other basis of governance will lead to injustice and sin,[243] a state must be ruled according to sharia and the person who should rule is an expert in sharia.[244]
The theory of sovereignty of the Guardianship of the Jurist (in fact of all Islam) explained by at least one conservative Shi'i scholar (Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi), is contrasted with the theory of sovereignty in "most of the schools of political philosophy and other cultures". Non-Muslim cultures hold that "every man is free", and in democratic cultures in particular, "sovereignty ... belongs to the people". A ruler and government must have the consent of the governed to have political legitimacy. Whereas in fact, sovereignty is God's. The "entire universe and whatever in it belongs to God ... the Exalted, and all their movements and acts must have to be in accordance with the command or prohibition of the Real Owner". Consequently, human beings "have no right to rule over others or to choose someone to rule", i.e. choose someone to rule themselves.[245] In an Islamic state, rule must be according to God's law and the ruler must be best person to enforce God's law. The people's "consent and approval" are valuable for developing and strengthening the Islamic government but irrelevant for its legitimacy.[245]
According to the Iranian-American academic Vali Nasr, [o] political tendencies of Shīʿa and Sunnī Islamic ideologies began to differ significantly following the Iranian Revolution. Sunnī fundamentalism "in Pakistan and much of the Arab world" was not "politically revolutionary". Rather than trying to change the political system through revolutionary struggle, it was primarily focused on attempting to Islamicize the political establishment. Iran, however was very interested in exporting its revolutionary ideas, and its conception of political Islam involved Ruhollah Khomeini's ideas on fighting oppression of the poor and class war, which characterized the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran:[15]
With the Shia awakening of Iran, the years of sectarian tolerance were over. What followed was a Sunni-versus-Shia contest for dominance, and it grew intense. [...] The revolution even moved leftists in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Lebanon to look at Islam with renewed interest. After all, in Iran, Islam had succeeded where leftist ideologies had failed. [...] But admiration for what had happened in Iran did not equal acceptance of Iranian leadership. Indeed, Islamic activists outside of Iran quickly found Iranian revolutionaries to be arrogant, offputting, and drunk on their own success. Moreover, Sunni fundamentalism in Pakistan and much of the Arab world was far from politically revolutionary. It was rooted in conservative religious impulses and the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values. As the French scholar of contemporary Islam Gilles Kepel puts it, it was less to tear down the existing system than to give it a fresh, thick coat of "Islamic green" paint. Khomeini's fundamentalism, by contrast, was "red"—that is, genuinely revolutionary.[15]
The American political analyst and author Graham E. Fuller, specialized in the study of Islamism and Islamic extremism, has also noted that he found "no mainstream Islamist organization (with the exception of [Shīʿa] Iran) with radical social views or a revolutionary approach to the social order apart from the imposition of legal justice."[246]
Salafi jihadism, (such as Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, ISIS), Sunni Salafism of those who seek to establish a global caliphate through armed armed struggle. Salafi jihadism is often described as "religiopolitical"Islamist and an "ideology". Notwithstanding this they have not engaged in any traditional political (as opposed to murderous or religious) activities. Al Qaeda, for example, has had "no political branch, union, women's organization, student branch or press, and there are no fellow-travelers. The `masses` are left on the pavement ... In this sense Al Qaeda is more a mafia or a sect than a professional underground organisation." [257]
Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries a unique and "major shift" in governance has taken place in much of the Muslim world,[263] namely that "the traditional institutions that once sustained and propagated Islamic orthodoxy -- have been dismantled". Prior to the twentieth century, the governments Islamic states tended to follow a system based on a balanced coexistence of sultan and ulama where the Islamic legal scholars made sure the rules of the sharia were adhered to. But modern Muslim states have much more power than pre-colonial states vis-a-vis the Islamic clergy, who have been "transformed" by the modern states "into salaried employees". The private endowments (awqaf) of the clergy, that gave them independence, have been taken over by the state.[263] Also contributing to the weakening of the juristic scholarly class and their moderating influence in Islam has been the international propagation of Wahhabism and allied conservative schools of Islam by Saudi Arabian petroleum exporting funds. It has led to the growth of expressions of puritanical intolerance (Abou El Fadl argues), including Salafi Jihadism with its terror attacks on civilians.[263] Legal scholar Noah Feldman credits the beginning of this process with the Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire that codified Sharia into law [called the Mecelle] replacing Islamic legal jurists.[264] Feldman believes it is no coincidence that the collapse of the influence of independent scholars of Islamic law has coincided with the rise of Islamist movements calling for enforcement of Islamic (sharia) law.[91]
