Iranian intervention in the Syrian civil war | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of foreign involvement in the Syrian civil war and the Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict | |||||||||
Iranian and Hezbollah's (marked in blue) military presence and influence in Syria as of December 2020 | |||||||||
| |||||||||
Belligerents | |||||||||
Iran-sponsored militias: In support of: Russia (airstrikes) [5] |
Supported by:
Jaysh al-Sunna (2013-17) [8] Supported by:
Supported by: |
Islamic State | Supported by: | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader of Iran) Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani † [18] [19] (Quds Force chief commander) Brig. Gen. Dariush Dorosti † [20] (IRGC commander) Maj. Abolghassem Zahiri (WIA) [2] (102nd Imam Hossein Battalion commander) Ahmad Gholami † (Iranian paramilitary commander) Brig. Gen. Razi Mousavi † (IRGC commander) [18] | Salem al-Meslet (President) Contents
Zahran Alloush † (Chief of Islamic Front)
| Abu Khayr al-Masri † [21] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi † | Zoran Birhat [25] | ||||||
Strength | |||||||||
2,000 soldiers according to the US (denied by Iran) [27]
5,000+ Iranian army soldiers (2015) [28] 10,000+ fighters (2017) [30] c. 2,000 al-Nujaba fighters [4] 120+ Naval Infantry advisors, several BMPs [31] [32] | ? | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Unknown | Unknown | Unknown |
From the 2000s until the fall of the Assad regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic were close strategic allies, and Iran provided significant support for the Syrian Ba'athist government in the Syrian civil war, including logistical, technical and financial support, as well as training and combat troops. Iran saw the survival of the Assad regime as being crucial to its regional interests. [38] [39] [40] When the uprising developed into the Syrian civil war, there were increasing reports of Iranian military support, and of Iranian training of the National Defence Forces both in Syria and Iran. [41] From late 2011 [42] and early 2012, Iran's IRGC sent tens of thousands of Iranian troops and Shi'ite foreign paramilitary volunteers in coordination with the Syrian government to prevent the collapse of the regime; thereby polarizing the conflict along sectarian lines. [43]
Iranian security and intelligence services advised and assisted the Syrian military in order to preserve the erstwhile Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's hold on power. [38] Those efforts included training, technical support, and combat troops. [38] [44] Estimates of the number of Iranian personnel in Syria ranged from hundreds to tens of thousands. [39] [45] [46] Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, backed by Iran's government, had taken direct combat roles from 2012 until 2024. [39] [47] [48] From the summer of 2013, Iran and Hezbollah provided important battlefield support for Assad, allowing it to make advances on the opposition. [47]
In 2014, coinciding with the peace talks at Geneva II, Iran stepped up support for Assad. [39] [47] Estimates of financial assistance range from tens to hundreds of billions of dollars. [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] Tehran's objectives included Shi'ification attempts through forced conversions, Shia missionary activities, establishment of shrines and demographic transformations by bringing in foreign Twelver Shia settlers in regime-controlled territories. [54] [42]
Iranian troops and allied militias on the ground were supported by ballistic missiles and air forces, including armed drones utilizing smart munitions. By October 2018, Iranian drones had launched over 700 strikes on Islamic State forces alone. [55] At the height of its intervention in 2015–18, an estimated 10,000 IRGC forces and 5,000 Iranian Army members were stationed in Syria alongside tens of thousands of Iranian-led foreign militias. In 2018, 2,000 officers of the Quds Forces commanded an estimated 131 military garrisons and tens of thousands of Iran-backed Shia jihadists across regime-controlled regions. [28] In 2023, Iran maintained 55 military bases in Syria and 515 other military points, the majority in Aleppo and Deir Ezzor governorates and the Damascus suburbs; these were 70% of the foreign military sites in the country. [56] On December 7, 2024, after severe military setbacks due to a series of rebel offensives, Iran and its proxies withdrew from Syria.
