Criticism of Buddhism

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Criticism of Buddhism has taken numerous different forms, including philosophical and rational criticisms, but also criticism of praxis, such as that its practitioners act in ways contrary to Buddhist principles or that those principles systemically marginalize women. There are many sources of criticism, both ancient and modern, stemming from other religions, the non-religious, and other Buddhists.

Contents

Doctrine

Karma

Buddhist karma and karmic reincarnation are feared to potentially lead to fatalism and victim blaming. Paul Edwards says that karma does not provide a guide to action. Whitley Kaufman, in his 2014 book, cross-examines that there is a taut relationship between karma and free will and that if karma existed, then evil would not exist because all victims of evil just get "deserved". [1] Sallie B. King writes that karma often leads to stigmatization of people with disabilities and people of lower social status (e.g., Dalits in India), especially for people with disabilities, as the Buddha's own words in the Cūlakammavibhanga Sutta are used to justify the stigmatization. [2]

Whitley Kaufman offers five criticisms of karma: [3]

  1. The Memory Problem: People have never found reliable evidence for the existence of reincarnation, and therefore, people have no way of knowing the specifics of the evils they have done in their past lives, and naturally, they cannot atone for them, which brings the whole theory closer to the theory of vengeance.
  2. The Proportionality Problem: It is difficult to determine the evaluative relationship between a person's good and bad behavior.
  3. The Infinite Regress Problem: Karma leads to the problem of infinite regression, where one cannot know where the first karma came from.
  4. The Problem of Explaining Death: Since death is often viewed as the greatest evil in Buddhism, but everyone inevitably experiences death, this may weaken the rigor of the karma discourse.
  5. The Free Will Problem: Karma's existence contradicts free will.

Miracles

Buddhist texts contain a range of paranormal phenomena, such as the Buddha's mysterious origins, and some Buddhists claim that the Buddha himself levitated while meditating. Scottish philosopher David Hume, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , was skeptical of all religious miracles and advocated treating them in the same light. [4] [5]

Sectarianism in Buddhism

Buddhist scholars use terms such as "early Buddhism" to describe Buddhism before the early religious schisms. About a hundred years after the death of the Buddha, the Buddhist community began to conduct gatherings such as "councils" to resolve the divisions that existed at that time. However, a series of schisms still occurred, leading to the birth of many schools of Buddhism, and Buddhists sometimes use very pejorative terms to characterize other schools that do not share their beliefs. [6] [7]

Women in Buddhism

Women are often depicted in traditional Buddhist texts as deceitful and lustful. A later Chinese text [a] states that a woman's body is "a vessel of impurity, full of stinking filth. It is like a rotten pit ... like a toilet, with nine holes pouring all sorts of filth." [8] Isaline Blew Horner and Diana Mary Paul are worried about the discrimination against almswomen and laywomen in Indian Buddhism. [9] Kawahashi Noriko observes that the contemporary Buddhist community in Japan is rife with two views, one that women are inherently incompetent and the other that women need to be dependent on men for their liberation; and that the Japanese Buddhist community has consistently ignored women themselves, as well as feminist critique. [10]

Criticism by other religions

Criticism by Jains

Shrimad Rajchandra

A Jain critique of Buddhist philosophy is articulated in the Chapter 7 (verse 62-70) of Atmasiddhi Shastra , a 19th century text by Shrimad Rajchandra. It is a long poetry as a dialogue in which a disciple raises doubts about the existence and permanence of the soul, and the Guru responds with systematic refutations of Buddhist positions, especially the doctrine of momentariness (kshanikvaad) and the denial of a self. [11]

  • Soul and the body - The Buddhist view that the soul is born with the body and perishes at death is rejected. According to the Guru, consciousness cannot be explained as a mere function of bodily elements, since matter is insentient and lacks awareness. To reduce awareness to physical processes is therefore incoherent. [12]
  • Momentariness and change - The disciple points to the constant fluctuation of emotions such as anger and affection as evidence that the so-called soul itself is momentary. The Guru replies that such fluctuations prove the existence of a persisting knower who experiences these changing states. Without continuity of the subject, memory and recognition across time would be impossible. [13]
  • Problem of witness - If the soul were continually created and destroyed, no valid witness would be able to verify this. The body cannot bear witness, being insentient and itself being transient, and the soul cannot testify to its own non existence as it wasn't existing before its creation and after its destruction as per the claim. To invoke another witness leads to infinite regress. The claim of perpetual arising and perishing therefore lacks coherence. [14]
  • Consciousness as irreducible - The Guru argues that consciousness cannot be produced from material associations. Non conscious substances cannot generate awareness, for consciousness by nature knows itself and others. Rather than being a product of combinations, the soul is the knower of combinations. [15]
  • Matter and awareness as distinct - Jain reasoning insists on the distinctness of matter and consciousness. Matter remains inert regardless of transformations, while awareness is intrinsic only to the soul. Neither can be reduced to the other, and the Buddhist attempt to collapse this distinction is therefore rejected. [16]
  • Indestructibility - What is not created cannot be destroyed. Since the soul is not a product of material causes, it is not subject to annihilation. The permanence of the soul follows from its uncreated nature. [17]
  • Inborn tendencies - Innate tendencies evident from birth, such as fear, cruelty, or compassion, are explained as impressions carried over from previous lives. Their presence without training or social conditioning supports the view of a pre existent soul that persists across successive embodiments. [18]
  • Permanence with change - Invoking the doctrine of manifold viewpoints (anekāntavāda), the Guru distinguishes between two perspectives. From the standpoint of substance (dravya naya), the soul is permanent with its qualities of bliss, knowledge. From the standpoint of modes (paryāyā naya), states (such as emotions, instincts, inclinations, beliefs) arise and perish at every moment. Continuity of personal identity across childhood, youth, and old age illustrates permanence of substance amid changing modes. This nuanced view avoids both absolute permanence and absolute momentariness. [19]
  • Self contradiction of radical momentariness - The doctrine that everything ceases instantly is said to refute itself. To assert that “all is momentary” requires a persisting subject who remembers the doctrine and utters it at a later time. Radical momentariness cannot account for continuity of thought, memory, or speech. [20]
  • Conservation of substances - The Guru draws on the principle that no substance is utterly destroyed but only transformed. A seed and soil become a sprout, a tree, flower, and fruit, but the underlying substance (matter) continues. If this holds true for inert matter, then consciousness must also be indestructible. The permanence of each soul is affirmed by this universal law of conservation. [21] In this manner Shrimad Rajchandra articulates a rebuttal of Buddhist absolute momentariness and soul denial, affirming instead that while the soul’s states are transient, its substance is eternal and indestructible. [22]