Some modern political interpretations regarding the role of the Majlis ash-Shura include those expressed by the Egyptian Islamist author and ideologue Sayyid Qutb, prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Palestinian Muslim scholar and propagandist Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, founder of the pan-Islamist political party Hizb ut-Tahrir.[265] In an analysis of the shura chapter of the Quran, Qutb argued that Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually the elite), within the general context of divine laws that the ruler must execute. Al-Nabhani argued that the shura is important and part of "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate, "but not one of its pillars", and may be neglected without the caliphate's rule becoming un-Islamic. However, these interpretations formulated by Qutb and al-Nabhani are not universally accepted in the Islamic political thought, and Islamic democrats consider the shura to be an integral part and important pillar of Islamic political system.[265]
↑ The second half of the 6th century CE saw political disorder in the pre-IslamicArabian peninsula, and communication routes were no longer secure.[26]Religious divisions played an important role in the crisis.[27]Judaism became the dominant religion of the Himyarite Kingdom in Yemen after about 380 CE, while Christianity took root in the Persian Gulf.[27] There was also a yearning for a more "spiritual form of religion", and "the choice of religion increasingly became an individual rather than a collective issue."[27] While some Arabs were reluctant to convert to a foreign faith, those Abrahamic religions provided "the principal intellectual and spiritual reference points", and Jewish and Christian loanwords from Aramaic began to replace the old pagan vocabulary of Arabic throughout the peninsula.[27] The Ḥanīf ("renunciates"), a group of monotheists that sought to separate themselves both from the foreign Abrahamic religions and the traditional Arab polytheism,[28] were looking for a new religious worldview to replace the pre-Islamic Arabian religions,[28] focusing on "the all-encompassing father god Allah whom they freely equated with the Jewish Yahweh and the Christian Jehovah."[29] In their view, Mecca was originally dedicated to this monotheistic faith that they considered to be the one true religion, established by the patriarch Abraham.[28][29]
↑ "Key themes in these early recitations include the idea of the moral responsibility of man who was created by God and the idea of the judgment to take place on the day of resurrection. [...] Another major theme of Muhammad's early preaching, [... is that] there is a power greater than man's, and that the wise will acknowledge this power and cease their greed and suppression of the poor."[44]
↑ "At first Muhammad met with no serious opposition [...] He was only gradually led to attack on principle the gods of Mecca. [...] Meccan merchants then discovered that a religious revolution might be dangerous to their fairs and their trade."[44]
↑ W.M. Watt argues that the initial agreement was shortly after the hijra and the document was amended at a later date specifically after the battle of Badr (AH [anno hijra] 2, = AD 624).[57]
↑ R. B. Serjeant argues that the constitution is in fact eight different treaties which can be dated according to events as they transpired in Medina with the first treaty being written shortly after Muhammad's arrival. [58][59]
↑ Julius Wellhausen argues that the document is a single treaty agreed upon shortly after the hijra, and that it belongs to the first year of Muhammad’s residence in Medina, before the battle of Badr in 2/624. Wellhausen bases this judgement on three considerations; first Muhammad is very diffident about his own position, he accepts the Pagan tribes within the Umma, and maintains the Jewish clans as clients of the Ansars[60][61]
↑ Moshe Gil, a skeptic of Islamic history, argues that it was written within five months of Muhammad's arrival in Medina.[62]
↑ also attributed to Ibn Taymiyya is: "sixty years with an unjust imam is better than one night without a sultan"[100]
↑ Author Jebran Chamieh notes that with no mechanism, no legal authority to determine when divine law has been violated, these principles are of limited use.)[108]
↑ As for the people who are to be consulted in shura -- Ahl al-Hal Wal 'Aqd -- Chemiah notes they have been given a name but not criteria for choosing them.[112] He quotes Islamic jurist Zafer Qasemi of Damascus: "This was an Islamic constitutional invention for which I could not find an explicit text in the Quran or sunna. For that reason, the expression remained a hypothetical speculation discussed by jurists, and transmitted from one generation to the next, with no impact on Islamic political life. I have searched in vain for the origin of this expression, but could not find who first proclaimed, or used it. I am certain that because this principle was never used, it remained theoretical and ambiguous."[113][114]
↑ various royal charities)[201] Led by Prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz, Minister of Defense at the time, who became king in January 2015. and religious attaches at dozens of Saudi embassies,[17][202]
↑ dawah (literally "making an invitation" to Islam)
↑ As for minority Shi'i groups, Zaidiyyah and Isma'ilis do not currently play an active "religious-political" role, at least according to Jebran Chamieh.[239]
↑ Litvak, Meir (2021). "Islamic Radical Movements and Antisemitism: Between Old and New". In Lange, Armin; Mayerhofer, Kerstin; Porat, Dina; Schiffman, Lawrence H. (eds.). An End to Antisemitism! – Volume 5: Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp.133–148. doi:10.1515/9783110671964-009. ISBN9783110671964.