Iran saw the survival of the Syrian government as being crucial to its interest. Its only consistent ally since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Syria provided a crucial thoroughfare to Hezbollah in Lebanon. IRGC had boasted Syria as being Iran's "35th province", in addition to viewing Bashar al-Assad's Alawite dominated Ba'athist government as a crucial buffer against the influence of Saudi Arabia and the United States. [39]
The Syrian city of Zabadani was vitally important to Assad and to Iran because, at least as late as June 2011, the city served as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's logistical hub for supplying Hezbollah. [57] Prior to the Syrian war, Iran had between 2,000 and 3,000 IRGC officers stationed in Syria, who helped to train local troops and managing supply routes of arms and money to neighboring Lebanon. [39]
In April 2014, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iranian deputy foreign minister said, "We aren't seeking to have Bashar Assad remain president for life. But we do not subscribe to the idea of using extremist forces and terrorism to topple Assad and the Syrian government". [58] Using its increased leverage during the civil war, Iranian government had been recruiting Alawites by setting up Khomeinist religious centers to convert them to Twelver Shi'ism. It had also been attempting demographic shifts by bringing in foreign Shia settlers and families of IRGC soldiers across Syria. [28]
In the civil uprising phase of the Syrian civil war, Iran was said to be providing Syria with technical support, based on Iran's capabilities developed following the 2009–2010 Iranian election protests. [40]
In April 2011 U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice accused Iran of secretly aiding Assad in his efforts to quell the protests, [59] and there were reports of Syrian protesters hearing security-force members speaking Persian. [60]
The Guardian reported in May 2011 that the Iranian government was assisting the Syrian government with riot control equipment and intelligence monitoring techniques. [61] According to US journalist Geneive Abdo writing in September 2011, the Iranian government provided the Syrian government with technology to monitor e-mail, cell phones and social media. Iran developed these capabilities in the wake of the 2009 protests and spent millions of dollars establishing a "cyber army" to track down dissidents online. Iran's monitoring technology is believed to be among the most sophisticated in the world, perhaps only second to China. [40]
In May 2012, in an interview with the Iranian Students News Agency which was later removed from its website, the deputy head of Iran's Quds Force said that it had provided combat troops to support Syrian military operations. [62] It was alleged by the Western media that Iran also trained fighters from Hezbollah, a Shia militant group based in Lebanon. [63] Iraq, located between Syria and Iran, was criticized by the U.S. for allowing Iran to ship military supplies to Assad over Iraqi airspace. [64]
The Economist said that Iran had, by February 2012, sent the Syrian government $9 billion to help it withstand international sanctions. [44] It has also shipped fuel to the country and sent two warships to a Syrian port in a display of power and support. [65]
In March 2012, anonymous U.S. intelligence officials claimed a spike in Iranian-supplied arms and other aid for the Syrian government. Iranian security officials also allegedly traveled to Damascus to help deliver this assistance. A second senior U.S. official said members of Iran's main intelligence service, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, were assisting Syrian counterparts in charge of the crackdown. [66]
According to a U.N. panel in May 2012, Iran supplied the Syrian government with arms during the previous year despite a ban on weapons exports by the Islamic Republic. Turkish authorities captured crates and a truck in February 2012, including assault rifles, machine guns, explosives, detonators, 60 mm and 120 mm mortar shells as well as other items on its border. It was believed these were destined for the Syrian government. The confidential report leaked just hours after an article appeared in The Washington Post revealing how Syrian opposition fighters started to receive more, and better, weapons in an effort paid for by Persian Gulf Arab states and co-ordinated partly by the US. [67] The report investigated three large illegal shipments of Iranian weapons over the past year and stated "Iran has continued to defy the international community through illegal arms shipments. Two of these cases involved [Syria], as were the majority of cases inspected by the Panel during its previous mandate, underscoring that Syria continues to be the central party to illicit Iranian arms transfers." [68] More anonymous sources were cited by the UN in May 2012, as it claimed arms were moving both ways between Lebanon and Syria, and alleged weapons brought in from Lebanon were being used to arm the opposition. [69] The alleged spike in Iranian arms was likely a response to a looming influx of weapons and ammunition to the rebels from Gulf states that had been reported shortly before. [70]
On 24 July 2012, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp commander Massoud Jazayeri said Iranians would not allow enemy plans to change Syria's political system to succeed. [71]
In August 2012 Leon Panetta accused Iran of setting up a pro-Government militia to fight in Syria, and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff General Martin Dempsey compared it to the Mahdi Army of Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Panetta said that there was evidence that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were attempting to "train a militia within Syria to be able to fight on behalf of the regime". [72] 48 Iranians were captured by the FSA in Damascus, and U.S. officials said that the men who were captured were "active-duty Iranian Revolutionary Guard members". [73]
In September 2012, Western intelligence officials stated that Iran had sent 150 senior members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to preserve the Assad government, and had also sent hundreds of tons of military equipment (among them guns, rockets, and shells) to the Assad government via an air corridor that Syria and Iran jointly established. These officials believed that the intensification of Iranian support had led to increased effectiveness against the Free Syrian Army by the Assad government. [74]
According to rebel soldiers speaking in October 2012, Iranian Unmanned aerial vehicles had been used to guide Syrian military planes and gunners to bombard rebel positions. CNN reported that the UAV or drones—which the rebels refer to as "wizwayzi" were "easily visible from the ground and seen in video shot by rebel fighters".