Pandit Todarmal

Another example of extensive review of Buddhism appears in the 18th century Jain text Mokshmarg Prakashak written by Pandit Todarmal. [23]

Todarmal begins by highlighting Buddhist teaching of Four Noble Truths and five skandhas (form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness). He rejects the Buddhist claim that these aggregates are inherently sorrowful, arguing that knowledge (vijñāna) and perception (saṃjñā) cannot themselves be suffering. [24] According to Jain reasoning, passions such as anger, greed, and attachment are the real sources of sorrow, whose nature is fleeting and is experienced by a permanent soul in ignorant state (wherein it identifies itself as body); and knowledge (especially the knowledge of self) is a liberating faculty. [25]

On the Buddhist concept of the āyatanas (twelve sense bases), Todarmal questions the purpose of listing them if, according to Buddhist thought, all phenomena are momentary. [26] He argues that continuity and interaction are inexplicable without a persisting substance. [27]

Similarly, the doctrine of samudaya (arising of suffering) is critiqued stating that if all elements are fleeting, then explaining causal relations and continuity of experience becomes incoherent. [28] Jain philosophy instead emphasizes the permanence of the soul, which underlies and experiences successive conditions. [29]

Todarmal also disputes the Buddhist path (mārga), which is described as cultivating insight into momentariness. [30] He argues that momentariness taken to its logical conclusion undermines the very purpose of religious practice including Buddhist practice of idol worship. [31] If everything, including the practitioner, exists only momentarily, then no lasting result such as liberation could be attained. [32]

The Buddhist conception of liberation ( nirvana ) is further questioned. While Buddhists describe liberation as the destruction of passions and even knowledge, Todarmal points out that knowledge is the intrinsic nature of the soul in Jain thought. [33] To destroy knowledge would mean to destroy the knower himself, rendering liberation self contradictory, and leaving a mystery that who attains liberation and from what, and who was in the bondage. [34]

Buddhist epistemology is also a target of Jain criticism. Todarmal notes that Buddhism recognizes only two valid means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). [35] He argues that if scripture is excluded, then Buddhist texts themselves cannot be considered authoritative. [36]

The external symbols of Buddhist monasticism such as the water pot, red robes, and the custom of alms-taking before noon are characterized by Todarmal as superficial postures inconsistent with the doctrine of impermanence. [37] Similarly, depictions of the Buddha in various poses are criticized as imaginative constructs, which he considers inconsistent with Buddhist claims to reject permanence and essence. [38]

Todarmal also surveys the four principal Buddhist schools of his time: Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka. [39] He characterizes their respective positions as speculative and mutually contradictory. [40] Through these critiques, Jain authors such as Todarmal also sought to defend the permanence of the soul, the centrality of knowledge, and the coherence of karmic continuity against Buddhist doctrines of impermanence, non-self, and limited epistemology. [41]

Taoism

Since the fall of the Han dynasty, Chinese Taoism and Buddhism have accused each other of copying their texts. Since at least 166, Taoism had propagated the idea that Laozi or one of his disciples went to India to become the Buddha to subdue the barbarians in the West. The Buddhists also fought back, and these debates continued until the middle of the 9th century. [42] [43]

Shinto

Hirata Atsutane, a Shinto fundamentalist and Japanese Kokugaku scholar, wrote a biography of the Buddha from a critical perspective. Atsutane's book was subsequently banned by the shogunate, but it was still widely disseminated among Japanese intellectuals and caused considerable embarrassment to the Buddhist community in Japan. [44]

See also

Notes

  1. The text is from the 转女身经 (The Sūtra on Transforming the Female Form), one version in Chinese originally reads: "此身便為不淨之器,臭穢充滿,亦如枯井、空城、破村[...] 此身如廁,九孔流出種種不淨".

References

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  2. Flanagan, Owen (22 June 2017). A Mirror Is for Reflection: Understanding Buddhist Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 168–171. ISBN   978-0-19-049979-2 . Retrieved 14 May 2024.
  3. Kaufman, Whitley R. P. (2005). "Karma, Rebirth, and the Problem of Evil". Philosophy East and West . 55 (1): 15–32. ISSN   0031-8221 . Retrieved 19 April 2024.
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Further reading