↑ "Chapter 1. "A Prophet Has Appeared, Coming with the Saracens": Muhammad’s Leadership during the Conquest of Palestine According to Seventh- and Eighth-Century Sources". The Death of a Prophet: The End of Muhammad's Life and the Beginnings of Islam, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, pp. 18-72. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812205138.18
↑ Volker Popp, Die frühe Islamgeschichte nach inschriftlichen und numismatischen Zeugnissen, in: Karl-Heinz Ohlig (ed.), Die dunklen Anfänge. Neue Forschungen zur Entstehung und frühen Geschichte des Islam, Berlin 2005, pp. 16–123 (here p. 63 ff.)
↑ Under the Umayyad caliphʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān, the Dome of the Rock was built in Jerusalem (691–692). There the word Islām appears for the first time. Until this moment the Muslims called themselves simply "believers", and coins were minted in the Arabic empire showing Christian symbols. Ibn Marwān also plays a major role in the reworking of the Quranic text. See: Patricia Crone / Michael Cook: Hagarism (1977) p. 29; Yehuda D. Nevo: Crossroads to Islam: The Origins of the Arab Religion and the Arab State (2003) pp. 410-413; Karl-Heinz Ohlig (Hrsg.): Der frühe Islam. Eine historisch-kritische Rekonstruktion anhand zeitgenössischer Quellen (2007) pp. 336 ff.
↑ Album, Stephen; Bates, Michael L.; Floor, Willem (30 December 2012) [15 December 1992]. "COINS AND COINAGE". Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol.VI/1. New York: Columbia University. pp.14–41. doi:10.1163/2330-4804_EIRO_COM_7783. ISSN2330-4804. Archived from the original on 17 May 2015. Retrieved 23 May 2022. As the Arabs of the Ḥejāz had used the drahms of the Sasanian emperors, the only silver coinage in the world at that time, it was natural for them to leave many of the Sasanian mints in operation, striking coins like those of the emperors in every detail except for the addition of brief Arabic inscriptions like besmellāh in the margins. [...] In the year 79/698 reformed Islamic dirhams with inscriptions and no images replaced the Sasanian types at nearly all mints. During this transitional period in the 690s specifically Muslim inscriptions appeared on the coins for the first time; previously Allāh (God) had been mentioned but not the prophet Moḥammad, and there had been no reference to any Islamic doctrines. Owing to civil unrest (e.g., the revolt of ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān b. Ašʿaṯ, q.v., against Ḥajjāj in 81/701), coins of Sasanian type continued to be issued at certain mints in Fārs, Kermān, and Sīstān, but by 84/703 these mints had either been closed down or converted to production of the new dirhams. The latest known Arab-Sasanian coin, an extraordinary issue, is dated 85/704-05, though some mints in the east, still outside Muslim control, continued producing imitation Arab-Sasanian types for perhaps another century.
↑ "The very first question a biographer has to ask, namely when the person was born, cannot be answered precisely for Muhammad. [...] Muhammad's biographers usually make him 40 or sometimes 43 years old at the time of his call to be a prophet, which [...] would put the year of his birth at about 570 A.D." F.Buhl & A.T.Welch, Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd ed., "Muhammad", vol.7, p.361.
↑ Watt, William Montgomery. Muhammad at Medina. pp. 227-228
↑ R. B. Serjeant. "The Sunnah Jâmi'ah, Pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the Tahrîm of Yathrib: Analysis and Translation of the Documents Comprised in the so called 'Constitution of Medina'." in The Life of Muhammad: The Formation of the Classical Islamic World: Volume iv. Ed. Uri Rubin. Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998, p. 151
↑ see same article in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 41 (1978): 18 ff. See also Caetani. Annali dell’Islam, Volume I. Milano: Hoepli, 1905, p.393.
↑ Julius Wellhausen. Skizzen und Vorabeiten, IV, Berlin: Reimer, 1889, p 82f
↑ Moshe Gil. "The Constitution of Medina: A Reconsideration." Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): p. 45.
↑ R. B. Serjeant, "Sunnah Jāmi'ah, pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the Tahrīm of Yathrib: analysis and translation of the documents comprised in the so-called 'Constitution of Medina'", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (1978), 41: 1-42, Cambridge University Press.