Rebels have displayed captured aircraft they describe as Iranian-built drones — brightly colored, pilotless jets. They're accompanied by training manuals emblazoned with the image of Iran's revolutionary leader, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. [75]
In January 2013, a prisoner swap took place between the Syrian Rebels and the Syrian Government authorities. According to reports, 48 Iranians were released by the Rebels in exchange for nearly 2,130 prisoners held by the Syrian Government. Rebels claimed the captives were linked to the IRGC. [76] US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland described the Iranians as "members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard," calling it "just another example of how Iran continues to provide guidance, expertise, personnel, technical capabilities to the Syrian regime." [77]
Iran decided in June 2013 to send 4,000 troops to aid the Syrian government forces, described as a "first contingent" by Robert Fisk of The Independent , who added that the move underscored a Sunni vs. Shiite alignment in the Middle East. [78] IRGC soldiers, along with fellow Shi'ite forces from Hezbollah and members of Iran's Basij militia participated in the capture of Qusair from rebel forces on 9 June 2013. [1] [79] In 2014, Iran increased its deployment of IRGC in Syria. [39] Iran also proposed to open a new Syrian front against Israel in the Golan Heights, this coming a day after Egyptian President cut off diplomatic relations with Syria and demanded that Iran support for the pro Syrian-government Hezbollah end. [80] A Syrian official called the severing of relations by Morsi "irresponsible" and said it was part of a move by the U.S. and Israel to exacerbate divisions in the region. [81]
According to American officials questioned by journalist Dexter Filkins, officers from the Quds force have "coordinated attacks, trained militias, and set up an elaborate system to monitor rebel communications" in Syria from late 2012 to 2013. With help from the Hezbollah, and under the leadership of Quds Force general Qasem Soleimani, the al-Assad government won back strategic territory from rebels in 2013, in particular an important supply route during the Al-Qusayr offensive in April and May. [82]
In the fall of 2013 Iranian Brigadier General Mohammad Jamali-Paqaleh of the Revolutionary Guards was killed in Syria, while volunteering to defend a Shia shrine. [83] In February, General Hassan Shateri, also of the Revolutionary Guards, had been killed while travelling from Beirut to Damascus. [84]
Iran has stepped up support on the ground for Syrian President Assad, providing hundreds more military specialists to gather intelligence and train troops. This further backing from Tehran, along with deliveries of munitions and equipment from Moscow, is helping to keep Assad in power. [39] [47] This surge of support was in part a decision strongly promoted by Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds force, to exploit the outbreak of infighting between rebel fighters and the al-Qaeda inspired Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). [39]
A former Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces commander said that "top Quds force commanders were tasked with advising and training Assad's military and his commanders", adding that "Revolutionary Guards directed the fighting on the instructions of the Quds Force commanders". [47] In addition there are thousands of Iranian paramilitary Basij volunteer fighters as well as Shi'ites from Iraq. Former Iranian officials and a Syrian opposition source also put the count of those auxiliary forces in the thousands. [39] [47]
A Syrian opposition source said in recent months Iranian led forces had begun operating in coastal areas including Tartous and Latakia. They have local ID cards, wear Syrian military fatigues and work with the elite Syrian Air Force intelligence unit. [47]
The Wall Street Journal reported on 2 October 2015 that Iran's Revolutionary Guard (the IRGC) has had some 7,000 IRGC members and Iranian paramilitary volunteers operating in Syria and was planning to expand its presence in the country through local fighters and proxies. The Journal also reported that some experts estimate 20,000 Shiite foreign fighters are on the ground, backed by both Shiite Iran and Hezbollah. [85]
At least 121 IRGC troops, including several commanders, have been killed in the Syrian Civil War since it began. [86] [87] [88]
Key victories were achieved with substantial support provided by the Quds force, namely the al-Ghab plains battles, Aleppo offensives, Dara'aya offensives of 2015 and the al-Qusayr offensives which established government and Hezbollah control over the northern Qalamoun region and the border crossings from Lebanon to Syria. In June 2015, some reports suggested that the Iranian military were effectively in charge of the Syrian government troops on the battlefield. [89]
After the loss of Idlib province to a rebel offensive in the first half of 2015, the situation was judged to have become critical for Assad's survival. High level talks were held between Moscow and Tehran in the first half of 2015 and a political agreement was achieved. [90] On 24 July General Qasem Soleimani visited Moscow [91] to devise the details of the plan for coordinated military action in Syria. [90] [92]
In mid-September 2015, the first reports of new detachments from the Iranian revolutionary guards arriving in Tartus and Latakia in west Syria were made. With much of the Syrian Arab Army and National Defence Forces units deployed to more volatile fronts, the Russian Marines and Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) have relieved their positions by installing military checkpoints inside the cities of Slunfeh (east Latakia Governorate), Masyaf (East Tartus Governorate) and Ras al-Bassit (Latakia coastal city). [93] There were also further reports of new Iranian contingents being deployed to Syria in early October 2015. [94]
On 1 October 2015, citing two Lebanese sources, Reuters reported [95] that hundreds of Iranian troops had arrived in Syria over the previous 10 days to join Syrian government forces and their Lebanese Hezbollah allies in a major ground offensive backed by Russian air strikes that started on 30 September 2015 and were welcomed as vital by Bashar Assad. [96]
On 8 October 2015, brigadier general Hossein Hamadani, the deputy to General Qasem Soleimani in Syria was killed. [97] [98] [99] On 12 October, two more senior commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hamid Mokhtarband and Farshad Hassounizadeh, were reported by Iranian media to have been killed in Syria. [100]
At the end of October 2015, Iran agreed to take part in the Syria peace talks in Vienna. [101] The talks for the first time brought Iran to the negotiating table with Saudi Arabia, which are said to be engaged in a proxy war in Syria. [102] [103] The talks however were promptly followed by an exchange of sharp rebukes between Iran's and Saudi Arabia's top officials that cast doubt on Iran's future participation in those. [104] [105]
In November 2016, Iranian government announced the deaths of over a thousand of its military troops deployed to Syria, a rapid spike from the 400 deaths announced a few months earlier. [106]
In June 2017, Iran attacked militants' targets in the Deir Ezzor area in eastern Syria with ballistic missiles fired from western Iran. [107] As a result of these attacks (in an operation which was named as the missile operation of "Laylat al-Qadr"), [108] more than 170 forces of ISIS among a number of its commanders were killed. [109] [ unreliable source? ]
In May 2018, Iranian Quds forces based in Syria launched a 20 rockets attack on Israel. None of the rockets hit any targets and Israeli aircraft responded by extensively hitting both Syrian and Iranian military sites in Syria. [110]
In January 2019, the Israel Defense Forces confirmed that it had carried out strikes against Iranian military targets in Syria several hours after a rocket was intercepted over the Golan Heights. The Israeli military claimed in a statement that Quds Force positions were targeted and included a warning to the Syrian military against "attempting to harm Israeli forces or territory." [111]
Between 27 February and 3 March, 4 Iranians were killed by Turkish forces. [112] On 7 March, an IRGC commander, Farhad Dabirian, was reported to be killed a day earlier in the Sayyidah Zaynab neighborhood in Damascus, without giving details on the circumstances of his death. [113] On 18 March, an Iranian commander, Mehran Azizani, was announced to be killed by Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. [114] On 15 May, Another commander, Abu al-Fadl Sarlak, was announced to be killed probably by an Israeli airstrike in Khanasir. [115]
After a year of cease-fire deals and emergence of a frozen conflict, many high-ranking members of the Ba'athist leadership like Maher al-Assad and First Lady Asma al-Assad has been seeking the end of Iranian military presence and demanding the withdrawal of Shia militias. This was part of their reconciliation plan with other Arab countries of the region. Head of IRGC in Syria, Javad Ghaffari, was dismissed by Bashar al-Assad in November 2021 to curtail Iranian influence in regime-held territories; demonstrating growing resentment within government circles over continued Iranian presence. [116]
On 6 December, amid the collapse of Syrian government forces due to the rebel offensive launched in late November, the Iranian government began evacuating military commanders and personnel from Syria. Among those evacuated included several Quds Forces commanders, IRGC members, diplomatic staff and their families as well as Iranian citizens. Flights to Tehran, as well as land routes to Lebanon, Iraq and the port of Latakia were being utilized to transport the outgoing Iranians from the country. [117]