1 2 3 Feldman, Noah, Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, Princeton University Press, 2008, p.6
↑ Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam by Olivier Roy, translated by Carol Volk, Harvard University Press, 1994, p.14-15
1 2 Feldman, Noah (March 16, 2008). "Why Shariah?". The New York Times. Retrieved 2008-10-05.
↑ Makdisi, George (April–June 1989). "Scholasticism and Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West". Journal of the American Oriental Society. 109 (2): 175–182 [175–77]. doi:10.2307/604423. JSTOR604423.
↑ Ajlani, Monir, Abqaritar al-Islam fi Usul al-Hukm (The Genius of Islam in the Principles of Government), Dar al-Nafa'es, Beirut, 1985, p.126, quoted in Chamieh 1992, p.78
↑ Qaemi, Zafer (1982). Nezam al-Hokm fil Shari'a wal Tarikh al-Islami (The System of Government in the Sharia and Islamic History). Vol.1. Beirut: Dar al-Nafa'es. pp.232–236.
↑ Bosworth, C.E.; Netton, I.R.; Vogel, F.E. (2012). "Siyāsa". In P. Bearman; Th. Bianquis; C.E. Bosworth; E. van Donzel; W.P. Heinrichs (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nded.). Brill. doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1096.(subscription required)
1 2 3 4 Huemer, Anna (2022). "Effeminate Rulers, Brave Soldiers? "Foreign" Masculinities in Selected Travelogues of Habsburg Diplomats in the Ottoman Empire". In Gruber, Doris; Strohmeyer, Arno (eds.). On the Way to the "(Un)Known"?: The Ottoman Empire in Travelogues (c. 1450–1900). Studies on Modern Orient. Vol.36. Berlin and Heidelberg: De Gruyter. pp.317–336. doi:10.1515/9783110698046-016. ISBN978-3-11-069804-6.
↑ Soykut, Mustafa (January 2013). Brentjes, Sonja; Harper, James G.; Ricci, Giovanni (eds.). "Review: "Permeable Borders of Faith and Politics: The Ottomans and Safavids in the Western Eye"". Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 56 (3). Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers: 503–513. doi:10.1163/15685209-12341317. ISSN0022-4995. JSTOR43303561.
↑ Morris, T.A. (1998). Europe and England in the Sixteenth Century. London, New York: Routledge. p.19. ISBN041515040X. Retrieved 21 March 2025. ... the high point of Ottoman power was passed by the time that [Suleiman] had died on campaign in ... 1566. Four generations of Europeans by this time had lived in fear of Turkish power and of the fanaticism of Islamic warriors, and the place of the 'cruel Turk' in the Western European mentality was assured.
↑ Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (I. B. Tauris, 2004; 2011), pp. 42–43.
Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," International Journal 61 (Winter 2005/6): 19–38.
↑ Howard, Douglas A. "Genre and myth in the Ottoman advice for kings literature," in Aksan, Virginia H. and Daniel Goffman eds. The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2007; 2009), 143.
↑ Richard Netton, Ian (2008). "'Abduh, Muhammad (1849–1905)". Encyclopedia of Islamic Civilisation and Religion. London and New York: Routledge. pp.5–6. ISBN978-0-7007-1588-6. .. [Abduh became] a member of the Council of al-Azhar in 1895 and Chief Mufti (Legal Official) in 1899.
↑ E. Campo, Juan (2009). Encyclopedia of Islam. New York: Facts On File, Inc. pp.5–6. ISBN978-0-8160-5454-1.
1 2 3 4 Hunt, Michael (2014). The World Transformed, 1945 to the Present. New York City: Oxford. p.495. ISBN978-0-19-937102-0.
↑ Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983), pp. 131–132
↑ Kerr, Malcolm H. (2010). "'Abduh Muhammad". In Hoiberg, Dale H. (ed.). Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol.I: A-ak Bayes (15thed.). Chicago, IL: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. pp.20–21. ISBN978-1-59339-837-8.
↑ Kügelgen, Anke von. "ʿAbduh, Muḥammad." Encyclopaedia of Islam, v.3. Edited by: Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas and Everett Rowson. Brill, 2009. Syracuse University. 23 April 2009.
↑ "The Pan-Islamic Movement". The Times. London, England. March 13, 1902.
↑ Ali, Muhamad (2016). "4: Controlling Politics and Bureaucratising Religion". Islam and Colonialism: Becoming Modern in Indonesia and Malaya. The Tun, Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press. p.150. ISBN978-1-4744-0920-9.