The fierce insistence of Iran's ruling clerics to engage actively in the Syrian crisis is driven by a sectarian strategy which depicts the conflict as a "religious war", [118] despite the considerable doctrinal differences between the Alawites and the Twelver Shiites and the traditional Arab nationalist and secular orientation of the ruling Baathist party.[ citation needed ]. Although the Assad government has enjoyed a political alliance with ruling clerics in Iran from the time of its establishment, this alliance is not driven by any common religious/sectarian causes; the Ba'ath government in Syria does not participate in Iranian religious issues, and the Ayatollahs in Iran do not consider Assad a Shiite partner. [119] [ verification needed ]
In a March 2018 ORB International poll of 1,011 adults across all of Syria's 14 governorates, 64% of Syrians said that Iran's influence on their country was "negative only", while 32% replied Iran's influence was "positive only". [120] Various factions of the Assad regime and many Ba'ath party supporters have also demanded the withdrawal of Hezbollah and other Iran-backed Khomeinist militant groups from Syria. [121]
Despite Iran's costly presence in Syria, public support for military involvement in Syria remains strong among the Iranians because of religious motivations and security concerns. [122] From January 2013 to March 2017, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps lost 2,100 soldiers in Syria and 7,000 wounded, according to Iran's veterans' affairs office. These included 418 ranking officers and several generals. [123] [124] In August 2017, Brigadier General Hamid Abazari stated that 25% of the soldiers that Iran had sent to Syria had been killed or wounded, [125] [126] implying several tens of thousands had served. In March 2019, IRGC officer and strategist Hassan Abbasi stated that 2,300 Iranians "went to Syria where they were martyred in recent years." [34] Ali Alfoneh of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy documented a minimum of 559 Iranian combat fatalities as of early 2018 [127] based on surveying funeral services in Iran. [128]
Thousands of Iranian-backed Afghan, Lebanese, Iraqi, Yemeni, Pakistani and other militia fighters have also been killed after joining IRGC-sponsored paramilitary organizations. The Afghans are recruited largely from Hazara refugees in Iran, and some had combat experience before joining; their relation to the Iranian military is only vaguely acknowledged and sometimes denied, despite the troops being uniformed fighters led by IRGC officers, trained and equipped in Iran, with state funerals involving uniformed IRGC personnel. [129] Among the dead are 2,000+ Afghans [35] and at least 160 Pakistanis. [130] [131] Officially, the Afghan paramilitaries are part of the independent Liwa Fatemiyoun group, while the Pakistanis are part of the Liwa Zainebiyoun group. These militias have also incurred heavy losses, with Liwa Fatemiyoun alone reporting over 10,000 casualties (2,000+ killed, 8,000+ wounded) by January 2018. [35]
Despite Iran's costly presence in Syria and rising casualties, polls in 2017 showed that majority of Iranians were in favour of military involvement in Syria because of "religious motivations" and "security concerns". [132]
Name | Rank and affiliation | Date | Place |
---|---|---|---|
Qodratollah Mansouri [133] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 15 December 2018 | Syria–Iraq border |
Shahrokh Daipour [134] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 17 June 2018 | Albu Kamal District, Syria |
Mohsen Hojaji | Third lieutenant, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 9 August 2017 | Al Waleed border crossing, Syria |
Ahmad Gholami [135] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 30 August 2016 | Aleppo, Syria |
Mohsen Ghitaslou | First lieutenant, 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade | 11 April 2016 | Syria |
Mohsen Qajarian [136] | Brigadier general, 1st Reza Armored Brigade | 3 February 2016 | Abu Kamal District, Syria |
Abdolreza Mojiri [137] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 29 November 2015 | Aleppo, Syria |
Reza Khavari [138] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 23 October 2015 | Hama, Syria |
Hossein Hamadani | Major general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 7 October 2015 | Aleppo, Syria |
Abdul Karim Ghobash [139] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 18 January 2015 | Al-Zabadani, Syria |
Mohammad Ali Allahdadi | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 18 January 2015 | Quneitra province, Syria |
Hamid Taqavi | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 27 December 2014 | Samara, Iraq |
Jabbar Darisawi [140] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 14 October 2014 | Damascus Governorate, Syria |
Abdullah Eskandari [141] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | May 2014 | Damascus Governorate, Syria |
Mohammad Jamali-Paqaleh | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | November 2013 | Syria |
Hassan Shateri | Major general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 12 February 2013 | Syria |
Farhad Dabirian | Commander, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 6 March 2020 | Syria [142] |
Razi Mousavi [143] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 25 December 2023 | Sayyidah Zaynab, Rif Dimashq, Syria |
Sadegh Omidzadeh [144] | General, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 20 January 2024 | Mezzeh, Damascus, Syria |
Kioumars Pourhashemi [145] | Brigadier general, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps | 24 November 2024 | Aleppo, Syria |
Name | Rank/Affiliation | Date | Place |
---|---|---|---|
Ali Reza Tavassoli | Afghan Shia commander of Fatemiyoun Brigade | 28 February 2015 | Daraa, Syria |
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, is a multi-service primary branch of the Iranian Armed Forces. It was officially established by Ruhollah Khomeini as a military branch in May 1979 in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. Whereas the Iranian Army protects the country's sovereignty in a traditional capacity, the IRGC's constitutional mandate is to ensure the integrity of the Islamic Republic. Most interpretations of this mandate assert that it entrusts the IRGC with preventing foreign interference in Iran, thwarting coups by the traditional military, and crushing "deviant movements" that harm the ideological legacy of the Islamic Revolution. Currently, the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization by Bahrain, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and the United States.
Qasem Soleimani was an Iranian military officer who served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). From 1998 until his assassination by the United States in 2020, he was the commander of the Quds Force, an IRGC division primarily responsible for extraterritorial and clandestine military operations, and played a key role in the Syrian Civil War through securing Russian intervention. He was described as "the single most powerful operative in the Middle East" and a "genius of asymmetric warfare." Former Mossad director Yossi Cohen said Soleimani's strategies had "personally tightened a noose around Israel's neck."
The Battle of Aleppo was a major military confrontation in Aleppo, the largest city in Syria, between the Syrian opposition against the Syrian government, supported by Hezbollah, Shia militias and Russia, and against the Kurdish-majority People's Protection Units (YPG). The battle began on 19 July 2012 and was part of the ongoing Syrian Civil War. A stalemate that had been in place for four years finally ended in July 2016, when Syrian government troops closed the rebels' last supply line into Aleppo with the support of Russian airstrikes. In response, rebel forces launched unsuccessful counteroffensives in September and October that failed to break the siege; in November, government forces embarked on a decisive campaign that resulted in the recapture of all of Aleppo by December 2016. The Syrian government victory was widely seen as a turning point in Syria's civil war.
The Axis of Resistance is an informal Iranian-led political and military coalition in the Middle East.
Foreign involvement in the Syrian civil war refers to political, military and operational support to parties involved in the ongoing conflict in Syria that began in March 2011, as well as active foreign involvement. Most parties involved in the war in Syria receive various types of support from foreign countries and entities based outside Syria. The ongoing conflict in Syria is widely described as a series of overlapping proxy wars between the regional and world powers, primarily between the United States and Russia as well as between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The 2012–2014 Quneitra Governorate clashes began in early November 2012, when the Syrian Army began engaging with rebels in several towns and villages of the Quneitra Governorate. The clashes quickly intensified and spilled into the UN-supervised neutral demilitarized zone between Syrian controlled territory and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
The National Defence Forces was a Syrian pro-government paramilitary volunteer militia, that was formed on 1 November 2012 and organized by the Syrian government during the Syrian Civil War as a part-time volunteer reserve component of the Syrian Armed Forces.
A number of states and armed groups have involved themselves in the Syrian civil war (2011–present) as belligerents. The main groups were the Syrian Arab Republic and allies, the Syrian opposition and allies, Al-Qaeda and affiliates, Islamic State, and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces.