↑ Robert Worley, Duane (2012). "6: Post-Cold War Strategies". Aligning Ends, Ways, and Means. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University. p.168. ISBN978-1-105-33332-3.
1 2 Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p.95. ISBN9780670021185. The Kingdom's 70 or so embassies around the world already featured cultural, educational, and military attaches, along with consular officers who organized visas for the hajj. Now they were joined by religious attaches, whose job was to get new mosques built in their countries and to persuade existing mosques to propagate the dawah wahhabiya.
↑ Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (11 August 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". cfr.org. The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 4 September 2014. Retrieved 21 August 2014. ... money that brought Wahabis power throughout the Arab world and financed networks of fundamentalist schools from Sudan to northern Pakistan.
↑ According to diplomat and political scientist Dore Gold, this funding was for support for Saudi approved Islam in Non-Muslim countries alone. Gold, Dore (2003). Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. Regnery. p.126.
↑ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p.234. A former US Treasury Department official is quoted by Washington Post reporter David Ottaway in a 2004 article [Ottaway, David The King's Messenger New York: Walker, 2008, p.185] as estimating that the late king [Fadh] spent `north of $75 billion` in his efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam. According to Ottaway, the king boasted on his personal Web site that he established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1500 mosques, and 2000 schools for Muslim children in non-Islamic nations. The late king also launched a publishing center in Medina that by 2000 had distributed 138 million copies of the Koran worldwide.
↑ Kepel, Gilles (2006). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. p.72. ISBN9781845112578. founded in 1962 as a counterweight to Nasser's propaganda, opened new offices in every area of the world where Muslims lived. The league played a pioneering role in supporting Islamic associations, mosques, and investment plans for the future. In addition, the Saudi ministry for religious affairs printed and distributed millions of Korans free of charge, along with Wahhabite doctrinal texts, among the world's mosques, from the African plains to the rice paddies of Indonesia and the Muslim immigrant high-rise housing projects of European cities. For the first time in fourteen centuries, the same books ... could be found from one end of the Umma to the other... hewed to the same doctrinal line and excluded other currents of thought that had formerly been part of a more pluralistic Islam.
↑ Ali, Muhamad (2016). "4: Controlling Politics and Bureaucratising Religion". Islam and Colonialism: Becoming Modern in Indonesia and Malaya. The Tun, Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press. p.150. ISBN978-1-4744-0920-9.
↑ Robert Worley, Duane (2012). "6: Post-Cold War Strategies". Aligning Ends, Ways, and Means. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University. p.168. ISBN978-1-105-33332-3.
↑ Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002 (p.63)
↑ Muslih, Muhammad; Browers, Michaelle (2009). "Democracy". In John L. Esposito (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Archived from the original on June 11, 2017.
↑ Lewis, Bernard (1988). The Political Language of Islam. University of Chicago Press. pp.4, 5.
↑ Esposito, John L.; DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2011). Shariah: What Everyone Needs to Know(PDF) (2nded.). Oxford University Press. p.162. Strong support for Shariah, despite examples past and present of its abuse, is reflected in the Gallup World Polls in 2006 and 2007, which found that large majorities of Muslims, both women and men, in many and diverse Muslim countries from Egypt to Malaysia, wanted Shariah as "a" source of law. While they did not want a theocracy, they did want a more democratic government that also incorporated Islamic values.
↑ Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic by Ervand Abrahamian. pp.34–5.
1 2 Mesbah-Yazdi, Mohammad-Taqi (2010). "1: Wilayat al-Faqih, Exigency and Presuppositions". In Husayni, Sayyid ‘Abbas (ed.). A Cursory Glance at the Theory of Wilayat al-Faqih. Ahlul Bayt World Assembly/Al-Islam.org. Retrieved 25 August 2022.
↑ Fuller, Graham E., The Future of Political Islam, Palgrave MacMillan, (2003), p.26
↑ Olivier Roy, Failure of Political Islam, (1994) pp.30–31
Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam[Echec de l'Islam Politique]. Translated by Volk, Carol. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Roy, Olivier (2004). Globalized Islam: the Search for a New Ummah. Columbia University Press.
Marina Ottoway, et al., "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East", Carnegie Endowment for Ethics and International Peace, Policy Brief 20 (October 20, 2002).
Raja, Masood Ashraf. "Muslim Modernity: Poetics, Politics, and Metaphysics". Gabriele Marranci, ed. Muslim Societies and the Challenge of Secularization: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Aberdeen: Springer, 2010: 99–112.
Wright, Steven (2007). The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror. Ithaca Press. ISBN978-0-86372-321-6.
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