The 2015 Southern Syria offensive, code-named "Operation Martyrs of Quneitra", was an offensive launched in southern Syria during the Syrian Civil War by the Syrian Arab Army, Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces. Government forces also include Iranian sponsored Afghani Shi'ite volunteer militias. The name "Operation Martyrs of Quneitra" refers to the January 2015 Mazraat Amal incident, in which several high level Hezbollah and IRGC members were killed in an Israeli strike.
Hezbollah involvement in the Syrian civil war has been substantial since the beginning of armed insurgency phase of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and evolved into active support for Syrian government forces and troop deployment from 2012 onwards. By 2014, Hezbollah was deployed across Syria. Hezbollah has also been very active in preventing Al-Nusra Front and Islamic State penetration into Lebanon, being one of the most active forces in the Syrian civil war spillover in Lebanon.
The siege of Nubl and al-Zahraa during the Syrian civil war was laid by rebels to capture two Syrian government-held towns north of Aleppo, after they had seized most of the northern countryside in July 2012. The siege was lifted on 3 February 2016, as a result of a Syrian government offensive.
Liwa Fatemiyoun, literally "Fatimid Banner", also known as Fatemiyoun Division or Fatemiyoun Brigade, is an Hazara Shia militia formed in 2014 to fight in Syria on the side of the Syrian government. The group's officially designated purpose, is the defense of the shrine of Zaynab bint Ali, and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include the Islamic State (IS). It is funded, trained, and equipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and fights under the command of Iranian officers. Both the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Iranian government downplay their relationship with one another, despite clear coordination and the brigade's operation under the auspices of the IRGC. Liwa Fatemiyoun is also closely associated with Hezbollah Afghanistan.
The following is a timeline of the Syrian Civil War from August to December 2015. Information about aggregated casualty counts is found at Casualties of the Syrian Civil War.
The Aleppo offensive was a Syrian Army large-scale strategic offensive south of Aleppo. The main objective of the operation was to secure the Azzan Mountains, while also creating a larger buffer zone around the only highway to the provincial capital controlled by the Syrian government. A related objective was to establish favourable conditions for a planned offensive to isolate rebel forces in Aleppo City and to relieve the long-standing siege of a pro-government enclave in Aleppo Governorate.
The Northern Aleppo offensive refers to a military operation launched northwest of Aleppo in early February 2016 by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies. The offensive successfully broke the three-year Siege of Nubl and Al-Zahraa, effectively cutting off the main supply route of the Syrian rebels from Turkey.
The Followers of Zainab Brigade, also known as the Zainebiyoun Brigade or Zainebiyoun Division, is a Pakistani Shia Khomeinist militant group actively engaged in the Syrian Civil War. It draws recruits mainly from Shia Pakistanis living in Iran, with some also Shia Muslim communities living in various regions of Pakistan.
The Aleppo offensive of October–November 2016, named the "Battle of the Hero Martyr Abu Omar Saraqib" by the Army of Conquest, refers to a military operation launched on the western outskirts of Aleppo at the end of October 2016 by rebel forces in Syria, against the Syrian government forces and its allies. The aim of the offensive was to establish a new supply line into Aleppo city after an Army-initiated summer campaign had cut off all rebel access to Aleppo.
The 2012–2013 escalation of the Syrian Civil War refers to the third phase of the Syrian Civil War, which gradually escalated from a UN-mediated cease fire attempt during April–May 2012 and deteriorated into radical violence, escalating the conflict level to a full-fledged civil war.
The Baqir Brigade, was a Syrian pro-government militia originating in the Aleppo Governorate that fights in the Syrian Civil War. The militia is one of the most prominent and largest pro-government militias from the Aleppo area and part of the "Local Defence Forces" network. Its members mostly consists of tribesmen from the al-Baggara tribe that traditionally supported the rule of the al-Assad family despite being mostly Sunni Muslim. Though the militia's fighters thus come from a largely Sunni background, many of them have converted to or are at least strongly influenced by Shia Islam. The Baqir Brigade has also been noted for its strong connections to the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and various Shiite Iraqi militias, and is thus generally considered to be a Shia or "Shi'ified" fighting force.
The Iran–Israel conflict during the Syrian civil war refers to the Iranian–Israeli standoff in and around Syria during the Syrian conflict. With increasing Iranian involvement in Syria from 2011 onwards, the conflict shifted from a proxy war into a direct confrontation by early 2018.
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